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TANG CHINA AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE UIGHUR EMPIRE

A Documentary History

BY

MICHAEL R. DROMPP

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For Jerry F. Sanders

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The opening passage of the Confucian *Analects* extols the pleasures of study and the joys of friendship. That these two items are linked and given such significance in one of the world's most influential books is more than mere coincidence, for the sage knew what was central to a good life. Without my teachers and friends, this work would not have been written, and it is a source of great happiness for me that I have this opportunity to thank them.

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The opening passage of the *Analects* contains one more bit of wisdom: the gentleman is not disconsolate if his efforts do not attract the world's attention. Perhaps it should also warn those who do attract such attention, however small it may be, to be thick-skinned to its inevitable criticisms. In a work such as this, I cannot hope to have written the final word, and there are bound to be scholars who will find places where improvement is possible. I welcome their suggestions. Of course, while those mentioned above are connected in some way to the production of this book, I alone am responsible for its contents and any shortcomings that the reader may find.

A NOTE ON ROMANIZATION, NAMES, AND TITLES

Chinese is Romanized according to the Pinyin system. For individual persons, I have provided information regarding biographies or other identifying data whenever possible. Chinese official titles are rendered in accordance with the forms used in vol. 3 of *The Cambridge History of China*. For titles which do not appear in that work, I have consulted Charles Hucker's *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China* and Robert des Rotours' *Traité des fonctionnaires et Traité de l'armée*. Chinese forms of official titles are generally given only when the title is of an unusual nature; otherwise only the translated title is given. Place names are not identified in the notes if they appear on one of the maps, unless there is additional information to be given concerning that particular place. In the few cases of Chinese place names with identical Romanizations, a superscript letter has been added to distinguish them, e.g., Weizhou[a] and Weizhou[b].

Turkic languages are Romanized according to a system modified from Vilhelm Thomsen's "Inscriptions de l'Orkhon dechiffrées" (p. 9) and Talât Tekin's *A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic* (pp. 23-25). I have, however, retained forms which have become well established in the literature, even when they do not fit this system. For example, I have employed the forms "Uighur" and "Kirghiz" rather than "Uyghur" and "Qïrghïz."

In order to distinguish Chinese names and terms from non-Chinese names and terms in Chinese transliteration, I have employed hyphens to separate syllables within the latter. Thus, the text refers to Sima Qian but Qi-bi Tong. The native forms of Turkic names and titles found in Chinese transcription are often identifiable, and those have been given in their Turkic forms whenever possible. Those which cannot be identified have been given in Pinyin Romanization, but with hyphens separating the syllables in order to identify them as Chinese transliterations. Thus, Hui-hu (not "Huihu") is rendered throughout as "Uighur" or "Uighurs," while Xiong-nu remains as it is (rather than "Xiongnu"). Hyphens are not employed for Sogdians using Chinese-type names, e.g., He Qingchao, even when those names contain elements that are clearly of non-Chinese origin, e.g., Cao

Moni. This use of hyphens, which may appear idiosyncratic, seems to me an effective sort of "shorthand" by which to indicate non-Chinese names and terms in Chinese transliteration for which the native forms remain unknown.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CFYG	Wang Qinruo et al., comp., *Cefu yuangui*
GKWD	Tōdō Akiyasu, *Gakken Kan-Wa daijiten*
HCYPJ	Li Deyu, *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*
HHS	Fan Ye, *Hou Han shu*
HS	Ban Gu et al., *Han shu*
JTS	Liu Xu et al., *Jiu Tang shu*
LWRWJ	Li Deyu, *Li Wenrao wenji*
QTS	Peng Dingqiu et al., comp., (*Qin ding*) *Quan Tang shi*
QTW	Dong Gao et al., comp., (*Qin ding*) *Quan Tang wen*
SJ	Sima Qian, *Shiji*
TD	Du You, *Tong dian*
TDZLJ	Song Minqiu, comp., *Tang da zhaoling ji*
THY	Wang Pu et al., *Tang huiyao*
TPHYJ	Yue Shi, *Taiping huanyu ji*
XTS	Ouyang Xiu et al., *Xin Tang shu*
ZGDM	Liu Junren, *Zhongguo diming da cidian*
ZGGJDM	Zang Lihe et al., eds., *Zhongguo gujin diming da cidian*
ZWDCD	Zhang Qiyun, ed., *Zhongwen da cidian*
ZZTJ	Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*
ZZTJKY	Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian kaoyi*

INTRODUCTION

The rise and fall of states has been a central concern of historians since their craft was first conceived. Great states in particular command our attention. The creation of an empire, often accomplished through violence and oppression, has nonetheless long been regarded by many as a mark of the potential greatness of human industry, while in the collapse of an empire can be seen the gloomy failure of a mighty human endeavor. This failure is particularly poignant in that it often signals an end to political order and the unleashing of chaos—a terrifying prospect for most human beings. The downfall of a massive structure is inherently magnetic. We cannot look away.

In the ninth century C.E., two great states faced one another across the Gobi Desert. One, China's Tang empire, saw itself as the epitome of civilization. Established early in the seventh century, this state had quickly achieved remarkable military power and extended its sway well beyond the traditional confines of China proper. At its greatest extent, it was a massive realm that required extraordinary force simply to hold it together. Tang officials governed from the borders of Korea in the east to the farthest end of the Tarim Basin in the west, from the great bend of the Yellow River in the north to the tropics of Vietnam in the south. Two centuries after its founding, however, the Tang empire's strength as well as its territory had diminished significantly. Buffeted by internal rebellions and foreign threats, the Tang state in the ninth century was no longer the dynamo it once had been. Still, it remained a potent force in its world, holding a position of centrality that was both political and cultural. Its enemies might be strong, but they could not take its place.

To the north of the Gobi was one of the Tang dynasty's greatest rivals, the Uighur empire of Mongolia. The Uighurs were nomadic pastoralists who spoke a Turkic language. Their empire, established in the middle of the eighth century, had been able to take advantage of the decline of Tang power, which they exploited to the fullest of their abilities. The Uighurs were just one of Tang China's competitors, but they held a special position as well. The nomadic powers to China's north had for more than a millennium been the chief military threat to the Middle Kingdom. Having inherited that position, the

Uighurs occupied a distinctive place in the late Tang world view—one that always included, by its very definition, the potential for violence. The collapse of the Uighur state in 840 was thus an event of great importance to the Tang government, even though relations between the two empires had been reasonably tranquil for many years.

The Uighurs kept few political or historical records of their own. Those that survive are primarily stone inscriptions which extol the achievements of their leaders. Their empire fell with a suddenness that allowed no such records to be added to those that had been made. The Chinese, on the other hand, had developed a system that promoted the creation of copious historical records. It is not surprising, therefore, that Tang sources contain important information about the Uighurs and their downfall. But much has been lost from the Tang record as well. The process of historical distillation through which the Chinese have traditionally brought order and coherence to their history has meant that the sources on which we rely for most of our information about the Tang era contain only a condensed version of events, derived from a much more voluminous record that has since been, for the most part, lost. As massive as such works as the two official Tang dynastic histories (*Jiu Tang shu* and *Xin Tang shu*) are, they pale beside the great quantity of information that officials of the era certainly produced. We are fortunate to have those official histories, as well as later synthetic works, but we are also unfortunate in that, all too often, the sources on which they were based no longer exist.

Such is not the case, however, for many of the Chinese sources dealing with the Uighurs in 840 and the years immediately following. Although the Tang court was very poorly informed about the situation in Mongolia leading up to the fall of the Uighur empire, its attention was quickly riveted to its northern border and the thousands of Uighur refugees who approached it. Their arrival precipitated a crisis for the Tang government, and that crisis naturally meant the production of a large quantity of official documents. Although many of these are no longer extant, one important body of documents has survived—as reprints of originals that have long since crumbled to dust. These are the writings of Li Deyu.

Li Deyu (787-850) is one of the most well-known figures of the late Tang era. In his own day he was famous as a court official and *littérateur* and perhaps infamous as the leader of a political clique in one of imperial China's most notorious court rivalries. After his death he continued to be admired for his accomplishments. His enduring fame

has been, without question, the most significant factor in the survival of his most important works; these include a number of poems (*shi*) and prose rhapsodies (*fu*), but the lion's share of them are a collection of more than 230 bureaucratic documents written in his capacity as a chief minister at the court of the emperor Tang Wuzong (r. 840-846). Li's collected works are known alternately as *Li Wenrao wenji*, i.e., *The Collected Works of Li Wenrao* (referring to Li Deyu by his *zi*, or courtesy name, of Wenrao) and *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, a much more imposing title whose English equivalent is rather unwieldy, something like *The Collected Works of Li, Duke of Wei, First Rank during the Huichang Era.*[1] This title emphasizes Li Deyu's tremendous influence during Wuzong's reign, known as the Huichang era, pointedly referring to the fact that the emperor had granted Li Deyu the title of Duke of Wei in 844, placing him in the most exalted ranks of the Tang official bureaucracy.

Li Deyu was the most important official in Wuzong's government, overseeing all important affairs of the nation. That he was in this position just at the moment that the Uighur empire fell and thousands of Uighur refugees streamed southward to the Tang northern frontier is a matter of sheer historical serendipity. Indeed, the fact that there are more than 80 documents pertaining to the Uighur crisis in Li's collected works represents another fortuitous turn of events, for Li Deyu had petitioned the emperor to request that a scholar of the Hanlin Academy be commissioned to draft the various edicts concerning the Uighurs. The emperor wisely refused.[2] Had he acquiesced to Li's suggestion—as he so often did—the historical record for the Huichang era certainly would be much diminished, as would this book which relies so heavily on the chief minister's writings.

The significance of Li Deyu's literary compositions was recognized immediately. The collection (at least of the bureaucratic prose) was assembled with dispatch, and prefaces were written by two of Li's contemporaries: Zheng Ya (fl. 820-846) and Li Shangyin (813-858).[3]

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[1] Zhou Jian-guo has suggested that the title *Huichang yipin ji* actually refers only to a portion of the *Li Wenrao wenji*—the 20 *juan* containing Li Deyu's bureaucratic prose; see Zhou, "Consider the Sun and the Moon," 82, n. 4. But we should note that the entire collection of Li's works, including poetry and prose rhapsodies, has been published under the title *Li Weigong Huichang yipin ji*, indicating that at the present time, the two titles are used essentially interchangeably.

[2] *ZZTJ* 247: 7976.

[3] Zheng Ya's preface may be found in *QTW* 730: 9534-9537; that of Li Shangyin

Both men were counted among Li Deyu's friends,[4] and their prefaces interestingly contain some parallel passages. Both carry the title "Taiwei Weigong *Huichang yipin ji* xu," that is, "Preface to the *Huichang yipin ji* of the Defender-in-Chief,[5] the Duke of Wei."

Li Deyu's writings regarding the Uighur crisis represent a corpus of materials of a size and quality that are rare for such an early period of Chinese history, since so much of the bureaucratic output of the Tang era has been lost. Their survival does not mean, of course, that we have all the sources that would be necessary for a complete and balanced understanding of the Uighur crisis. The historian may well lament the loss of the writings of other Chinese officials, both civilian and military, who were concerned with the crisis, and particularly the loss of the Uighur and Kirghiz letters that were sent to the Tang court. But a great deal can be gleaned from Li Deyu's works, particularly if those are used in conjunction with other important sources such as the two Tang dynastic histories and the Song-period history *Zizhi tongjian*. With all these remarkable texts at our disposal we are well-placed to learn not only about the events of the Uighur crisis itself, but also about Tang diplomatic practices and rhetoric, the Tang court's relationship with autonomous provinces as well as non-Chinese "loose-rein" (*jimi*) peoples at the frontier, Uighur factionalism and the aspirations of their fugitive leaders, Kirghiz ambitions in Inner Asia, and related subjects. Because Li's own documents are the most revealing in regard to all these topics, I have translated most of them—a total of 69—here, omitting only those which are so formulaic in nature that they reveal little or nothing of use to the study. This is their first appearance in English. Most of them have not been translated into any other language, although there are some exceptions.[6]

Li Deyu's writings on the Uighurs have not been mined by many modern scholars. The most important to have done so is the Chinese scholar Cen Zhongmian, whose 1937 article "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang" attempted to identify and resolve discrepancies existing in two different editions of the texts (which represent the two

may be found in *QTW* 779: 10269-10272. Only Li Shangyin has official biographies in the standard Tang histories; see *JTS* 190c: 5077-5078 and *XTS* 203: 5792-5793. Both biographies also contain information on Zheng Ya.

[4] See Yang, *Li Deyu yanjiu*, 53, 58, and 61-62.

[5] Defender-in-Chief (*taiwei*) was among the grandiose titles granted to Li Deyu in 844.

[6] All known translations are indicated in the Appendix.

major editorial traditions in the transmission of these documents) and to provide dates for those documents which lack them. In his article, Cen compared the two extant versions and then reconstructed an "original" text from them. In making my translations, I have compared Cen's reconstructed texts with three different printed editions of Li Deyu's collected works (the two editions listed under Li Deyu's name in the bibliography as well as the relevant chapters of *Quan Tang wen* which contain Li's prose works). Although Cen's work does not place the documents in historical context and is not entirely free from misprints and other errors, nevertheless it is an extremely valuable study, and my debt to it will be obvious.

Other scholars have made some use of Li Deyu's texts concerning the Uighurs, but their work has tended to focus on only a few of the relevant documents. For example, G.P Suprunenko studied and translated 10 such documents concerned with the Kirghiz only.[7] Édouard Chavannes and Paul Pelliot did not neglect the pertinent passages from Li's works in their important study of Manichaeism in China, but this included only a small number of passages from the collection.[8] And despite its promising (but misleading) title, Tsai Wen-shen's 1967 dissertation, "Li Tê-yü'nün metuplarına göre Uygurlar (840-900)," actually considers information from a variety of other Chinese sources, and does not make exhaustive use of Li's writings on the subject, presenting and translating only 16 of the documents under consideration here.[9]

This book, then, is to my knowledge the first in any language to consider Li Deyu's writings concerning the Uighurs (and other Inner Asian peoples) in their entirety and in historical context. I can only hope that I have done justice to the great man who wrote them. Thanks to his painstaking efforts, a hitherto dim corner of East Asian history can now be better illumined and our understanding of the ninth-century history of China, the Uighurs, and the Kirghiz enriched.

[7] See Suprunenko, "Dokumentiy ob otnesheniiakh kitaia s eniseiskimi kyrgyzami v istochnike IX veka 'Li Vei-gun Khoichan ipin' tszi.'"

[8] See Chavannes and Pelliot, "Un traité manichéen retrouvé en Chine, traduit et annoté, deuxième partie."

[9] See Tsai, "Li Tê-yü'nün mektuplarına göre Uygurlar (840-900)." Thirteen of the translations are complete, while three are only partial. The dissertation's title is misleading because Li Deyu's writings on the Uighurs cover the period from 840 to 845 only. Since Tsai's study extended beyond that period, he considered numerous other Chinese texts concerned with Uighur history up to 900.

The organization of this book follows a simple pattern. The first chapter considers broad themes related to the history of the Chinese frontier with Inner Asia, while the next three present a narrative examination of the Tang-Uighur crisis. The fifth chapter examines Tang relations with the Turkic Kirghiz people, who brought the Uighurs to their final political collapse, while the sixth considers the rhetoric of the crisis. The last chapter discusses the impact that the collapse of the Uighur empire had on the history of the broader region of East and Inner Asia. Finally, in the Appendix, Li Deyu's relevant works (along with one additional document of great importance to this study) are presented in translation. Throughout the book, documents which are translated in the Appendix are indicated with the use of bold type, e.g., **Doc. 1**.

Most of the Uighurs who fled to China after the destruction of their steppe empire met with grief and annihilation. Were we able to hear the story from their perspective, our understanding of these events would undoubtedly be clearer and richer. Lacking those, we must be content to work with what is available in the Chinese records, particularly the imposing literary legacy of the Duke of Wei.

CHAPTER ONE

THE FRONTIER

"Heaven and Earth have divided north and south
by deserts, mountains, and rivers ...."

Introduction

On 20 February 840, a new Son of Heaven ascended the imperial throne in the Chinese capital city of Chang'an. This was Li Chan, Prince Ying and the younger brother of the deceased emperor. The prince's accession had been engineered by the palace eunuchs, who had no doubt hoped to find in him the same weakness of spirit that had allowed them to dominate his predecessor. They were to find, however, that this new emperor, known to posterity as Tang Wuzong (r. 840-846), was made of much sterner stuff than his brother. And it was well that he should be, for he would face several serious crises during his short reign.

The first and greatest of these crises originated to the north of China, in the steppe lands of Inner Asia, where an empire was overthrown in the same year as the new emperor's elevation. This great state, centered in the heart of modern Mongolia, had been ruled for nearly a century by the Uighurs (Chinese Hui-hu, Hui-he),[1] speakers of a Turkic language and creators of a unique culture. Its demise was occasioned by a combination of factors: natural disaster, internal struggle, and the rebellion of a subject people. Yet as final as this collapse was, it did not spell the end of Uighur history or culture, for many Uighurs fled their lost homeland and created a new civilization in the oasis

[1] Many writers on the Uighurs have been influenced by the modern Chinese rendering of that people's name, *Wei-wu-er*, to the point of assuming that the initial *ui-* of "Uighur" should be pronounced something like *wee-* as in English "week." This has led to the frequent appearance of the infelicitous and incorrect phrase "a Uighur" in various English-language works. The Uighurs themselves pronounce this enthnonym, which is more appropriately written *Uyghur*, so that the initial *ui-* is something like the *-uoy* in English "buoy." Therefore, when writing in English, the correct article to use before "Uighur" is not "a," but "an."

cities of the Tarim Basin—modern Xinjiang in the People's Republic of China. Our concern, however, is not with them. Rather, we shall focus on another group, actually two large groups of Uighurs who fled southward to the Chinese border. There, these refugees sought asylum and succor. Some hoped to be taken in for resettlement within the vast territories of China's still-imposing Tang empire, while others hoped to find a way to recover their homeland with Chinese assistance. For most, the result of their encounter with China was death.

Flight to China had been an act of desperation. To the Chinese, the arrival of the Uighur refugees initiated a crisis that would test the Tang dynasty's inadequate northern defenses. As most of the Uighurs who came to China had been killed by the summer of 843, it should be apparent that the Chinese were able to resolve this crisis, however appalling the solution may seem. The Uighur refugees were gone from the border zone, and their particular history did indeed come to a halt amidst the din of armed conflict and the grim determination of China's military and civilian officials. The frontier had been "cleansed."

Because these particular Uighurs represent an historical "dead end," the standard Chinese histories (often our only sources for the history of eastern Inner Asia) have few words to say about them. If these were our only extant sources, this would be a short tale indeed. But because China's chief minister throughout the crisis was a cultivated gentleman of letters as well as a powerful and resourceful politician, his collected writings, which include more than 80 texts on the Uighur crisis, have survived, printed and reprinted through the centuries long after the original documents had been lost. These texts do much more than illuminate a dim historical *cul-de-sac*. They reveal much about the Uighurs and their culture, and much more about the political, diplomatic, and military culture of late Tang China. They present for our scrutiny ninth-century Chinese methods of court deliberation, strategy, intrigue, and morality. For these reasons, they are worthy of close study.

The Chinese—Inner Asian Frontier

Few frontiers have been as consistently dynamic as that at which the Uighur-Chinese crisis unfolded. That frontier, which in early times was generally flexible and rarely firmly fixed, both linked and separated the nomadic peoples of Inner Asia and the agrarian peoples of North China, and so has been a place of extraordinary historical

importance. The eastern Eurasian steppe has been the birthplace of the world's most powerful and sophisticated nomadic empires, while China is the home of one of the globe's most distinctive and enduring civilizations. These facts promoted the dynamism of this particular frontier. It shifted regularly, and no imposing and permanent "Great Wall" demarcated it until the Ming dynasty created that well-known structure in the 16th century. Although defensive walls had been built long before that, they did not follow a single geographic line, but were placed in different regions in different eras. Furthermore, they were not so permanent as the Ming wall, and so gradually disappeared over time.[2] The Tang dynasty did not include wall-building as part of its defensive strategy, although it did maintain walled garrisons at the northern frontier. Therefore, no long defensive walls existed to block the southward movement of the Uighurs.[3]

When the Uighur refugees arrived near China's border garrisons in 840, the nomadic peoples of Inner Asia and the Chinese already had a history of interactions that spanned more than a thousand years. Beginning in the fourth century B.C.E., Chinese and Inner Asian states had sought various methods of coping with each others' existence and expectations; these embraced a wide range of activities, including diplomacy, trade, warfare, and marriage politics. After the crisis of the mid-ninth century was resolved, such frontier contacts would continue for nearly another millennium, until technology and political change ended the military power of the nomads and brought new "barbarians" from the most remote regions of Western Eurasia to a very different Chinese frontier. For more than two thousand years, then, this frontier was the site of countless interactions—violent and peaceful, celebratory and conciliatory, political and economic, legal and illegal—between these two great cultural zones. Nomadic powers rose and fell, as did Chinese dynasties. In both zones, political unity alternated with periods of political fragmentation. As the frontier between them was flexible, depending on each zone's relative political strength, so was the degree of political unity in each zone. In modern times, when this frontier has taken on a completely new meaning, its

[2] On the history of the Great Wall and wall-building in China, see Waldron, *The Great Wall of China*.

[3] Waldron has argued that the Tang dynasty—particularly in its early years—saw the construction of such walls as indicative of military weakness; see *The Great Wall of China*, 47-48.

traditional image has nonetheless been enhanced by romantic notions of mighty hordes of armed warriors charging across the Gobi. As an idea, this ecological, cultural, political, and economic frontier has had few equals in history.[4]

The story of this frontier is most frequently told as a tale of differences. The influences of environment played the most significant role in creating two strongly contrasted societies: that of the sedentary Chinese, who lived by an intensive agriculture supplemented by animal husbandry, and the nomadic peoples of Inner Asia, who lived by an extensive pastoralism supplemented by hunting, fishing, and rudimentary agriculture. These fundamental differences in modes of production created, in the eyes of many, mutually hostile systems that were bound to be in conflict with one another. A quick look at the historical record certainly seems to suggest the frequency, and hence the seeming inevitability, of such conflict. It should be noted that the Chinese have always had the more prominent voice in the matter, since their civilization was well-suited to the keeping of records and promoted the compilation of voluminous state histories. The way of life of the pastoral nomadic peoples, however, was particularly ill-suited to the keeping of records, and so the viewpoint of that civilization has been recorded only rarely. The earliest known records from the steppe appear relatively late—only in the sixth century C.E.—and are few in number.

The story of differences does not, however, present a complete picture. Another important theme to be considered is that of dependencies and necessities. Modern scholars have argued convincingly that the economy of the nomads was not only non-autarkic but also highly vulnerable to disruption. In other words, nomadic peoples could not produce everything that was needed for their own livelihoods and so required goods from sedentary societies to supplement their own production. Furthermore, the nomadic pastoral economy could and did frequently fall into a state of crisis due to natural calamities (such as harsh weather and epizootics) that killed off large numbers of livestock, leading to famine for the human population. In good times, this economic system could provide for many of the nomads' needs, but it was limited in this ability. Herd animals can indeed supply a great number of useful goods and services: food (meat and milk products),

[4] On the historical development and historiographical construction of this frontier, see Di Cosmo, *Ancient China and Its Enemies*.

clothing (wool and leather), shelter (felt for tents), fuel (dung), tools (bone), and transportation. Studies of nomadic societies have shown, however, that they are in some degree dependent on the agricultural products and handicraft goods of sedentary societies to supplement their own production.[5] Although many Inner Asian peoples did engage in limited agriculture in areas that were conducive to it, particularly river valleys, this generally did not offset their desire for agricultural products from China and other agrarian regions.[6] Chinese silks were another important, albeit secondary, item that was desired, for they were useful as a sort of universal currency with which other goods, particularly those difficult or impossible for nomads to produce, could be purchased.

The Chinese, on the other hand, were able to live by their own production without requiring additional goods from other producers. China's agrarian economy allowed its people to produce everything essential to their livelihood. The intensive farming of the Chinese produced grains, fruits, and vegetables, while supplemental animal husbandry provided meat products—usually in sufficient abundance for the support of China's impressive population. There was, however, one thing that Chinese governments often needed but which China did not produce in sufficient numbers: horses. These could, of course, be obtained from the nomads to the north, who usually had them in abundance. It is an irony of history that the Chinese often had to import horses from the very people who presented the military danger that made those horses necessary.

Nomadic peoples of Inner Asia could obtain the goods they desired from China by two methods: either through trade or warfare. The two cannot be neatly separated, for trade was often carried out under the threat of military force.[7] Because of their way of life, which promoted skill in the military arts, the nomads of Inner Asia often enjoyed a military advantage over sedentary peoples. Thanks to that advantage, nomads were, throughout most of the period of recorded history (that is, until the application of guns to warfare), able to use force or the

[5] See Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, 69-84.

[6] On the use of agriculture in Inner Asia, see Di Cosmo, "Ancient Inner Asian Nomads: Their Economic Basis and Its Significance in Chinese History"; see also Vainshtein, *Nomads of South Siberia*, 145-146 and T'ang, "Agrarianism and Urbanism, and Their Relationship to the Hsiung-nu Empire," 117-120.

[7] For an overview of this subject, see Jagchid, "Patterns of Trade and Conflict between China and the Nomads of Mongolia."

threat of force to obtain what they wanted. Agriculturalists might initiate military campaigns against the nomads, and these might even be successful at times, but the wartime advantage usually lay with the nomads, whose skill in horse-riding and archery could not be rivaled by the Chinese or any other sedentary people.

For both the nomadic pastoralists of Eastern Inner Asia and the agrarian Chinese, their interactions were of paramount political and economic importance for centuries. In the Chinese sources one reads frequently of these interactions; Inner Asian sources, while far fewer in number, also reveal their importance. Each Chinese government and each Inner Asian power sought to cope with the presence of the other, either through violent or peaceful means or a combination thereof. Although the Chinese had many neighbors at their borders, it was the nomads to the north who remained China's greatest foreign policy concern throughout most of its history. The Chinese feared the predatory raids of Inner Asian peoples, and attempted to ward them off with a variety of means. For Chinese governments, interactions with the pastoral peoples of the north were typically viewed as being primarily of a political nature, if one includes both diplomatic and military encounters under that rubric, although the Chinese were certainly not unaware of the economic aspects of their relations with nomadic peoples. From the point of view of the pastoralists, economic matters often dominated their relations with China, although political issues were important as well. The pastoralists usually did not have to fear Chinese attacks, so the relationship cannot have appeared the same to them as it did to the Chinese, who developed a set of *topoi* surrounding the nomads in order to describe them as greedy, essentially inhuman, and certainly uncivilized. One must not, however, carry that notion too far. Chinese documents make it abundantly clear that these *topoi* tended to be employed when expedience demanded, but could be overlooked or even contradicted when necessary. "Good barbarians" did exist, and were in fact praiseworthy.[8] As for nomad views of the Chinese, these could be equally negative. China may have possessed goods that the nomads desired, but this did not mean that they regarded

[8] A ninth-century essay by Chen Yan argued that one could be Chinese (*hua*) in appearance but a "barbarian" (*yi*) at heart, and vice-versa. Chen was defending the promotion in 848 of one Li Yansheng who, despite his Chinese name, was a native of Western Asia (Da-shi); see *QTW* 767: 10094. The essay has been translated in Ch'en, *Western and Central Asians in China under the Mongols*, 8-10.

the Chinese as culturally superior to them in any way. They were in fact often critical of the Chinese and their way of life.[9]

Whatever their opinions of one another, Inner Asian pastoralists and Chinese interacted in a variety of ways in order to achieve their economic and political goals. Embedded within these encounters was the constant threat of violence, for the desires and goals of the two sides were often not only different but incompatible. Chinese records show that the elite of that nation frequently debated the merits of accommodation and resistance in the development of China's frontier policy. While some officials encouraged trade, others vigorously rejected it as a dangerous activity that ultimately would strengthen China's enemies. Neither viewpoint was able to gain permanent acceptance. Given the frequent changes within Chinese policy and the constantly shifting needs of the nomadic peoples, it is not surprising to see that the intercourse between these two groups represented a constantly modulating dance of diplomacy, trade, peace, and war.

The study of the history of Inner Asian-Chinese relations still requires a conscious effort to see beyond the stereotypes that the Chinese in particular tended to employ in their writings. The viewpoints of nomadic peoples are far less known and hence far less pervasive in traditional historiography. In a consideration of the history of this dynamic frontier, the historian must be judicious in the use of sources; otherwise it is all too easy to become wedded to the Chinese perspective that creates a skewed image of greedy "barbarians" endlessly scheming to seize the riches of China by whatever means possible. While one cannot avoid the fact that the bulk of the sources are in Chinese and present the Chinese perspective, one can still strive to use those sources (as well as native sources from the steppe, when they exist) in a way that will consider different viewpoints. For that purpose, one must look, whenever possible, beyond the standard historical texts of the Chinese, for these have been distilled to such a degree as to be in many cases quite unrevealing of anything but the most basic facts as perceived by the Chinese; furthermore, the standard histories reveal biases and elements of didacticism that often obscure. To obtain greater insights, one must look to other sources, particularly surviving court documents, unofficial histories, etc. Of course, the earlier the period

[9] Note, for example, the relevant passages in the eighth-century Old Turkic inscription of Kül Tigin; see Tekin, *A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic*, 261-262.

the less likely one is of finding such sources, but when they do exist they can be employed with great benefit. Had such sources not existed, the present study could not have been written. It is my hope that this work will reveal what can be discovered when one moves beyond the traditional histories.

The Xiong-nu "Model"

While our particular focus is on nomad-Chinese interactions of the mid-ninth century C.E., it is necessary to look at earlier periods to examine the patterns and precedents that had already been established in regard to those encounters. The first great nomad-Chinese confrontation was that between China's Han dynasty and the Xiong-nu empire to the north. The Han was China's first successful and long-lived imperial state, while the Xiong-nu confederation was the first of the great nomad empires based on the Mongolian steppe. Established in 202 B.C.E., the Han dynasty inherited the centralized imperial organization established by the short-lived Qin dynasty (221–207 B.C.E.) and modified it to create a powerful and prosperous state that prevailed until its formal abolition in 220 C.E. That the Xiong-nu empire, which covered a vast stretch of Inner Asia, was established at approximately the same time as the Qin/Han imperium was no coincidence.[10] The history of relations between these two powers established important precedents which later helped to define and shape relations between other nomadic powers and other Chinese dynasties. To the Chinese, the Xiong-nu became the archetypal "barbarians," and this image of them served to inform later Chinese perceptions of other nomads. The Han historian Sima Qian[11] (145–87? B.C.E.) wrote of the Xiong-nu, "They move about in search of water and pasture and have no walled cities or fixed dwellings, nor do they engage in any kind of agriculture."[12] He went on to describe their herds, their hunting activities, and their practice

[10] See Barfield, "The Hsiung-nu Imperial Confederacy: Organization and Foreign Policy," but note also the remarks in Di Cosmo, *Ancient China and Its Enemies*, 178-190.

[11] The biography of Sima Qian, which is based largely on his own autobiography in *SJ* 130: 3293-3321, may be found in *HS* 62: 2707-2739. For a translation, see Watson, *Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Grand Historian of China*, 40-69.

[12] Watson, *Records of the Grand Historian of China*, vol. 2, 155.

of raiding and plundering, stating of this last feature of Xiong-nu life that "it seems to be their inborn nature .... Their only concern is self advantage, and they know nothing of propriety or righteousness."[13] Not only was the Xiong-nu way of life—along with its most visible accoutrements (food, clothing, shelter, etc.)—different from that of the Chinese, but their values were different as well. For the Han Chinese, the frontier was not only a political and geographical concept. It was a moral one as well.

The Xiong-nu thus came to be regarded as the very antithesis of the Chinese.[14] While these negative images could be discarded when necessary, such as when the Han court concluded an alliance with a Xiong-nu leader, they were extraordinarily powerful and recurred for centuries throughout the Chinese written record. After the fall of Xiong-nu power, other nomadic peoples were often defined in Chinese sources by their presumed descent (or lack thereof) from the Xiong-nu. Long after the Han dynasty had fallen, nomads continued to be described in terms that had been used by Han writers in reference to their dangerous northern neighbors, and Han precedents were sought by Chinese bureaucrats eager to justify actions they had proposed. For this reason, it is necessary to look more closely at the Han-Xiong-nu encounter.

During the Han era, differing approaches to the Xiong-nu can be clearly discerned. The Qin dynasty had followed an aggressive policy toward the Xiong-nu. In the Han dynasty's early years, emperors tended to approach the Xiong-nu "problem" through non-violent methods, developing treaties of peace and trade and promoting a relationship of mutual toleration. Some scholars have seen this as a period of regular Chinese concessions to the Xiong-nu that meant virtual Xiong-nu domination.[15] This approach was ultimately abandoned by the Han emperor Wudi (r. 140–87 B.C.E.), in large part because it had not effectively spared China from Xiong-nu incursions.[16] This emperor carried out a number of spectacular, if ultimately not highly successful, campaigns into Inner Asia to attack the Xiong-nu

[13] Watson, *Records of the Grand Historian of China*, vol. 2, 155.

[14] See Di Cosmo, *Ancient China and Its Enemies*, 296-297.

[15] Perelomov and Martynov, *Imperial China*, 64-66.

[16] For an interesting interpretation of this situation, which argues that it was not the Xiong-nu supreme ruler (the *shan-yu*), but rather Xiong-nu regional leaders who enjoyed a significant degree of independence, who carried out these incursions, see Di Cosmo, *Ancient China and Its Enemies*, 215-227.

on their home turf. There were also outright failures; one of the most well-known setbacks of Han Wudi's aggressive northern strategy was the surrender of his general Li Ling[17] (d. 74 B.C.E.) to the Xiong-nu in 99 B.C.E.[18] Although some admired the emperor for his strength and decisiveness, many historians of later eras criticized Han Wudi for these campaigns, which were seen as wasteful and unproductive.[19] Indeed, the emperor himself questioned the wisdom of his frontier policies in his later years.[20] Thus, while Han Wudi was regarded as a strong emperor, his name was often brought forth as a negative model when a Chinese official wished to argue against an aggressive frontier policy.[21]

The situation between the two powers changed dramatically some years later (and this indeed may have been the result, at least in part, of Han Wudi's pressure on the Xiong-nu) when the Xiong-nu state was plunged into chaos. In 58/57 B.C.E., the Han court learned that the Xiong-nu were embroiled in a deadly power struggle in which several men claimed the supreme title of *shan-yu*. After years of civil warfare, only two contenders remained: Hu-han-ye and his elder brother (or half-brother) Zhi-zhi Gu-du-hou, more commonly known in the sources simply as Zhi-zhi. Unable to defeat his rival, Hu-han-ye chose to declare himself a vassal of the Han dynasty in 53 B.C.E. in order to obtain Chinese protection and support. He sent his son to "serve" at the Chinese court—that is, as a hostage. Zhi-zhi also sent a son to the Han court, presumably to prevent the Chinese from favoring his rival. In the winter of 52/51 B.C.E., Hu-han-ye offered his formal submission to the Han dynasty at the Wuyuan Pass and requested permission to proceed to the Han capital. This being granted, he reached Chang'an early in 51 B.C.E., where he was treated with respect and granted various gifts. The Han emperor Xuandi (r. 73–49 B.C.E.) gave him assistance in the form of grain and troops, although

[17] The biography of Li Ling may be found in *SJ* 109: 2877-2878 and *HS* 54: 2450-2459. The latter, which is far more detailed, has been translated in Watson, *Courtier and Commoner in Ancient China*, 24-33.

[18] On Li Ling's campaign, see Loewe, "The Campaigns of Han Wu-ti," 119-122. Note that Li Ling remained among the Xiong-nu and served as an official of their empire.

[19] Criticisms of Wudi's northern policies began to be voiced soon after the emperor's death; see Loewe, "The Campaigns of Han Wu-ti," 104-105.

[20] *HS* 54: 2457; see also Watson, *Courtier and Commoner in Ancient China*, 30.

[21] On the great expense incurred by Wudi's campaigns against the Xiong-nu, see Di Cosmo, *Ancient China and Its Enemies*, 286-290.

it appears that the latter were intended to serve only as escorts when Hu-han-ye returned to the north. In 50 B.C.E., both Hu-han-ye and Zhi-zhi sent envoys to the Han court to offer tribute, and the emperor used the occasion to make clear his support for Hu-han-ye. The next year, Hu-han-ye made another journey to the Chinese court. Now fearful of the combined power of Hu-han-ye and the Han empire, Zhi-zhi fled westward, first to the Kirghiz (Chinese Jian-kun)[22] and then to the kingdom of Kang-ju.[23] After failing in his attempts to improve relations with the Han court, Zhi-zhi allied himself with the king of Kang-ju by means of a bilateral marriage arrangement; Zhi-zhi married the king's daughter, while Zhi-zhi's own daughter was wed to the king. Zhi-zhi was later killed in an attack by the Chinese general Chen Tang[24] in 36 B.C.E. Hu-han-ye continued to enjoy good relations with China.[25]

The submission of Hu-han-ye was an extraordinary event in the annals of Han history. Indeed, one scholar has referred to it as "by far the most important single event in the history of foreign relations of the Han period."[26] Because of its positive outcome, later historians often praised Han Xuandi's policies, even though it seems clear from the evidence that he himself played no role in the weakening of the Xiong-nu, and enjoyed the completely fortuitous—and unforeseen—benefits of a Xiong-nu civil war, whereas Han Wudi had faced a strong and far more united Xiong-nu state. Still, Xuandi responded to circumstances in a manner so as to establish peace at the northern frontier for many years to come; his success with the Xiong-nu cannot

[22] On the identification of the Jian-kun with the Kirghiz, see *XTS* 217b: 6146 as well as **Doc. 61** in the Appendix.

[23] The location of Kang-ju is a matter of some controversy. It most likely encompassed the valleys of the Chu, Talas, and middle Syr-Darya (Jaxartes) rivers; see Daffinà, "The *Han shu* Hsi Yü Chuan Re-Translated," 323-324, as well as Bregel, *An Historical Atlas of Central Asia*, 10-13. Kang-ju's connection to Sogdiana is also uncertain. Some scholars have identified Kang-ju as "Sogdiana," but this identification has not been accepted by many others. It seems that at least during some periods Sogdiana was subordinate to Kang-ju; see de la Vaissière, *Histoire des marchands sogdiens*, 31-32 and 43-44.

[24] A biography of Chen Tang may be found in *HS* 70: 3007-3029.

[25] This account is based primarily on information found in *ZZTJ* 27: 867-871 and 882-891; 28: 908-909; and 29: 935-944. See also Dubs, *History of the Former Han Dynasty*, vol. 2, 190-196; Loewe, *Crisis and Conflict in Han China*, 211-251; and de Crespigny, *Northern Frontier*, 186-189. On Zhi-zhi, see Loewe, *Crisis and Conflict in Han China*, 211-251 as well as Daffinà, "Chih-chih Shan-yü."

[26] Yü, *Trade and Expansion in Han China*, 45.

be dismissed simply as good luck.[27] In fact, many of Xuandi's officials had urged him to take advantage of the weakness of the Xiong-nu to attack them. In the official discussion of the matter which the emperor ordered, the voice of the imperial secretary Xiao Wangzhi[28] (d. 46 B.C.E.) was that which carried the day. Xiao made effective use of historical precedents as well as pragmatic considerations to argue for the kind and respectful treatment of Hu-han-ye. When the *shan-yu* appeared at court, Xiao again argued against several officials—those who wanted to accord Hu-han-ye less honor than that shown to Han kings (*wang*) and marquises. He urged the emperor to treat Hu-han-ye as the leader of an independent state—that is, as a guest rather than as a vassal. Again, the emperor followed Xiao's suggestion.[29]

Thus, although the aggressive emperor Han Wudi has been admired by many for his dynamic, expansionist policies, many later Chinese officials viewed his reign with alarm, and regarded him as a negative example of an overly-ambitious ruler who attempted to put the entire world beneath his heel, but who succeeded only in squandering the empire's resources while gaining no lasting peace. Han Xuandi, on the other hand, was often viewed as a moderate ruler who followed wise policies and attempted to gain peace through the policy known as *huairou*: kindness and gentleness that would attract foreign peoples to the benefits of Chinese civilization, and thereby bring peace to the frontier.[30] For later Chinese, these two Han emperors exemplified the two most obvious approaches to the northern nomads: aggressive expansionism or benevolent paternalism. In addition, there were also positive and negative models to be found among the Xiong-nu. The *shan-yu* Hu-han-ye became the epitome of the "good and submissive barbarian," a perfect illustration of the efficacy of *huairou* and an excellent model to which to point in order to show the widespread good which resulted from the submission of a wise foreign ruler to the moral authority of a virtuous and humane Chinese emperor. His

[27] See the comments in Yü, *Trade and Expansion in Han China*, 57-58.

[28] The biography of Xiao Wangzhi may be found in *HS* 78: 3271-3289. It has been translated in Watson, *Courtier and Commoner in Ancient China*, 198-221.

[29] Watson, *Courtier and Commoner in Ancient China*, 208-210 and 212-213; see also de Crespigny, *Northern Frontier*, 197.

[30] For criticisms of Han Wudi, see Dubs, *History of the Former Han Dynasty*, vol. 2, 8-13 and 16-19, as well as Loewe, "The Campaigns of Han Wu-ti," 104-105. For praise of Han Xuandi's policies, see Dubs, *History of the Former Han Dynasty*, vol. 2, 187-196.

rival, Zhi-zhi, came to symbolize the "bad and recalcitrant barbarian" who rejected the emperor's benevolence and the benefits of Chinese civilization. His violent end served as confirmation of his folly and a warning to others.

The elite of China's Tang dynasty (618–907 C.E.) were highly conscious of the Han legacy in many areas, including relations with foreign peoples. Separating the two dynasties had been a long period of disunity within China, during which time parts of the north had come under alien rule. This disunity had been brought to an end by the short-lived Sui dynasty (581–618 C.E.), which had collapsed soon after establishing a unified Chinese state, much as the Qin dynasty had done prior to the founding of the Han dynasty. The successor of Sui, the Tang in fact saw itself in many ways as the true successor of Han. The Tang dynasty, still considered one of China's "golden ages," was the first solid and long-lived dynasty to be established after the fall of Han. It is not at all surprising that the Tang Chinese, so conscious of their past and the power of historical precedent, should have wished to look back on the glorious Han as their model, and not the short-lived Sui or the many preceding dynasties that had managed to control only portions of Chinese territory—even though the Tang dynasty had, in many respects, more in common with them than with the Han, which had become a memory nearly four centuries before the Tang was established.

Inner Asia after the Xiong-nu

As Xiong-nu power weakened in eastern Inner Asia late in the first century C.E., new groups of nomads came to the fore and sought to establish their power on the steppe. Several managed to carve out large states, although these had neither the size, the power, nor the longevity of the Xiong-nu state. That situation changed, however, with the rise of the Türks (Chinese Tu-jue) in 552. They had been subordinate to the ruling Rou-ran (Ruan-ruan, Ru-ru)[31] people whose little-studied and little-understood empire centered in Mongolia enjoyed a great degree of power and influence in many regions

[31] Rou-ran, Ruan-ruan, and Ru-ru are all Chinese forms. The true name of this people remains unknown. Some scholars have connected them to the Avars of European history.

of Asia that bordered the steppe. Chafing under Rou-ran rule and the indignity suffered by their chieftain when he had been refused a marriage alliance with the Rou-ran qaghan (this despite the former's help in putting down a rebellion of another subject tribe), the Türks overthrew their masters and set themselves up in their place. Within a very short time the Türk empire had grown to an extraordinary size, stretching from the borders of Koguryŏ in Korea to the shores of the Black Sea. With such an enormous territory—and the peoples living there—under their control, the Türks were able to enjoy a position of influence over the divided kingdoms of North China. Although their own power was soon divided into rival Eastern and Western states, the Türks continued to dominate Inner Asia.

The rise of Sui and Tang power, however, ultimately proved problematic for the two Türk states. Although they had initially been closely involved in the political maneuverings in North China that had accompanied the Sui collapse, even to the point of assisting the Tang founder Tang Gaozu (Li Yuan, 566-635, r. 618-626), the Eastern Türks soon found the situation turned to their disadvantage. Problems within the Eastern Türk state were exploited by the Chinese, allowing the dynasty's dynamic second emperor Tang Taizong (Li Shimin, 599-649, r. 626–649) to crush the Türk qaghan Illig (Chinese Xie-li) in 630 and bring the defeated Eastern Türks into China for resettlement. Not long after that, the Western Türks were also subordinated to Tang power.[32]

It is at this point that we first hear of the Uighurs as an important people of Inner Asia. In the power vacuum that the defeat of Illig Qaghan and the Türks had brought to the Mongolian plateau, other groups in that region now struggled to gain some degree of power on the steppe; one of these was the Uighurs. Tang Taizong took advantage of the disunity of the steppe peoples to reach accommodations with many of them. In a process that is still not fully understood, Taizong assumed the title of "Heavenly Qaghan" (*Tian Ke-han*)[33] and organized these foreign peoples into various Chinese-style administrative units. Within this system, the Uighurs and other groups were designated as "loose-rein" (*jimi*) peoples. The various "loose-rein" peoples, including the Uighurs and Kirghiz, were then grouped into larger units known

[32] For an overview of Sui and early Tang relations with the Türks, see Pan, *Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan*, 100-107, 114-115, 120-121, 127-128, and 169-197.

[33] See Pan, *Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan*, 179-181.

as protectorates.[34] The Uighurs were organized into the commandery of Hanhai, and their leader, known in Chinese sources as Tu-mi-du, was given the titles of *huaihua* ("cherishing transformation") grand general and commander of Hanhai. The Kirghiz were organized into the commandery of Jiankun, a reference to the earlier (Han-era) designation for them.[35]

What remains uncertain is the degree of political authority this permitted the Tang empire to exercise over Inner Asian peoples such as the Uighurs. No doubt the level of control was, at least in part, a function of proximity. Since the Uighurs were relatively far from the area of Tang direct control, it seems likely that they enjoyed a high level of autonomy. Indeed, the Uighur leader Tu-mi-du took for himself the title of qaghan at the same time he accepted titles from the Tang court.[36] Nevertheless, the link was more than a mere formality. Chinese sources inform us that between 649 and 668, Uighur troops participated in a total of five different Tang campaigns against the Eastern and Western Türks as well as the Korean state of Koguryŏ.[37] Furthermore, it seems clear that the Uighurs were subject to a variety of Tang regulations, including the payment of taxes or tribute to the Tang court.[38]

Although Tang control over the region of the Mongolian plateau appears to have been relatively slight, no Inner Asian people fully succeeded in dominating the region until the Türks themselves managed to throw off Chinese rule in 682 and returned to the steppe to reestablish their power. The Uighurs were once again subordinated to Türk rule. The restored empire of the Türks was initially hostile to China, and was only one of several powerful states that confronted a powerful but overextended Tang empire. In response, the Tang dynasty became increasingly militarized, maintaining large standing armies at the borders it shared with the Türks, the Tibetans, the Khitans, and

[34] On the Tang *jimi* system, see Pan, *Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan*, 197-202.

[35] *JTS* 195: 5196.

[36] *JTS* 195: 5196.

[37] See Pan, *Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan*, 384 and Liu, "Hui-hu yu Li Tang hezhan zhi yanjiu," 518. Liu misdated the first such campaign to the third year of the Zhenguan reign era (629) instead of the twenty-third year (649); see *JTS* 194a: 5165.

[38] See Pan, *Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan*, 201.

other peoples. Improved relations with the Türks did not significantly alter this situation.

Weaknesses within the Türk empire led to its collapse in 742. That fall was brought about by the Uighurs in alliance with two other peoples, the Basmïls (Chinese Ba-xi-mi) and Qarluqs (Chinese Ge-luo-lu), who then battled for the supremacy of the Mongolian steppe. It was the Uighurs who ultimately prevailed, establishing a new steppe empire centered on the Orkhon valley in 744.

The Uighur Empire

Of the several nomadic confederated powers which dominated the eastern Eurasian steppe to the north of China in the period prior to the Mongol world empire, perhaps none occupies a position so undeniably singular as that of the Uighurs. Their state, formed on the ruins of that of their ethno-linguistic cousins the Türks in the middle of the eighth century, gained a special relationship to China a mere decade after its establishment. This was achieved by virtue of the Uighurs' decisive intervention in the An Lushan rebellion (755–762)—a cataclysm that nearly destroyed the Tang dynasty. By sending cavalry to the aid of the Tang court, the Uighurs gained for themselves such considerable moral capital (as well as a reputation for considerable military prowess) that three Chinese imperial princesses were, over the course of the ensuing century, wedded to their rulers. This was an unprecedented sign of Chinese favor and indebtedness, for these were daughters of emperors, women of such high status that they had never before been granted in marriage to any other foreign ruler. In addition, the Uighurs enjoyed relatively amicable relations with the Chinese court which, if too fraught with mutual suspicion to be considered truly friendly, did lead to virtually uninterrupted trade between the two states. This enriched the Uighurs in a dramatic fashion and allowed them the wealth necessary to support the Manichaean faith which they, unique in the world, adopted for their empire's official religion. When their state at last met its doom in the mid-ninth century, the Uighurs were able, at least in part, to flee to a new region and found there a new and distinctive civilization which left a marked impression on Inner Asian history and culture, particularly when the Uighurs served as tutors of the emerging Mongol elite of

the thirteenth century.[39] It was the Uighurs who gave the Mongols a script, among other cultural gifts. Unlike many earlier groups which had dominated the eastern steppe, such as the Xiong-nu, Rou-ran, or the Türks themselves, the Uighurs thus survived for centuries after the destruction of their empire as a distinct and identifiable culture and polity with clear linguistic, political, and cultural links to the period of their paramountcy on the eastern steppe.

The Uighurs were inheritors of the traditions established by the Türks, themselves the first people of the steppe who can be given an undisputed linguistic identity thanks to the eighth-century stone inscriptions which they erected in the heart of their empire. The language of the Uighurs in Mongolia was essentially identical to that of the Türks; both empires also used the same runiform script for their epigraphic monuments. Indeed, it has been suggested that the Uighur Empire should be considered simply as a "third Türk Empire," following fast on the heels of the first (552–630) and the second (682–742).[40] While it is clear that the second Türk empire was a restoration of the first, with the royal A-shi-na house returned to its supreme position on the eastern steppe, the Uighur empire represents a change in ruling house and its supporting cohort, so that it really cannot be considered a "third Türk empire." Furthermore, the Old Turkic inscriptions make it quite clear that the second empire claimed descent from the first, while the Uighurs were viewed within these same inscriptions as a separate people, despite their linguistic proximity to the Türks. At the very least, the Uighurs saw their state as a new phase within the established Turkic tradition.[41] The founding family of Yaghlaqar (Chinese Yao-luo-ge) now ruled from the region of the Orkhon River, and the Uighurs were well aware that their empire had succeeded that of the Türks. Nevertheless, it is true that the Uighurs continued many of their predecessors' practices. The language and script have already been mentioned; the Uighurs also employed many of the same titles as the Türks—titles that in some instances significantly predated the Türks' first empire.

As rulers of the steppe lands north of the Gobi, and hence north

[39] See de Rachewiltz, "Turks in China under the Mongols," and Brose, "Uighurs and Technologies of Literacy."

[40] See, for example, Pan, *Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan*, 287.

[41] See Sinor, "The Uighur Empire of Mongolia," 189-190 and 203-204, in which the author argues for at least some continuity between the Türk and Uighur traditions.

of Tang China, the Uighurs were inheritors of yet another tradition stretching back to the empire of the Xiong-nu—the tradition of economic exchanges with China. We have noted that thanks to the maneuverability of their swift cavalry and the difficulty for the Chinese to maintain adequate defenses against them, nomadic peoples had threatened China for centuries in their efforts to obtain necessary goods through plunder, intimidation, or trade. Like many peoples before them, the Türks had used force and the threat of force to maintain this trade, and when the Uighurs inherited the Türks' position on the Mongolian steppe in 744, they were placed in the same situation.

Tang China in 744 was an imposing state of tremendous power. Virtually surrounded by strong enemies, it had by this time become heavily militarized, reliant on large (and expensive) professional armies rather than the farmer-soldiers of the early Tang *fubing* system. These armies were led by powerful military governors, many of whom were of foreign origin.[42] One of these was An Lushan, the son of a Sogdian father and Türk mother, who served at the northern frontier.[43] After several defeats that had alienated him more and more from the Tang court, he rebelled against the Tang emperor Xuanzong (r. 712–756). Such was the power and scope of this rebellion that the "brilliant emperor" (*ming huang*) who had reigned from a court of astonishing wealth and cultural efflorescence found himself a fugitive in his own land, and was forced to abdicate the throne in favor of his son, the emperor Suzong (r. 756–762). The new emperor sought help from foreign peoples to put down the rebellion. The Uighurs responded to his call, sending cavalry to China to aid the imperial cause. Why they chose to do so is unclear,[44] but the decision was to have extraordinary consequences for both the Chinese and the Uighurs. The Uighur cavalry, although relatively few in number, succeeded in assisting the Tang court to defeat the rebels. But these forces also caused difficulties for the dynasty at times, plundering China's cities and inflicting

[42] On the professionalization of the Tang military and its connection to the An Lushan rebellion, see Graff, *Medieval Chinese Warfare*, 205-223.

[43] Biographies of An Lushan may be found in *JTS* 200a: 5367-5372 and *XTS* 225a: 6411-6424. The former has been translated, with extensive commentary, in Levy, *Biography of An Lu-shan*.

[44] An interesting theory has been set forth in Kamalov, "Turks and Uighurs during the Rebellion of An Lu-shan [and] Shih Ch'ao-yi (755–762)." The author argues that the Uighurs were eager to wipe out the remnants of Türk power in North China.

harm on the very people whom they were there to relieve. Still, it seems certain that they were crucial in the quelling of the rebellion and hence the saving of the Tang dynasty.

Having served to preserve the dynasty, the Uighurs found that their relationship with China was transformed in a most singular fashion. They could no longer be treated simply as typical nomads greedy for China's wealth, for the Tang dynasty now owed them, however grudgingly, a significant debt. The Uighurs took advantage of this unusual situation to engage in the extortion of benefits from the Tang court which continued for the remainder of the Uighur empire's existence. Not only were the Uighurs able to demand Tang princesses as wives for their rulers, but also they instituted a trade in Uighur horses for Chinese silks that was to prove highly profitable for them.[45] On a symbolic level, the marriages of three Uighur qaghans to Tang imperial princesses (daughters of emperors, rather than the collateral female relatives who were married to foreign rulers in all other cases) as well as the Tang bestowal of grandiose titles on all Uighur rulers were of great importance. It was Chinese wealth which underpinned these symbols, allowing the Uighur qaghans the revenue, obtained through the horse-silk trade, to maintain their court at a level of opulence unprecedented on the eastern steppe and to dole out enough of this wealth to maintain the allegiance of their followers—at least for a time. For the Tang court, the imperial family's marital relationship with the Uighur rulers was an enormous concession to the "barbarians" as well as a confession of military weakness. Such marriages were indeed costly, as was the regular purchase of Uighur horses. The resentment—and occasional resistance—that they provoked at the Tang court was not insignificant,[46] but the Chinese ultimately could find no alternative to acquiescence.

The Uighur position on the steppe thus was a highly unusual one that rested in many ways on Chinese resources received as rewards—payment for their meritorious behavior *vis-à-vis* the Tang dynasty. This is not to imply that the Chinese were acting simply out of moral considerations. The dynasty's border defenses had been severely weakened by the An Lushan rebellion and continued to be threatened by other

[45] On this trade, see Mackerras, "Sino-Uighur Diplomatic and Trade Contacts," and Beckwith, "The Impact of the Horse and Silk Trade on the Economies of T'ang China and the Uighur Empire"

[46] See Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, 26-36 and 42-49.

imposing powers such as the Tibetans. This vulnerability made the Tang court inclined to maintain payments to the Uighurs, which could be couched in the language of moral imperatives. The Uighurs' exceptional position proved to be far more effective in the siphoning of Chinese wealth than any number of raids, although Uighur military power remained a persistent threat. And while the Chinese grumbled at the ever-increasing number of horses (and their ever-declining quality) sent by the Uighurs, they never denied that the Uighurs stood in a unique relationship to their state and its imperial house.

Another important result of Uighur intervention in the An Lushan rebellion was the establishing of Manichaeism as the state religion of the Uighurs. The religion founded by the Persian Mani (216–276 C.E.) had spread from West Asia to Inner Asia and China thanks to the activities of missionaries. An evangelical faith, its diffusion was often associated with merchant activity. The Sogdians were particularly important in this and were an active presence in many capacities in China and on the Mongolian steppe.[47] Their involvement with the Uighurs' predecessors, the Türks, is well known, particularly for the period of the First Empire, when they were active among the Türks as merchants, missionaries, and diplomats.[48] As for Manichaean activity in China, the first known mission occurred during the reign of Tang Gaozong (r. 650–683).[49]

According to the available sources, the Uighurs who had come to China during the An Lushan rebellion encountered Sogdian Manichaean priests there, and soon after that the ruling qaghan declared his devotion—and that of his realm—to the religion. His reasons for doing so are nowhere elaborated, but it seems likely that he saw the utility of a centralizing and unifying religion in which he could act as defender of the faith by linking it to state patronage. The Uighur empire was still young, and the qaghan may have been seeking a tool that would help him to increase his control over his potentially unwieldy polity. Why he chose Manichaeism is unclear; the religion

[47] Lieu, *Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China*, 175-180.

[48] See de la Vaissière, *Histoire des marchands sogdiens*, 196-212. It should be noted that the Sogdians were connected to the spread of Buddhism, rather than Manichaeism, among the early Türks.

[49] Lieu, *Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China*, 189. Lieu argued (pp. 180-181 and 187) that Manichaean missionary activity in East Asia was slowed by the collapse of the Han dynasty and subsequently reinvigorated three centuries later by the sixth-century Sui reunification which promoted the resumption of trade contacts.

seems particularly ill-suited to nomadic life because of its insistence on vegetarianism for its elect. It may be that he settled upon Manichaeism because it was not associated with China and was instead connected with the Sogdians, who enjoyed great prestige in Inner Asia. Indeed, the Tang government had shown hostility toward the religion and attempted to suppress it among native Chinese in 732.[50] Whatever their reason for adopting it, the Uighurs are the only people in history to have made Manichaeism their state religion. Uighur patronage of the religion forced the Tang government to be more accommodating to it. Not only were there Manichaean temples in the two capital cities of Chang'an and Luoyang, but they were also established in other parts of the empire. Although some were in the north, and may have been intended to serve non-Chinese Manichaean communities within China, the establishing of temples in four prefectures in the lower Yangzi region in 768 must have been intended for proselytizing and maintaining the faith among the Chinese.[51] The Tang court was not pleased by the necessity of allowing the Manichaean presence within China's borders. As Samuel Lieu has noted, "Uighur Manichaean temples were both a symbol of foreign arrogance and a sore reminder to the Chinese of their military weakness."[52]

The Tang dynasty had survived the An Lushan rebellion, but did not recover from it. The golden age of the dynasty clearly had passed. The intervention of the Uighurs signaled both a rise in their fortunes and a decline in those of the Tang empire. Once the dust of the rebellion had settled and the Uighurs had departed, the dynasty found itself significantly weakened, its borders contracted, and its control over certain provinces diminished by the rise of largely autonomous

[50] On Tang official efforts to ban Manichaean missionary activity in China, see *TD* 40: 229 which is translated in Lieu, *Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China*, 190 as well as in Chavannes and Pelliot, "Un traité manichéen retrouvé en China, traduit et annoté, deuxième partie," 154. The ban allowed foreigners within China to continue the practice of Manichaeism.

[51] Lieu, *Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China*, 194-195. Temples were established in Jingzhou, Hongzhou, Yangzhou, and Yuezhou. Note that for the first place name, Lieu mistakenly writes Ch'ing (Qing) rather than Ching (Jing). For the location of these prefectures, see Wang, *Tangdai fanzhen yu zhongyang guanxi zhi yanchiu* (map) or Twitchett, *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 3, 742. These four prefectures were stretched over a broad area, from the central region of the Tang empire to the eastern seacoast.

[52] Lieu, *Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China*, 196. See also Chavannes and Pelliot, "Un traité manichéen retrouvé en China, traduit et annoté, deuxième partie," 262.

local military governments. Furthermore, the Tang state continued to be threatened by powerful enemies such as the Tibetans, and was in an unhappy and sometimes tense "marriage" with the Uighurs, who could easily become hostile if irritated. The Tang government was forced to pay a great deal of attention to affairs within China after the An Lushan rebellion, and its diplomatic involvement with other states diminished. As the Uighurs seemed to present only a moderate threat so long as trade was not curtailed, the Chinese thus paid less and less attention to the affairs of the northern neighbors. Their post-rebellion records indicate strong interest only in marriage politics, the horse-silk trade, and the potential for Uighur violence against China—all sore subjects at the Tang court.

The Uighurs benefited from this situation for many years. Their qaghans enjoyed the prestige derived from Tang confirmation and three marriages to imperial princesses. This gave them a *cachet*, and hence a special type of legitimacy, rivaled by no other Inner Asian rulers. Their people (or at least some of them) enjoyed the benefits of the unusual trade between the two states, which provided wealth far beyond the nomads' usual capacity and helped support a way of life that would not otherwise have been possible. The great wealth of the Uighurs promoted the creation of at least two significant urban centers—the capital of Ordubalïq in the Orkhon River valley[53] and the city of Baybalïq near the Selenga River.[54] Uighur cities have been

[53] See Minorsky, "Tamīm ibn-Baḥr's Journey to the Uyghurs," 283, for a description of the Uighur capital in the early ninth century. The name Ordubalïq derives from Old Turkic *ordu*, "a royal residence," and *balïq*, "town, city"; see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 203 and 335-336. It should be noted that this name is not found in any contemporary (i.e., Tang-era) Turkic source, nor in any Chinese source. Its first appearance (in the form Ordubaligh) is in the work of the thirteenth-century Persian historian Juvaini (ca. 1226–1283), who himself had visited the ruins of the city. Juvaini wrote that these ruins, located on the banks of the Orkhon River, included stone inscriptions. The city had been the center of Uighur imperial power, from which "the whole of the East came under their sway." See Boyle, *Genghis Khan: The History of the World-Conqueror*, 54-58 and 236. While we cannot be certain that the Uighurs called their capital Ordubalïq, Juvaini's account seems trustworthy in this respect. At any rate, this name is strongly to be preferred over the commonly used Qarabalghasun (and its many variants), which is a Mongol name, albeit derived from Old Turkic: Turkic *qara*, "black," > Mongol *qara*, "black," and Turkic *balïq*, "town, city" > Mongol *balaghasun*, "town, city"; see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 643 and 235-236.

[54] Baybalïq ("Rich City") is mentioned in the Shine Usu inscription (ca. 760); see Ramstedt, "Zwei uigurische Runeninschriften der Nord-Mongolei," 35. The inscription makes it clear that the city was built with the assistance of both Sogdians and

studied by modern archeologists.[55] Two important primary sources also attest to agricultural activity in the Uighur state.[56]

The empires that faced each other across the Gobi Desert were both multi-ethnic states with established imperial administrations to control their diverse populations. For the Uighurs, this meant both the co-opting or forceful domination of local tribal leaders and the appointment of Uighur overseers to regulate them. Although their functions are nowhere made clear, it is likely that these overseers were intended to guarantee the loyalty of subordinate tribes and see to whatever tax levies and other obligations were to be placed on them. Such peoples as the Basmïls, Kirghiz (Chinese Xia-jia-si, etc.), Khitans (Chinese Qi-dan), Tatabï (Chinese Xi), Shi-wei, and others were in this position, which still must have allowed them a significant degree of local autonomy. There is also evidence to suggest that the Uighurs employed a hostage system in which relatives of subject tribes were kept among the Uighurs to guarantee the fealty of those tribes. The exact nature of Uighur control over subordinate peoples remains unclear. The Kirghiz, for example, were particularly fractious. Although they were linguistically very close to the Uighurs, the Turkic Kirghiz maintained a distinct identity in their homeland, centered on the upper Yenisei River valley in southern Siberia. Chinese sources inform us that the Kirghiz were defeated by the Uighurs around 758, after which Kirghiz relations with China were cut off.[57] The Uighurs were forced to campaign against the Kirghiz again some time after 795 to reestablish their dominance in the region.[58] The Kirghiz apparently

Chinese. This is certainly the same as the Fuguicheng ("Rich City") located by the Chinese chief minister and geographer Jia Dan (730–805) in the Uighur realm on the north bank of the Xian'e (Selenga) River; see *XTS* 43: 1148, as well as Yan, *Tangdai jiaotong tu kao*, vol. 3, 608 and 633. Jia's report mentions two additional cities in the southern part of the Uighur empire: Gongzhucheng ("Princess City") and Meijiancheng ("Space-between-the-Eyebrows City"). The odd name of the latter could have a Buddhist connotation, since Chinese *meijian* is a reference to the *ūrnā*, one of the most well known of the 32 signs of Buddhahood; see Soothill and Hodous, *A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist* Terms, 309. Jia Dan served as chief minister under the emperor Dezong (r. 779–805); his biographies may be found in *JTS* 138: 3782-3787 and *XTS* 166: 5083-5085.

[55] See Khudiakov, "Pamiatniki uigurskoi kul'tury v Mongolii."

[56] Klyashtorny, "The Terkhin Inscription," 344 and 347 (eighth century), and Minorsky, "Tamīm ibn-Baḥr's Journey to the Uyghurs," 283 (early ninth century). See also Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, 13.

[57] *JTS* 195: 5201.

[58] See Schlegel, "Die chinesische Inschrift auf dem uigurischen Denkmal in

had sought to assert their autonomy at a time when Uighur power was weakened.[59] Although the Uighurs again were successful in their struggle with the Kirghiz, some time around 820 the Kirghiz once more attempted to throw off Uighur rule. From this can be seen the difficulties that the Uighurs had in maintaining control over at least this particular people. The discovery of what appears to be a line of Uighur-period defensive ramparts and watchtowers in Tuva,[60] between the Uighur heartland in Mongolia and the Kirghiz base in southern Siberia, suggests that the Uighurs required such means to extend their power into that region and maintain it.

In addition to these pastoral peoples, the Uighur empire also was home to significant communities of sedentary peoples, particularly Sogdians and Chinese, both of whom made important contributions to that state. The Chinese helped with the building of Uighur cities and the maintenance of the households of Tang imperial princesses sent to the steppe as brides for Uighur rulers. We may also assume they were involved in international trade. The Sogdians played important roles in both trade and religion (as Manichaean clerics), but also enjoyed substantial political influence, involving themselves in the power structure of the Uighur state and in important diplomatic ventures.[61]

As for China, the Tang empire had absorbed many different peoples within its borders in virtually every direction. For our purposes, the most important of these were at the northern border, particularly the Turkic Sha-tuo,[62] the Tu-yu-hun of Xian-bei origin,[63] and the

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Kara Balgassun," 80-86. According to the inscription, the Uighurs defeated a force of 400,000 Kirghiz and killed their ruler.

[59] Uighur power had begun to decline about 790 due to internal factionalism and a defeat at the hands of the Tibetans. In 795, the ruling Yaghlaqar family was removed from the Uighur throne and replaced by the Ädiz (Chinese Xie-die) who, however, took the Yaghlaqar name for their own. They began the restoration of Uighur power; see Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, 10-12, 31, and 107-109.

[60] Vainshtein, *Nomads of South Siberia*, 119.

[61] On the tremendous importance of the Sogdians to the economies of many Asian states (including the Uighur empire), see de la Vaissière, *Histoire des marchands sogdiens*.

[62] The Sha-tuo were a Turkic people whose origin is to be traced to the Western Türks. The Turkic form of their name is unknown. The primary account of the Sha-tuo during the Tang period is to be found in *XTS* 218: 6153-6166. The first part of this account has been translated in Chavannes, *Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) occidentaux*, 96-99. Another account of the Sha-tuo may be found in *THY* 94: 1695-1698. On the settling of Sha-tuo tribes within Chinese territory, see Eberhard, *Conquerors and Rulers*, 140-141.

[63] During the late Tang era, the people who had been known in Chinese sources

Tanguts (Chinese Dang-xiang).[64] These three groups had submitted to the Tang at different times, and were controlled by the "loose-rein" system. Under this arrangement, these peoples—not unlike subordinate tribes within the Uighur empire—kept their own local leaders and enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy. They tended to live in peripheral lands of the Tang realm that could still support a pastoral way of life, although the pressures and temptations of sedentary life certainly must have influenced them, and we cannot ascertain to what degree these formerly nomadic peoples still maintained their traditional ways of life in the mid-ninth century. We should also note that there were both Uighurs and Sogdians living within important urban centers of the Tang realm.

Despite the benefits enjoyed by the Uighurs from their special status in regard to the Tang empire, relations between the two states were not always friendly. The Uighurs were not simply intent on propping up the Tang state, and sometimes sought to take advantage of Tang weakness.[65] That weakness, however, should not be exaggerated. Post-An Lushan China was still a large and powerful state, albeit far weaker than in its glory days. The most notable symbol of its decline was its loss of control over outlying areas such as the Tarim Basin (a central component of the trade routes known as the "Silk Road"), as well as the high level of autonomy enjoyed by the leaders of many provinces

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as Tu-yu-hun came to be referred to more commonly as Tui-hun, Tu-hun, and sometimes simply Hun; see Pelliot, "Note sur les T'ou-yu-houen et les Sou-p'i," 323 and Daffinà, "L'itinerario di Hui Shêng," 261. The same people were known in Tibetan sources as 'A-za; see Daffinà, "L'itinerario di Hui Shêng," 262-263. On the settlement of the Tu-yu-hun in the Ordos region, see Molè, *The T'u-yü-hun*, xix-xx. Their state, located south and west of the Gansu corridor (see Herrmann, *An Historical Atlas of China*, 24) had been destroyed by the expanding Tibetan empire in 663, and they gradually had been forced further and further east to the Chinese circuits of Shuofang and Hedong (i.e., the Ordos region and the area east of it) by the middle of the eighth century; see Molè, *The T'u-yü-hun*, 61.

[64] On the settlement of Tanguts in North China during the Tang dynasty, see Dalby, "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," 679. The Tanguts were still relatively strong in the mid-ninth century, and caused difficulties for the Tang government throughout the reign of Emperor Wenzong and again in 843 during the reign of Wuzong; see *XTS* 221a: 6217 and *ZZTJ* 247: 7993. They are first mentioned in the eighth-century Old Turkic inscription of Bilgä Qaghan; see Orkun, *Eski Türk Yazıtları*, vol. 1, 60-61. In Tibetan sources they are called Mi-ñag; see Dunnell, "Who Are the Tanguts?" 82-83. For what is apparently the only mention of the Tanguts in Khotanese documents, see Bailey, "A Khotanese Text Concerning the Turks in Kantşou," 31, 35, and 50.

[65] Mackerras, "Uygur-Tang Relations, 744–840."

that ostensibly remained part of the empire. Such decentralization not only weakened the imperial court's political power, but also diminished its economic strength, as the autonomous provinces frequently refused to send tax revenues to the capital. Some Tang emperors proved to be strong leaders nevertheless, and even attempted to reassert central control over autonomous provinces, sometimes successfully.[66] The departure of Tang power from the Tarim Basin was important for both the Uighurs and their rivals the Tibetans. Both empires sought to exert their own influence there, with varying degrees of success. Indeed, while the Uighurs benefited from maintaining reasonably amicable ties with China, they devoted much of their military energy to struggles with the Tibetans. Much of this conflict was centered on the Tarim Basin and its important trade routes. Although it is clear that the Uighurs did enjoy control over parts of that region, the degree of domination and its time frame are still matters of some scholarly debate.[67] This also serves to remind us that, like the Tang state, the Uighur empire did not have fixed borders that remained unchanged throughout its history. The power—and territory—of the great empires of the Uighurs, the Chinese, and the Tibetans waxed and waned during this period.

It was only in the early 820s that these three states finally achieved a measure of stability in their relations with one another. China and the Uighurs renewed their relationship through another marriage alliance; the Taihe Princess was given in marriage to the Uighur qaghan in 821. This princess, the third daughter of the Tang imperial house to have been granted to the Uighur qaghans in marriage, was the daughter of the Tang emperor Xianzong (r. 805-820); it was her brother Emperor Muzong (r. 820–824) who relinquished her to the Uighur qaghan in the second month of the first year of the Changqing reign period (8 March—5 April 821), at which time she was less than 26 years old.[68] At about the same time the Tang and Tibetan empires signed a treaty that maintained peace between them, while the Uighurs

[66] The most successful in this regard was Xianzong; see Peterson, "Court and Province in Mid- and Late T'ang," 522-538.

[67] See Beckwith, *The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia*, 153-157 and 163-166.

[68] See *THY* 6: 75 and 77-78 as well as Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, 177, n. 269. *THY* 6: 65-66 places her as the eighteenth of nineteen daughters, while *XTS* 83: 3667-3668 places her as the seventeenth of eighteen.

and Tibetans also came to an arrangement for peaceful relations.[69] By 823 it seemed that the political situation in greater East Asia had settled into a general peace. And yet, in regard to the Uighurs at least, that peace was deceptive, as it was at about this same time that their lengthy struggle began with the Kirghiz people.

The Decline of Uighur Power

Increasingly absorbed by internal events and conditions, the Chinese were not aware that the Uighurs were in a state of decline by the 830s. As late as 821 they had been impressed (indeed, alarmed) by the grandness of the Uighur embassy that came to Chang'an to escort the Taihe Princess to the steppe.[70] The opulence of this marriage masked problems within the Uighur state. Unaware of any significant change in the Uighurs' situation, the Chinese continued the horse-silk trade.

The available sources suggest that the fundamental causes of Uighur decline included the twin forces of political factionalism and revolt by restive subjects. Indeed, most Inner Asian empires have disintegrated due to internal tensions surrounding disputes concerning succession to the throne and/or rebellions by subject peoples.[71] Although it is known that the Uighur empire suffered from factionalism related to the establishment of Manichaeism as the state religion,[72] it seems that such divisions had faded to insignificance by the ninth century.[73] Succession seems to have been a more intractable problem. In the empire's heyday, sons often succeeded fathers, and succession often went smoothly. Even a major coup that led to a new family's assumption of the throne did not destabilize the empire for any length of time. In the empire's later years, however, there is almost no information regarding the relationships among qaghans, so that we cannot say what form(s) of succession occurred. But it is clear that succession disputes were ram-

[69] See Beckwith, *The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia*, 186-187 and Szerb, "A Note on the Tibetan-Uigur Treaty of 822/823."

[70] *XTS* 217b: 6129-6130.

[71] See Drompp, "Centrifugal Forces in the 'Heartland'" and Drompp, "Supernumerary Sovereigns."

[72] See Golden, *An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples*, 175 as well as Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, 152-153, n. 146 and Sinor, "The Uighur Empire of Mongolia," 193-195.

[73] See Mackerras, "The Uighurs," 333.

pant in the last decades of the Uighur empire; indeed, they must have been a function of increasing factionalism among the Uighur ruling elite. Although the reason is not clear, the 830s witnessed a bloody internal conflict that apparently began with the assassination of Qasar (Chinese He-sa) Qaghan (r. 824–832) in 832.[74] His nephew Hu Tigin (r. 832–839)[75] succeeded him but could not restore stability to the realm. The new qaghan discovered a plot against him and executed its perpetrators, an Uighur prince (*tigin*) and a minister of Sogdian origin named An Yunhe.[76] In 839, another minister named Küräbir (Chinese Jue-luo-wu)[77] avenged their deaths by leading some Sha-tuo

[74] *XTS* 217b: 6130. On this date, see Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, 181-182, n. 219. Hamilton suggested that this is a transcription of a Turkic form "Xazar," pointing out that this form is attested in the list of Uighur personages found in the *Maḫrnâmag*; see Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 141 as well as Müller, "Ein Doppelblatt aus einem manichäischen Hymnenbuch (Maḫrnâmag)," 9. The same Chinese transcription is found in *XTS* 221b: 6247 in the ethnonym "Tu-jue He-sa," which Chavannes rendered as "Turcs Khazars"; see his *Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) occidentaux*, 145. Chinese *sa* is known to have been used during the Tang period to transcribe Turkic *–sar*, as in Chinese *pu-sa* = Turkic *pusar*, "bodhisattva"; see *DTS*, 398 as well as Sinor, "À propos de la biographie ouigoure de Hiuan-tsang," 580 and Csongor, "Chinese in the Uighur Script of the T'ang-Period," 118. Rather than Xazar (or Qazar), I prefer the form Qasar, based not only on the *Maḫrnâmag* evidence, but also on the evidence of the Terkhin inscription which contains the name *qsr*, i.e., Qasar; see Kliashtornyi, "Terkhinskaia nadpis'," 88 and 91, as well as the same author's remarks in Klyashtorny, "The Terkhin Inscription," 340-341. Qasar's formal title was Ay Tängridä Qut Bolmïsh Alp Bilgä Qaghan, and his confirmation by the Tang court was under the title Zhaoli Qaghan; see Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 141.

[75] This man's personal name is given in *JTS* 195: 5213 as Sa, which apparently is an error. Müller hesitantly suggested that Hu Tigin might be the same person as the "Ügä Peroz Tegin" of the *Maḫrnâmag*, but this is not convincing; see Müller, "Ein Doppelblatt aus einem manichäischen Hymnenbuch (Maḫrnâmag)," 29. Concerning Hu Tigin, see Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 141, where two dates are misprinted as 933 (for 833) and 939 (for 839).

[76] *JTS* 195: 5213, translated in Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, 122 and 124; see also 182, n. 294 concerning the prince's name. Despite the Chinese look of his name, An Yunhe was almost certainly a Sogdian or person of Sogdian descent whose family was originally from Bukhara; see Pulleyblank, "A Sogdian Colony in Inner Mongolia," 320.

[77] Hamilton suggested the equivalence of Chinese Jue-luo-wu with the known name Küräbir; see *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 141. The reconstructed Tang pronunciation seems to support this (see *GKWD*, 533, 1026, and 166), particularly since it is well know that Tang Chinese final *–t* was used to render Turkic final *–r*; see Csongor, "Chinese in the Uighur Script of the T'ang-Period," 92. The name Küräbir appears only once in a single Old Turkic text, a manuscript fragment discovered by M.A. Stein in Miran. In this text, the name (or title) appears with full vocalization in the appellation Küräbir (or Köräbir) Urungu Sangun; see Thomsen, "Dr. M.A. Stein's Manuscripts in Turkish 'Runic' Script from Miran and Tun-huang," 187-188 and Pl. I. Turkic *urungu* means "flag, standard"; see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 236. *Sangun* is the Turkic form of Chinese *jiangjun*, "general"; see Ecsedy, "Old Turkic Titles of Chinese Origin," 87-88. The name Küräbir is also attested in the famous Staël-Holstein manuscript, where it appears in the Khotanese form *kurabirä*; see Bailey, "The Staël-Holstein Miscellany," 3. Henning saw in this the Khotanese form of the tribal name given in Chinese as Ju-luo-bo (*JTS* 195: 5196-5197, where it also appears as part of a personal name); see Henning, "Argi and the 'Tokharians'," 55, as well as Chavannes, *Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) occidentaux*, 91-92. This, too, would seem a reasonable equivalence, given the Tang pronunciation; see *GKWD*, 80, 1026, and 160. Henning also equated this name with the Uighur tribal name given in Chinese as Du-luo-wu (also written Hu-/Gu-luo-wu), and stated that Chinese *wu* is known as a transcription for (Khotanese) Saka *bīri* from other sources, which he did not name; see Henning, "Argi and the 'Tokharians'," 555-556. Henning does not appear to have been aware of the form Jue-luo-wu. It should be noted that among early Turkic peoples it was not uncommon to use tribal appellations as parts of personal names or titles. Thus, Küräbir could be both the name of a tribe and part of the name or title of an individual.

troops, which he had obtained by bribing the Sha-tuo leader Zhu-ye Chi-xin[78] with a gift of 300 horses, to attack the Uighur qaghan. The qaghan's troops were defeated, and he himself committed suicide. A new qaghan, He-sa, was enthroned.[79]

[78] The Sha-tuo chieftain Zhu-ye Chi-xin (d. 887) was the son of Zhu-ye Zhi-yi; see *XTS* 218: 6156. For his role in helping the Tang dynasty put down the rebellion of Pang Xun (868–869), Zhu-ye Chi-xin was granted the imperial surname Li and the name Guochang, "Glory of the Nation"; see *XTS* 218: 6156 and Somers, "The End of the T'ang," 700. Zhu-ye Chi-xin (Li Guochang) was the father of the famous Li Keyong (d. 908) who was instrumental in the quelling of the great Huang Chao rebellion (873–884) and was quite influential in late Tang politics (see chapter 7). For further information on Li Guochang, see *XTS* 218: 6156-6160 *passim*; for further information on Li Keyong, see *XTS* 218: 6157-6166 *passim*.

[79] This He-sa should not be confused with the previous Qasar (He-sa) Qaghan; the Chinese characters for the two are completely different. In some editions of *JTS*, his name is given as Lu-ji, but this is apparently an error; see Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, 182, n. 295. Even the form He-sa has variant writings, for which see Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 141. In *THY* 98: 1749 the new qaghan is called (Jue-luo) Wu-du-gong, and in *CFYG* 967: 11373 the form Wu-jian-gong is used. There is also a form Shu-sa preserved in *ZZTJKY* 246: 7942. It is this last qaghan of the Uighur steppe empire which Müller attempted to identify with the Xasar Tegin of the text known as *Maḫrnâmag*; see "Ein Doppelblatt aus einem manichäischen Hymnenbuch (Maḫrnâmag)," 29. But it seems more likely that Xasar should be identified with the earlier Qasar Tigin, who ruled as qaghan from 824 to 832. The "second" He-sa's name does not give a good correspondence to Qasar/Xasar; see *GKWD*, 884 (using the homophone *he*, since this dictionary does not contain the particular character *he* used in the text) and 1501. It should be noted that Haneda proposed that He-sa and Küräbir were the same person, based on evidence from *THY* and *Hou Tang xian zu ji nian lu*; see Haneda, "Tōdai Kaikotsushi no kenkyū," 287-289. *THY* states that the Uighur minister Jue-luo-wu-jian-gong led Sha-tuo troops to attack [Hu Tigin] Qaghan. The qaghan committed suicide, and

While all this was occurring, the Uighurs had also been struggling with a rebellion by the Turkic Kirghiz people,[80] who lived north of the Mongolian plateau in the region of the upper (i.e., southern) Yenisei River valley in Siberia.[81] Chinese sources indicate that the Kirghiz had been defeated by the Uighurs in 758.[82] Although the degree of Kirghiz subjugation to Uighur control is unclear, the sources state that after their defeat the Kirghiz were unable to contact China, and that the Uighurs conferred upon their leader the official title of Bilgä Ton Irkin (Chinese Bi-jia Dun Xie-jin).[83] More than half a century later, observing the weakening of Uighur power, the Kirghiz ruler styled himself qaghan in about 820.[84] This precipitated an Uighur attack,

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then the people of the Uighur nation set up Wu-jian-gong as He-sa Qaghan; see *THY* 98: 1749. *Hou Tang xian zu ji nian lu* also indicates that Jue-luo-wu (whom it calls Wu-du-gong) was the same person as He-sa (whom it calls Shu-sa) Qaghan; see *ZZTJKY* 246: 7942. The latter source, however, is fraught with problems, and so was disregarded by Sima Guang in his consideration of this particular issue. Evidence from other sources, however, indicates that Jue-luo-wu (Küräbir) was not the same person as He-sa Qaghan. *JTS* states that Külüg Bagha led Kirghiz cavalry to attack the Uighur capital and "killed He-sa and beheaded Jue-luo-wu"; see *JTS* 195: 5213. The account in *XTS* is essentially the same; see *XTS* 217b: 6130. Sima Guang chose to follow these two accounts in the writing of *ZZTJ*; see *ZZTJKY* 246: 7942. If we accept that Jue-luo-wu is indeed a Chinese transcription of Küräbir, then the apparently faulty division of the minister's name in *THY* and *Hou Tang xian zu ji nian lu* would tend to cast doubt on those sources.

[80] Tang sources sometimes refer to the Kirghiz by the archaic name of Jian-kun, but more commonly refer to them by various names such as Jie-gu, He-gu, He-gu-si, or Ju-wu; see *THY* 100: 1784-1785 and *XTS* 217b: 6146-6147. During the Huichang reign period the Chinese transcription of their name was changed to Xia-jia-si as a result of the visits of Kirghiz envoys to the court of the Tang emperor Wuzong. This new form was sometimes mistakenly written as Jia-jia-si (*THY* 100: 1785). After the Tang period, still other transcriptions to the name Kirghiz were employed in Chinese texts, adding to the general confusion surrounding this particular ethnonym. The name of the Kirghiz is attested in the major Old Turkic runiform inscriptions of the eighth century, where it is written *qïrqz*—i.e., Qïrqïz; see Orkun, *Eski Türk Yazıtları*, vol. 1, 22-73 *passim* and 110-111. The same name is also found in the Suci and Shine-usu inscriptions which date from the period of the Uighur empire; see Ramstedt, "Zwei uigurische Runeninschriften in der Nord-Mongolei," 4 and 23-24 as well as Orkun, *Eski Türk Yazıtları*, vol. 1, 157 and 173.

[81] For an overview of their history, see Drompp, "The Yenisei Kyrgyz from Early Times to the Mongol Conquest."

[82] *JTS* 195: 5201 and *XTS* 217b: 6149.

[83] *XTS* 217b: 6149.

[84] *XTS* 217b: 6147 states that before this the Kirghiz leader had been called *a-re*, and indicates that this was both the leader's surname and his title. There is no other evidence for this, however, nor is there any appropriate Old Turkic word that would correspond to *a-re*. Chinese sources mention various Turkic titles for Kirghiz leaders in the seventh century, including *beg* (Chinese *bei*) and *elteber* (Chinese *qi-li-fa*/*xie-li-fa*);

which was repulsed, after which the two peoples fought incessantly for about 20 years.[85] After successfully resisting Uighur efforts to subdue him, he grew bolder and is reported to have cursed the Uighur ruler with the following words: "Your luck has run out! I will take your golden tent, and in front of your tent I will race my horses and plant my flag. If you can oppose me, then come on! If you cannot, then away with you!"[86]

The Kirghiz became directly involved in the last stages of the Uighur court factional struggles, for an Uighur general, Külüg Bagha (Chinese Ju-lu Mo-he),[87] who had fled from the Uighur capital because of his hatred for Küräbir (who, it will be remembered, was instrumental in enthroning the qaghan He-sa in 839), found refuge with the Kirghiz. The winter of 839/840 proved devastating for the Uighurs. Heavy snowfall led to the deaths of many herd animals, which caused famine and disease among the Uighurs.[88] With the Uighur heartland thus further weakened, the Uighur renegade Külüg Bagha then returned to the Orkhon valley at the head of a reported 100,000 Kirghiz cavalry, killed the new qaghan as well as Küräbir, and thus set off the great migrations of the Uighurs to the west and south. The Kirghiz ruler, who was part of this invasion, burnt the Uighurs' flags and the famous golden tent. He plundered the Uighur capital and, in addition to those riches, came into the possession of another great prize:

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see *XTS* 217b: 6149 as well as Bombaci, "On the Ancient Turkic Title Eltäbär." In the eighth-century Old Turkic inscriptions of Kül Tigin and Bilgä Qaghan, the ruler of the Kirghiz—at that time an enemy of the Türks—was called qaghan; see Orkun, *Eski Türk Yazıtları*, vol. 1, 41, 46 and 52. It should be noted that in these inscriptions, the only foreign rulers given the dignity of the title qaghan were the lords of China, Tibet, the Türgish, and the Kirghiz. The Old Uighur inscription of Shine-usu (ca. 760) refers to the Kirghiz ruler by the title of *qan*, at that time essentially synonymous with qaghan; see Ramstedt, "Zwei uigurische Runeninschriften in der Nord-Mongolei," 24-25 and Orkun, *Eski Türk Yazıtları*, vol. 1, 172 as well as Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 611 and 630. The Chinese text of the Qara-balghasun inscription of the early ninth century also calls the defeated Kirghiz ruler a qaghan; see Schlegel, "Die chinesische Inschrift auf dem uigurischen Denkmal in Kara Balgassun," 84. It should be noted that A-re appears as the personal name of a Türk (Tu-jue) in a Chinese report for 931, although the correct form for this name seems to be A-shu; see Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 99-100 and 147. Hamilton rendered A-shu as Ašuq, a name attested in Old Turkic.

[85] *ZZTJ* 246: 7946-7947.

[86] *XTS* 217b: 6149.

[87] The Turkic form of this title has long been established. For the Tang pronunciation of the Chinese, see *GKWD*, 201, 1384, 1110, and 1255.

[88] *ZZTJ* and *ZZTJKY* 246: 7942; see also *XTS* 217b: 6130.

the Taihe Princess. He prepared an armed escort to send her back to China.[89]

The Kirghiz had succeeded in their efforts to throw off Uighur domination, thanks in part to Külüg Bagha's intelligence regarding the vulnerability of the Uighur court. Their destruction of the Uighur empire ended a period of approximately three centuries during which the Mongolian plateau had been the home of powerful Turkic empires. The Kirghiz did not replace the Uighurs in the Orkhon valley, but remained focused on their homeland in the region of the upper Yenisei valley to the north.[90] The Uighur heartland then entered into a dark period about which little is known until its reemergence to the light of history early in the thirteenth century with the rise of Chinggis Qan. As for the Uighurs themselves, many survived by fleeing to the regions of Gansu and the Tarim Basin. Others chose the path to China, and it is to them that we now turn our attention.

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[89] *XTS* 217b: 6130-6131 and 6149-6150, as well as *ZZTJ* 246: 7942-7943, 7946-7947, and 7957. According to *ZZTJ* 246: 7957, this escort included 10 Kirghiz officials with the title of *tarqan*. **Doc. 43**, however, states that the escort was led by a Kirghiz general.

[90] For an explanation, see Drompp, "Breaking the Orkhon Tradition."

CHAPTER TWO

THE FLIGHT OF THE UIGHURS TO CHINA

"Now, a poor bird has flown to our bosom...."

The Arrival of the First Group of Refugees

Two large groups of Uighur refugees fled to the Tang border immediately after the Kirghiz attack. As has been noted, they found no "Great Wall" to impede their progress. The Tang, unlike some other dynasties, did not engage in the building of long defensive (or offensive) walls at its frontiers, choosing instead to defend itself with walled garrisons and troops stationed there. But by 840 the northern Tang frontier was poorly defended; garrison towns and their defensive walls had been allowed to fall into disrepair, and manpower was insufficient to counter any real threat. Another complication was that the frontier zone was not just the home of Chinese garrison troops, farmers, and traders, but was also inhabited by groups of Inner Asian peoples who had been settled in Tang territory under the so-called "loose-rein" system. The Uighurs who came to the Chinese frontier thus would have encountered not only ethnic Chinese, but also other speakers of a Turkic language (the Sha-tuo) as well as other groups of Inner Asian origin (the Tanguts and Tu-yu-hun).

According to Chinese sources, the first group of Uighur refugees reached the region near the northern garrison city of Tiande in the autumn of 840, specifically the ninth month of the fifth year of the Kaicheng reign period (30 September–28 October 840).[1] Although there is evidence that the forces around Tiande had skirmished with a group of Uighurs at some point in the preceding year (19 January 839–6 February 840),[2] the arrival of this large group of Uighurs in

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[1] *ZZTJ* 246: 7953.

[2] See *ZZTJKY* 246: 7942, which cites the *Hou Tang xian zu ji nian lu*. This source, now lost, indicated that Wen Deyi, along with Sha-tuo troops, may have done battle with some Uighurs in the fourth year of the Kaicheng era. Sima Guang pointed out the problems with this source and apparently tended to discount this information. A memorial written by Li Deyu **[Doc. 3]**, however,

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the autumn of 840 appears to have been relatively peaceful, despite a statement from one source that some Uighurs robbed from the Tiande Army around 29 October 840.[3] Although the border officials were no doubt shocked to witness the arrival of this large body of Uighurs, it must have quickly become apparent to them that this was not a raiding force, nor indeed a force with hostile intent. But they had no idea why these Uighurs had arrived at the border, nor what they wanted.

This first group of Uighurs to arrive at the Tang frontier were led by a brother (or brothers) of the deceased qaghan (apparently He-sa Qaghan, although this is not certain), chief among whom was Ormïzt (Chinese Wo-mo-si)[4] Tigin. Other important leaders within this group included Naghïd Chor (Chinese Na-xie Chuo)[5] and the ministers Chi-

indicates that a conflict between Wen Deyi and some Uighurs may indeed have taken place at that time. These Uighurs may have been a group which fled from the upheaval within the Uighur empire before the final Kirghiz assault.

[3] *JTS* 8: 240.

[4] Chavannes and Pelliot identified this name as a Chinese transcription of Sogdian *wrmzt* (Ormuzd), "Jupiter (jeudi)"; see "Un traité manichéen retrouvé en Chine, traduit et annoté, deuxième partie," 166 and 287, as well as Huber, "Études de littérature bouddhique," 40-41. This name, which appears in the Uighur-language *Xuāstvānīft* as Xormuzta, is that of the "First Man" or "Primal Man" in the Manichaean religion. Its derivation is from the name Ahura Mazda; see Asmussen, *Manichaean Literature*, 69 and Asmussen, *Xuāstvānīft: Studies in Manichaeism*, 13. The name appears in the *Maḫrnâmag* as *'ormizd*, which Müller rendered as Ormizd; see "Ein Doppelblatt aus einem manichäischen Hymnenbuch (Maḫrnâmag)," 16. It also appears in two Old Turkic texts. In one, the name is given without full vocalization as *o/urmzt*, which von Le Coq rendered as Ormazt; see von Le Coq, "Köktürkisches aus Turfan," 1053 and Pl. "ms. T.M. 327 Vorderseite." In the other text, the name appears in full vocalization as *o/urmïzt*, which Thomsen transcribed as Urmïzt, suggesting that this might represent W(u)rmïzt; see Thomsen, "Ein Blatt in türkischer 'Runen'schrift aus Turfan," 302 and Pl. Based on this evidence, it seems that the proper Turkic form of this name, at least during the period under consideration here, must be Ormïzt. The term *tigin* is well known within the Old Turkic and Uighur context as a high-ranking title corresponding to "prince," used for the sons and brothers of the ruler (qaghan). As for his position with the Uighur royal family, *ZZTJ* states simply that Ormïzt was the brother of an Uighur qaghan; see *ZZTJ* 246: 7947. In addition to *tigin*, he is also referred to as a king's son (*wang zi*, apparently a translation of *tigin*) in *XTS* 217b: 6131, a great chieftain (*da shouling*) in *JTS* 18a: 588, and even as a minister (*xiang*) in *ZZTJKY* 246: 7942, quoting from *Hou Tang xian zu ji nian lu*. Since *ZZTJ* is not more specific, it perhaps should be taken to mean that Ormïzt was the brother of the most recent qaghan, i.e., He-sa Qaghan. While He-sa's relationship to the two preceding qaghans is unknown, it is clear that he was placed on the throne by the usurping power of the minister Küräbir.

[5] This name was recognized by Chavannes and Pelliot as a Chinese transcription of Sogdian *nāχiδ* (Nahid), "Vénus (vendredi)"; see Chavannes and Pelliot, "Un traité manichéen retrouvé en Chine, traduit et annoté, deuxième partie," 166 and 287, as well as Huber, "Études de littérature bouddhique," 40-41. To my knowledge, this name appears only once in an Old Turkic text, where it is given as *naghïd*; see Thomsen, "Ein Blatt in türkischer 'Runen'schrift aus Turfan," 302 and Pl. Based on this evidence—and the general absence of *h* in Old Turkic—the proper form for this name in this context should be Naghïd. The title *chor* is also well-known as that of a high-ranking official within the Uighur hierarchy.

xin[6] and Pu-gu.[7] Given the importance of the Sogdians in the Uighur empire, it is quite likely that there were Sogdians among these Uighur refugees. In fact, the names Ormïzt and Naghïd both are of Sogdian origin, and reflect the great influence of the Sogdians and Manichaeism among the Uighurs. After reaching the area near Tiande, the Uighurs, who were low on provisions, traded for foodstuffs and apparently expressed a desire to be allowed to enter Tang territory. The border

[6] It is unclear if this is a Chinese transcription of a Turkic (or other) name, or is to be regarded as a Chinese-style given name (*ming*). The reconstructed Tang pronunciation (for which see *GKWD*, 1267 and 455) seems similar to the Turkic name or title *chikshin* which appears in one of the Yenisei inscriptions as *chikshn* and again as *chi*[gap of one letter]*sn*; see Orkun, *Eski Türk Yazıtları*, vol. 3, 116. The name or title Chikshin/Chiksin is possibly related to the known Turkic title *chigshi* (for which see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 417), which was itself a loan-word from Chinese *cishi*, "prefect"; see Ecsedy, "Old Turkic Titles of Chinese Origin," 86-87. Chinese Chi-xin, which has the meaning "red-hearted," i.e., "sincere, compassionate," appears elsewhere in Chinese sources as the personal name or title of non-Chinese persons. It was the personal name of the Sha-tuo leader Zhu-ye Chi-xin, later known as Li Guochang. Chinese sources mention an Uighur embassy to China of 782 which was led by a man named Kang Chixin; see Mackerras, "Sino-Uighur Diplomatic and Trade Contacts," 229. He most likely was a Sogdian whose family originated in Samarkand; see Pulleyblank, "A Sogdian Colony in Inner Mongolia," 320. Thus we see Chi-xin as the name (and almost certainly not a title) of an Uighur minister, a Sha-tuo chieftain, and a Sogdian ambassador in the employ of an Uighur qaghan. It should be noted that Zhu-ye Chi-xin had a younger brother named Zhu-ye Chi-zhong; see *XTS* 218: 6156. Chinese *zhong*, the final character in his given name (*ming*), has meanings quite similar to *xin*, "heart." It is still common for Chinese families to give siblings of the same sex generational names which share a common character. In the case of the Zhu-ye family, at least, it seems that Chi-xin and Chi-zhong functioned as Chinese names and were not transcriptions of foreign names, although that possibility cannot be completely discounted, nor can we ignore the possibility that these were translations of foreign (i.e., non-Chinese) names.

[7] This is a well-known Turkic name which appears in Chinese sources as one of the tribes of the Tie-le or Te-le tribal confederation; see *JTS* 195: 5195, *XTS* 142a: 6111, and *THY* 96: 1725. But *THY* 98: 1744 also lists the Pu-gu as one of the "nine clans" (*jiu xing*), which have been identified as the Toquz Oghuz of the Old Turkic inscriptions; see Pulleyblank, "Some Remarks on the Toquzoghuz Problem," 39-40. Although the Turkic form of the name Pu-gu, which is a surname (or tribal name used as a surname), does not appear in any known Turkic source, its form is thought to be something like Buqu(t); see Czeglédy, "On the Numerical Composition of the Ancient Turkish Tribal Confederations," 276 and Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 2n.

officials at Tiande were, however, skeptical. On 11 November Wen Deyi, an imperial commissioner of the Tiande Army, sent a memorial to the court which claimed that the Uighurs were encroaching on the Western City for Receiving Submission (Xi Shouxiangcheng), just west of Tiande, and that the border populace was agitated and fearful of possible warfare because of the great number of Uighurs there. Their tents filled the horizon. "From east to west for 60 *li*," Wen Deyi wrote, "I cannot see the end of them."[8]

Li Deyu and Tang Wuzong

The government at the Tang capital of Chang'an which received this news was in many respects new. Emperor Wenzong (r. 827–840) had died on 10 February 840, and his younger brother Li Chan, to be known as Emperor Wuzong (r. 840–846), had ascended the throne on 20 February at the age of 25.[9] The newly-enthroned emperor was the son of Emperor Muzong and Empress Wei.[10] He was Muzong's fifth son, and his third (and last) to reign as emperor.

The new emperor had lost little time in appointing as one of his chief ministers the brilliant Li Deyu (787–850), who quickly emerged as the most powerful person at the court of this relatively young emperor.[11] Li Deyu was the scion of a politically prominent family. His grandfather, Li Xiyu (ca. 719–776), was an important official during the reign of the emperor Daizong (r. 762–778).[12] His father, Li Jifu (758–814),

[8] *ZZTJ* 246: 7947; see also *ZZTJKY* 246: 7954. A *li* is approximately one-third of a mile.

[9] The basic annals (*benji*) of Tang Wuzong may be found in *JTS* 18a: 583-611 and *XTS* 8: 239-245. The exact date of his birth is uncertain. *JTS* 18a: 583 gives it as 2 July 814 (the twelfth day of the sixth month of the ninth year of the Yuanhe reign era), while *THY* 2: 13 gives it as the previous day, i.e., the eleventh day of the same month, 1 July 814. The diary of the Japanese monk Ennin supports the date of 1 July 814, making it the more likely one; see Reischauer, *Ennin's Diary*, 250, especially n. 935. On Wuzong's various imperial titles, see *THY* 2: 13-14. As Wenzong had died shortly after the beginning of the new year (the fifth year of the Kaicheng reign era), Wuzong retained that designation throughout that year, changing the reign title to Huichang only the following year, on the ninth day of the first month (4 February 841); see Hiraoka, *Tōdai no koyomi*, 276.

[10] *THY* 2: 13.

[11] Biographies of Li Deyu may be found in *JTS* 174: 4509-4530 and *XTS* 180: 5327-5344.

[12] Li Xiyu's biography may be found in *XTS* 146: 4735-4737.

was himself a chief minister under the emperor Xianzong.[13] Li Deyu had held several provincial posts prior to 840, and had served briefly as chief minister under the emperor Wenzong.[14] He was an essayist, a poet, and a fancier of rare plants, unusual stones, and works of art.[15] He also was no stranger to issues of border defense, for one of his provincial postings had been as military governor of Xichuan in modern Sichuan, which he took up in October 830. This was a sensitive position, as Xichuan had just suffered from an invasion by the forces of the state of Nanzhao on Tang China's southwestern frontier. Although he was there for less than two years, Li Deyu quickly gained an understanding of the situation in Xichuan and did an exemplary job of improving its defenses. In the execution of his duties, he revealed an ability to comprehend and cope with a wide range of details, which impressed the court at Chang'an and contributed to his being recalled to the capital to serve as chief minister under Wenzong.[16]

Although Wuzong appointed other chief ministers,[17] as was the norm during the Tang period, none enjoyed the power and influence that Li Deyu held. His supremacy can be seen in the fact that his official appointment was as left vice-director of the Department of State Affairs, a title of particular importance in the Tang era.[18] As

[13] For biographies of Li Jifu, see *JTS* 148: 3992-3997 and *XTS* 146: 4738-4744. Li Jifu was the author of an important geographical work, *Yuanhe jun xian tuzhi*. For further information on Li Deyu's family, see Tang, *Li Deyu yanjiu*, 17-43. For a list of the various offices Li Deyu held throughout his career, see Tang, *Li Deyu yanjiu*, 100-104.

[14] See *JTS* 174: 4509-4521 *passim* and *XTS* 180: 5327-5334 *passim*.

[15] Li Deyu's poetry (*shi*) and prose rhapsodies (*fu*) may be found in his collected works (*HCYPJ* and *LWRWJ*); the former may also be found in *QTS* 475: 5387-5417, while the latter may also be found in *QTW* 696: 9047-9057 and 697: 9061-9067. For a consideration of his literary output, see Zhou, "Consider the Sun and Moon: Li Te-yü and the Written Word." Regarding the chief minister's interest in unusual stones and plants, see Schafer, "Li Te-yü and the Azalea."

[16] Backus, *The Nan-chao Kingdom and T'ang China's Southwestern Frontier*, 123-126.

[17] For a list, see *THY* 2: 14.

[18] Because Tang Taizong had held the position of director of the Department of State Affairs during his father's reign, that position remained unfilled throughout the remainder of the Tang period. The Department of State Affairs, the "working administrative agency" of the Tang central government, was headed by two vice-directors, with the left enjoying precedence over the right, as was customary. See Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China*, 29, 394-395, and 522. As Hucker has noted, the vice-directors of the Department of State Affairs, as well as the directors and vice-directors of the Secretariat and Chancellery, all served as chief ministers by virtue of their offices; note that by the late Tang the Secretariat and

noted by Michael Dalby, Li Deyu was "given the practical power to make almost all important decisions on the government's behalf. His method, so far as we know, involved minimal consultation, a thorough review of pertinent information and intelligence, and then a period of withdrawal in his garden, where he produced his plans alone."[19] This is not to say that the emperor was a puppet in Li's hands,[20] but Wuzong seems to have accepted Li's proposals most of the time, particularly in regard to the Uighur crisis. It was Li Deyü who personally oversaw the handling of this crisis from beginning to end, consistently submitting his suggestions to the emperor for approval and, judging from all available evidence, receiving that approval just as consistently. Indeed, one wonders just how much the emperor was personally involved in decision-making in this and other matters; during the period of the Uighur crisis, for example, the emperor found time for imperial hunting excursions, of which he was particularly fond.[21]

The First Chinese Defensive Maneuvers

The court's first response after receiving Wen Deyi's memorial was to contact the area's highest-ranking military official: Liu Mian,[22] military governor of Zhenwu, east of Tiande. Liu had spent much of his life in the north in the region of Zhenwu, and was by this time a seasoned border general in his late fifties.[23] He had experience in commanding non-Chinese troops, which was to prove useful to him during the Uighur crisis. Characterized as "brave and valiant, good at riding and shooting [the bow],"[24] Liu Mian was said to profit from the guidance of two supernatural lights which directed him away from danger whenever he was in peril.[25]

Chancellery had been merged into a single office. See Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China*, 30 and 193.

[19] Dalby, "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," 661.

[20] See, for example, Dalby, "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," 663.

[21] *ZZTJ* 246: 7957, 7968 and 248: 8013.

[22] Biographies of Liu Mian may be found in *JTS* 161: 4233-4234 and *XTS* 171: 5194-5195.

[23] Liu Mian died in the sixth year of the Huichang period (31 January 846–20 January 847), aged 65 *sui*; see *JTS* 161: 4234 and *XTS* 171: 5195.

[24] *JTS* 161: 4233.

[25] *JTS* 161: 4234.

Liu Mian was ordered to camp at the Yunjia Pass[26] to prepare for a possible Uighur attack. While there is evidence to indicate that the Uighurs of Ormïzt's group did engage in some minor violations at the border,[27] nothing which could be termed an attack on Tiande or the Western City for Receiving Submission took place at this time. In the first month of the first year of Wuzong's Huichang reign period (27 January–24 February 841), Liu Mian memorialized that the Uighurs had withdrawn, and so was ordered to return to his garrison at Zhenwu.[28] This "withdrawal" of the Uighurs did not mean that they had left the Tang frontier completely. Ormïzt and his followers were in fact still in the vicinity. Liu Mian appears to have been satisfied that the Uighurs were not a serious threat. It may be that, since they desired asylum from the Tang court, they had pulled back a bit from the border to display their peaceful intentions, or they may have withdrawn out of fear that Liu Mian would attack them. In any event, the Uighur pressure on China's northern frontier was reduced. Nevertheless, the refugees still hovered nearby.

The Tang court naturally wished that the Uighurs would simply leave the border region and return to their homeland. Unaware of the particulars surrounding the *débâcle* on the Orkhon, the court nevertheless had received intelligence of its broad outlines. Some time prior to 27 March 841,[29] Li Deyu composed his first letter to the Uighurs **[Doc. 1]**. Written in the emperor's name, the letter was addressed to no particular leader and revealed the court's general lack of information about the Uighurs' circumstances as well as its desire to stabilize the border as quickly as possible. The letter was conciliatory but censorious. In what was to become a common theme throughout Tang correspondence with the Uighur refugees, this first letter spoke of the previous good relations enjoyed by the two empires and the benefits that had accrued from them. It then chastised the Uighurs for having marred those relations by disturbing the border region, and encouraged them to select a new ruler—one close to China—and recover their

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[26] While the exact location of this pass is uncertain, a note to *ZZTJ* 246: 7947 states, "Yunjia Pass is in Shanyu Prefecture. The military governorship of Zhenwu controls Shanyu Prefecture."

[27] See **Doc. 1**.

[28] *ZZTJ* 246: 7948.

[29] See Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 123-124. Tsai incorrectly dated this document to July 842; see his "Li Tê-yü'nün mektuplarına göre Uygurlar," 101-103.

homeland. The Chinese did not yet realize the extent of the Uighur defeat. Their overriding desire was to rid the frontier of destabilizing forces; to this end, the letter stated that the border generals had been ordered not to engage in battle with the Uighurs, apparently to allow them to retreat from the frontier in an orderly fashion. The letter also expressed the emperor's concern for the Taihe Princess, who had been married to the Uighur qaghan in 821. As the daughter of the emperor Tang Xianzong, the Taihe Princess was the paternal aunt of Wuzong as well as his two immediate predecessors, Jingzong (r. 824–827) and Wenzong. It was of course incumbent upon Wuzong to show concern for her as a display of filial piety. But Ormïzt and his group did not know where the princess was. Her career as a pawn of international politics was continuing on the steppe, in a manner that was to become a matter of great concern for the Chinese court.

After this first letter had been sent, several months passed, apparently without significant incident along the frontier. In the eighth month (20 August–18 September 841),[30] Li Deyu composed another letter, again in the emperor's name, this time addressed specifically to Ormïzt Tigin and the nobles of his group **[Doc. 2]**. This was in response to a letter that Ormïzt had given to Tang officials at Tiande, to be forwarded to the court at Chang'an. Ormïzt's letter, which does not survive, explained the circumstances of the Uighurs' downfall (apparently including the information that tribes other than the Kirghiz had been instrumental in the Uighurs' collapse) and had requested asylum within China for his followers. Li Deyu's response makes it clear that the Chinese were not eager to allow the Uighurs into their territory; they much preferred that they return northward to reclaim their homeland. The letter also indicated that the Tang court was now aware of the enthronement of a new Uighur qaghan, but was unaware of his whereabouts—and those of the Taihe Princess.

This letter is important in establishing a pattern of rhetoric that was to become important in the ensuing diplomatic exchanges. Although it does not do so explicitly, by mentioning the Wuyuan Pass (not far from Tiande) it alluded to the submission of the Xiong-nu ruler Hu-han-ye to the Han emperor Xuandi in the winter of 52/51 B.C.E.—an event that we have already noted as being of great significance not only to the history of the Han dynasty, but to Chinese ways of thinking

[30] *ZZTJKY* 246: 7953. It seems clear from the account in *ZZTJ* that this document is to be dated prior to the next **[Doc. 3]**, which is dated 12 September 841.

about relations with nomadic peoples. Just as the Tang Chinese saw themselves in many respects as the inheritors of the Han, they also saw the Uighurs as successors of the Xiong-nu. The Xiong-nu *shan-yu* Hu-han-ye had become a symbol of proper behavior for a nomadic leader in dire straits. Now that another prince from the steppe had asked to submit to China almost nine centuries later, it is not surprising that Li Deyu should refer to the events surrounding Hu-han-ye as a fitting parallel. The letter's tone concealed the fact that the Tang state was in fact relatively weak in regard to its border defenses, and presented the Chinese emperor in his full splendor as lord of the world, whose only desire was that all peoples be at peace. The letter was taken by Zhang Jia, an official who held the title of president of the Court for Diplomatic Relations and who had been made a commissioner of the border patrol for his mission to the Uighurs. Zhang Jia was to meet with the Uighur leaders in order to allow them to explain their intentions, which Zhang would then convey to the Tang court.[31]

Mounting Tension at the Frontier

While the court at Chang'an was trying to foster a peaceful arrangement at the frontier, other forces were at work to unravel those efforts. At Tiande, the imperial commissioner Tian Mou[32] and the army supervisor Wei Zhongping were eager to expel the Uighurs. They submitted a memorial stating that the Tu-yu-hun, Sha-tuo, and Tang-uts, all non-Chinese tribes which had been settled in Tang territory in the Tiande region under the "loose-rein" system, had long been enemies of the Uighurs and wished to attack them now that they were menacing the border. Many officials at court approved of this plan, but Li Deyu denounced it, citing the Uighurs' previous merit during the An Lushan rebellion, their current poverty, and the restraint that they had shown thus far at the border as reasons why such a strike should not be allowed. He urged the emperor to send envoys to pacify the Uighurs and to transport provisions to them, just as Han Xuandi had done for Hu-han-ye. Again, Li Deyu employed this centuries-old precedent to make a point. As we have noted, although the Han

[31] *ZZTJ* 246: 7953.

[32] Brief biographies of Tian Mou may be found in *JTS* 141: 3854 and *XTS* 148: 4786-4787.

emperor Wudi had campaigned aggressively against the Xiong-nu for years, he had been unsuccessful in breaking their power. In contrast, Han Xuandi had maintained a foreign policy that was essentially non-expansionistic; and while Hu-han-ye's submission was due to civil war within the Xiong-nu empire, Chinese historians and bureaucrats had traditionally viewed it as the result of Xuandi's wise and virtuous policies. Li Deyu's praise of Han Xuandi, and its implied criticism of Wudi, would not have been lost on any of the officials present at the court debate. Still, some of them continued to oppose him. Li Deyu then pointed out that Tiande had only some 1000 troops available for its defense, and that the peoples who had requested permission to attack the Uighurs would "scatter like startled birds or fish" if they perceived that the battle was going against them. He concluded his argument by stating that it would be better to pacify the Uighurs than to attack them, but that if an attack were precipitated by an Uighur invasion, it would require far more manpower than Tiande alone could muster.[33] It is clear, then, that despite the presence of the Uighur refugees little if anything had been done to fortify the frontier against them.

Li Deyu then submitted a memorial to the emperor which requested that Tian Mou be restrained from acting rashly against the Uighurs **[Doc. 3]**. It is probably to be dated on or just prior to 12 September 841, the day that the decree to restrain Tian Mou was issued.[34] Li Deyu's argument had succeeded in winning the emperor's support, as it so often did. The chief minister's memorial pointed out that he was receiving at least some intelligence from Uighur sources, and relied upon both moral and pragmatic arguments to convince the emperor. Li referred to the Uighurs as "a poor bird" which had flown to the Tang bosom for protection and mentioned the apparent sincerity of their petition of submission. Returning to the *topos* of Han Xuandi and Hu-han-ye, the memorial reminded Wuzong that many Han court officials also had wished to use force against Hu-han-ye when he offered submission, but that the virtuous Xiao Wangzhi had urged kindness, and this policy, which was adopted, had been successful in establishing peace at the northern frontier. On the practical side, Li Deyu argued that it was quite possible that Tian Mou and his non-

[33] *ZZTJ* 246: 7952-7953.
[34] *ZZTJ* and *ZZTJKT* 246: 7954.

Chinese allies might not be successful, and that this would lead to a difficult and embarrassing situation. He urged the emperor to order the northern garrisons to be on alert for Uighur attacks and to ignore minor skirmishes that might break out between the Uighurs and the non-Chinese "loose-rein" peoples in Tang territory. Finally, Li Deyu encouraged the emperor to be particularly attentive to affairs in the autonomous province of Youzhou, which was at that time politically unstable. He singled out a military official named Zhang Zhongwu,[35] at that time an officer of the Xiongwu Army in Youzhou, as an important figure in regard to the Tang court's interests in that province. Located directly to the east of the region in which the Uighur situation was unfolding, Youzhou could prove important in the overall affair. It thus makes sense that Li Deyu would refer to the situation in Youzhou in a memorial concerning the Uighurs.

Li Deyu's memorial is proof that Ormïzt's Uighurs had committed no violation of the border peace for at least the two months prior to the writing of the memorial. Li Deyu would not allow an attack on the Uighurs simply to satisfy Tian Mou's vainglory or desire for revenge. Still, he realized that the border situation could change abruptly, and so thought it best that troops in the region be prepared for a possible attack. But he wanted to wait for Zhang Jia's return to gain a better understanding of the circumstances there. In the meantime, Li Deyu's concerns regarding Youzhou were heightened, as the province's Lulong Army mutinied on 14 October 841. This mutiny was followed by another which occurred before mid-November. Not long after that, Zhang Zhongwu was able to take the position of military governor of Youzhou with the help of the Tang central government, and restored order there.[36] Although he retained his autonomy, he proved to be reasonably cooperative with the Tang court. As we shall see, he was to play an important role in the Uighur crisis.

In the meantime, after Zhang Jia had returned to Chang'an, probably in the intercalary ninth month (18 October–16 November 841),[37] Li Deyu submitted another memorial which discussed the border situation **[Doc. 4]**. This memorial, which reveals that the Chinese court

[35] Biographies of Zhang Zhongwu may be found in *JTS* 180: 4677-4679 and *XTS* 212: 5980-5981.
[36] *ZZTJ* 246: 7955-7958.
[37] On this date, see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 134, n. 1.

could not ascertain the number of Uighurs who actually were at the frontier, set forth Li Deyu's fears that Tang forces in the north were not sufficient to defeat them. It also developed further the theme of Han Xuandi's wise policies as opposed to those of Han Wudi. Urging the emperor to bestow various gifts upon the Uighurs, who were short on provisions, Li Deyu pointed out that even if the court decided later to attack the Uighurs, it would be wise to treat them kindly at first in order to allay their suspicions. Thus it would seem that Li Deyu's "poor bird" metaphor in the previous memorial may not have been free from insincerity, since it was aimed almost exclusively at getting the emperor to assent to his own plan, rather than that of his rivals. Although Li Deyu's memorials are laden with references to what he considered to be the morally proper course of action, it seems that the chief minister's primary concern was the weakness of the northern defenses rather than strict adherence to moral rectitude. To achieve his aims, he bolstered discussion of his pragmatic policies with Confucian rhetoric and precedents that would have had great resonance for the emperor as well as Li's fellow officials.

While the emperor did not make an immediate decision about granting provisions to the Uighurs, he did order Li Deyu to compose an imperial edict to be sent to them **[Doc. 5]**. This edict is a prime example of the chief minister's persuasive art. Since the emperor had agreed to restrain Tian Mou from attacking the Uighurs at Li Deyu's request, the chief minister certainly did not want the Uighurs to perpetrate violence along the border. Such a conflict would not only cause a military crisis for China, but would also be politically embarrassing for Li Deyu, who still cherished hopes that the Uighurs would somehow manage to return to their homeland. Since the newly-enthroned qaghan had not yet contacted the Tang court, Li Deyu was wary of being overly cordial to Ormïzt, in the fear that this might prove to be a political blunder that could complicate relations with the new qaghan. He in fact urged Ormïzt to show consideration for the new qaghan with a quote from the Confucian sage Mencius: "There has never been a humane person who abandoned his relative, nor a righteous person who neglected his sovereign."[38] It seems that Li Deyu feared

[38] This is a close paraphrase of a passage from Book I of the *Mencius*. Legge translated this passage as "There never has been a benevolent man who neglected his parents. There never has been a righteous man who made his sovereign an after consideration"; see Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, vol. 2: *The Works of Mencius*, 127.

that Ormïzt and the others would not support the new qaghan, or might prefer to stay at the Chinese border rather than go home to face a difficult campaign to retake the Mongolian plateau. He therefore was unwilling to comply with Ormïzt's request that he be allowed to come to Chang'an, lest it cause anxiety for the new qaghan. Li Deyu clearly was concerned about proper protocol in the matter, and did not wish to alienate the new qaghan—who might be leading an even larger group of Uighurs, and who might later succeed in regaining power on the steppe.

Li Deyu's suspicions concerning Ormïzt's feelings toward the new qaghan might have been aroused in part by the fact that Zhang Jia had reported an Uighur request for weapons and armor. This request was summarily refused, but the refusal was softened by the bestowal of various other gifts. Why had Ormïzt requested weapons and armor? He may have wished to obtain them for protection against the more immediate danger of the nearby Tu-yu-hun, Sha-tuo, and Tanguts, but it may be that, as Li Deyu apparently was beginning to suspect, there was hostility between Ormïzt and the man who now claimed sovereignty over the Uighurs. The lack of any contact with the new qaghan was a matter of great concern for the Chinese, although Li Deyu and others still harbored hopes that all the Uighur refugees would join together with their new ruler to retake their homeland.

Li Deyu cannot have been aware of the intricate factions and rivalries among the Uighurs. While he told Ormïzt that the latter should honor the propriety of the relations between lord and retainer and thus serve the new qaghan, the chief minister had persuaded Emperor Wuzong that since Ormïzt's group had come to the border in the ninth month of the previous year (30 September–28 October 840) and the new qaghan was not enthroned until the second month of the present year (25 February–26 March 841), the two men did not have "the distinction of ruler and subject between them."[39] Ormïzt could not be considered a rebel since he had fled the attacking Kirghiz (as had other groups of Uighurs, who had migrated in other directions) and offered submission to the Tang court before the elevation of the new qaghan. The Chinese clearly hoped to keep peace at the border without antagonizing the new Uighur ruler.

With the approach of the winter of 841/842, Li Deyu requested

[39] *ZZTJ* 246: 7953.

that 30,000 *shi* (ca. 2394 U.S. tons)[40] of grain be sent to the Uighur refugees. It has already been seen that Ormïzt Tigin had requested provisions from the Tang government. The chief minister no doubt wished to avoid the raids which were likely to occur should the refugees at the border find themselves without adequate supplies for the winter. On 20 October 841, Emperor Wuzong, who was as yet undecided in the matter of granting food to the Uighurs, convened a meeting of his chief ministers to discuss the question. Present among them was Li Deyu's antagonist Chen Yixing,[41] who had led the argument against Li's earlier suggestion that Ormïzt and his followers be granted provisions. Once again he opposed Li Deyu's plan. In response, Li Deyu is said to have remarked, "Now, the troops that we have levied [to go to the northern border] have not yet been assembled. Tiande is alone and in danger. If we do not give the famished barbarians this grain to eat and thereby keep the peace, Tiande almost certainly will be captured. And who would be to blame for this?"[42] As the Song historian Sima Guang noted, these words "certainly put a clamp on Chen Yixing's beak!"[43] The emperor was persuaded by the practicality of Li Deyu's argument, and ordered that provisions be sent to the Uighurs. The amount to be sent, however, was reduced to 20,000 *shi* (nearly 1600 U.S. tons).[44]

Li Deyu's retort to Chen Yixing reveals that troops indeed were being levied for the protection of the northern frontier cities against a possible Uighur attack. These must be the 6000 troops that Li requested in a memorial which dates from about the same time as the discussion mentioned above, i.e. October or November 841 **[Doc. 6]**.[45] The

[40] During the Tang era, *shi* and *hu* were equivalent measurements, with the former commonly used to indicate weight and the latter used for volume; see Balász, "Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte der T'ang-Zeit (618-906)," part 3, 44. In texts pertaining to this particular question, the two terms are used interchangeably; see **Doc. 8** as well as *JTS* 174: 4522, *XTS* 180: 5336, and *ZZTJ* 246: 7954. According to Balász, one *shi* = 72.544 kg. Thus 30,000 *shi* = 2,176,320 kg., equivalent to about 4,787,904 lbs. avoirdupois, or almost 2394 U.S. tons. These figures should be regarded as approximations.

[41] Biographies of Chen Yixing may be found in *JTS* 173: 4494-4497 and *XTS* 181: 5345-5347.

[42] *ZZTJ* 246: 7954-7955.

[43] *ZZTJJKY* 246: 7954.

[44] *ZZTJ* 246: 7955.

[45] According to Cen Zhongmian, the memorial should be dated to some time between the intercalary ninth month and the eleventh month, i.e., between 18 October and 16 December 841; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang,"

memorial pointed out that the Uighurs still were in difficult straits, and could not consider returning to reclaim their homeland at the onset of winter. Although Li Deyu then claimed not to be concerned about an Uighur attack, he did express concern that the Tibetans would take advantage of the situation to cause trouble for China, and possibly seize Chinese territory. It is for this reason that Li Deyu requested that 6000 infantry troops be sent to Taiyuan to reinforce northern defenses. The Tibetans had gained control of the territory west of the great bend of the Yellow River during the chaotic years of the An Lushan rebellion, and so were a very real threat to the Tang northwestern border.[46] By sending reinforcements to Taiyuan, Li Deyu hoped to strengthen both China's northern and western flanks. The number of troops seems rather small, but it is difficult to ascertain the significance of this since the number of troops already at Taiyuan and other northern cities is unknown.

The Arrival of the Second Group of Refugees

In the eleventh month (17 December 841–15 January 842), Li Deyu submitted a memorial expressing concern about the fate of the emperor's aunt, the Taihe Princess **[Doc. 7]**. This memorial, which is probably to be dated to the first half of the month (i.e., prior to 1 January 842),[47] indicates that the court still did not know the whereabouts of the new Uighur qaghan, but hoped to contact him (and thus the princess) with the assistance of Ormïzt Tigin. In it, Li Deyu suggested that a Chinese envoy with a handful of light cavalry be sent out to take her an imperial letter with an escort (and presumably guides) provided by Ormïzt. His purpose in sending the letter was not only to make contact with the princess, but also to show foreign peoples that marriage to a Tang princess was a precious boon, the granting of which was a mark of extraordinary favor which meant the establishment of a truly firm bond between the Chinese imperial house and the foreign ruler to whom she was given in marriage. His purpose in suggesting an escort from Ormïzt Tigin was not only

137, n. 1. All the available evidence seems to point to a date in the earlier part of this period, probably October or November.

[46] On the loss of Chinese territory to the Tibetans, see Cen, *Sui Tang shi*, vol. 1, 275-282 and Beckwith, *The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia*, 143-147.

[47] *ZZTJJKY* 246: 7955. See also *ZZTJ* 246: 7957.

to obtain guides for the envoy, but also to test the Uighur prince's sincerity.

Wuzong agreed to Li Deyu's request; his order putting it into action is extant but undated.[48] According to the sources which have survived, it was in the latter part of the eleventh month (ca. 1–15 January 842) that an envoy from the princess herself arrived at the Tang capital. This envoy informed the court that the new Uighur ruler, Ögä (Chinese Wu-jie)[49] Qaghan, requested imperial appointment from the Chinese court in the tradition of his ancestors.[50] The princess was in his camp, for her Kirghiz escort had been ambushed and massacred by the qaghan's followers before they could return her to China.[51] Her rescue thus was short-lived, and she was once again in the custody of the Uighurs.

According to the sources, the new Uighur qaghan had been known as Wu-xi[52] Tigin prior to his elevation to the position of sovereign by thirteen Uighur tribes. The new qaghan was the younger brother of Qasar Qaghan and the uncle (father's younger brother) of Hu Tigin Qaghan.[53] His relationship to Ormïzt is unclear, although the available evidence suggests that they were members of rival factions

[48] *QTW* 76: 997. This brief document contains nothing of interest to this study.

[49] Although the Turkic form of Wu-jie (for the Tang pronunciation, see *GKWD* 789 and 45) has not been conclusively proven, many scholars have suggested that it is a transcription of the well-known Turkic title *ögä/ügä*; see Müller, "Ein Doppelblatt aus einem manichäischen Hymnenbuch (Maḫrnâmag)," 30, as well as Chavannes and Pelliot, "Un traité manichéen retrouvé en Chine, traduit et annoté, deuxième partie," 247. Radloff gave the title in the form *ögä* and defined it as "die Ehre"; see Radloff, *Versuch eines Wörterbuches der Türk-Dialecte*, vol. 1/2, 1192. Doerfer preferred the form *ügä* and defined it as "ein tü[rkisch] und mo[ngolisch] Titel, etwa: Ratgeber"; see his *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen*, vol. 2, 157-159. *DTS* (p. 379) gives *ögä* as the correct form for this title, which it defines as "wise, sage, wise man," adding that it is derived from Turkic *ög*, "reason, mind, thought" (p. 378). Clauson also preferred *ögä*, claiming that *ügä* was "impossible for etymological reasons" as both *ögä* and *ög* were derived from Turkic *ö-*, "to think." He defined *ögä* as "roughly equivalent to 'Counsellor'"; see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 101, 99, and 3-4. For an opposing viewpoint, see Doerfer, *loc. cit.* Finally, for more on this name/title, see Bailey, "Turks in Khotanese Texts," 91 and Müller, "Ein Doppelblatt aus einem manichäischen Hymnenbuch (Maḫrnâmag)," 19, 33, 34, and 36-38.

[50] *ZZTJKY* 246: 7955, based on the *Wuzong shilu*, which is no longer extant.

[51] *ZZTJ* 246: 7957.

[52] For the Tang pronunciation, see *GKWD* 789 and 404. This suggests no Turkic name or title.

[53] *THY* 98: 1749.

within the Uighur aristocracy. We have seen that Ormïzt was likely the brother of He-sa Qaghan, who had been placed on the throne by the minister Küräbir in an act of usurpation in 839. Ögä, however, was apparently related to the two previous rulers, Qasar Qaghan and Hu Tigin Qaghan. It would seem, then, that the two men were leaders of rival Uighur factions—no doubt descended from the same factions involved in the bloodshed which rent the Uighur court in the 830s. This hypothesis is strengthened by the overt hostility between Ögä and Ormïzt, which quickly becomes apparent from the Chinese sources. It would also explain why the latter fled so quickly to China to request asylum, and why he proved so eager to assist the Tang court in the destruction of Ögä Qaghan.

Ögä Qaghan, who had thus far kept his distance from the Tang border region, had approached closer at the end of 841 or in the first days of 842. Although the sources are somewhat confused, this seems to be the Tang court's first contact with the new Uighur ruler.[54] At about the same time, an Uighur minister, known only by his title of *il-ögäsi*[55] (Chinese *xie-yu-jia-si*), also presented a petition from the qaghan

[54] According to Wuzong's basic annals in *JTS* 18a: 588, Ögä Qaghan had already sent an official to China in the eighth month (20 August–18 September 841), but Li Deyu's biography in the same work states that in the second month of the second year of the Huichang era (16 March–14 April 842), the qaghan camped at the border and sent an envoy to China to request troops and provisions to help him recover his nation, and also wanted to "borrow" Tiande to house the princess (and himself) temporarily; see *JTS* 174: 4521. The biography then places Tian Mou's request to attack the Uighurs after this fact, i.e., some time early in 842; see *JTS* 174: 4521-4522. This is clearly an error, as it has been shown that Tian Mou's request was made before 12 September 841 and referred to attacking Ormïzt. Sima Guang pointed out these inconsistencies and rejected the account of the basic annals, choosing instead to follow the evidence of *HCYPJ*; see *ZZTJKY* 246: 7954. If he is correct, then the best date for the arrival of the princess' envoy, and the first real contact with Ögä Qaghan's group of Uighurs, is that of the first weeks of January 842, as indicated in the *Wuzong shilu*.

[55] This probably is not the same *il-ögäsi* who was in Ormïzt's group and who is mentioned in **Doc. 2**. This is clearly a title that could be held by more than one person at any given time; see Müller, "Der Hofstaat eines Uiguren-Königs," 211. It should be noted that in some Chinese texts this title is given as *xie-gan-jia-si*. It is now accepted that the form *xie-yu-jia-si* is correct, and that this is a Chinese transcription of Turkic *il-ögäsi*. Müller translated this title as "Ruhm des Reichs"; see "Uigurica II," 93. Doerfer criticized this as "jedoch recht unsicher" and promoted the translation "Föderationsratgeber"; see Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen*, vol. 2, 157. Turkic *il* (or *el*) is generally translated as "realm"; see Clauson *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 121-122. As for *ögä*, see n. 49 above. The final element *-si* is the genitive ending in Old Turkic.

to the Chinese court.[56] It is likely that he was part of the same embassy which delivered the letter from the Taihe Princess.

The next two documents concerning the Uighurs to come from Li Deyu's brush, an imperial proclamation of pacification **[Doc. 8]** and a letter to Ögä Qaghan **[Doc. 9]**, are both to be dated to 29 January 842.[57] In the first document, Li Deyu again employed the precedent of Han Xuandi and Hu-han-ye to provide legitimacy for the court's decision to make solicitous inquiries of Ögä Qaghan and his followers, and to relieve them with 20,000 *shi* of grain. Li was careful to place the Uighurs in a subordinate relationship *vis-à-vis* the Tang empire, referring to them as "vassals" and speaking of their "submission" to Tang influence. The granting of grain was presented as a gracious act—but one intended to help the Uighurs return home, for it was still the court's desire, despite the approach of this new group of refugees, that the Uighurs somehow manage to recover their homeland. Because the amount of grain to be granted to Ögä Qaghan is the same as that previously earmarked for Ormïzt Tigin, and because the sources are confused and contradictory, it is not clear if Ormïzt was indeed granted 20,000 *shi* of grain or not, but it does seem that that amount was sent to the qaghan.[58]

[56] *ZZTJ* 246: 7957

[57] *ZZTJ* 246: 7957-7958.

[58] According to *ZZTJ* 246: 7954-7955, Li Deyu made his initial request for grain for the Uighurs some time around 14 October–17 November 841, prior to the arrival of Ögä Qaghan's envoy. This grain must have been intended for Ormïzt's group. Sima Guang wrote, "[Li] Deyu merely wanted to relieve Ormïzt and the others [of his group], and that is all. Although the emperor had agreed to give them rice, he had not yet sent his envoy when he learned that Ögä was at the border. He therefore sent Wang Hui to give him [i.e., the qaghan] 20,000 *hu* of grain, and that is all. He did not confer any grain again" (*ZZTJKY* 246: 7955). Thus, in Sima Guang's opinion, the grain originally was allocated for Ormïzt, but ultimately was sent to Ögä. In his study of Li Deyu's documents concerning the Uighur crisis, Cen Zhongmian wrote that Sima Guang had not investigated all the evidence from *HCYPJ* carefully, and raised several objections to Sima Guang's conclusion—but without offering a solution himself. Cen's objections do reveal minor flaws in Sima Guang's reasoning but are nevertheless inconclusive. For example, Cen showed that an envoy had indeed been sent from the emperor with gifts for Ormïzt before Ögä'a arrival at the border, yet could not show that these gifts included grain; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 135-136, n. 4. It would appear that they did not, since grain would have been of sufficient importance to be mentioned. Li Deyu's biography in *JTS* indicates that Ögä Qaghan's followers bartered for grain at the Chinese border. It is clear from the context, however, that either this is an error for Ormïzt's group, or the sequence of events in this part of the biography is confused. The emperor's allocation is given as 30,000 *hu*, and the group for which it was intended is not specified; see *JTS* 174: 4522. The contradictory nature of the sources makes it impossible to ascertain whether any grain was sent to Ormïzt. However, it does seem clear that 20,000 *shi* of grain was granted to Ögä Qaghan, despite the statement in Li Deyu's biography in *JTS*.

Along with grain, the qaghan was sent a long letter written by Li Deyu in the emperor's name **[Doc. 9]**. This text is quite revealing, since it is a response to Ögä's own petition that had been presented by the *il-ögäsi* (which does not survive). Although it mentioned the previous good relations between the Tang and Uighur empires and expressed a desire to assist the Uighur refugees in their need, as well as making reference to the various favors granted to the Uighurs in the past (princesses and silks), the imperial letter was primarily an elaborate justification for the Tang court's decision to refuse the qaghan's most urgent request that the court "lend" him a city in the Zhenwu region as a temporary residence for himself and the Taihe Princess. Such a request was certainly without precedent; again the story of Han Xuandi and Hu-han-ye was trotted out, along with another example from the early Tang period, to reveal the impracticality of the Uighur request. Li Deyu even suggested that such an act would be demeaning to the Uighurs, causing them to become like the small "loose-rein" tribes dwelling on the fringes of Tang territory. The letter's argument concluded with a rather clumsy attempt to encourage the qaghan to send the Taihe Princess to the Tang court.

It was probably the presence of the princess in the refugee camp that emboldened the qaghan to make his unusual request to "borrow" a Chinese city, for it was also unprecedented for a foreign ruler to come clamoring at the Chinese frontier with a Chinese imperial princess in tow. As the emperor's paternal aunt, the Taihe Princess was a valuable hostage; having her in his possession would lend weight to any request that Ögä Qaghan might make of the court in Chang'an. Still, the emperor refused. The northern border was already in a precarious situation. Handing a city over to a dispossessed Uighur ruler would only have added to its instability. Now that this second group of Uighur refugees had approached the frontier, the Tang court was no doubt even more nervous about the situation there, although (or perhaps because) it was not aware of the exact location of this new group. The court's first missive to Ögä Qaghan, while not antagonistic, could hardly be termed welcoming. No doubt the qaghan was displeased at its contents. And since the emperor had refused the qaghan's request

to "borrow" a border city, the latter refused to send the Taihe Princess to the Chinese court.

A second imperial letter to the Uighur qaghan **[Doc. 10]** was written by Li Deyu in the early part of the second year of the Huichang reign period (which year began on 14 February 842).[59] According to at least one source, this second letter is to be dated to that year's second month (16 March–14 April 842).[60] This letter repeated the court's refusal to turn over a border city to the Uighurs, and again urged them to return to their native land. It also mentioned an Uighur request for grain. It is unclear if this refers to Ögä's initial request for provisions, which would indicate that the allocated 20,000 *shi* had not yet been sent, or to a second request for grain. Sima Guang stated that the Tang letter was written in response to a communication from the Uighurs which "again" asked for provisions and "again" asked for the use of a border city.[61] It would seem that the most likely interpretation is that the Uighurs were repeating two previous requests, one of which the emperor had agreed to grant but had not yet fulfilled. It would also appear from this letter that there had been some trouble between these Uighurs and tribes of Tanguts and Tu-yu-hun living within Tang territory. The letter promised an investigation.

This letter to the Uighurs also indicated that the new qaghan had expressed concern for the Manichaeans living within China. Some, if not many, of these Manichaeans must have been Uighurs and Sogdians. As a patron of the faith, the qaghan was duty-bound to attempt to guarantee their well-being, which he astutely surmised would be threatened by the Uighur empire's collapse. While the imperial letter suggested that the Tang court would provide security for Manichaeans in China, it made no promises.

The tone of this second letter to Ögä Qaghan seems more exasperated than that of the first. In this letter the emperor struck the pose of being the sole shield between the homeless Uighurs and wrathful

[59] See Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 143, n. 1, as well as Chavannes and Pelliot, "Un traité manichéen retrouvé en Chine, traduit et annoté, deuxième partie," 289 and n. 1. Note that this is one of only a few documents under consideration here that is designated as a draft or abstract (*yi*). This indicates that the text was to be sent to the scholars of the Hanlin Academy so that they could add appropriate language; see Kaneko, "T'ang International Relations and Diplomatic Correspondence," 91, n. 21. The Hanlin additions would not have altered the meaning of the text.

[60] *ZZTJ* 246: 7958.

[61] *ZZTJ* 246: 7958.

Chinese officials and generals. The argument against lending a city to the Uighurs, while never addressing the real, strategic reason for the refusal, was a forceful case built on Confucian concepts of cosmology and the world order. Its primary point was the importance of maintaining the natural boundaries that had been ordained by Heaven and Earth, a concept of great antiquity.[62]

The Strengthening of Tang Defenses

Meanwhile, the court at Chang'an had not been idle in the matter of improving border defenses. In the first month (14 February–15 March 842), Li Shi,[63] a director in the Ministry of War, was appointed a commissioner of the border patrol in order to investigate the situation with the various frontier commanders. In the following month (16 March–14 April 842), the military governor of Hedong, Fu Che, repaired the old garrison town of Batoufeng in case of a possible Uighur attack.[64] Also in that month, Li Deyu submitted to the throne a detailed memorial discussing the repairs and other preparations that he deemed necessary for the protection of the border **[Doc. 11]**. His focus was particularly on Batoufeng and the three Cities for Receiving Submission, which had been built in approximately 708 C.E. to protect the area immediately north of the great bend of the Yellow River. This interesting document reveals the court's previous neglect of China's northern border defenses, and makes clear that much work remained to be done for the border to be made secure. It speaks of abandoned positions and the need for more troops to guard Batoufeng, as well as of the sorry state of the Cities for Receiving Submission. According to Li Deyu, the Eastern City was without troops and horses, while the Central City was nearly abandoned and its defensive wall in a state of collapse. He again urged repairs and reinforcements. Furthermore, the chief minister worried about the lack of a water source within the Eastern City, and urged the emperor to order the city's outer wall restored, since that wall protected some wells which had been dug near the inner wall's west gate. It is quite clear that

[62] See Perelomov and Martynov, *Imperial China*, 98 and 101-103, as well as the discussion in chapter 6.

[63] Li Shi's biography may be found in *XTS* 146: 4746-4747.

[64] *ZZTJ* 246: 7958.

the Tang frontier defenses were in a shambles, and equally clear that Li Deyu was seeking to do whatever was necessary to improve them in a hurry.

Despite his concern for military defenses, Li Deyu had not lost sight of political matters. In the first of Li Deyu's documents under consideration here to contain a date appended to the text, a memorial of 18 April 842 **[Doc. 12]**, he expressed concern for the political ramifications of the actions of military officials at Tiande, where small groups of Uighurs were surrendering to the Tang authorities. The Tiande officials apparently pumped these Uighurs for information and then liquidated them. Li stated his fear that if this fact were learned by other Uighurs, it would result in increased tension at the frontier. He proposed instead that surrendered Uighurs be sent to Taiyuan for resettlement within China. No response to this memorial is extant, but it is probable that the emperor acquiesced to Li's suggestion, as he typically did.

In the third month (15 April–13 May 842), Li Shi returned to the capital and reported that Liu Mian, military governor of Zhenwu, had "put things in order impressively." Because Fu Che was seriously ill, Liu Mian was then named to replace him as military governor of Hedong on 9 May 842. Li Zhongshun, superior general of the Imperial Insignia Guard, was named to replace Liu Mian in Zhenwu.[65] Both of these men were to play major roles in upcoming border events concerning the Uighurs.

Conflict among the Uighurs

At this time there was a power struggle within the first group of Uighur refugees. Although surviving accounts of this altercation are contradictory, it is clear that a deep rift had developed within the group, with Ormïzt on one side and the ministers Chi-xin and Pu-gu on the other. Ormïzt contacted the Tang official Tian Mou and warned him that Chi-xin was planning an attack on the frontier. If Chi-xin indeed had such a scheme in mind, Ormïzt must have realized that this raid could ruin his own plans for peaceful submission to the Tang. He thus showed his good faith by revealing Chi-xin's plot. He then used a pretext—possibly a plan to join forces with Ögä Qaghan—to entice both Chi-xin and Pu-gu to his camp, and murdered them both. Naghïd Chor Tigin, who apparently was also part of Chi-xin's faction, gathered the latter's horde of 7000 tents and fled eastward, finally reaching the northwest border of the Xiongwu Army of the autonomous province of Youzhou.[66]

Zhang Zhongwu, the military governor of Youzhou, sent his younger brother Zhang Zhongzhi to lead 30,000 troops to attack them. The precise date of this attack is unknown.[67] Although his followers were

[65] *ZZTJ* 246: 7959.

[66] See *ZZTJKY* 246: 7959-7960. The variants are as follows. (a) *JTS* 195: 5214 states that Chi-xin, Pu-gu, and Naghïd Chor had not submitted to Ögä Qaghan. When Chi-xin made plans to attack China, the qaghan sent his subordinate Ormïzt to proclaim his own good will to Tian Mou at Tiande. Chi-xin was then enticed to come visit the qaghan. He and Pu-gu were then murdered, and Naghïd Chor fled eastward. (b) *XTS* 217b: 6131 states that Ormïzt considered Chi-xin to be crafty and cruel, and so secretly made an agreement with Tian Mou, enticed Chi-xin to come to his (i.e, Ormïzt's) tent, and there beheaded him. Naghïd Chor then fled eastward. (c) In his "Preface to the Account of [Leaders of] Foreign Lands Returning to Loyalty" (*HCYPJ* 2: 10-11, *LWRWJ* 2: 6a-8a, *QTW* 707: 9196-9197), Li Deyu described Chi-xin as cruel and haughty, and then went on to state that Ormïzt secretly informed Tian Mou of his own desire to submit, exposed Chi-xin's guilt, and followed this with the latter's severed head. Having reviewed these accounts, Sima Guang wrote, "Now, Ormïzt himself hated Chi-xin's cruelty and craftiness, enticed him to come to his own tent, and killed him—that is all," thereby indicating his preference for the evidence in *JTS* and *HCYPJ*; see *ZZTJKY* 246: 7959. It is clear that the *JTS* account is confused, since it is inconceivable that Ormïzt could be considered Ögä's "subordinate" or would have served as his agent. Indeed, the qaghan almost certainly had nothing to do with the entire affair. Sima Guang's further reasoning, however, is less convincing. He posed the question, "If Chi-xin did not submit to Ögä, how could he be willing to follow Ormïzt to have an audience with Ögä?"; see *ZZTJKY* 246: 7959. It is possible that Ormïzt had suggested an attempt to reconcile with Ögä and combine forces. This is supported by Li Deyu, who provided what appears to be the best account of the matter in his "Preface and Stone Inscription Regarding Sage Merit in Youzhou" (*HCYPC* 2: 7-10, *LWRWJ* 2: 1a-6a, *QTW* 711: 9247-9349.): "Chi-xin had an angry and violent nature, and he possessed many war horses. In the beginning he, along with the renowned prince Ormïzt, planned first to enter and submit [to China], but suddenly he turned his back [on this plan] and, relying on his strength, secretly planned a calamity [for China]. He was tricked by Ormïzt, who enticed him to accompany him to visit the qaghan. [Chi-xin] was [then] slaughtered outside [Ormïzt's] tent. His horde was greatly scattered and dispersed, and went eastward to press Yuyang (i.e., Youzhou)." This account was written by Li Deyu only a few years after these events had occurred. The text is dated to the fifth year of the Huichang era (11 February 845–2 January 846); see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang", 244, n. 1. On the basis of this account, it seems that Ormïzt's ruse—a supposed plan to communicate with Ögä—was later misconstrued by the authors of *JTS* as actual involvement in the affair by Ögä Qaghan.

[67] According to *CFYG* 987: 11591, Zhang Zhongwu and his younger paternal first cousin of the same surname (*congdi*) led 30,000 men to defeat Chi-xin (which is

defeated and he himself was wounded, Naghïd Chor managed to escape by hiding among a herd of camels. He was later captured and executed by Ögä Qaghan.[68] Some sources state that 30,000 Uighurs, including two *tigin*s, a qaghan's elder sister, and several other dignitaries were captured after the defeat of Naghïd Chor and then distributed to various areas for resettlement.[69] One account, however, puts the number of Uighur prisoners at 90,000 and states that all of them, young and old alike, were put to death.[70] It is difficult to discern exact details in this matter, but the number 30,000 is most likely to be accurate since it appears in the preface to an inscription, dated 845, commemorating the deeds of Zhang Zhongwu.[71]

At the time of the conflict within Ormïzt's group, the whereabouts of Ögä Qaghan and his followers remained uncertain. Wuzong apparently planned to grant an imperial appointment to the new qaghan in accordance with his request. Vice-Director of the Ministry of Works Miao Zhen[72] was named to go north to confer this appointment, but the qaghan's movements made it difficult for him to accomplish his task. He waited in Hedong, hoping that Ögä would let his location be known and set a place for a meeting. This never happened. It may be that the qaghan feared letting the Chinese know too much of his movements. In the end, Miao Zhen did not leave the safety of Tang

clearly an error for Naghïd Chor). In general, *CFYG*'s versions of events connected with the Uighur crisis are replete with errors, and so I am hesitant to accept that work's account here, particularly considering that Chi-xin was already dead by this time. His men were being led by Naghïd Chor.

[68] *ZZTJ* and *ZZTJKY* 246: 7961-7962.

[69] *ZZTJKY* 246: 7962. It is not clear to which Uighur qaghan the text refers. Since the Uighur princess in question was originally with Ormïzt's group, it seems likely that she was the elder sister of He-sa Qaghan, and not Ögä, although she may have been the sister of an earlier qaghan.

[70] *JTS* 195: 5214.

[71] See Li Deyu's "Preface and Stone Inscription Recording Sage Merit in Youzhou," *HCYPC* 2: 7-10, *LWRWJ* 2: 1a-6a, *QTW* 711: 9247-9349.

[72] This is certainly the same man mentioned in **Doc. 7** whom Li Deyu requested be deputed to go northward and seek Ormïzt's aid in finding the Taihe Princess. There is some confusion over his given name, which is written with three different (homophonic) characters in various sources; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 138, n. 4. In Wuzong's imperial edict to send an official to inquire after the princess, the envoy's name is given as Miao Wan; see *QTW* 76: 997. This name also appears in the account in *THY* 6: 78. It is quite possible that the characters Zhen and Wan (which is similar in appearance to one form of Zhen) have been confused.

territory and the appointment was never given.[73] It appears that at this time Ögä Qaghan had withdrawn from the region of Tiande, apparently heading northwest to seek protection in the Cuozi Mountains, 300 *li* (about 100 miles) west of Shijiabo.[74] Another group of Uighurs, possibly Naghïd Chor's followers heading eastward toward Youzhou, had raided the area of Hengshui and then camped to the east of Shijiabo. Li Deyu informed the throne that these Uighurs were not under the qaghan's control, and suggested that Liu Mian and Zhang Zhongwu prepare their troops to attack them and expel them from Tang territory.[75] This may be the same group of Uighurs which was reported to have attacked Yunzhou and Shuozhou in the third month (15 April–13 May 842).[76] Although the sources are imprecise, it would make perfect sense for Naghïd Chor to have moved southward to the Hengshui region after the murder of Chi-xin, and then to have moved eastward to Youzhou by way of Yunzhou and Shuozhou.

Safe Haven at Last: The Formal Submission of Ormïzt

Ormïzt Tigin had displayed his sincerity to the Tang court by the elimination of Chi-xin and Pu-gu, and so continued with his plan to submit. After the necessary arrangements had been made, he led 12 high officials, 37 grand chieftains, and 2618 cavalry officers to submit officially at Tiande on 2 June 842.[77] These figures represent only the various leaders within this group of Uighurs, and not the entire

[73] *ZZTJ* 246: 7959.

[74] I have been unable to locate either the Cuozi Mountains or Shijiabo. Cuozi may be an error for Cuojia, which mountains are mentioned in *XTS* 43b: 1148 as being located between the Piti Spring and the Uighur capital; see Haneda, "Tōdai Kaikotsushi no kenkyū," 291, n. 183. Shijia was commonly used as a transcription for Śākya, the family name of the Buddha; see Soothill and Hodous, *A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms*, 482. If *bo* is an error for *po*, then the entire word is the common Chinese transcription of Śakra, lord of the devas (*ti-po*), which is an epithet of Indra; see Eitel, *Handbook of Chinese Buddhism*, 134 as well as Soothill and Hodous, *A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms*, 145, 206, and 482.

[75] *ZZTJ* 246: 7960.

[76] *XTS* 8: 241.

[77] See Li Deyu's "Preface to the Account of [Leaders of] Foreign Lands Returning to Loyalty," (*HCYPJ* 2: 10-11, *LWRWJ* 2: 6a-8a, and *QTW* 707: 9196-9197). *CFYG* 977: 11483 erroneously dates this event to the period 25 May–22 June 841 and misprints the number 2618 (*erquan liubai yishi ba*) as something incomprehensible (*sanquan yishi kou liushi ba*). It seems that some of the numbers have been miswritten or transposed and *bai* "hundred" misread as *kou* "mouth."

horde. As a result of his submission to Tang authority, Ormïzt Tigin was granted the titles of grand general of the Left Imperial Insignia Guard and Prince of the Commandery of Huaihua ("Cherishing Transformation").[78] Ormïzt's subordinates were also granted official titles.[79] As for the title Prince of the Commandery of Huaihua, this was not only a reward but also a pointed historical allusion, for Tang Taizong had granted the same title to the submitted Türk noble A-shi-na Si-mo after Taizong's defeat and capture of Illig Qaghan in 630.[80] The propagandistic nature of the title is evident, since the "transformation" referred to is that of a "barbarian" leader who had abandoned his traditional ways and been drawn to and influenced by China's civilization. The implied parallel between Taizong and Wuzong was of course an added bonus.

On 16 June 842, Li Deyu submitted a memorial that praised the emperor for having occasioned the submission of Ormïzt, and petitioned the throne to send an official to grant provisions and gifts—in the form of grain (5000 *shi* of rice, or just under 400 U.S. tons) and silks (3000 rolls)—to Ormïzt's followers **[Doc. 13]**. This would not only help the submitted Uighurs, but also show all peoples the grace and generosity of the Tang court. In the same memorial, Li Deyu also asked that Ormïzt's followers not yet be parceled out to the various

[78] The imperial proclamation granting these titles to Ormïzt was written by Li Deyu and may be found in *HCYPJ* 8: 59, *LWRWJ* 8: 1b-2a, and *QTW* 697: 9067. It contains no information relevant to this study, and so has not been translated here.

[79] The imperial proclamation granting titles to Ormïzt's subordinates, written by Li Deyu, may be found in *HCYPJ* 8: 59-60, *LWRWJ* 8: 2b-3a, and *QTW* 697: 9068. Since it adds no information pertinent to this study, it has not been translated here. On Ormïzt's ranks, see *THY* 100: 1799.

[80] When internal rebellion plagued the rule of the Eastern Türk Qaghan Illig, only A-shi-na Si-mo remained loyal to him, and so was captured along with him in 630. Tang Taizong admired the latter's loyalty and granted him several titles, including Prince of the Commandery of Huaihua. A-shi-na Si-mo was then given command of Illig Qaghan's followers, who were resettled south of the Yellow River. Later, he was granted the imperial surname Li. With Taizong's approval, he attempted to recover the Türk homeland in Mongolia, but this proved impossible for him. He died soon after his return to the Tang capital in 643. See *JTS* 194a: 5163-5165 and *XTS* 215a: 6039-6040; see also Chang, "Tang dai xiang Hu anzhi kao," 268-269. Note also that in the twentieth year of the Zhenguan reign era (22 January 646–9 February 647), Taizong bestowed the title of Huaihua grand general on the Uighur chieftain Tu-mi-du, who was so emboldened by Taizong's support that he began to style himself qaghan; see *JTS* 195: 5196. Chavannes translated this title as "grand général qui aime le perfectionnement"; see Chavannes, *Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) occidentaux*, 91.

provinces for resettlement. It may be that Li was already planning to employ these submitted Uighurs as part of the Tang force to defend the northern border should violence erupt. Ten days later, on 26 June 842, Zhang Jia, president of the Court for Diplomatic Relations, was sent to Tiande to implement Li Deyu's suggestions. At this time Ormïzt received gifts of grain (5000 *hu*) and silk from the Tang court,[81] although this sheds no light on the problem of earlier grain allocations.

Li Deyu's motive for keeping Ormïzt's group intact at the border is made clearer in his next memorial on the subject, dated 1 August 842 **[Doc. 14]**. This memorial was occasioned by the visit of Ormïzt Tigin, along with some of his retainers, to the Tang capital. In it, Li proposed that Ormïzt's followers be designated as the Return to Righteousness (*Guiyi*) Army. Ormïzt was to become imperial commissioner of this army, while his subordinates were to serve as its officers. This was perfectly in keeping with numerous precedents in which submitted foreigners, particularly those from the north, had been incorporated into the Chinese military system to strengthen it. Given that Ögä Qaghan remained an uncertain factor at the frontier, it is not surprising that Li Deyu wished to make use of Ormïzt's followers, many of whom no doubt were seasoned cavalry fighters. In his memorial, Li added the interesting point that Ormïzt and his followers had been granted Chinese-style clothing to wear, reinforcing the claim that these Uighurs did indeed "cherish transformation." On that same day, a decree was issued naming Ormïzt not only as imperial commissioner of the Return to Righteousness Army, but also to the civilian post of honorary president of the Ministry of Works.[82] According to one source, he was also granted the title of grand general of the Left Imperial Insignia Guard at this time.[83] On the next day, 2 August 842, Li Deyu requested that Ormïzt be granted flags,

[81] *ZZTJ* 246: 7961.

[82] The "Imperial Proclamation Conferring [the Titles of] Honorary President of the Ministry of Works and Imperial Commissioner of the Return to Righteousness Army on Ormïzt," written by Li Deyu, may be found in *HCYPJ* 8: 59, *LWRWJ* 8: 2a-2b, *QTW* 697: 9067-9068, and *TDZLJ* 128: 691. It contains no information relevant to this study, although its presentation of historical precedents for Chinese employment of foreign troops, drawn from the Qin and Jin dynasties, is interesting in terms of Li Deyu's justification for the Tang court's actions.

[83] *ZZTJ* 246: 7962.

in which to dwell. To him, the arrangements made for Ormïzt (if he knew of them) would have been seen as a sign of Chinese favoritism toward Ormïzt and a signal of the Tang court's apparent disdain for the qaghan himself. To the Tang court, however, Ormïzt Tigin was no longer a foreign prince, but part of the Tang civilian and military structure, and so his settlement within a northern town could not be compared to Ögä's request.

Ormïzt had played his hand perfectly. By coming immediately to the Chinese border before a new qaghan could be enthroned, he had avoided the stigma of being branded a rebel. By not allowing his followers to attack the Chinese border cities, he had shown his pacific intent. And by revealing Chi-xin's plans to raid the Tang frontier (whether real or fabricated) and then thwarting those plans by murdering his own compatriots, Ormïzt had shown his complete sincerity and trustworthiness as far as China was concerned. As a reward, he was taken in and made part of the official Tang establishment with titles, Chinese clothing, and a place to settle his family and retainers.

The culmination of Ormïzt's rewards came on 23 September 842, when he was granted the imperial surname Li and the name Sizhong ("Loyal Thoughts").[91] Other high-ranking Uighurs of his group also were granted the imperial surname and various names, all of which contained the character *si* ("thought, to think").[92] Ormïzt's own son was given a title and the name Li Jimei.[93] The interior minister Ayabïr[94]

[91] The imperial proclamation granting this name to Ormïzt may be found in *HCYPJ* 8: 60, *LWRWJ* 8: 3a-3b, and *QTW* 697: 9068. The dating is from *ZZTJ* 246: 7965. *CFYG* 976: 11466 dates the document to 15 August 841, more than a year prior to the date in *ZZTJ*, but the passage (like so many others in this work) contains many errors, including an incorrect transcription of Ormïzt (Meng-mo-si rather than Wo-mo-si) and an incorrect form of his new name (Quanzhong rather than Sizhong).

[92] See *THY* 100: 1799 and *XTS* 217b: 6131-6132. *ZZTJ* 246: 7965 refers to three of these high-ranking Uighur leaders as Ormïzt's younger brothers, but this is not corroborated in the other accounts.

[93] *THY* 100: 1799.

[94] Some sources give his name in Chinese transcription as Shou-ye-wu rather than Ai-ye-wu, but this appears to be an error; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 165, n. 4. The Tang pronunciation of Ai-ye-wu (for which see *GKWD* 480, 1044, and 166) seems an excellent transcription of the name or title Ayabïr which, while unattested in Turkic sources, appears in the Staël-Holstein manuscript in a list of Turkic names and titles as *ayabirä* and in another Khotanese text as *ayavirä*; see Bailey, "The Staël-Holstein Miscellany," 3 and Bailey, "A Khotanese Text Concerning the Turks in Kanṭşou," 30, 31, and 49. Henning read the Staël-Holstein form as *ayabiri* and equated it with the Uighur tribe known in

was also given the surname Li (although some sources say he was given the surname Ai) and the name Hongshun ("Great Obedience"). He was granted the titles of honorary right policy advisor and assistant commissioner of the Return to Righteousness Army.[95]

Ormïzt's risk had been great, as were his rewards—and his responsibilities. His career was far from over. Rather than rest on his laurels, he would pay for his honors with his service to the emperor, as he had requested to do. He returned to the northern frontier to serve as part of the Tang military force that was arrayed against Ögä Qaghan, the man who should have been Ormïzt's sovereign but who was, and apparently had long been, his bitter enemy.

Chinese sources as Xi-ye-wu, which he believed should be rendered *eyäbör* or *eyäßir*; see Henning, "Argi and the 'Tokharians,'" 556. Both Bailey and Henning seem to have been unaware of the Chinese form Ai-ye-wu. On Tang Chinese *–wu* as Old Turkic *–bir*, see chapter 1, n. 77 above.

[95] The imperial proclamation granting Ayabïr his new name and titles may be found in *HCYPJ* 8: 60-61, *LWRWJ* 8: 3b-4a, and *QTW* 697: 9068-9069. The text of the proclamation contained in *CFYG* 976: 11466 has some minor errors.

CHAPTER THREE

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TANG COURT AND ÖGÄ QAGHAN

"Can the warnings of past events be of no concern to you?"

The Dilemma of Ögä Qaghan

Ormïzt Tigin had managed to reach an accommodation with the Chinese that placed him in the "good barbarian" category and seemed to allow him the possibility of survival under reasonably good terms. His rival Ögä Qaghan was not willing to accept such terms, and so came to be seen more and more as a "bad barbarian." The qaghan was, of course, in a completely different situation, as he claimed the throne of the Uighur state. Indeed, he may well have not envied Ormïzt the welcome that the latter received from the Tang court, for it seems that he still cherished hopes of recovering power on the steppe, and so was unwilling to compromise his position. That is not to say that he was pleased with the turn of events regarding Ormïzt. The *tigin* was, after all, if not the leader of a rival Uighur faction, at least a rebellious prince who refused to submit to the new qaghan. To see him welcomed and even honored by the Tang emperor would certainly have made Ögä Qaghan angry, for Ormïzt was properly his subject, not the subject of the Chinese ruler.

The qaghan was doubtless becoming increasingly suspicious of Chinese motives. The welcoming of Ormïzt was part of a much larger picture. It is not unlikely that the qaghan's spies had informed him of the defense preparations that had been ordered by the court at Chang'an, and it is also possible that he knew that Ormïzt's followers had been organized as part of the Tang military structure and suspected that such troops would one day be used against him. The fact that the Chinese emperor had refused his request for a border city in which to live, despite the fact that the qaghan still held the Taihe Princess as hostage, also suggested that the Tang court harbored plans to move against him. What could he do? To surrender to Tang authority would mean a complete renunciation of his royal dignity

and an end to his hopes of recovering the Uighur homeland. But his own military weakness prevented him from actually moving north of the Gobi in an effort to make that recovery happen. Did he hope to intimidate the Chinese, whose northern border defenses were clearly in a dismal state of disrepair, and thereby work out a *modus vivendi* which would allow him to remain independent, at least to some degree? No clear plan can be determined from the surviving sources, and in fact it appears that the qaghan's actions were dictated time and again by immediate circumstances. What is clear, however, is that by hovering at the Chinese frontier and refusing to submit to Tang authority, Ögä virtually guaranteed himself a military confrontation with the forces of the Chinese state.

When Yang Guan, who carried the Tang court's second letter to the qaghan **[Doc. 10]** in March/April 842, returned from his mission, he brought with him a letter from the qaghan in which the latter requested grain, domesticated animals, and the return of Ormïzt, as well as apparently restating his concern for the Manichaeans in China. This document has not survived, but the Chinese response, written by Li Deyu, is extant **[Doc. 16]**. In this letter, which probably is to be dated some time prior to 29 May 842,[1] the emperor agreed to the qaghan's request for grain, although on much less favorable terms than before. Instead of offering to grant grain to the Uighurs, the emperor's letter suggested that Ögä use silk that the Uighurs had received in payment for horses sold to the Tang court to purchase grain at Zhenwu. As for the qaghan's other requests, all were refused, which again signaled to Ögä that the Tang court was not favorably disposed toward him or his followers. The letter's refusal of animals maintained a certain logic, arguing that in China oxen were used primarily for plowing and not for meat, which certainly was true, nor was it wrong to assert that

[1] Judging from internal evidence in the letter and subsequent events, it seems that the imperial reply is to be dated prior to Tian Mou's memorial of 29 May 842, for which see below. If it were written after that date, the letter surely would have mentioned Tian Mou's complaint. It is even possible that the letter helped to provoke the Uighur disturbances of which Tian wrote. Cen Zhongmian has dated the imperial letter more generally to the fourth month (14 May–12 June 842); see his "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 150. Chavannes and Pelliot dated the letter to the second half of 842; see "Un traité manichéen retrouvé en Chine, traduit et annoté, deuxième partie," 293. Cen Zhongmian has discussed the error of their dating; see "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 153-154, n. 1. *ZZTJ* 246: 7962 places the letter in the fifth month (13 June–11 July 842), after Tian Mou's memorial.

China was not a sheep-rearing nation. In the matter of Ormïzt the emperor was adamant. The *tigin* had submitted to the emperor, and was now under his protection. He would not be sent to the qaghan. Once again the story of Hu-han-ye was brought out, this time to relate the fact that some of Hu-han-ye's high-ranking officials had submitted at the same time as the *shan-yu* and been given titles by Han Xuandi. The letter also reminded the qaghan that after the Tang defeat of the Türk qaghan Illig, many of his subordinates had submitted to Chinese authority and were also given positions within the Tang government. The implication was that the Tang court was showing propriety in its treatment of Ormïzt. It should be noted that in this letter Ormïzt Tigin was not compared to Hu-han-ye, as he had been in previous documents, but to the latter's subordinates. To compare Ormïzt to a sovereign ruler would have been insulting to Ögä Qaghan. In reality, the comparison of Ormïzt to Illig Qaghan's subordinates provided the best parallel since in both cases the men (Ormïzt Tigin and Illig's followers of rank) were aristocrats of a collapsed state to which they could not return—unlike Hu-han-ye and his followers, who did indeed return north of the Gobi to regain power on the Mongolian plateau after the *shan-yu*'s submission to Han Xuandi. In internal documents, the comparison of Ormïzt to Hu-han-ye, however imperfect, was undoubtedly intended to enhance Tang prestige.

The letter to Ögä Qaghan concluded with a clear indication that Manichaeism would no longer be accorded the same stature in China that it had enjoyed while the Uighurs were flourishing. The letter claimed that the religion was allowed in China only as a special favor to the Uighurs, and that its popularity had increased only because of their own might.[2] Now that the Uighurs were weakened, the letter claimed that their state religion was quickly losing its appeal, at least in South China. As a result, all temples in that region would be tem-

[2] As Chavannes and Pelliot pointed out ("Un traité manichéen retrouvé en Chine, traduit et annoté, deuxième partie," 293-294, n. 3), Manichaeism began to be tolerated in China (but only for foreigners) in 732, during the Kaiyuan reign period (713–741) of the emperor Xuanzong. Since the Uighurs apparently did not begin their conversion to Manichaeism until after their qaghan's encounter with Manichaean priests in Luoyang in 762/763, this edict is incorrect in its suggestion that the religion was tolerated in China only in deference to the Uighurs. It is certain, however, that Uighur support was instrumental in the spread of Manichaeism in China; see Chavannes and Pelliot, "Un traité manichéen retrouvé en Chine, traduit et annoté, deuxième partie," 154-155.

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porarily closed, and only temples in the two capitals of Chang'an and Luoyang, as well as in the northern city of Taiyuan, would be allowed to remain open. The emperor promised to rescind this order once the Uighurs' homeland was again "at peace"—perhaps another inducement to get Ögä Qaghan to leave the border region. The Manichaean temples apparently were never reopened, but it is now known that the Manichaeans of South China were not nearly so inconstant as the emperor's letter claimed, since the religion survived "underground" for centuries.[3] Finally, we should note that the imperial letter blamed the Uighurs for their own downfall, claiming that this was the result of their own lack of benevolence. This was contrasted to the virtuous behavior of the Son of Heaven.

It should be obvious that the letter did little to reduce tensions at the frontier. On 29 May 842, Tian Mou memorialized from Tiande that since the Uighurs had continued to cause disturbances, he had sent out 3000 troops on his own authority to ward them off.[4] Although the sources are not clear on the matter, it seems that Tian Mou's troops did not actually clash with the Uighurs. The border peace, although fragile, remained intact. Two days later, on 31 May, Li Deyu submitted a lengthy memorial to the emperor which severely criticized Tian Mou's actions **[Doc. 17]**. According to this memorial, the 3000 troops in question represented the entirety of Tiande's military power. Li Deyu was furious that Tian had jeopardized them and the city in this way, and urged the emperor to order him to wait for ample reinforcements (to include some 700 crossbow archers from the Chinese interior) before joining battle with the Uighurs. The chief minister also urged the emperor to appoint Shi Xiong,[5] whom Li considered both courageous and skilled in military tactics, as Tian Mou's assistant. This may have been a move to help forestall future foolish actions on Tian's part. It seems that Li Deyu was not against military action as far as the Uighur refugees were concerned, but did not want to engage the enemy until victory was certain. In his memorial he also expressed the hope that Tian Mou could take advantage of the Uighurs' plight to encourage them to submit. Even if the qaghan himself remained

[3] See Lieu, *Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China*, 220-264.

[4] *ZZTJ* 246: 7960.

[5] Shi Xiong's biography may be found in *JTS* 161: 4235-4237 and in *XTS* 171: 5195-5196. At this time he was serving as a military officer in Zhenwu, where he had been under Liu Mian's command.

aloof, the submission of some of his followers would weaken his forces both militarily and psychologically.

In his memorial, Li Deyu also informed the emperor that non-Chinese groups at the border—Tu-yu-hun (Tui-hun), Tanguts, and others—had been instructed to wait until after Tiande's reinforced troops had attacked the Uighurs, and then they could raid the Uighur camp to seize booty, animals, and slaves. These tribes had been guaranteed a free hand in this, and were even promised rewards based on the number of Uighurs slain. The memorial also mentioned Ormïzt Tigin, whose submission apparently was still a matter of some concern. While Li Deyu made it clear that he could not guarantee the sincerity of the prince's submission, he did point out that it was necessary for the Tang court to show particular kindness to him since this would promote dissension among the Uighurs while also providing proof that the Son of Heaven, in his role as nurturer, was not merely seeking to annihilate a weakened enemy, but could be gracious to those who prostrated themselves before his authority.

Finally, the memorial mentioned an Uighur named Yaghlaqar (Chinese Yao-luo-ge) Yuan-zheng[6] and the silk received in payment for Uighur horses that he had in his possession at Zhenwu. What had prompted this Uighur nobleman to come to Zhenwu is uncertain, although it is likely that he had been sent by Ögä Qaghan to go to China with an escort to obtain the silk owed the Uighurs by the Tang government for horses which had been purchased at an earlier date, prior to the collapse of the Uighur state. If obtained, the silk would be an important resource for Ögä Qaghan that would aid him in the purchase of provisions for his followers. The silk represented, for him, a means of survival. Li Deyu's memorial considered possible

[6] Yaghlaqar was the name of the royal family of the Uighurs; see Pulleyblank, "Some Remarks on the Toquzoghuz Problem," 39-40 and *JTS* 195: 5198). The man's given name of Yuan-zheng is reminiscent of the A-shi-de Yuan-zhen of the Eastern Türks who has sometimes been identified with the Tonyuquq of the eighth-century Turkic runiform inscriptions; on this identification, which remains inconclusive, see Hirth, "Nachworte zur Inschrift des Tonjukuk," 13 ff., Kliashtornyi, "Ton'iukuk-Ashide Iuan'chzhen," 202-205, and Clauson, "Some Notes on the Inscription of Tonyuquq," 132. We have already noted the use of Sogdian names among the Uighurs; it is by no means unimaginable that some Uighurs could have used Chinese names, particularly if they were the product of a marriage between an Uighur and a Chinese. Yuan-zheng could be a Chinese-style given name (*ming*) or possibly a transcription of a Turkic name or title, although the Tang pronunciation of Yuan-zheng (as well as Yuan-zhen) suggest nothing in Old Turkic; see *GATD* 102, 566, and 836.

courses of action depending on whether Yaghlaqar Yuan-zheng chose to submit to Chinese authority or not. It was Li's suggestion that, should this Uighur leader and his followers surrender, they should be divided among various prefectures far from the border region for resettlement.

According to *Zizhi tongjian*, although Ögä Qaghan's followers were "diminished and weakened," they still numbered some 100,000 persons who were camped at Lümen Mountain north of Datong.[7] This apparently was the qaghan's approximate position when Yang Guan delivered the emperor's letter. The number of 100,000 should be considered a general approximation which at any rate probably included women, children, and the aged as well as troops. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Uighur presence was still very significant, and that Tang defenses in the area could not yet be considered sufficient to ensure victory. Li Deyu certainly was preparing for the possibility of an armed conflict with the Uighurs, but still cherished hopes that the qaghan would leave the frontier of his own accord. Yang Guan had informed Li that Ögä feared that Chi-xin's followers, headed eastward under Naghïd Chor after the conflict within Ormïzt's group had led to Chi-xin's murder, would align with the Tatabï (Xi), Khitans, and Shi-wei, all former Uighur vassals, to obstruct his movement away from the border. While this may simply have been an excuse given by the qaghan for his reluctance to depart from the Chinese border, Li Deyu took the matter seriously enough to compose a memorial in which the issue was addressed **[Doc. 18]**. Although a precise date for this memorial is unknown, it was probably written in the spring or summer of 842.[8] In the memorial, Li requested that the emperor order Zhang Zhongwu, military governor of autonomous Youzhou (the region closest to the lands of the Tatabï, Khitans, and Shi-wei in Manchuria), to order those peoples to attack Chi-xin's followers

[7] *ZZTJ* 246: 7962. The exact location of this mountain has not been determined. If it is to be placed north of Datong, this would mean that the qaghan's followers had moved a significant distance to the east.

[8] Because the memorial was based on Yang Guan's report, Cen Zhongmian dated it to the fourth month, i.e., 14 May–12 June 842, shortly after Yang's return to the capital; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 153-154, n. 1. The memorial can be placed with a high degree of certainty prior to the eighth month (8 September–7 October 842) and, if the ordering of events in *ZZTJ* is correct, most probably before Li Deyu's memorial of 28 August 842 (see below); see *ZZTJ* 246: 7963.

so as to clear the way for Ögä Qaghan's return northward. We have already seen that Zhang did eliminate the threat of these Uighurs, who were under the leadership of Naghïd Chor when they reached the border of Youzhou.

A memorial concerning prisoners and animals captured by Zhang Zhongwu after his younger brother had defeated Naghïd Chor **[Doc. 19]** is undated, but clearly should be placed in the period shortly after that battle.[9] According to this memorial, Zhang Zhongwu had offered the captured Uighur prisoners and beasts to the Tang court—an offer that Li Deyu was determined to refuse. The chief minister based this refusal on ancient precedents from the *Zuo zhuan*, a text that enjoyed special prestige during the Tang era, and which Zhang Zhongwu, like many other military men of the Tang dynasty, had studied.[10]

Zhang's motives for offering Uighur prisoners and animals to the Tang court are not clear. Perhaps he expected rewards in return. It seems certain that Zhang Zhongwu accepted Tang orders and advice because his goals in regard to the Uighurs were identical with those of the court, and because Tang support strengthened his position in Youzhou, a notoriously unstable region. The emperor's response to this memorial is not indicated, but since Wuzong usually followed Li Deyu's recommendations, it is probable that the Tang court rejected the offer of Uighur prisoners. This did not result in any serious strain in regard to relations between Chang'an and Youzhou.

The defeat of Naghïd Chor and the submission of large numbers of Uighurs in Youzhou led to important developments in that region's history. Among those Uighurs who submitted was a man of the Uighur A-bu-si (Abuz?) tribe[11] who, because of his martial skills, was employed

[9] Cen Zhongmian dated this memorial to the seventh month (10 August–7 September 842) since that was his preferred date for Zhang Zhongzhi's clash with the forces of Naghïd Chor; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 166, n. 1.

[10] On the special status of the *Zuo zhuan* (as well as the *Chun qiu*) during the Tang period, see McMullen, *State and Scholars in T'ang China*, 79-81, 89-92, and 101-105. The author notes (p. 79) that the *Zuo zhuan* "suited the T'ang temperament, with its love of action. It can be no accident that throughout the dynasty, when military men were commended for Confucian learning, this was the text that they were said to have known." On Zhang Zhongwu's familiarity with the *Zuo zhuan*, see *JTS* 180: 4677 and *XTS* 212: 5980.

[11] The A-bu-si tribe is mentioned in some Chinese sources as one of the tribes comprising the *Toquz Oghuz* ("Nine Oghuz," Chinese *jiu xing*, "nine surnames"), but there is some confusion as to the precise application of this term; see Pulleyblank, "Some Remarks on the Toquzoghuz Problem" and Hamilton, "Toquz-Oγuz et On-

by Zhang Zhongwu within the military government of Youzhou. For his faithful service in the defense of Youzhou, this Uighur was given titles and granted the Chinese name Li Maoxun.[12] Long after the resolution of the Uighur crisis and the death of Zhang Zhongwu, Li Maoxun seized power in Youzhou in 875 and was recognized as military governor by the Tang court. His son Li Keju succeeded to his position and served as military governor of Youzhou from 876 to 885. While in this position he unsuccessfully opposed the rise to power of another Turkic leader, Li Keyong, in North China. This led to renewed instability in Youzhou, and Li Keju committed suicide along with his entire family (*zu*)[13] after losing a struggle for control of the province.[14] From this account we can see that at least one Uighur refugee who submitted to Zhang Zhongwu not only remained in Youzhou, but rose to supreme power there, which he then passed to his son. We can presume that Li Maoxun's service to Youzhou continued for more than 30 years, under the military governorships of Zhang Zhongwu and his various successors, before Li Maoxun finally seized control of the province himself.[15] It also seems likely that Li Maoxun's supporters would have included other Uighurs from among those who had submitted to Zhang Zhongwu in 842.

On 28 August 842, Li Deyu submitted a memorial concerning Chinese silk paid for Uighur horses **[Doc. 20]**. While somewhat problematic, this document suggests that the Tang court was prepar-

Uyγur." For more on the ethnonym A-bu-si itself, see Pulleyblank, *The Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-shan*, 167-168, n. 87. It is interesting to note that from 822 until the Tang dynasty's end, the autonomous province of Chengde, on Youzhou's southern border, was ruled by a "dynasty" of military governors of Uighur A-bu-si origin who employed the Chinese surname Wang; see *JTS* 142: 3884-3892. During the Huichang era, the second of these, Wang Yuankui, cooperated with the Tang central government in the crushing of Liu Zhen in Zhaoyi (see chapter 4), for which he was amply rewarded; see *JTS* 142: 3888-3889. From this and other evidence one can see how deeply enmeshed people of Inner Asian origin were in the politics of North China even in the late Tang.

[12] Maoxun means "excellent merit," with *xun* referring particularly to services rendered to the state.

[13] The Chinese term *zu* can refer to a family, clan, or tribe. The first is the most likely meaning here, since the texts inform us that Li Keju took his family with him into a building and then set it aflame.

[14] Biographies of Li Maoxun and Li Keju may be found in *JTS* 180: 4680-4681 and *XTS* 212: 5983; see also *ZZTJ* 252: 8180-8182 *passim* and 256: 8321, 8323.

[15] See Wu, *Tang fang zhen nian biao*, 1: 565-572 for an overview of the changes in the holders of the military governorship of Youzhou during this period.

ing to pay the Uighurs for horses that had been received prior to the collapse of their state. It is well known that the Tang court frequently was in arrears in its payment for Uighur horses.[16] Part of this silk was to go to the qaghan, and part to Ormïzt Tigin, since the latter had testified that in the past he (and apparently other Uighur nobles) had possessed his own horse herds, and so was deserving of payment for them. This suggests what one would readily surmise without this evidence: that prior to 840, Uighur rulers paid their subordinates for the horses which they sold to the Tang court. In this way, Uighur leaders provided horses to the ruler, who arranged for their transport to China and then distributed the payment in silk to those same leaders. Ormïzt wanted to make this perfectly clear to the Chinese, and then asked that his portion of the silk be returned to the throne and then granted to Ögä Qaghan. His purpose in proposing this is made clear in Li's memorial. Ormïzt feared that the qaghan would become even more hostile to him if he accepted the silk after his submission to Chinese authority; he hoped that by passing the silk on to the qaghan the latter's enmity would be blunted. The Chinese officials were pleased by this, and hoped that the silk payment would encourage the qaghan to leave the frontier. *Zizhi tongjian*, relying on the evidence of Li Deyu's previous memorial, stated that the court had first thought that the qaghan was afraid to leave the border because of his belief that Naghïd Chor would combine forces with other tribes to the east to hinder his return northward. But after Naghïd's defeat at the hands of Zhang Zhongzhi and the subsequent surrender of many of his followers, the qaghan still remained at the border. In the words of Sima Guang, "The discussants [at court then] thought that the Uighurs were waiting for payment for their horses. The emperor ordered that the horse price be paid in full, but still they did not go."[17] He went on to write that the Tang government thus gave the Uighurs the help they sought in hopes of getting them to leave the border region, and at this point "still had no intention of attacking and killing them."[18] It has already been shown, however, that Li Deyu was preparing for all possibilities, including military confrontation. As for Tang hopes

[16] See Mackerras, "Sino-Uighur Diplomatic and Trade Contacts," 218-219. It should be noted that there is no clear link between the silk which was actually sent to the qaghan and the silk mentioned in connection with Yaghlaqar Yuan-zheng.

[17] *ZZTJ* 246: 7963.

[18] *ZZTJKY* 246: 7964.

that the Uighurs would leave if given assurances of safe passage or silks, these seem naïve at best. The greatest hindrance to an Uighur departure was the Uighurs' own weakness; they simply did not have the military power to regain control of the Mongolian steppe. How well the Chinese understood this is unclear, but it is obvious that the Tang court was using every opportunity to urge the remaining Uighur refugees either to leave or to submit.

Ormïzt's actions in this regard were well considered, particularly as Ögä had demanded that the *tigin* be surrendered to him. If he could not have the prince himself, perhaps the qaghan would be satisfied with Ormïzt's share of the silk as a sort of ransom. This should have been, and probably was, a strong signal to Li Deyu that the hostility between Ormïzt and Ögä was genuine, and that the former's submission to Tang authority was sincere, particularly as it was his only viable option. As can be seen from this memorial, Li seemed more certain of the *tigin*'s sincerity than he had been some three months earlier. Although the exact circumstances are unclear, the silk owed to the qaghan (and probably that relinquished by Ormïzt as well) did eventually reach him, but it did not have the desired effect.

Some time near the end of the seventh month (10 August–7 September 842), a letter written by Li Deyu **[Doc. 21]** was sent to an unspecified Uighur minister.[19] This was written in response to a dispatch from that minister which had been transmitted to the court by Li Zhongshun, military governor of Zhenwu. It was not written in the emperor's name as letters to the qaghan had been, but in Li Deyu's, since he was a closer counterpart to the Uighur minister. The letter indicated that a snag had developed in the Tang court's negotiations with Ögä Qaghan. The silk which the qaghan demanded had not yet been received. It appears that the Uighurs, angered at not yet having received the payment in silk that was owed to them, had sent a dispatch, written by a minister, criticizing the Tang court for its refusal to pay as well as for its imminent embrace of the "rebel" Ormïzt. The Uighur letter, which does not survive, must have intimated that the Uighurs would not leave the border until the silk was handed over, and also threatened that the Uighurs' behavior might prove to be uncontrollable should their demands not be met. The desires expressed in the Uighur missive were threefold: that the payment for Uighur horses be sent, that Ormïzt not be taken in by the Tang court, and that the Chinese cease their attempts to meddle in Uighur affairs.

[19] On the dating, see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 166, n. 1. Cen argued convincingly that the letter is to be dated shortly before a similar letter sent to an Uighur minister—possibly the same one—carried by Liu Mian on 27 September 842.

According to Li Deyu's letter to the Uighur minister, the silk already had been given to Yaghlaqar Yuan-zheng, who apparently had been sent by the qaghan to obtain it. In an earlier memorial **[Doc. 17]**, the chief minister had requested that Yaghalqar Yuan-zheng be restrained at Zhenwu, and that Li Zhongshun and others take change of this man and his entourage, as well as the silk intended for payment. In the present letter, however, Li Deyu claimed that Yaghlaqar Yuan-zheng "was not constrained in any way." Still, Yaghlaqar Yuan-zheng apparently remained at Zhenwu. Li Deyu blamed the Uighurs themselves for this, citing the frequent shifting of the qaghan's camp and the inadequacy of the escort provided for Yaghalaqar Yuan-zheng as reasons for the latter's failure to return to the Uighur camp. It seems quite possible, however, that Yaghlaqar Yuan-zheng had been detained at Zhenwu on Li Deyu's order. It may be that he then felt it prudent to submit to Tang authority after his detention, since he no doubt had become aware of at least some of the preparatory measures being taken by the Tang government to ward off the Uighurs. It seems clear that Li Deyu had reason to believe that he would submit. Yaghlaqar Yuan-zheng's fears of being attacked by tribes under Tang "loose-rein" control, such as the Tu-yu-hun and Tanguts, may also have been quite real, and the letter does request that the qaghan send a suitable escort, suggesting that if he would do so, then Yaghlaqar Yuan-zheng would be able to return to the Uighur camp with the silk payment. Although the subsequent fate of Yaghlaqar Yuan-zheng is unknown, this latest letter from Li Deyu's brush reveals that he had not returned to Ögä Qaghan by August or September 842, several months after Li's earlier memorial of 31 May 842 **[Doc. 17]** had first mentioned him.

Li Deyu's letter to the Uighur minister also offered a justification, heavily padded with Confucian moralizing, for the Tang court's welcoming of Ormïzt Tigin. Li's assertion was that since the Son of Heaven exercises authority over the entire world, he must comfort and aid those in need—if they will accept that comfort and aid. This was more than mere posturing on Li Deyu's part, since it also proclaimed to the other Uighur nobles that they could expect kind and generous treatment should they submit. The chief minister no doubt wished to extend temptation to a group of men in an unenviable position, in

hopes of further weakening the Uighur threat at the Tang frontier. This policy already had been spelled out in an earlier memorial to the throne **[Doc. 17]**.

Another memorial written by Li Deyu **[Doc. 22]**, which should be dated not long after the preceding letter to the Uighur minister,[20] indicates that Ögä Qaghan had finally received the silk payment which he had demanded. This payment presumably is to be dated after 28 August and before 27 September 842, since a letter to an Uighur minister written on the latter date **[Doc. 30]** does not mention the silk, suggesting that the problem had been resolved.[21] This payment thus was effected shortly after Li Deyu's first letter to the Uighur minister had been sent.

The payment of silk to Ögä Qaghan, while solving one problem, gave rise to another. Li Deyu's memorial reveals that he had reason to believe that the qaghan's followers would use this silk to buy animals and war materiel from both Chinese garrison troops and non-Chinese Tang subjects (the various "loose-rein" peoples) living near the frontier. This clearly would be disadvantageous to the Tang; Li likened it to giving financial assistance to the enemy. The Chinese were willing to let the Uighurs use the silk to buy food, but not war materiel or animals for combat. Li Deyu thus suggested that Liu Mian, Li Zhongshun, and other border officials prevent this type of trade by confiscating the animals (particularly horses and camels) and punishing those who ignored the ban on trading with the Uighurs for such things. Informers were to be rewarded with the confiscated goods.

Growing Tensions

At the same time that diplomatic maneuvers to encourage the Uighurs to leave the frontier were stalled, military tension was mounting. Liu Mian's troops had been defeated in a clash with some Uighurs near Yunzhou (Datong) in the sixth month (12 July–9 August 842).[22] It is unclear, however, as to which Uighur group this refers. Since Naghïd Chor's followers had headed eastward and probably were not defeated

[20] See Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 167-168, n. 1.

[21] See Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 166-167, n. 1 and 167-168, n. 1.

[22] See *ZZTJKY* 246: 7963 and *XTS* 8: 241.

by the forces of Youzhou until the seventh month, it seems likely that it was this group which engaged Liu Mian in the sixth month, and not Ögä's followers. This hypothesis is supported by several facts. Naghïd's journey eastward, which ended in his defeat at the hands of Zhang Zhongzhi, could easily have taken him near Yunzhou. As has been shown, a group of Uighurs who were followers of neither Ormïzt nor Ögä had invaded the region of Hengshui in the first month (14 February–15 March 842); these may have been the same Uighurs who attacked Yunzhou and Shuozhou in the third month (15 April–13 May 842). This could also have been Naghïd Chor's group. Thus, during the time between their attack of the third month and their defeat in about the seventh month, Naghïd Chor's followers could have been in the area of Yunzhou. While it is not impossible that it was the qaghan's followers who fought with Liu Mian, this seems unlikely. According to *Zizhi tongjian*, although Ögä Qaghan was camped north of Datong in the fourth month (see above), he had since moved westward, where his troops raided the Tanguts and Tu-yu-hun living in the region between Tiande and Zhenwu, and camped north of Batoufeng.[23] Furthermore, Li Deyu's first letter to the Uighur minister **[Doc. 21]**, which is to be dated some time near the end of the seventh month, does not mention any violation of the border by Ögä's followers. Since the Uighur minister's dispatch which prompted this letter was a criticism of Tang behavior as well as an expression of the Uighurs' desire to obtain the silk owed them, it is inconceivable that Li Deyu would have failed to mention the altercation of the sixth month had the qaghan's group been involved.

It was, however, the qaghan and his followers who began to move southeastward from Tiande some time around the end of the seventh month; these Uighurs arrived north of Batoufeng at the beginning of

[23] *ZZTJ* 246: 7963. The sources are inconsistent in regard to the Uighurs' location. The account of Ögä Qaghan's movements given in *ZZTJ* 246 *passim*, as well as the information from Li Deyu's works, suggests that the qaghan first came to the region of Tiande, north of the Yellow River, and stayed in that general vicinity until the fourth month of the second year of the Huichang era (14 May 842–12 June 842), after which his group moved eastward to the region of Datong in the administrative unit of Hedong. Soon after this they returned to the area north of the Yellow River, between Tiande and Zhenwu, and yet they drove into Datong again in the eighth month (after Liu Mian's defeat by the unspecified group of Uighurs). **Doc. 27** lends support to this, referring to the frequent shifting of the qaghan's camp. These frequent moves seem to have been motivated by the need to obtain provisions—generally through violence.

the eighth month (8 September–7 October 842).[24] This alarmed the Tang court. On the first day of that month (8 September),[25] Li Deyu submitted a memorial calling for a surprise night attack on the Uighurs **[Doc. 23]**. But only a few days later, on 14 September,[26] he submitted another memorial reversing his opinion and requesting that the attack be cancelled **[Doc. 24]**. The chief minister's change of heart had come about because intelligence had reported that the Uighurs, despite their approach to Batoufeng, had not engaged in any hostile actions. He still hoped that the Uighur crisis could be resolved without recourse to warfare, although he was prepared to use force against the Uighurs should it become necessary. His memorial requested that Liu Mian make yet another effort to meet with the Uighur leaders, presumably to negotiate a withdrawal from the border.

Meanwhile, however, the qaghan had already departed from Batoufeng and moved eastward, entering the region of Datong, where his followers seized "several 10,000" cattle and horses from non-Chinese peoples living in that part of northern Hedong. Zhang Xianjie, the prefect of Yunzhou, closed up the city to keep them out. The Tu-yu-hun and Tanguts in the region, presumably the victims of the Uighurs' theft, pulled up their dwellings and fled to the protection of the mountains.[27] It seems from this report that Ögä's followers, while still quite numerous and able to steal animals from the "loose-rein" Tu-yu-hun and Tanguts with impunity, were becoming increasingly desperate.

In response to the Uighurs' actions, the emperor ordered various officials and nobles to discuss the matter. Li Deyu was of course an important person within this group, which also included his political adversaries Chen Yixing and Niu Sengru.[28] Niu proposed a defensive policy which was criticized by Li Deyu, who argued that the Uighurs

[24] *JTS* 18a: 590.

[25] This date is according to the *Wuzong shilu*; see *ZZTJKY* 246: 7964.

[26] The text gives the date as the seventeenth day (24 September), but *ZZTJKY* 246: 7964 gives the date as the cyclical day *wuchen*, which was the seventh day (14 September); see Hiraoka, *Tōdai no koyomi*, 278. Cen Zhongmian preferred the date of the seventh day, which is based on the lost *Wuzong shilu*; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 169, n. 1. The dating of the next memorial **[Doc. 25]** to the tenth day (17 September) would also suggest the correctness of dating this earlier memorial to the seventh day rather than to the seventeenth.

[27] *ZZTJ* 246: 7963.

[28] Biographies of Niu Sengru (d. 847) may be found in *JTS* 172: 4469-4473 and *XTS* 174: 5229-5232.

could be defeated by a swift, direct strike. Once again we see the chief minister reversing his opinion, probably because the Uighurs had behaved in such a threatening manner and managed to obtain large numbers of animals against the wishes of the Tang court. He thus opposed Niu's proposal, saying, "If we [only] guard strategic places and [thus] show weakness, the barbarians will have no reason to withdraw." The emperor, as usual, sided with Li.[29]

On 17 September 842, Li Deyu submitted a memorial asking that troops from several prefectures to the east and southeast of Chang'an be sent to reinforce the northern frontier **[Doc. 25]**. He was particularly eager to prevent the Uighurs from crossing the Yellow River once it had frozen in the winter, for he worried that they would then join forces with the Tibetans. He also feared that the Tang government would not be able to withstand a combined Uighur-Tibetan attack. Although in a state of decline, the Tibetan empire was still a significant power which held a great deal of territory, some of which had once been part of the Tang empire. This included much of the region known as Hexi, west of the great bend of the Yellow River and not too distant from the Uighur qaghan's encampment. The Chinese court had not yet learned of the death of the last important Tibetan *btsanpo*, Khri-u-dum-brtsan gLang-dar-ma, which was reported on 11 January 843.[30] Thus, at this time, Li Deyu's fears of Uighur-Tibetan collusion must have been quite real, and not just an attempt to frighten the emperor into agreement with his request that more troops be sent to the frontier. While it would seem from this document that, after raiding the Datong region, the qaghan had withdrawn somewhat, Li Deyu anticipated a winter incursion, facilitated by the freezing of the northern rivers.

Probably between 14 and 22 September 842,[31] Li Deyu submitted

[29] *JTS* 18a: 591-592.

[30] *ZZTJ* 246: 7969.

[31] Sima Guang connected this memorial with a report in the *Wuzong shilu* that "Fu Che memorialized that Uighurs had plundered Hengshui," dated to the first month (14 February–15 March 842), but since the memorial's internal evidence shows that it was not submitted until after Liu Mian had been made military governor of Hedong, an event which occurred in the third month (15 April–13 May), Sima Guang dated the memorial in question to the third month, shortly after Liu's transfer to Hedong and Li Zhongshun's appointment at Zhenwu; see *ZZTJ* and *ZZTJKY* 246: 7960. Cen Zhongmian, however, has gathered an impressive array of evidence to argue for a date between 14 and 22 September. His most important evidence is that (a) Sun Chou is known to have been in the capital in mid-Septem-

another memorial that addressed three specific concerns **[Doc. 26]**. The first was an Uighur attack on the Hengshui Palisade, located south of Tiande (and of the Yellow River) and west of the Central City for Receiving Submission. After the attack, these Uighurs had "withdrawn to the east of Shijiabo" after their raid. Li Deyu was uncertain as to their identity, but made it clear that they were far from the qaghan's camp. He speculated that they might have been the remnants of Naghïd Chor's followers fleeing from the disaster in Youzhou. According to the memorial, Ögä Qaghan's encampment was some 300 *li* (about 100 miles) east of these Uighurs. Li Deyu was careful to distinguish the Hengshui raiders from the qaghan's followers, reporting that the former apparently had acted on their own volition and were not under the qaghan's command. Li Deyu urged their destruction by Liu Mian and Zhang Zhongwu, an act which could have the secondary benefit of frightening the qaghan.

The second matter raised in the memorial was the vexing one of the recovery of the Taihe Princess. Her continued residence among the Uighur refugees was an embarrassment to the Tang court on many levels, and her recovery was thus a matter of both moral and political importance to the Chinese. Ögä Qaghan certainly wished to keep her in his control as a bargaining chip in his ongoing negotiations with the court at Chang'an. Nevertheless, as he had already experienced, his holding of the princess was no guarantee of Tang acquiescence to his demands. Li Deyu's memorial stated that intelligence reports had revealed that the princess and the qaghan had their own tents and conducted separate interviews with Chinese envoys. Therefore,

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ber; (b) although the *Wuzong shilu* dates an attack on Hengshui in the first month, a letter to the qaghan dated to the eighth month (8 September–7 October) **[Doc. 27]** mentions the attack on Hengshui as "recent" (*zuo*), the same word used in the memorial under consideration here; (c) although Naghïd Chor was defeated by Youzhou's forces, he himself was not captured at that time, and must still have had some followers with him, so that this memorial need not be dated prior to Naghïd's defeat; (d) since Naghïd Chor took command of Chi-xin's followers only after the latter's murder, an event which took place in the third month or at the beginning of the fourth, this memorial must post-date that event; and (e) the memorial dated 14 September 842 **[Doc. 25]** states that the Uighurs, having come to the area north of Batoufeng, had not yet engaged in any disturbances of the border. Hence this particular memorial under consideration must be placed after 14 September. Cen believed that the Uighurs mentioned in the first section of the memorial under consideration could have been the remnants of Naghïd Chor's followers returning westward from their defeat at the hands of Zhang Zhongzhi. See Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 172-173, n. 1.

it might be possible to speak with her privately and inform her of the necessity of her departure from the Uighur camp (something she no doubt needed little convincing of) and of possible plans for effecting that end.

Finally, the memorial considered the question of which strategy to employ against the Uighurs. Li Deyu suggested abandoning small, unprotected towns and cities to prevent the Uighurs from raiding them and thereby obtaining goods from them. He urged the fortification of larger (walled) cities and stated that if the Uighurs raided Tang territory, a military force should be sent out to attack the Uighur camp—where they would have left their women, children, the aged, and supplies—to weaken them. Perhaps still smarting from recent defeats at the hands of the Uighurs, and cognizant of the fact that the qaghan's horde was still quite large, Li counseled against engaging the Uighur raiders in battle, since these would be skilled troops. His comments reveal the continuing general weakness of the northern border defenses, and suggest what was eventually to become the Tang plan: a direct attack on the Uighur encampment, with all the refugees and their baggage, rather than a clash with raiding armies.

Continued Communications, Increasing Belligerence

At about the same time, prior to 27 September 842, Li Deyu composed letters to both Ögä Qaghan **[Doc. 27]** and the Taihe Princess **[Doc. 28]**, each written in the emperor's name. The first began with a litany of Chinese kindnesses to the Uighur refugees, including the payment of the silk owed for Uighur horses, and then criticized the qaghan for his erratic movements. It also accused him of plotting an attack on Tang territory. And while Li Deyu suspected that the Uighurs who had attacked Hengshui Palisade were not acting on the qaghan's command, the letter nevertheless used the incident to strengthen Chinese criticism of the Uighurs. Still, at its end the letter proffered hope that the entire situation still could be resolved peaceably. The emperor's posture throughout the letter was that of nurturer and pacifier—indeed, of sole protector of the Uighurs, shielding them from the wrath of suspicious Tang generals and officials. The letter concluded with mention of one Shi Jiezhi, most likely a Sogdian (or part-Sogdian) whose family was originally from Tashkent, who had lived

among the Uighurs.[32] This man had also spent time in Chang'an. He was well informed on political matters and had convinced the Tang court that he would be an effective envoy to Ögä Qaghan. The letter indicated that the court relied on Shi Jiezhi to discuss matters with the qaghan beyond what was contained in the letter.

The imperial letter to the Taihe Princess expressed concern for her well-being and offered solace for the trials which she was undergoing. After criticizing the behavior of the Uighurs, the letter urged her to attempt to convince them of the error of their ways. It stated that if the Uighurs did not accept her commands, this was essentially a renunciation of the long-standing marital alliance that had existed between China and the Uighurs. The message ended with the statement that the emperor was sending winter clothing for her along with the letter. A perusal of this text suggests that it was written more for the benefit of the Uighur leaders, including the qaghan, than the princess herself. It is difficult to imagine that the Tang court truly believed that she could influence these desperate Uighurs to any great extent. The letter's assertion that she was the Uighurs' queen, with the power to command them, is a bit of exaggeration. There is no evidence to either suggest or disprove the notion that after her husband's death the princess had been married to subsequent Uighur qaghans. Furthermore, the actual political influence of Chinese princesses among the Uighurs has never been ascertained. It seems most likely that the Taihe Princess' influence would have been relatively little at this point, although her value as a hostage was still considerable. This of course placed her in a precarious position.

It is fortunate that no questions of great historical importance hinge on these two letters, for they may never have been delivered. On 25 September 842, Li Deyu submitted a memorial expressing his concerns about Shi Jiezhi, the man who had been chosen to deliver the letters **[Doc. 29]**. Li had learned that Shi apparently feared that, as someone who was connected to the Uighurs, he might later be taken into custody by the Tang government, and so had sought the commission

[32] The surname Shi was used by both Chinese and Sogdians from Tashkent; on the latter, see Pulleyblank, "A Sogdian Colony in Inner Mongolia," 320. Chinese sources call him an Uighur, thereby revealing that he was not Chinese. Given that fact, and the close relationship between the Uighurs and the Sogdians, it is almost certain that Shi Jiezhi was either Sogdian or part-Sogdian. Note that *JTS* 18a: 593 gives a variant form of the first character of Shi's given name (*ming*).

as an envoy to the Uighur camp in order to escape Chinese control. Li also had discovered that two of Shi's men already had fled from Tang territory and probably had reached the Uighur camp. While he did not name his sources, it seems quite possible that the chief minister's suspicions concerning Shi Jiezhi were raised by Ormïzt Tigin, since the latter probably was still in Chang'an at this time. Li therefore became concerned about Shi's motives, fearing that his mission to the Uighurs would not only be without positive effects (since previous envoys had been unable to convince the qaghan to submit or leave), but would "give rise to villainy," since Shi might inflame the qaghan's anger with tales of Chinese treatment of Manichaeans and Uighurs—who, according to this memorial, had been registered by the government, presumably in case they should need to be taken into custody at some point—and of the favor that had been shown to Ormïzt. Since Shi Jiezhi had already left the capital, Li Deyu urged the emperor to approve an order to Liu Mian to restrain him before he could leave Tang territory, and then return him to Chang'an. Whether Liu Mian was successful in preventing Shi from reaching the Uighur camp is unrecorded.[33] If he was intercepted by Liu Mian, the letters to the qaghan and the princess may still have been sent, with minor alterations to delete references to Shi.

Two days after Li Deyu had submitted the memorial concerning Shi Jiezhi, a letter from Li's brush was sent to the Uighur *il-ögäsi* on 27 September 842, to be carried by Liu Mian **[Doc. 30]**. Employing the same exasperated tone as the previous letter to the qaghan **[Doc. 27]** and drawing upon powerful historical examples, it is an example of Li Deyu's mastery of the arts of persuasion and castigation. Compared with the letter to the qaghan, this communication with the Uighur minister is far longer and employs a much more literary style with numerous historical examples as well as quotes from the ancient texts *Shi jing* and *Zuo zhuan*. Just how able the Uighur minister was to appreciate such a style remains a mystery. The letter also differs from that sent to the qaghan in that it stressed coming to submit to China rather than returning north of the desert. Once again we are presented with the example of Hu-han-ye as a "good submissive barbarian," while his rival Zhi-zhi was cast as a "bad recalcitrant barbarian" whose unhappy fate, clearly spelled out in the letter, was to prove

[33] See *ZZTJKY* 246: 7965.

prophetic. Li Deyu urged the minister to behave with propriety and arrange at the very least for the Taihe Princess to return to China. He pointed out (rather belatedly) that it was after all the Kirghiz who were the Uighurs' enemies, not the Chinese. Li ridiculed the Uighurs for attacking weak peoples such as the Tu-yu-hun rather than engaging their real enemies. And while the letter did chide the Uighurs for misdirecting their fury, it was the first communication with the refugees in which there was virtually no mention of the Uighurs returning to their homeland. There is no clear explanation for this change of focus. Perhaps Li Deyu was beginning to realize the hopelessness of getting the Uighurs to return to the Mongolian plateau.

An examination of the Tang letters to the Uighurs reveals that the tone of those communications was indeed becoming increasingly belligerent. This latest letter went so far as to state that the Chinese did not fear the wrath of the Uighurs. It seems that the Tang court was becoming more confident of its border defenses (and, probably, Uighur weakness), although problems remained. An undated memorial by Li Deyu discussed some of those difficulties, particularly in regard to communication and supply **[Doc. 31]**. According to this memorial, the Uighurs were in the vicinity of Yunzhou. Li feared that they might take advantage of their proximity to important frontier cities to cut off post-horse communications with Tiande and Zhenwu. The chief minister did not credit the Uighurs with the ability to devise such a plan, but feared that "villainous persons along the border"—presumably Chinese or members of the "loose-rein" tribes at the frontier region—would collude with the Uighurs. Li Deyu further urged that abandoned post stations from Xiazhou to Tiande be rehabilitated to facilitate the sending of urgent communications from Tiande. As far as supply was concerned, Li urged the emperor to authorize the purchase of grain from the prosperous and auspiciously-named northern community of Rich Valley (Fugu). These provisions would be used to supply the northern frontier cities. They would be kept along the northern routes so that they could be used to relieve either Zhenwu to the east or Tiande to the west.

The Tang government still made no direct move to attack the Uighurs, although the stockpiling and repairs mentioned in Li's memorial no doubt were approved by the throne and thus constituted further preparations for a possible military showdown. It is also clear from later reports that the Uighurs had raided the region of Yunzhou to obtain cattle and sheep. This suggests that the refugees' food supplies

remained in a precarious situation, necessitating raids to obtain what they needed. This can also be seen in the fact that the Taihe Princess wrote a letter, the text of which has not survived, requesting cattle and sheep from the emperor. The Tang court did not act on this request, nor did it act upon Ögä Qaghan's repeated demand for the surrender of Ormïzt.[34]

Meanwhile, the Uighurs began to move eastward. Li Deyu's next memorial on the subject **[Doc. 32]**, dated some time between 25 September and 4 October 842,[35] revealed his concern that this movement might presage an attack, particularly since autumn, the traditional season for nomad incursions, had arrived. According to this memorial, the Uighurs were now in the vicinity of Zhenwu. Li hoped that General Liu Mian could be ordered to reinforce strategic sites and attempt to gain further intelligence concerning the actual circumstances of the Uighur refugees. It is unfortunate indeed that none of Liu Mian's memorials or reports survives, for his response to this order, and others, would greatly increase our knowledge of events at the frontier.

The Decision for War

Despite his long forbearance, on 4 October 842 Li Deyu submitted a memorial to the throne revealing that the chief minister finally had lost hope of dealing with Ögä Qaghan through peaceful means **[Doc. 33]**. There is no indication in the available records of any specific occurrence which caused Li Deyu to believe that warfare had become inevitable, but he was no doubt propelled toward this conclusion by the Uighurs' own refusal to leave or submit. In his memorial, Li presented the emperor with two possible timetables for an attack on the Uighurs' camp: an immediate assault, or a delay until spring. Li Deyu wished for troops from semi-autonomous Youzhou to participate in this action, but was concerned that, once they had left Youzhou, their provisioning would become the obligation of the Tang court. He therefore was eager that they not leave Youzhou until absolutely necessary. Li pointed out the various advantages and disadvantages of each option. In a winter campaign, the Uighurs might make use of

[34] *JTS* 18a: 592.
[35] See Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 184, n. 1.

frozen rivers to make a surprise attack on Tang installations. Furthermore, Taiyuan's troops were demoralized and weak. Li Deyu estimated that an additional 10,000 men would be needed as reinforcements. As for a spring campaign, the Uighurs and their horses would be lean after the deprivations of winter, and thus might be more easily routed. Furthermore, a spring attack would spare the Tang troops from a difficult campaign in harsh weather. After reviewing these pros and cons, Li Deyu requested permission to assemble the high officials at the capital to discuss the matter. A decision had to be reached quickly, since winter was rapidly approaching. Not without critics in high places, Li Deyu may have hoped to reach some sort of consensus regarding this very important action, or perhaps he hoped to showcase the incompetence of his rivals.

The emperor consented to the discussion, and the majority of those present agreed that a spring campaign was the best plan. A memorial was written to that effect.[36] Although that document does not survive, on 9 October 842 Li Deyu wrote a memorial discussing and criticizing some of the points which it had raised **[Doc. 34]**. He especially objected to the imprecise language of the group's memorial which, from the examples quoted in Li's own memorial, appears platitudinous in the extreme. Li Deyu's excoriation of their suggestions and remarks shows at the same time his acute understanding of the circumstances surrounding the Uighur crisis. He scoffed at the officials' suggestion that any Uighurs fleeing from the frontier (apparently after the Tang initial attack) should be allowed to do so without being pursued. Li realized that this would only prolong the difficulties at the border. Particularly important are the chief minister's remarks on the Tang government's difficulty in enlisting troops for duty at the northern frontier. Various inducements had failed to help in the recruitment of sufficient numbers of troops, and thus manpower for the Tang armies in the north remained inadequate for the defense of the frontier.

Underlying Li Deyu's criticisms of the officials' group memorial was the implication that only he was sufficiently well-versed in this matter to formulate effective policy. However, he urged the emperor to allow another discussion, to include himself and his rivals Niu Sengru and Chen Yixing, the results of which were to be presented to the throne within two days. On 14 October 842, Li submitted another memorial

[36] *ZZTJ* 246: 7966.

revealing the results of this second discussion, and the further criticisms of the earlier group memorial which had emerged in that discussion **[Doc. 35]**. In this latest memorial, Li presented the strategy which he planned to employ against the Uighurs. Taking advantage of their proximity to the border, the cumbersomeness of the refugee families (which would be unable to move as rapidly as a strike force), and the fact that the Uighurs had settled in one area, Tang forces would fall upon them suddenly in the coming spring, after they had been weakened by the hardships of winter.

This memorial shows Li Deyu's exasperation with the numerous suggestions made by the senior officials during their assembled discussion of the Uighur problem, and indicates that he did not welcome their remarks. Indeed, he merely wanted their opinion as to the general policy the government should follow. One can imagine that his purpose in suggesting the discussions was not to obtain significant input from the other officials, but rather to receive their approval for his plan to attack the Uighurs in the spring—the policy which, as shown in his earlier memorial of 4 October 842 **[Doc. 33]**, he clearly preferred. His request for a discussion makes it seem as if he were seriously interested in the officials' contributions, but his reaction to their input makes it clear that his interest in their opinions was minimal. It may be that the discussion's real purpose was to conciliate the officials. Rejecting most of their additional comments and suggestions, Li Deyu simply accepted the majority proposal that an attack on the Uighurs take place in the spring after winter preparations were completed. This gave the court several more months in which to prepare.

Whether we choose to believe Li Deyu's assertion that all military preparations prior to this had been purely for defensive purposes, with no intention of an attack on the Uighurs, it is clear from the evidence that the decision to expel the Uighurs by force had been made by 4 October 842, apparently because the Uighurs remained at the border, showing no sign of either submitting or leaving, and had had the temerity to raid Yunzhou.[37] Despite the problems connected

[37] As part of this discussion, Pan Yihong included the official Du Mu's letter to Li Deyu regarding the northern border situation; see Pan, *Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan*, 317-318. This letter, mentioned in *JTS* 147: 3986 and *XTS* 166: 5097 (which were apparently the source of Pan's information), cannot have been written at this time, as it refers to Li Deyu as *taiwei*—a title that he did not receive until 844. See Du, *Fanchuan wenji* 16: 232-234, as well as *QTW* 752: 9864-9865 for the text of the

to obtaining recruits, the Tang military machine, rusty though it was, was now engaged in a buildup for an attack on the Uighur refugees in the spring of 843.

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letter. Du Mu's letter is probably to be dated to the fall or winter of the fourth year of the Huichang era, i.e., late 844 or early 845; see Fu, *Li Deyu nianpu*, 551-554.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS

"How can we harbor a den of vipers at the Great Wall?"

The Tang Northern Command Structure

The man chosen to direct the Tang offensive against Ögä Qaghan was Liu Mian, who had been promoted in the third month of the second year of the Huichang reign period (15 April–13 May 842) to the post of military governor of Hedong to replace the ailing Fu Che. Some time between 8 and 14 October of that same year,[1] he was named Uighur pacification commissioner (*zhaofu Hui-hu shi*).[2] According to the imperial proclamation of appointment, Liu was allowed to retain whatever titles he already held in addition to that of his new appointment. The edict also stated that the Uighurs, if "unrepentant," were to be expelled from the frontier by force. At the same time, Zhang Zhongwu was appointed eastern Uighur pacification commissioner (*dongmian zhaofu Hui-hu shi*),[3] while Ormïzt (Li Sizhong) was made

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[1] On this dating, see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 187-188, n. 1.

[2] This form of the title is undoubtedly correct, as it is the form which appears in the imperial proclamation granting the title (found in *HCYPJ* 3: 18, *LWRWJ* 3: 7b-8b, and *QTW* 698: 9075-9076) as well as in *ZZTJ* 246: 7966. (The proclamation has not been translated in this work.) A similar form appears in Liu Mian's funerary inscription; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 187-188, n. 1. In *JTS* 18a: 592 the title is given as *Hui-hu nanmian zhaotao shi*; here the element "southern" (*nanmian*, meaning "facing the Uighurs from the south") has been added, and *tao* has been written for *fu*, possibly in confusion with the title granted to Ormïzt (Li Sizhong), which does contain the term *zhaotao* rather than *zhaofu*. The meanings are essentially the same. In *JTS* 195: 5214 the title appears as *nanmian zhaokong Hui-hu shi*, where *kong* is clearly an error for *fu*. In *XTS* 8: 292 and 217b: 6132 the title is given as *Hui-hu nanmian zhaofu shi*. As Cen Zhongmian has pointed out, the addition of "southern" to Liu Mian's new title probably was made in the histories to correspond to the element "eastern" (*dongmian*) in the title granted to Zhang Zhongwu; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 187-188, n. 1. As indicated above, the Song historian Sima Guang was apparently aware of this, and rejected the inclusion of "southern" in Liu's title in *ZZTJ*.

[3] The imperial proclamation of appointment (*HCYPJ* 3:18, *LWRWJ* 3: 7b-8b,

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group commander of the Tanguts of Hexi *(Hexi Dang-xiang dujiang)*[4] as well as southwestern commissioner to chastise the Uighurs *(Hui-hu xi'nan zhaotao shi)*.[5] A tripartite structure for the upcoming military campaign thus was established, with Liu Mian in the north flanked by Zhang Zhongwu in the northeast and Ormïzt in the northwest. The imperial proclamation appointing Zhang Zhongwu implies that coordination between the forces of the Tang central government and those of Youzhou was to be relatively loose, with each leader acting on his own volition to achieve a common goal. It points out historical examples in which two commanders independently and yet harmoniously attacked foreign groups. In deference to Youzhou's special semi-autonomous status, Zhang's proclamation of appointment was far more laudatory than that granted to Liu Mian, and enumerated Zhang's imposing list of titles. In addition to his new post as eastern Uighur pacification commissioner, Zhang was also named honorary president of the Ministry of War at this time.[6]

On 18 October 842, only a few days after the three men were appointed to these particular positions, Li Deyu submitted a memorial regarding the procurement of horses for the campaign **[Doc. 36]**. In his memorial, the chief minister requested permission to arrange for the purchase of war horses from non-Chinese frontier peoples under Tang control. The horses would then be moved to a secure place in order to keep them out of Uighur hands and to establish a "central store" for horses from which any of the various circuits could be supplied. It is clear from Li's memorial that the court's greatest problem

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and *QTW* 698: 9075-9076) contains no information of relevance to this study.

[4] The Tang military command region of Hexi, with headquarters as Liangzhou, was established in 710; see *XTS* 67: 1861-1862 as well as Wu, *Tang fangzhen nianbiao*, 1216-1227. It had fallen under Tibetan control in the years following the An Lushan rebellion. Thus there was at this time no Tang administrative unit called Hexi. However, the term continued to be used for the land west of the great bend of the Yellow River, a small portion of which the Tang government still controlled. It is also possible that this term referred to Tanguts who had previously lived in Hexi but had fled eastward to more secure Tang territory when that region was taken by the Tibetans, and so still were called "Hexi Tanguts." According to Dalby, Tanguts had been settled in "loose-rein" prefectures in the regions of Xiazhou and Yinzhou (in the Ordos, across the river and east of Hexi) at the beginning of the ninth century; see "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," 679.

[5] *ZZTJ* 246: 7966.

[6] Zhang's proclamation of appointment may be found in *HCYPJ* 3: 18-19, *LWRWJ* 3: 8b-9b, and *QTW* 698: 9076. It is discussed in Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 188-189, but has not been translated here.

in its military preparation was a lack of horses. By purchasing horses from the Tu-yu-hun, Tanguts, and others, the Tang government could prevent those horses from being either stolen by or illegally sold to the Uighurs.

The very next day, 19 October, Li Deyu memorialized concerning intelligence he had just received from Taiyuan **[Doc. 37]**. He had been informed that Ögä Qaghan had just shifted his camp southward approximately 40 *li* (about 13 miles), apparently fearing an attack by the Khitans or some other tribe. While this movement was regarded by Liu Mian (the source of the intelligence) as a defensive move, it was nevertheless cause for alarm, as it brought the Uighurs closer to Tang territory. The memorial also mentioned information that had been received concerning Youzhou and the Shi-wei people of the northeast, and so sheds interesting light on the subject of Uighur control over subordinate tribes prior to 840. According to Li's memorial, after Zhang Zhongzhi's defeat of Naghïd Chor, Zhang had captured the wife and son of the Shi-wei ruler among his prisoners, and turned them over to his brother Zhang Zhongwu. This suggests that the Shi-wei ruler's wife and son were hostages among the Uighurs, and had ended up with Naghïd Chor's group after the Uighur collapse. According to the memorial, the Shi-wei ruler wished to ransom his wife and son with various treasures, including sheep, horses, gold, and silks. Zhang Zhongwu replied that he did not wish for such riches, but would return the Shi-wei ruler's family to him if he simply would kill the Uighur overseers who were still among the Shi-wei. According to Li's memorial, the forces of Youzhou and the Shi-wei had then combined to accomplish the murder of the Uighur overseers, but they had not yet returned from Shi-wei territory.

This is a rare instance of a description, however slight, of how the Uighurs maintained control over other tribes that were politically subordinate to them. According to Sima Guang, Uighur overseers were stationed with each tribe; they collected taxes and used their vantage point to keep an eye on Chinese activities as well. Although Sima Guang did not say so, it seems that the overseers' safety was guaranteed by a hostage system (as suggested above) and by the threat of Uighur reprisals. Sima Guang wrote that after the Uighur collapse, Zhang Zhongwu sent a military official to contact the Tatabï and Khitans, and that together they put to death all the Uighur overseers among them, along with "others" who were presumably members of the overseers' families and entourages (including bodyguards), as

well as local collaborators—a total of more than 800 persons.[7] The Uighur overseers thus must have been a significant presence among the various subordinate tribes, far more than the handful one might initially imagine. After the collapse of the Uighur state, these overseers over subordinate tribes, at least those to the east and northeast, had remained there in some capacity, presumably under the assumption that a restoration of Uighur power was possible. Through the machinations of Zhang Zhongwu, three of these tribes executed their Uighur overseers. Other tribes previously under Uighur domination probably exterminated, expelled, or assimilated their former overseers in time. Still, it is interesting to note the apprehension that kept these overseers safe, at least for awhile. The smaller tribes certainly did not wish to risk Uighur revenge. It is also clear that at least some tribes remained loyal to the Uighurs well after 840. The Uighur refugees at the Tang frontier thus were not entirely bereft of allies.

The final section of Li Deyu's memorial of 19 October 842 indicates that by this time the Tang government's border defenses, excepting those at Datong, were considered adequate for defense against Ögä Qaghan and his followers. Li suggested that another 1000 men from the region just south of Youzhou be sent to fortify Datong. The emperor agreed to this, and some time prior to the tenth month (i.e., before 6 November 842), those troops were sent to the frontier. At about the same time, the emperor ordered the generals at Taiyuan to mobilize their Shi-wei, Sha-tuo, and Tu-yu-hun troops. Shi Xiong was deputed to be in charge of them as the vanguard in the attack on the Uighur camp.[8]

The Military Role of Ormïzt

In the meantime, Li Deyu had submitted another memorial on 20 October 842 regarding troop deployment **[Doc. 38]**. In this memorial, the chief minister proposed that troops from Hedong, Youzhou, Zhenwu, and Tiande be sent out to press the Uighurs, while Ormïzt (Li Sizhong) was to command non-Chinese troops in the strike. Ormïzt had made a request, which does not survive, asking that troops from the Tu-yu-hun, Sha-tuo, and other tribes be brought together under

[7] *ZZTJ* 246: 7967.
[8] *ZZTJ* 246: 7967 and *JTS* 18a: 593.

his command to be used in the assault on Ögä Qaghan. Li Deyu hoped that the non-Chinese troops under Ormïzt could be divided into two wings, each to be under the control of a non-Chinese general. For this function he proposed He Qingchao[9] and Qi-bi Tong.[10] Each of these men already held a position within the Tang government at this time; He Qingchao was prefect of Yinzhou, while Qi-bi Tong was prefect of Weizhou[a].[11] The emperor agreed to this plan, and Li Deyu composed a letter of edict to Ormïzt informing him of the decision to place He Qingchao and Qi-bi Tong under his command **[Doc. 39]**. According to this letter, the two men had been told to submit completely to Ormïzt's authority. But while they were to be directed by Ormïzt, the letter also made it clear that the latter was to deliberate with Chinese officials concerning plans to expel the qaghan, and was not to act "frivolously" on his own volition. Indeed, Ormïzt was instructed to discuss plans with Tang officials and then "continuously memorialize" concerning those plans. While it seems unlikely that Li Deyu harbored doubts about Ormïzt's loyalty to the Tang, the chief minister's instructions do suggest that the court was concerned about the former Uighur prince's role in the campaign. Since Ormïzt was in many ways an unknown quantity, new to the Tang military structure, it makes perfect sense that Li Deyu would want to make certain that some controls were in place to prevent him from making serious errors.

Ormïzt apparently was already in control of Uighur troops (his own followers) and Tanguts. Under this new arrangement, he was to receive other non-Chinese troops as well as two adjutants, He Qingchao

[9] He Qingchao, for whom there is no known biography, may have been a Sogdian from Kushaniya, or someone whose paternal ancestry included Sogdians from Kushaniya. See Pulleyblank, "A Sogdian Colony in Inner Mongolia," 320.
[10] *JTS* 199b: 5343 includes the Qi-bi tribe as part of the Tie-le confederation. *XTS* 217b: 6111 also lists the Qi-bi (also called Qi-bi-yu) as part of the Tie-le confederation and equates this confederation with the Uighurs. Thus, it would seem that the Qi-bi were a people with close affiliation to the Uighurs, if not a sub-tribe or clan of the Uighurs; see Chavannes, *Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) occidentaux*, 34-35, n. 10. There is a very brief account of the Qi-bi in *XTS* 217b: 6142. A note to *ZZTJ* 246: 7967 states, "the tents of the Qi-bi tribe had submitted at Zhenwu during the Taihe reign period (14 March 827–27 January 836). Qi-bi He-li came to court during the reign of Taizong and subsequently stayed on as a member of the imperial guard." Qi-bi Tong was a descendant of Qi-bi He-li. While there is no known biography for Qi-bi Tong, biographies of Qi-bi He-li may be found in *JTS* 109: 3291-3294 and XTS 4117-4120.
[11] *ZZTJ* 246: 7967.

and Qi-bi Tong, who were to place themselves under his command near Zhenwu.[12] It is clear that non-Chinese troops and leaders were to play an important role in the upcoming campaign; Ormïzt's army was made up entirely of non-Chinese troops, while the bulk of Shi Xiong's contingent appears to have been non-Chinese. As for the troops under Liu Mian and other northern commanders, they also contained non-Chinese personnel.

It soon came to Li Deyu's attention, however, that placing Tu-yu-hun troops under Ormïzt's command was not a wise move, since the Tu-yu-hun and Uighurs apparently had a long-standing grudge, the origin and nature of which are not specified in the sources. On 3 November 842, Li Deyu submitted a memorial to the throne requesting that Liu Mian and other military officials at the frontier discuss this matter **[Doc. 40]**. Li suggested that Tu-yu-hun troops whose loyalty was doubtful could be dismissed, and that various tribal leaders could be sent with their troops on the campaign, so that each tribal group would be under the direct supervision of a familiar person. This suggestion did not solve the increasingly delicate problem of which troops to place under the leadership of Ormïzt. Although Li Deyu had earlier requested the transfer of an additional 1000 troops to Datong, he feared that these Chinese troops would have difficulty understanding Ormïzt, whose knowledge of the Chinese language may have been limited. On 10 November 842, Li submitted another memorial suggesting that the Chinese troops not be sent to serve under Ormïzt, and that half of the Turkic Sha-tuo troops under Liu Mian's command be transferred to Ormïzt instead **[Doc. 41]**. Ormïzt seems to have hoped that all non-Chinese troops from the various participating armies would be placed under his command, but Li Deyu's latest memorial makes it clear that, in matters at the northern frontier, non-Chinese troops were an absolute necessity to serve as scouts. Each Chinese army at the northern frontier usually had 100 or 200 such non-Chinese cavalry. Li cautioned that if all non-Chinese troops were sent to Ormïzt, then other armies "would not be able to advance." He then suggested the compromise concerning half of Liu Mian's Sha-tuo troops. In addition to proposing a solution to the problem of which troops to place under Ormïzt, this memorial shows the importance of non-Chinese troops to the success of Chinese armies involved in campaigns at the

[12] *ZZTJ* 246: 7967.

frontiers. It implies that even when such troops are not specifically mentioned in the historical texts, we should assume that non-Chinese contingents typically were present as scout and reconnaissance troops in northern campaigns (and perhaps others) during this period. As for the recommendation that Sha-tuo troops be placed under Ormïzt, we should note that the Sha-tuo were a Turkic people who were linguistically similar to the Uighurs. In addition, they already had a history of involvement in Uighur affairs, and had been instrumental in placing He-sa Tigin on the Uighur throne in 839. Ormïzt probably was, as we have seen, He-sa's brother, and therefore would have had reasonably friendly ties with the Sha-tuo. It would appear from Li Deyu's memorial that Liu Mian himself had suggested leaving behind some of his Sha-tuo troops. It is unclear whether he intended for them to be placed under Ormïzt.

On 13 November 842, just three days after submitting the preceding memorial, Li Deyu submitted yet another on the same topic, reiterating his fear of problems with the Tu-yu-hun and his preference for placing Sha-tuo troops under Ormïzt's command **[Doc. 42]**. This memorial also revealed that Li believed that He Qingchao and Qi-bi Tong would accept Ormïzt's leadership, albeit grudgingly. Although the details are vague, it seems that both He and Qi-bi had registered a protest after being informed of the plan to place them under Ormïzt, and that the court had reconsidered the situation and the possibility of some other arrangement. A discussion had been held on 11 November, and on 12 November an order had been promulgated that He Qingchao and Qi-bi Tong should instead divide leadership of the various tribes with Ormïzt, and that the two men would only be required to accept Ormïzt's commands in case of an emergency. But Li Deyu was still concerned that He and Qi-bi would not be happy with this arrangement, and that it would lead to problems at the frontier. Li pointed out that Qi-bi Tong had been a prince among the Qi-bi people, and had held a high post in the Tang government as prefect of Weizhou[a]. Thus he could be counted on to divide control of the non-Chinese tribes with Ormïzt. Since both Qi-bi Tong and He Qingchao were Tang officials, surely they would obey Ormïzt in an emergency if ordered to do so. As for Ormïzt himself, Li Deyu seemed to think that it was perhaps premature to entrust him with sole command of the tribes that had been placed under his control, and that the state's experienced generals should be involved.

While *Jiu Tang shu* states that He Qingchao and Qi-bi Tong had

under them 6000 Sha-tuo and Tu-yu-hun cavalry which they led to Tiande,[13] *Zizhi tongjian* states that after Ormïzt had requested 6000 Qi-bi, Sha-tuo and Tu-yu-hun troops with which to attack Ögä Qaghan, He Qingchao and Qi-bi Tong then "divided command of the foreign troops of Hedong and led them to Zhenwu to accept Li Sizhong's [i.e., Ormïzt's] command."[14] Although the sources agree as to the number of troops under He Qingchao and Qi-bi Tong, they differ as to their ethnic composition and the place where they were stationed. Regarding the problem of composition, no final conclusion can be reached from the available information. Li Deyu's original plan, as shown in his memorial of 20 October 842 **[Doc. 38]**, was to place Sha-tuo and Tu-yu-hun troops under He and Qi-bi, who were to join forces with Ormïzt, then in command of a contingent of Uighurs and Tanguts. In Li's later memorials on the subject, the generic term *fanhun*, best translated simply as "foreign" or "foreigner(s)," is employed. Li's memorial of 3 November 842 **[Doc. 40]** mentions the Qi-bi and Tu-yu-hun (Tui-hun) tribes, and points out that the latter might refuse to serve under Ormïzt because of long-standing enmity between the Uighurs and the Tu-yu-hun. The memorial of 10 November **[Doc. 41]** suggests placing Sha-tuo troops under Ormïzt, rather than Chinese troops from Yizhou[b] and Dingzhou. Finally, the memorial of 13 November **[Doc. 42]** implies that the Tu-yu-hun were to be withdrawn from the campaign, yet both *Jiu Tang shu* and *Zizhi tongjian* mention Tu-yu-hun troops under He Qingchao and Qi-bi Tong when these two men were sent north to the frontier.

Despite these uncertainties, it seems clear that Ormïzt's combined army of Uighur and Tangut troops was joined by He Qingchao and Qi-bi Tong who led Qi-bi, Sha-tuo, and possibly Tu-yu-hun troops. If the Tu-yu-hun did participate in the campaign despite Li Deyu's misgivings, they may have served under He Qingchao or Qi-bi Tong, who apparently were independent of Ormïzt's direct control except in case of an emergency.

[13] *JTS* 18a: 593.
[14] *ZZTJ* 246: 7967.

First Contact with the Kirghiz

In the meantime, the first envoy from the victorious Kirghiz, a general named Ta-bu-he-zu,[15] arrived with his retinue at Tiande some time during the tenth month (6 November–5 December 842).[16] Virtually all the information we have concerning this embassy comes from a letter written by Li Deyu to an Uighur minister **[Doc. 43]**. Since the letter clearly had persuasion as its primary goal, it is possible that some of the information contained within it is exaggerated. Nevertheless, the letter is highly revealing. Dated probably to the very end of the second year of the Huichang reign period (i.e., December 842 or January 843),[17] it was also the Tang court's last known communication with the camp of Ögä Qaghan.

Li Deyu's last letter to the Uighurs quotes part of the Kirghz envoy's missive, which does not survive. According to Li's account, the Kirghiz were concerned that they had heard nothing of the fate of the Taihe Princess since, when they had routed the Uighurs in 840, they had sent her with an escort to return to Tang territory. As the envoy had not returned, the Kirghiz had decided to send out 400,000 troops to search for them even as far as Tibetan territory. Li Deyu's purpose in informing the Uighurs of this is made clear by his subsequent remarks that the Uighur refugees were weak and not great in number, and thus unable to withstand such a powerful enemy. He urged them to return the princess and then hide themselves in the mountains and valleys to escape the wrath of the Kirghiz. He also informed them of the Kirghiz intention to occupy the Uighurs' former territory of He-luo-chuan[18] and thus obtain control over parts of the Gansu corridor and the northern Tarim Basin, specifically the cities of Anxi[19] and

[15] The Tang pronunciation (for which see *GKWD* 1280, 404, 210, and 923) does not suggest a clear Turkic form. The first two syllables are slightly reminiscent of the name Taspar, the regnal title of the qaghan who ruled the Eastern Türks from 572 to 581. His name is usually transcribed as Ta-bo in Chinese sources. The element *he* typically transcribes Turkic *alp*, "brave," which is common in ninth-century Kirghiz names or titles. The syllable *zu* suggests nothing in Turkic.
[16] *ZZTJ* 246: 7968.
[17] See Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 202, n. 1.
[18] The identity of He-luo-chuan is highly problematic and will be discussed in the following chapter.
[19] The Protectorate-General (*duhufu*) of Anxi ("Pacified West") was established in 640 by the Tang emperor Taizong as the Chinese administrative unit for the control of various city-states of the Tarim Basin. Its administrative center was based

Beiting[20] as well as various tribes of Tatars[21] and other peoples.

in Qocho (Chinese Gaochang, later Xizhou) from 640 to 649, and then in Kucha from 649 until 670, when it was moved back to Qocho due to Tibetan conquests in the Tarim region. See Wechsler, "T'ai-tsung (Reign 626-49) the Consolidator," 226-227 as well as Twitchett and Wechsler, "Kao-tsung (Reign 649-83) and the Empress Wu," 285-286. Tang control over this region was in any case often compromised, with the Western Türks, Uighurs, and Tibetans exercising considerable authority there. In 791, Anxi fell to the Tibetans and was abandoned by the Chinese. See Dalby, "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," 610. The Uighurs, who were defeated along with the Chinese, soon recovered and reestablished control over both Qocho and Kucha, which became important centers of Western Uighur power after the collapse of the Uighur empire. See Moriyasu, "Qui des Ouigours ou des Tibétains ont gagné en 789-792 à Beš-Balïq?" and Beckwith, *The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia*, 155, as well as Takeuchi, "The Tibetans and Uighurs in Pei-t'ing, An-hsi (Kucha), and Hsi-chou."

[20] The Protectorate-General of Beiting ("Northern Court") was established by the Tang in 702 just to the north of Qocho. See Wechsler, "T'ai-tsung (Reign 626-49) the Consolidator," 227. It was known to the Turkic peoples as Beshbaliq, "Five Cities." See Moriyasu, "Qui des Ouigours ou des Tibétains ont gagné en 789-792 à Beš-Balïq?" and Takeuchi, "The Tibetans and Uighurs in Pei-t'ing, An-hsi (Kucha), and Hsi-chou." Beshbalïq was also a major power center of the Western Uighurs. See Abe, "Where Was the Capital of the Western Uighurs?"

[21] In Kljaštornyj, "Das Reich der Tataren in der Zeit vor Činggis Khan," 75-77, the author asserted that the Kirghiz did war with the Tatars in 842, and that this interpretation of Li Deyu's letter was corroborated by two Kirghiz runiform inscriptions. These inscriptions, however, are highly problematic. One of them, which Kljaštornyj believes to refer to this supposed war, is badly damaged at the crucial point, and contains no actual mention of a Kirghiz-Tatar conflict of any kind; see Ščerbak, "L'inscription runique d'Oust-Elégueste (Touva)," 145-146 and Vasil'ev, *Korpus tiurkskikh runicheskikh pamiatnikov basseina Eniseia*, 33-34. The second is also problematic and, at the most, may refer to the Tatars as "enemies" (Old Turkic *yaghï*); see Kliashtornyi, "Deviataia nadpis' s Uibata," 35. The Tatars of Li Deyu's letter have also been the subject of remarks in Ögel, "Ein Tor nach China im 10. Jhdt.," particularly 169-174. These must be taken with caution. On p. 171, n. 11, the author misinterpreted Li Deyu's letter as indicating that the Kirghiz already had taken Anxi, Beiting, etc., as is clear from his translation: "Die Kirghisen verlegten (soeben) ihre Wohnsitze in das Ho-la-Tal, das alte Land der Uiguren, and vereinigten unter ihrer Herrshaft An-hsi, Pei-t'ing, Ta-tan und die Fünf Stämme." He then went on to remark, "Tatsachlich aber gelang es den Kirghisen niemals, An-shi [*sic*] und Bischbaliq zu erobern. Der Text ist zu bezweifeln." While it is true that the Kirghiz never attacked or established control over Anxi or Beiting, the Chinese text does not state that they had. Other scholars have had difficulties with this text of Li Deyu's as well. In his "The Foundation of the Turfan Uyghur Kingdom," Czeglédy wrote that the Russian scholar G.P. Suprunenko "calls our attention to Chinese reports which refer to some further attacks made by the Qirghiz in 842 (or?) 843 against Anhsi and Peit'ing. Thus, the Qirghiz at least tried to continue the pursuit of the Uyghurs during the disintegration of the Orkhon Uyghur Empire" (p. 160). Czeglédy gives no source for these remarks by Suprunenko, and I have not been able to find such an assertion in her articles available to me. If she has made this assertion, she must be referring to Li Deyu's text, and it would appear then that she, like Ögel,

Li's letter also informed the Uighurs that while the Kirghiz envoy had not encountered a single Uighur on his journey to Tiande and the Western City for Receiving Submission, he had expressed concern that the Uighurs would be in communication with the Tibetans, and so had ordered Kirghiz cavalry to block the road that would facilitate such contact. It should be remembered that at this time the Tibetans controlled the region to the west of the great bend of the Yellow River, including a large portion of the former Tang province of Longyou, and also had long maintained a presence in the Tarim Basin. In light of the fact that the Kirghiz were seeking the Taihe Princess—along with those who had seized her from them—and had expressed an interest in extending their territorial power, Li Deyu urged the Uighurs once more to submit. He pointed out the foolhardiness of relying upon the help of small tribes such as the Black Carts (Chinese Hei Chezi) of the Shi-wei, for this would only lead to the Uighurs being scorned by others and would not serve to protect them from any real danger.

In the meantime, the Tang government continued its preparations for war against Ögä Qaghan and his followers. On 22 November 842, Li Deyu submitted a memorial requesting permission to allow Liu Mian to act on his own judgment rather than wait for orders from the court **[Doc. 44]**. The chief minister feared that General Liu was overly prudent and so would lose an opportunity to crush the Uighurs. Li Deyu thus requested that the emperor issue a decree to Liu Mian giving him such permission. The emperor agreed, and the decree was issued the following day.[22] Although the decree is no longer extant, it is likely that its text approximated that suggested by Li Deyu urging Liu to take some initiative in his decisions.

A Chinese Spy among the Uighurs

It was at about this time that Liu Mian sent a man from Zhenwu as a spy to Ögä's camp. This man, named Cai Xi, is not mentioned in traditional sources in regard to the Uighurs, but his story was recorded

misunderstood the Chinese. There is no other Chinese source suggesting that the Kirghiz had attacked, or wished to attack, Anxi, Beiting, etc., except for this text and others based on it. The text is, without question, problematic; see **Doc. 43** and the accompanying notes. On the Tatars, see the Appendix, n. 14.

[22] *ZZTJKJ* 247: 7972.

by a young Chinese scholar named Li Qi[23] who in 850/851 composed an account of Cai's exploits among the Uighurs in order to try to win for Cai the credit that Li Qi believed he was due **[Doc. 70]**. According to Li Qi's account, Cai had once been under sentence of death at Zhenwu for nearly killing a man in a brawl, but had been spared by Liu Mian, who was at that time military governor. Now that the tranquility of the border was threatened by the Uighur refugees, Cai Xi begged Liu Mian (now in charge of the planned Tang offensive and no longer stationed at Zhenwu) to allow him to serve with the Tang troops at the frontier. His request was granted. When Tang troops neared the border, they learned that the Uighurs had moved closer to Zhenwu. Liu Mian apparently was eager to gain the merit (and, no doubt, the substantial rewards) for rescuing the Taihe Princess, but feared that officials at Zhenwu would beat him to it. Cai Xi then volunteered to serve as a spy in order to convince the Uighurs to move further east to Liu's own circuit of Hedong, in order to give Liu the chance to realize his wish. Cai pretended to be pursuing an escaped criminal (or criminals), and reached the Uighurs' camp probably in November/December 842. He informed the Uighurs that the officials of Zhenwu were determined to annihilate them, and counseled them to shift their camp eastward to the border of Hedong to avoid such a fate.

The stratagem worked. During the winter (from approximately November 842 to February 843), a large number of Uighurs submitted to Zhang Zhongwu at the border of Youzhou. These numbered some 30,000 persons from several Uighur tribes, and included some important leaders: two princes (*tigin*), a Princess Bilgä Qatun, a minister, and a grand general Cao Moni who appears to have been a Manichaean of Sogdian ancestry.[24] It seems not unlikely that these had all decided

[23] Biographies of Li Qi may be found in *JTS* 157: 4149-4150 and *XTS* 146: 4746-4747. According to *QTW* 803: 10637, he was a native of Jiangxia in modern Hubei.

[24] The names of the two princes are given as Mang/Pang-ju-zhe and A-dun-ning. The Tang pronunciation of the former (for which see *GKWD* 1562, 80, and 1334) suggests that the first two syllables may render Turkic *bänggü*, "eternal, everlasting"; see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 350-351. This has been attested as a personal name in the form Mängü in Old Uighur; see Müller, "Zwei Pfahlinschriften aus den Turfanfunden," 12. The solution to the final syllable is not apparent. As for A-dun-ning (Tang pronunciation in *GKWD* 1414, 570, 367), the first two characters are virtually identical with A-dun, a clan name given in the 981 itinerary of the Song envoy Wang Yande; see Tuotuo et al., *Song shi* 490: 14111.

to submit after the spy Cai Xi had convinced them of their impending destruction at the hands of the forces of Zhenwu, particularly as Cai's account makes clear that after hearing his warning, many Uighurs hurried eastward to Ningwu, in the western region of Youzhou, to submit. The emperor ordered that these Uighurs be dispersed to the various circuits, and this apparently was carried out.[25] It is not clear why the Tang court agreed to accept prisoners taken by Youzhou at this time, since they had been refused earlier. It may be that, with the offensive so close at hand, the court was eager to do nothing that might jeopardize the participation of troops from Youzhou.

The submission of a large number of Uighurs at Youzhou indicates a further weakening of Ögä Qaghan's position. We have seen that his followers were earlier estimated at the rather unreliable number of

In this name, Hamilton saw Turkic *altun*, "gold"; see Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 146. I know of no other mention of this particular clan or tribe in Chinese or Turkic sources. As for the princess' name, given in Chinese as Mi-jie Ke-dun, this presents no difficulties. While Turkic *bilgä* is more commonly rendered in Tang sources as Bi-jia, the form Mi-jie represents an acceptable alternative; see Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 149. It does seem odd, however, that the Chinese source gives this woman two seemingly contradictory titles: princess (*gongzhu*, borrowed from Chinese into early Turkic languages as *qunchuy*; see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 635) and *qatun*, which at this time was generally reserved for the qaghan's consort. As this woman's relationship to other Uighur leaders is unclear, the problem cannot be solved. As for the minister's name, Zhu-luo-gu A-die, the first element suggests no know Turkic name; see *GKWD* 1224, 733, and 262 for the Tang pronunciation. The second element is the Chinese form of the Uighur clan name Ädiz (Ediz), which is attested in the Old Turkic inscriptions of Kül Tigin and Bilgä Qaghan. The Ädiz are also mentioned in *XTS* 217a: 6111 in a list of fifteen Tie-le tribes. The name is also sometimes given in Chinese sources as Xie-die; see Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 1-2, n. 2. Mackerras asserted that all Uighur qaghans from 795 to 840 came from the Xie-die/A-die tribe, replacing the Yaghlaqar as the Uighurs' royal clan; see Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, 158. This, however, is not entirely certain. Mackerras based this assertion on the fact that in 795 the Uighur ruler died without an heir, and a minister of the Ädiz clan was named qaghan (the Huaixin Qaghan of Chinese sources). The sources state that he did not presume to call himself by his own clan name because of the tremendous prestige of the Yaghlaqars; see Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, 107 and 109. But while Huaixin Qaghan was of the Ädiz clan and yet adopted the name Yaghlaqar, his relationship to his successor is not at all clear, nor are the various relationships between successive Uighur qaghans until 824; see Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 140-141. Finally, Cao was the Chinese surname used by Sogdians from Kabudhan; see Pulleyblank, "A Sogdian Colony in Inner Mongolia," 320. The general's given name Moni is simply the Chinese rendering of Mani, the name of the founder of the Manichaean religion.

[25] *JTS* 195: 5214.

100,000.[26] While the numbers are problematic, it seems clear that the loss of a large number of his people represented not only an alarming problem with defection but also a serious weakening of his military forces. As for the Uighurs who remained with the qaghan, they too shifted their camp eastward, but only to the region north of Hedong. There they were located some 200 *li* (about 67 miles) from Liu Mian's army. When Liu informed the court of what had transpired, he was urged to rescue the princess. But how was he to accomplish this? Again Cai Xi came to his service and went to the Uighur camp on another mission, probably in December 842 or January 843. It is in fact possible that Cai carried the Tang court's last letter to the Uighurs **[Doc. 43]**.[27]

In the meantime, on 6 December 842, Liu Congjian,[28] the military governor of the semi-autonomous province of Zhaoyi, offered to send out 5000 troops to attack the Uighurs, but his offer was refused.[29] The reason for the court's decision is nowhere stated, but in its account of the Tang campaign against Liu Congjian's nephew Liu Zhen[30] in 843, which successfully wrested control of Zhaoyi from the Liu family, *Jiu Tang shu* states that Li Deyu had despised Liu Congjian for his "depravities" or "crimes" (*jianhui*).[31] Zhaoyi, while not a province with the degree of autonomy enjoyed by Youzhou, had achieved at least some measure of independence in 825 when the military governorship was allowed to pass from father (Liu Wu)[32] to son (Liu Congjian). After Liu Congjian's death in 843, a military campaign was launched by the Tang central government against his nephew Liu Zhen, who sought to succeed to his uncle's title. This campaign was notable for the assistance given to the Tang court by the autonomous provinces of Chengde and Wei-Bo, and achieved the desired result. Liu Zhen was murdered by his own followers in 844 and the Tang court appointed a new military governor for Zhaoyi, thereby reasserting its control over

[26] *JTS* 195: 5214.
[27] See Drompp, "A T'ang Adventurer in Inner Asia," 17.
[28] Biographies of Liu Congjian may be found in *JTS* 161: 4231-4233 and *XTS* 214: 6014-6015.
[29] *ZZTJ* 246: 7968.
[30] Biographies of Liu Zhen may be found in *JTS* 161: 4233 and *XTS* 214: 6015-6017.
[31] *JTS* 161: 4233.
[32] Biographies of Liu Wu may be found in *JTS* 161: 4230-4231 and *XTS* 214: 6012-6014.

the province.[33] It was after the successful resolution of the Zhaoyi crisis that the emperor granted Li Deyu the title of defender-in-chief (*taiwei*) and enfeoffed him as Duke of Wei (*Weiguo Gong*)—the highest honors that could be conferred upon the chief minister.[34] This was Li's reward for having overseen all the most urgent affairs of the Tang government for a period of five years, "from the arrival of the Uighurs at Tiande in the winter of the fifth year of the Kaicheng era to the pacification of Ze-Lu[35] in the eighth month of the fourth year of the Huichang era."[36]

While it is not clear why Li Deyu had a personal dislike for Liu Congjian, he surely resented Zhaoyi's autonomy as an impediment to Tang unity. His refusal to accept aid from Zhaoyi during the Uighur crisis reveals that he did not wish to give Liu Congjian an opportunity to be involved in imperial affairs, nor to provide him with any sort of legitimacy from the court, nor to allow him to accrue merit from the state, even if he were fighting on the side of the Tang court. The court's refusal of Liu Congjian's troops is also an indication that border defenses were now regarded as adequate to meet the Uighur threat.

Further Preparations for War

Although the Tang court was preparing to attack the Uighurs, and no doubt wished to be rid of them as quickly as possible, little could be done in the winter months. Liu Mian and Zhang Zhongwu both insisted that they could not advance their troops northward in the dead of winter, and requested permission to wait until the coming of spring to do so. Li Zhongshun, however, volunteered to advance, along with Ormïzt, to spy on the Uighur camp.[37] On 13 January

[33] See Dalby, "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," 665-666.
[34] *JTS* 174: 4527. These great honors were inherently connected, as the person holding the title of defender-in-chief was automatically considered one of the Three Dukes (*san gong*)—"a collective reference to dignitaries who were officially considered the 3 paramount aides to the ruler and held the highest possible ranks in the officialdom"; see Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China*, 399 and 485. It was this exalted rank that allowed the title of Li's collected works to contain reference to "the first rank" (*yipin*) of the Huichang era. Li was granted these titles on 13 October 844; see *XTS* 8: 244 as well as *JTS* 18a: 601.
[35] Ze-Lu refers to Zhaoyi; the Zhaoyi Army was located in Zezhou and Luzhou.
[36] *JTS* 174: 4527. See also *XTS* 180: 5339.
[37] *ZZTJ* 246: 7969.

843, Li Deyu submitted a memorial requesting reinforcements for Li Zhongshun in the form of 500 cavalry from Hezhong **[Doc. 45]**. It is likely that the emperor approved his request. We should note that just before Li Deyu submitted this memorial, the Tang court learned of the death of the Tibetan *btsanpo* on 11 January 843.[38]

On 30 January 843, Li Deyu submitted another memorial regarding troops at the northern frontier **[Doc. 46]**. This one requested that Ormïzt be allowed to advance with his troops to the Baoda Palisade, which would bring him closer to Ögä's camp.[39] It is tempting to imagine that Ormïzt was eager to attack the qaghan not only to rid himself of his enemy once and for all, but also to guarantee his position within his adopted land. Now that he had the forces of the Tang empire behind him, Ormïzt was ready for a showdown. Li's memorial suggests that Ormïzt's troops were to serve as the vanguard in an attack, to be supported by the armies of Liu Mian and Zhang Zhongwu.

The emperor agreed to Li Deyu's proposal.[40] It is recorded in *Xin Tang shu* that after his advance to the Baoda Palisade, Ormïzt led troops from Hezhong, Chenzhou, and Xuzhou to do battle with Ögä Qaghan's followers, and defeated them.[41] The text implies that this occurred before the end of the lunar year, i.e., before 2 Febuary 843, but this would be too rapid a chain of events, since Li Deyu's request that Ormïzt be allowed to advance his troops was made only on 30 January. The clash between Ormïzt's forces and the Uighur refugees was not a major one, but it is clear from a secret imperial edict intended for Liu Mian and Zhang Zhongwu **[Doc. 47]** that a decisive attack on the qaghan was being planned. As this edict was mentioned in the preceding document, it must be dated to about the same time—i.e., about 30 January 843.[42] Written by Li Deyu, the edict mentioned the Uighurs' past merit and the favor that the Tang government had shown them in response to it. It then described the Uighur refugees as ungrateful for the kindness displayed by the Tang court since their arrival at the frontier, and stated that it had become clear that the Uighurs had no intention of returning to their homeland. No doubt

[38] *ZZTJ* 246: 7969.
[39] I have not been able to locate the Baoda Palisade.
[40] *ZZTJ* 246: 7969.
[41] *XTS* 217b: 6132.
[42] The edict has been erroneously dated to 12 November 842 in *CFYG* 994: 11670.

the information received from the first Kirghiz envoy had strengthened this impression and shown the Chinese that Uighur recovery of the Mongolian plateau was an impossibility. Given the Uighurs' refusal to leave the Tang frontier, the emperor, as nurturer of the people, made it clear that he could not "harbor a den of vipers" nor "nourish venomous scorpions" in his bosom. Although Liu Mian and Zhang Zhongwu were told to send another warning to the Uighurs, they were also ordered to attack them should they prove unresponsive.

At about this same time, Li Zhongshun memorialized that he had attacked and defeated some Uighurs.[43] This may have been the same attack as that in which Ormïzt took part near the Baoda Palisade; the sources are not clear. At any rate, this was a skirmish rather than a large-scale engagement, and did not result in the withdrawal of the Uighur refugees. Indeed, the Uighurs themselves were soon to take the offensive, no doubt pressed by the hardships of winter.

In the meantime, the spy Cai Xi had returned to Liu Mian after another successful mission. He had managed to have an audience with the Taihe Princess and then requested to meet with the qaghan, but this was refused by a high-ranking official (a *tarqan*) who stated that it would not be suitable for Ögä to meet with a foreign envoy while he was seeking to restore his throne. Cai was told that he could meet with an Uighur minister, possibly the *il-ögäsi* mentioned in Chinese sources. This Uighur minister complained that the Tang court had shown little sympathy to the refugees. Cai replied that the court had not realized the extent of the Uighurs' misfortune, and that now Liu Mian had sent him with ten camel-loads of provisions for them. He also suggested that the Uighurs move further south, as it would be easier to aid them if they were closer to Tang territory. The Uighurs remained suspicious, and at one point surrounded Cai with bowmen who threatened to kill him if he did not reveal the true purpose of his mission. Cai remained calm, claiming that indeed his sole purpose was to help the Uighurs. The minister then urged him to guarantee this by swearing a "weighty oath." Cai went further than the minister had anticipated, and offered to have his left hand cut off as proof of his sincerity. According to Li Qi's account, "His complexion was unchanged and his speech was quite resolute." The Uighurs said that such an extreme act was not necessary; Cai was simply asked to cut

[43] *ZZTJ* 246: 7969.

open the flesh above his heart so that a bit of blood would flow into a vessel, and then drink it. While taking this blood-oath, Cai exclaimed, "If I mislead you, and upon entering the Tang border you become disaffected, then may Heaven strike me dead—boil me alive and mince me for pickling!" He then drank all the blood in the vessel.

This dramatic scene was convincing, and the Uighurs then shifted their camp to the region north of Yunzhou (Datong) in Hedong. Once there, however, they used the pretext of hunting for food to raid Zhenwu. This attack occurred in the first days of the new year—that is, about 3 February 843.[44] Cai Xi was eager to return to Liu Mian's camp and give his report, and so told the Uighurs he would go into Hedong to get more provisions for them. He thus was allowed to leave. Cai gave a complete report to Liu Mian, probably around 4–9 February.[45] He asserted that the Uighurs were now closer to the border because he had enticed them, that they were now weary after their attack on Zhenwu, and that they had made no preparations for battle because he had succeeded in convincing them that the Tang court did not seek their destruction. Cai Xi urged Liu Mian to take advantage of the moment and act quickly. Liu Mian agreed with his spy's assessment, and so moved his troops to Yunzhou to prepare for the attack.[46]

Just before the Tang main attack on Ögä Qaghan and his followers, another prominent Uighur official named Pu-gu Yi went to Youzhou and offered to deliver the Taihe Princess to Zhang Zhongwu.[47] This act, while perhaps calculated with little more in mind than the preservation of Pu-gu Yi's own hide, suggests increasing dissension among the qaghan's remaining followers. This can also be seen in the defection of four other important persons at Zhenwu while the Uighurs were

[44] *ZZTJ* 247: 7971. The third year of the Huichang era began on 3 February 843. Since the Tang defeat of the qaghan's troops occurred on 13 February, the attack on Zhenwu had to have occurred at the very beginning of the month, giving Cai Xi time to report to Liu Mian; see Drompp, "A T'ang Adventurer in Inner Asia," 17-18.

[45] See Drompp, "A T'ang Adventurer in Inner Asia," 17-18.

[46] See **Doc. 70**.

[47] *JTS* 195: 5214. Pu-gu Yi's title of "ministry president" is difficult to analyze in this context, and it is impossible to know the meaning or functions of such an office among the Uighurs. The Turkic form of the title is unknown. Pu-gu is a well-known Turkic tribal name. The man's given name suggests a Chinese-style *ming* (such as those used by He Qingchao and Qi-bi Tong), although a Turkic form cannot be ruled out. For the Tang pronunciation of Yi, see *GKWD* 1019.

near there; these included the qaghan's trusted confidants and relatives, and at least one Manichaean cleric.[48] The increasing demoralization among the Uighur refugees is clear. We should note that these defectors could also serve as sources of intelligence for the Tang generals as they prepared for their attack.

The Assault on the Uighur Camp

After Ögä Qaghan's attack on Zhenwu, he remained camped near that city. It was here that Liu Mian decided to launch his major offensive against the Uighurs. Since he had been given permission to act without approval from the court at Chang'an, he chose a bold plan. He ordered his adjutant Shi Xiong to lead three Sha-tuo tribes under Zhu-ye Chi-xin, as well as Qi-bi and Tuo-ba (i.e., Tangut) troops, to make a surprise attack on the qaghan's camp. Liu Mian's plan was to strike the Uighurs so suddenly that in their confusion and panic they would abandon the Taihe Princess, allowing her to be safely recovered by Tang forces. Liu Mian himself would follow Shi Xiong's strike force with a large army.[49]

Shi Xiong led his troops from Yunzhou to Mayi. They then advanced to Zhenwu under cover of night "when the moon was darkened."[50] Looking out from the battlements of Zhenwu in an attempt to estimate the Uighurs' strength, Shi saw felt-covered carts attended by persons dressed in red and green clothing of a Chinese style. He was informed by spies (perhaps Cai Xi himself) that these were the carts of the Taihe Princess and her entourage. Shi then sent out a spy to inform the princess of the impending attack on the Uighur camp. She was instructed to remain hidden in her cart and not to move.[51] While it was still dark, Shi ordered that some 10 holes be made in the city's walls.

At dawn, the long-awaited assault commenced. Shi ordered pennons and torches to be raised on the walls of Zhenwu, and had his men release large numbers of cattle, horses, and other animals through the

[48] *JTS* 195: 5214-5215. The ethnicity of this Manichaean cleric is unknown, particularly since the text gives no surname for him. His given name Zhijing means "purity of will" in Chinese.

[49] *ZZTJ* 247: 7971. A note states that these Tuo-ba were "of the Tangut tribe"; on this connection, see Dunnell, "Who Are the Tanguts?", 81-82.

[50] *JTS* 161: 4235.

[51] *ZZTJ* 247: 7971.

holes in the city wall. These were followed by his own troops, who fell upon the enemy to the accompaniment of war drums. According to Shi's biography in *Jiu Tang shu*, "Torches lit up the sky, and the hubbub shook the earth. The qaghan, terrified beyond measure, led [some] cavalry and fled."[52] The princess was rescued unharmed by Shi's troops. According to Cai Xi's account, he himself was instrumental in this. Cai claimed that he rushed into the Uighur camp, found the princess, and helped her onto a horse. He then led her toward the Tang lines, shouting, "This is the princess!" Shi Xiong heard him and assigned them a guard of 30 infantry to protect the princess and lead her to safety. Shi Xiong and his troops then pursued the qaghan and engaged in a decisive battle at a place called Shahu ("Kill the Foreigners") Mountain on 13 February 843. The Uighurs were severely defeated. A large number—given in all sources as the imprecise number 10,000—were killed, and many—with estimates ranging from 5000 to 20,000—were taken prisoner. Large numbers of livestock were also taken. Ögä, although wounded, escaped with "several hundred" cavalry and fled to the protection of the Black Carts of the Shi-wei.[53] The Taihe Princess was escorted to Yunzhou and from there to Taiyuan.[54]

Liu Mian's victory memorial arrived at the Tang capital on 19 February 843.[55] Shortly thereafter, the emperor went to the Xuanzheng Hall within the Daming Palace where he received the congratulations of his officials.[56] An imperial proclamation promulgated to commemorate the event was written by Li Deyu **[Doc. 48]**. This

[52] *JTS* 161: 4236.

[53] See the accounts in *JTS* 161: 4236 and *ZZTJ* 247: 7972-7973. In regard to the number of prisoners, the smaller figure comes from *JTS*, while the larger is found in *ZZTJ*. As for those who fled from Shahu Mountain with the qaghan, we should note that later the qaghan is said to have had followers numbering in the thousands; see chapter 5.

[54] *JTS* 18a: 594-595.

[55] *ZZTJ* 247: 7973. *JTS* 18a: 593-594 places Liu Mian's memorial in the second month (5 March—3 April 843). This has been pointed out as an error by Cen Zhongmian who, however, did not mention the dating given in *ZZTJ*; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 206, n. 1.

[56] *JTS* 18a: 594 states that this occurred on the same day that Liu Mian's memorial arrived, but as this source's dating for the arrival of that memorial has been shown to be incorrect, the dating of the emperor's visit to the Xuanzheng Hall must also be regarded with some suspicion. The Xuanzheng Hall was the site of many solemn events within the palace. See Xiong, *Sui-Tang Chang'an*, 85-88 and maps 4.1 and 4.2.

long and formal document set forth a stinging rebuke of the Uighurs, blaming them for their own destruction since, as the chief minister pointed out, they were not responsive to Tang kindness but instead behaved in an outrageous manner. The proclamation also stated that the campaign would continue until the qaghan and his followers had been destroyed, and offered rewards for those who had established merit in the campaign. It further expressed the imperial thanksgiving for the safe recovery of the Taihe Princess. The proclamation then addressed the problem of Uighurs living in China, announcing that those in the capitals of Chang'an and Luoyang would be required to wear Chinese-style clothing and would be parceled out to the various circuits. We may presume that this was intended to keep them from forming communities of significant size within China, and thereby promote their acculturation. Uighur and Manichaean temples, shops, dwellings, money, and goods were all to be inventoried by the government, and the names of the monks of the Manichaean temples were to be recorded as well. The persecution of Manichaeism in China, which had begun with the closing of Manichaean temples in southeastern China and then was rapidly advanced by this imperial proclamation, paved the way for the persecution of other foreign religions, culminating in Wuzong's famous attack on the Buddhist church.[57]

The proclamation concluded with a reference to the Xiong-nu leaders Hu-han-ye and Zhi-zhi, stating that "for these two savages (*lu*), calamity and happiness were entirely of their own choosing." The implication, of course, was that Ögä Qaghan was completely responsible for what had befallen him. The proclamation suggested that all foreign peoples should use the examples of Hu-han-ye and Zhi-zhi as a mirror with which to adjust their own behavior in order to seek felicity and avoid destruction.

On 23 February 843, Zhang Zhongwu, Liu Mian, and Shi Xiong were granted honorary titles and promotions for their roles in the resolution of the Uighur crisis.[58] Absent from the list of those who were granted rewards for the defeat of the Uighurs and the rescue of the Taihe Princess was the spy Cai Xi. According to Cai, Liu Mian

[57] On the persecution of Manichaeism during the reign of Wuzong, see Lieu, *Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China*, 195-198, as well as Chavannes and Pelliot, "Un traité manichéen retrouvé en Chine, traduit et annoté, deuxième partie," 295-303.

[58] *JTS* 18a: 595.

had written a letter concerning his deeds and promised to make it known to the emperor; the general also was reported to have said that if not for Cai Xi, he would not have achieved the honor that he did. But in the end, Cai's achievements were not reported to the throne, and he remained unrewarded. This is why Li Qi wrote his account of Cai Xi in 850/851. We should note, however, that after Li Qi's account of his exploits became known, Cai received several official appointments.[59] The last of these was in 862, when he was posted to Annan, the Tang province located in what is today northern Vietnam, as a special bandit-suppression military commissioner to oppose the invading forces of the state of Nanzhao.[60] He died the following year when the invaders captured Jiaozhou.[61]

Four days after the granting of titles to Zhang Zhongwu, Liu Mian, and Shi Xiong, Li Deyu submitted a memorial on 27 February 843 requesting that troops be sent out to intercept those Uighurs who had escaped the massacre of Shahu Mountain, in order to eliminate the problem once and for all **[Doc. 49]**. In his memorial, the chief minister urged the emperor to order Li Zhongshun and He Qingchao to advance with their troops (which would include some Chinese troops that had been under the command of Ormïzt) in order to intercept the Uighurs. The latter were said to be fleeing to the Black Carts of the Shi-wei people. Li Deyu hoped that foreign tribes could be induced to join in the attack on the Uighurs as well. We should note that this memorial proves that, despite Li's reservations, the 1000 Chinese troops from Yizhou[b] and Dingzhou had indeed been placed under Ormïzt's command.

Not long after that, on 4 March 843, Li Deyu submitted another memorial regarding plans for the annihilation of those Uighurs who had eluded capture **[Doc. 50]**. The chief minister urged speed, and hoped that the matter could be resolved before the third month (i.e., before 4 April 843). To achieve that speed, he requested that the emperor approve a scheme by which various rewards, in titles and cash, would be given to those Tang military leaders who managed to capture the qaghan and the three important Uighur ministers who

[59] See Drompp, "A T'ang Adventurer in Inner Asia," 22.
[60] *XTS* 9: 257.
[61] *XTS* 222b: 6283 and *ZZTJ* 250: 8096-8102, *passim*. See also Backus, *The Nan-chao Kingdom and T'ang China's Southwestern Frontier*, 131-139, especially 137-139. Jiaozhou was in the vicinity of modern Hanoi.

apparently had fled with him. Lesser rewards, of titles only, would be granted to those who captured less prominent Uighurs. Li Deyu pointed out that the cost of these rewards, 25,000 strings of cash, would be only one-fifth of that of supplying the northern army for a month. The chief minister thus hoped to achieve rapid success at a relatively low cost. His call for speed in exterminating the remaining Uighurs was, however, fruitless, for it was not until three years later that Ögä Qaghan was finally eliminated in the summer of 846.[62] In the meantime, the qaghan depended on the protection of his former vassals, the Black Carts.[63] Many of his dispersed troops apparently fled to Youzhou and submitted to Zhang Zhongwu rather than follow their qaghan to live as suppliants among former subordinates.[64]

In the meantime, the Tang court continued with its rewards for those who had performed meritoriously at the border. For his role in the campaign, Ormïzt (Li Sizhong) was of course to be rewarded, but because he himself was an Uighur, he feared the enmity of Chinese border officials and asked to be allowed to come to Chang'an in the company of his younger brothers and the minister Ayabïr (Ai/Li Hongshun). The emperor granted his request.[65] While it is not recorded when Ormïzt arrived at the Tang capital, we do know that he was named superior general of the Left Palace Gate Guard and instructor of Prince Fu.[66] He was given two salaries, one for each office, and also was granted a mansion in the Yongle precinct of Chang'an.[67]

[62] *ZZTJ* 248: 8025.
[63] Some sources, such as Zhang Zhongwu's biographies in *JTS* 180: 4678 and *XTS* 212: 5981, erroneously state that the qaghan fled to Kang-ju. This represents confusion with the fate of the Xiong-nu pretender Zhi-zhi, and shows a perfect (albeit unconscious) acknowledgement of the parallelism in the fates of Ögä and Zhi-zhi. See chapter 6 for more on this subject.
[64] *ZZTJ* 247: 7973.
[65] *ZZTJ* 247: 7973.
[66] Prince Fu was Li Hong, seventeenth son of the former emperor Shunzong (and therefore Wuzong's paternal great-uncle). He died in the third year of the Qianfu reign period (30 January 876–17 January 877); see *JTS* 150: 4049. On the title, see des Rotours, *Traité des fonctionnaires et Traité de l'armée*, 629, where it is rendered as "le maître [d'un prince]." Hucker's *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China*, 562-563 renders it as "Princely Mentor," but does not list it as a Tang-period title.
[67] The Yongle precinct (or ward) was located in central Chang'an; see Xiong, *Sui-Tang Chang'an*, map 2.1.

The Annihilation of Ormïzt's Followers

At the same time, the Return to Righteousness Army, made up primarily of Uighurs who had submitted along with Ormïzt, was ordered to be disbanded.[68] The exact date of its dissolution is a matter of some uncertainty, although it appears to have occurred in the months immediately following the battle of Shahu Mountain.[69] The imperial decree for the disbanding of the army **[Doc. 51]** was written by Li Deyu. The order makes it clear that while Ormïzt was to be allowed to come to the capital, his followers were to be divided among the militias of the military governors of various circuits within the empire. The purpose of this was to divide the Uighur troops, probably to prevent them from being too influential a population in any one area, while at the same time putting them to good use as garrison guards to reinforce Tang defenses. In this way the Tang court could strengthen its military while keeping the Uighurs divided and under close supervision.

This decree was to have tragic consequences. Its terms came as a blow to the Uighurs, who may have hoped to be allowed to remain in the border region as a "loose-rein" tribe enjoying some degree of autonomy. To be divided and parceled out to various circuits was intolerable to them. The Return to Righteousness Army included 43 (or 33) Uighur officers and more than 3000 men. They rejected the imperial command and camped around the Hutuo River, refusing to move further south. Liu Mian decided at this time to take advantage of the emperor's earlier order that he take more initiative and act on his own volition rather than waiting for orders from Chang'an, and massacred the entire group of Uighurs.[70] This was then reported to the court as a *fait accompli*, along with the information that the 30,000 Uighurs who had surrendered at Youzhou had been successfully dispersed and attached to various circuits.[71] General Liu was not punished for his rash act, and returned to Taiyuan from Daizhou some time between 15 and 30 June 843.[72]

[68] *XTS* 217b: 6133.

[69] Sima Guang placed the dissolution of the Return to Righteousness Army between 5 March and 16 March 843; see *ZZTJ* 247: 7973. In *XTS* 217b: 6132-6133, this event is placed after the murder of Ögä Qaghan, which took place in the summer of 846, although mention of the qaghan's death may have been added as a note to his flight to the Black Carts, and thus the chronology may be suspect. Cen Zhongmian argued against the dating in *JTS* and suggested a date some time between 4 April and 30 June 843, although he did not refer to the dating in *ZZTJ*; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 221, n. 1.

[70] See Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 221, n.1.

It is tempting to wonder what Ormïzt, who apparently was in Chang'an at the time, thought when he learned of the massacre of his troops. One also wonders how Li Deyu reacted to the news. Neither man can have been happy. Although he had managed to preserve his own life, Ormïzt no doubt lost many close comrades on the banks of the Hutuo River. As for Li Deyu, he was aware that this was hardly an example of the Confucian practice of *huairou*. At any rate, Ormïzt apparently settled into a quiet life and disappeared from the pages of history. We know nothing of his subsequent life, although he is mentioned in another document written by Li Deyu **[Doc. 69]**, showing that he was still alive at the time of its composition, probably in the fifth year of the Huichang reign period (11 February 845–30 January 846). It seems likely that he and his family stayed in the north, probably at Taiyuan. His grandson Li Yantu is mentioned twice in *Cefu yuangui*, according to which he served during the 920s as vice-governor of Taiyuan and remained devoted to the Manichaean faith of his forbears.[73]

[71] Liu Mian's memorial to this effect is placed in the third month (4 April–2 May 843) in *ZZTJ* 247: 7976.

[72] *ZZTJ* 247: 7985.

[73] According to *CFYG* 965: 11355, Li Yantu was appointed envoy by the Later Tang emperor Zhuangzong (r. 923-926) to confer imperial appointment on the Uighur qaghan of Ganzhou; this occurred in the second year of the Tongguang reign period (8 February 924–26 January 925). According to *CFYG* 976: 11468-11469, a Manichaean priest who served in the temple adjacent to Li Yantu's home in Taiyuan was buried on 2 October 929. The text, which is ambiguous, states that either the priest or Li Yantu himself was from the Uighur "homeland"—in this case probably Ganzhou. Hamilton believed that Li Yantu came to Taiyuan from Ganzhou or Xizhou along with his family; see Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 69n. It seems more likely, however, that Li Yantu lived in Taiyuan and "imported" an Uighur or Sogdian priest for his family temple—quite possibly when he went on his diplomatic mission to Ganzhou. Indeed, the second passage (which has been translated in Lieu, *Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China*, 223) makes it clear that Li Yantu and his family or tribe (*zu*) had submitted to Chinese authority in the years following the collapse of the Tang dynasty in 907. It seems likely that he was the son of Li Jimei, the only son of Ormïzt mentioned in any source; see chapter 2 and *THY* 100: 1799.

The Return of the Taihe Princess

Some six weeks after her rescue at the northern frontier, the Tang court celebrated the return of the Taihe Princess to the capital with great ceremony. A pawn in international politics, she had spent more than 20 years among the Uighurs. Now, after enduring countless fears and discomforts, she was safely in Tang hands. As soon as news of her rescue reached the court, it was reported at the Jingling tumulus, the resting place of her father, the emperor Xianzong. She spent some days at Taiyuan, while military activities at the frontier continued. While there, she was given a "white sable" (ermine?) fur which the Kirghiz had presented to the throne, as well as a jade ring; both were gifts from her nephew the emperor.[74] It is also possible that a Kirghiz envoy was sent to Taiyuan to greet her.[75]

The princess arrived at Chang'an on 29 March 843.[76] The Japanese monk Ennin, who was in China at the time, included in his diary an interesting but unlikely bit of Chang'an gossip: "None of the Uighurs who accompanied the Princess were allowed in the city. A[n] Uighur Prince had accompanied her, but she herself killed him on the way."[77] She was met at the Zhangjing Monastery outside the city's Tonghua Gate—the same gate by which she had departed more than 20 years ago—by the chief ministers and various officials.[78] Her return to the city was an emotional one. She was driven by carriage to the Tang ancestral temple, where she visited the chambers dedicated to her

[74] *XTS* 83: 3668-3669.

[75] See chapter 5.

[76] The dating of the princess' arrival at the capital is confused in *ZZTJ* 247: 7974, which gives the date as the cyclical day *gengyin*, corresponding to the first day of the third month, 4 April 843. A later paragraph, however, begins, "In the third month …", which, in Sima Guang's style, generally implies that anything before it is to be placed chronologically prior to the third month. Yet the princess' arrival is placed after the beginning of the second month, in which there was no day *gengyin*. Both *THY* 6: 78 and the diary of the Japanese monk Ennin (Reischauer, *Ennin's Diary*, 326) give the date of the princess' arrival as the 25th day of the second month, i.e., 29 March 843, but do not provide the cyclical day. This (29 March 843) was also the date of the promulgation of the princess' new title.

[77] Reischauer, *Ennin's Diary*, 326-327.

[78] *ZZTJ* 247: 7975. The Zhangjing Monastery was a large Buddhist establishment named for the Empress Zhangjing, mother of the emperor Daizong (r. 762–779); it was the largest monastic construction project in the post-An Lushan era. See Xiong, *Sui-Tang Chang'an*, 270. The Tonghua Gate was located near the northeastern corner of the city, and hence provided the easiest access to the Daming Palace; see Xiong, *Sui-Tang Chang'an*, map 2.1

father, the emperor Xianzong, and her brother, the emperor Muzong. While there she wept copiously.[79]

According to *Zizhi tongjian*, after reaching the Guangshun Gate of the Daming Palace,[80] the princess removed her ceremonial garb and earrings. She then made a confession of the Uighurs' guilt and her own "improper conduct" as a princess whose duty had been to pacify the Uighurs. The emperor had sent the interior imperial commissioner Miao Wan to make inquiries about her health,[81] after which she entered the inner area of the palace grounds. On the day of her return, an imperial edict was promulgated changing her title from Taihe Princess to Dingan Grand Senior Princess (*Dingan Dachang Gongzhu*).[82] Following normal procedure, the Taihe household administration, which had been created to support her while she lived abroad, was abolished.[83] The next day, she was received in an audience with the emperor and empress.[84] At about that time, two court officials, Li Jingfang and Li Pin, composed poems to commemorate her return.[85]

Despite the emperor's solicitous treatment of the Dingan Grand Senior Princess, she was snubbed by six other imperial princesses,

[79] *XTS* 83: 3669. The Tang ancestral temple, located in the southeast area of the imperial city within Chang'an, was the site of important state rituals; see *TD* 47: 269-271 and Xiong, *Sui-Tang Chang'an*, 134-138 and map 2.2.

[80] The Guangshun gate was located within the grounds of the Daming Palace, and led from the palace's outer area to its inner precincts; see Xiong, *Sui-Tang Chang'an*, maps 4.1 and 4.2.

[81] The emperor's edict ordering Miao Wan to greet the princess is preserved in *QTW* 76: 997 and *THY* 6: 78. On Miao Wan/Zhen, see chapter 2, n. 72.

[82] *XTS* 83: 3668 and *ZZTJ* 247: 7974. The edict granting the princess her new title may be found in *QTW* 76: 993 and *TDZLJ* 41: 196-197. "Senior Princess" was the appropriate title for the emperor's aunt; see Twitchett, "The T'ang Imperial Family," 49. The addition of the element "Grand" apparently was an additional show of consideration. Note that *ZZTJ* erroneously gives the princess' new title as Anding Grand Senior Princess.

[83] *XTS* 83: 3669. See also Twitchett, "The T'ang Imperial Family," 51, n. 136.

[84] *XTS* 83: 3669.

[85] These poems may be found in *QTS* 508: 5775-5776 and 587: 6809. It should be noted that the great poet Bai Juyi also composed a poem on the princess' return. This poem, written after the ninth month (16 October–13 November 844), referred to Shi Xiong's shooting of a red heron while escorting the princess southward—a symbol of military good fortune. See Waley, *The Life and Times of Po Chü-i*, 204. The text of the poem may be found in Bai, *Bai Juyi ji* 37: 854-855. According to Waley, this was "among the very few of his later poems which refer directly to current happenings in the outside world."

who refused to greet her.[86] On 31 March 843, the emperor issued an edict punishing these princesses, each of whom was fined 100 rolls of silk—save for the senior member of the group, the Yang'an Princess, who was fined 300 rolls.[87] No reason is given for their curious breach of etiquette. Of the six offending princesses, the Yang'an Princess was the daughter of the emperor Shunzong (r. 805), who had reigned prior to the slighted princess' father, the emperor Xianzong. Four others were the elder sisters of the Dingan Grand Senior Princess. Thus, at least five of the six princesses would have considered themselves her elders.[88] It may also be that they felt she had been somehow sullied by her contact with the Uighurs. The officials of the Secretariat-Chancellery approved of the emperor's actions. In a memorial preserved in *Tang huiyao*, an anonymous official[89] praised the emperor's discipline of the unruly princesses by referring to a passage from the *Zhou yi* (i.e., *Yi jing*): "When the Family is so maintained with rectitude, the entire world will be settled and at peace."[90] He then requested that the affair be fully reported to the Office of Historiography so that an account of the emperor's actions could be recorded for the edification of future generations.[91] This was approved by the emperor.[92]

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[86] *ZZTJ* 247: 7975.

[87] The emperor's edict may be found in *QTW* 76: 998 and *THY* 6: 78. Only the *THY* text is dated.

[88] *ZZTJ* 247: 7975 states that there were six princesses who snubbed the Taihe Princess, but *XTS* 83: 3669 claims that there were seven. The edict fining the princesses names six. In a note to *ZZTJ*, Song Bai "corrected" Sima Guang and named seven princesses: the six mentioned in the edict as well as a seventh, the Yining Princess. But *THY* 6: 66 records that the Yining princess, seventeenth daughter of the emperor Xianzong (and the daughter who immediately preceded the Taihe Princess in birth), "died young." *XTS* 83: 3668 states that she "died before she could be given in marriage." It is therefore virtually impossible that she was alive at this time. *XTS* thus is in error, and the original text of *ZZTJ* is correct. Following is a list of the six princesses and their birth status from *THY* 6: 65-66:

Yang'an Princess	ninth daughter of Shunzong
Xuancheng Princess	fifth daughter of Xianzong
Zhenning Princess	eighth daughter of Xianzong
Linzhen Princess	eleventh daughter of Xianzong
Zhenyuan Princess	twelfth daughter of Xianzong
Yichang Princess	seventh daughter of Muzong

[89] Apparently one of the chief ministers; see *XTS* 83: 3669.

[90] This statement comes from the commentary on the 37th hexagram, "The Family" (*jiaren*); see *Zhou yi* 4: 7b. The translation is from Lynn, *The Classic of Changes*, 363.

[91] *THY* 6: 78 and *QTW* 967: 12691-12692. On the Office of Historiography, see Twitchett, *The Writing of Official History under the Tang*, 13-20, as well as McMullen, *State and Scholars in T'ang China*, 20-21.

[92] *XTS* 83: 3669.

After her dramatic rescue and return to the capital, the Dingan Grand Senior Princess settled into what was presumably a peaceful if obscure existence at the capital, and at this point disappears from the historical record. The date of her death is unknown. With the destruction of Ögä Qaghan's followers and the rescue of the princess, the Uighur crisis was now essentially resolved, although there remained some mopping up to do. The threat to China's northern frontier had been dispelled, thanks to the collaboration of three forces: the border generals and their troops, Ormïzt and other submitted Uighurs, and the brilliant mind of Li Deyu.

CHAPTER FIVE

TANG RELATIONS WITH THE KIRGHIZ

"We are of the same clan ...."

Communications with the Kirghiz

With the decisive defeat of the Uighurs at Shahu Mountain, two things remained to be done: the establishment of friendly ties with the Kirghiz and the elimination of those Uighurs who remained at large. As we have seen, the first envoy from the Kirghiz, a man named Ta-bu-he-zu, had arrived at Tiande late in 842. Although he apparently never went further into Tang territory, his message was received at the Chinese capital and relayed, at least in part, to the Uighur refugees in Li Deyu's final letter to an Uighur minister **[Doc. 43]**. And while this first Kirghiz envoy had arrived in the last months of 842, Li Deyu did not compose a reply until after the defeat of the Uighurs and the return of the Taihe Princess to Chang'an, i.e., after 29 March 843.[1] If this dating is correct, however, then the reply was also composed after the second Kirghiz envoy had arrived.

All the Tang court's letters to the Kirghiz ruler, although in the emperor's name, were written by Li Deyu. The earliest of these **[Doc. 52]**, which was a response to the first Kirghiz envoy, is largely formulaic and dwells on events of the past, clearly in an effort to establish some sort of Tang authority over the Kirghiz. It refers pointedly to

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[1] Cen Zhongmian wrote, "According to the phrase *ji zhi jue ting* within the letter, we know that the princess had not [yet] arrived." Thus Cen dated the letter to "probably prior to the twenty-fifth day of the second month of the third year," i.e., prior to 29 March 843; see "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 212, n. 1. This interpretation hinges entirely on the meaning of the word *ji*, since *zhi jue ting* clearly means "arrive at the imperial palace." The particle *ji* has several functions, and often indicates sequence. Cen apparently interpreted it to mean "will then," while it is also possible that the word means simply "then," thus placing the verb *zhi*, "to arrive," in the past tense. Dobson, *A Dictionary of the Chinese Particles*, 463-465, gives four refinements of meaning within this use of *ji*. In my opinion, Dobson's functions for *ji* fit my interpretation better than Cen's, and for this reason I prefer to date this letter after the princess' return to Chang'an on 29 March 843.

the successes of Tang Taizong and to his taking the title of "Heavenly Qaghan" at the request of "the peoples of the northwest" in 630/631. The letter goes on to describe how Taizong's envoy was sent to pacify the Kirghiz in 632/633 and how in 647/648 a Kirghiz chieftain came to the Tang court where he was granted titles, including commander-in-chief of the Kirghiz (Jian-kun). All of this implied Kirghiz subordination to Tang authority, at least in Chinese eyes. According to the letter, Kirghiz tribute had come to the Tang court "uninterruptedly" until the end of the Tianbao reign period (742–756) when Kirghiz contact with the Tang state was cut off by the rise of Uighur power in Mongolia.

The letter also gives official acceptance to the idea that the Kirghiz qaghan was related to the Tang imperial house of Li through the Han general Li Ling. After his surrender to the Xiong-nu in 99 B.C.E., Li Ling had lived in their empire for the remainder of his life, serving as their governor over the Jian-kun people, later equated with the Kirghiz.[2] Li Ling was the grandson of the Han general Li Guang (d. 119 B.C.E.),[3] from whom the Tang imperial family also claimed descent.[4] It is interesting to see how the Kirghiz apparently had retained a tradition of historical memory regarding intermarriage between their people (presumably including their leaders) and Li Ling and his troops, or were at least willing to invent such a "tradition" to gain a special relationship with the Tang ruling house. It is recorded in *Xin Tang shu* that the Kirghiz qaghan's name was entered into the register of the Tang imperial household at this time.[5]

In terms of the Uighur crisis, we have already seen through Li Deyu's letter to the Uighur minister **[Doc. 43]** that the Kirghiz letter (which is not extant) had inquired after the fate of the Taihe Princess and

[2] Several Chinese sources state that the Kirghiz considered their people with dark hair and eyes to be the descendants of Li Ling and his men; see *XTS* 217b: 6147, *THY* 100: 1785, and Duan, *Youyang zazu* 4: 36. According to *XTS* 217b: 6149, the emperor Zhongzong (r. 684 and 705–710) had once sent a message to the Kirghiz which stated, "Your nation and Ours are of the same ancestral clan (*zong*). You are not like other foreigners."

[3] Biographies of Li Guang may be found in *SJ* 109: 2867-2876 and *HS* 54: 2439-2449. The former has been translated in Watson, *Records of the Grand Historian of China*, vol. 2, 141-152, and the latter has been translated in Watson, *Courtier and Commoner in Ancient China*, 12-23.

[4] On the Tang claim of descent from Li Guang, see Wechsler, "The Founding of the T'ang Dynasty," 150-151.

[5] *XTS* 217b: 6150.

stated that the Kirghiz were preparing to send out a massive force of 400,000 troops to search for her and her escort. The Kirghiz letter also indicated the Kirghiz ruler's intention of occupying some of the Uighurs' former territory and blocking efforts by the Uighur refugees to contact the Tibetans. As was indicated in the previous chapter, this passage from Li Deyu's letter to the Uighur minister regarding Kirghiz expansion has long troubled scholars and given rise to problematic interpretations, and so is deserving of some scrutiny. The passage is difficult in many ways. The first problem we encounter is that two words are apparently missing from the text.[6] This has led me to the following translation: "Ta-bu-he-zu also stated that … when the Kirghiz move to He-luo-chuan and occupy the Uighurs' former land, they also will obtain Anxi, Beiting, and five tribes of Tatars and others."

The next problem regards the identification of He-luo-chuan. This toponym is also found in the itinerary of the Song envoy Wang Yande, who traveled to the land of the Western Uighurs in 981. James Hamilton saw in He-luo Turkic *qara*, "black," and (keeping the Chinese meaning of *chuan*) rendered this as "le Rivière Qara," which he identified as modern Etsin Gol in present-day Inner Mongolia, located between the great bend of the Yellow River and Hami, as one would expect for Wang Yande's route westward.[7] Hamilton apparently based his identification in part on Emile Bretschneider's remark that "Hei-shui (Black Water) is still the Chinese name of a river east of Su chou fu. The Mongols call it Etsina."[8] But given the Tang pronunciation of *he-luo* and the fact that Chinese *he* was used so frequently to translate Turkic *alp*, "brave," we should note that Hamilton's equation of Chinese *he-luo* with Turkic *qara* is not without difficulties.[9]

Wang Yande's itinerary would place He-luo-chuan in the western part of modern Inner Mongolia. As it is given in *Song shi*, Wang's course of travel went from Xiazhou westward and ended at Qocho (Chinese Gaochang).[10] Unfortunately, many of the place names in between remain unidentified. But the source does say that before reaching He-luo-chuan, Wang crossed the Yellow River and later

[6] Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 203, n. 7.

[7] Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 154.

[8] Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources*, vol. 1, 159, n. 428.

[9] On the Tang pronunciation of *he-luo*, see *GHWD* 210 and 1026. See also Csongor, "Chinese in the Uighur Script of the T'ang-Period," 83.

[10] Tuotuo et al., *Song shi* 490: 14110-14113.

passed through an area near the Dudu (Turkic *tutuq?*) Mountains, described as "Uighur territory during the Tang dynasty."[11] Before reaching Hami (Yizhou), Wang mentioned He-luo-chuan, which he described as "the place where the Uighur princess(es) lived during the Tang dynasty," adding that "there are still foundations of city walls there."[12] *Song shi* also mentions a tribute mission from the "He-luo-chuan Uighurs" in the fourth year of the Yongxi reign period (1 February 987–21 January 988).[13]

The question is, then, whether Li Deyu's He-luo-chuan is the same as Wang Yande's, the latter of which seems with little doubt to be the modern Etsin Gol. Elisabeth Pinks accepted the Bretschneider/Hamilton identification of Etsin Gol for Wang Yande's He-luo-chuan, but not Li Deyu's, which she believed to have been located "in den Gebieten des einstigen uigurischen Orkhonreiches."[14] Japanese scholars had earlier come to the same conclusion, and placed the ninth-century He-luo-chuan near the Orkhon River.[15] There is, however, no real evidence for this location, save for the fact that the mid-ninth-century Chinese texts mention He-luo-chuan as an important part of the Uighur empire. We therefore cannot rule out the possibility that the two He-luo-chuans are the same. The biggest problem is that the Chinese texts are not at all clear as to the location of He-luo-chuan. The Uighurs of He-luo-chuan are in fact mentioned in a later document written by Li Deyu **[Doc. 61]**, but the location of He-luo-chuan is not made evident. It is therefore difficult not only to determine where this place was to be found, but also whether the ninth-century He-luo-chuan is the same as the He-luo-chuan of Wang Yande's itinerary in the tenth century.[16]

Since the Chinese sources are so problematic, one might well wonder if a "Black River" (*qara sub*) is mentioned in any Turkic source from the period. Again there is no clear answer. Talât Tekin believed that

[11] Tuotuo et al., *Song shi* 490: 14110.

[12] Tuotuo et al., *Song shi* 490: 14111.

[13] Tuotuo et al., *Song shi* 490: 14114-14115.

[14] Pinks, *Die Uiguren von Kan-chou in der frühen Sung-Zeit (960-1028)*, 128-129, n. 97.

[15] See Abe, "Where Was the Capital of the Western Uighurs?" 443-444.

[16] It should be noted here that the comments of Ögel on this subject betray a misreading of the Chinese texts and a willingness to extrapolate from vague or terse remarks to broad theses; see Ögel, "Ein Tor nach China im 10. Jhdt." His remarks should be considered with caution.

he had found this term in the Uighur Terkhin/Tariat Inscription,[17] and suggested that it was a river or lake in the Türk-Uighur heartland of Mongolia—possibly the Xar Us Nur ("Black Water Lake") in the Altai region of northwestern Mongolia.[18] Another reading of this text disagrees with Tekin's, however, and thus the problem is no nearer to a solution.[19]

It seems quite possible that Li Deyu's He-luo-chuan is the same as Wang Yande's, and should be identified with Etsin Gol in western Inner Mongolia. This certainly was at one time a part of the Uighur empire, and may have represented the southernmost point *up to which* the Kirghiz hoped to extend their control, thereby reaching near to both Tang and Tibetan territory. Thus the passage in question could mean, "when the Kirghiz move *as far as* He-luo-chuan and [so] occupy the Uighurs' former land …." The identification of He-luo-chuan in the mid-ninth century with Etsin Gol seems to make the best sense for connecting it with the more westerly locations of Anxi, Beiting, and the Tatars of Gansu mentioned in Li Deyu's letter. Control over the Mongolian plateau would not imply control over the northern Tarim, but the Etsin Gol region could be important to a campaign directed toward the Tarim through the Gansu corridor. It also seems significant that Wang Yande carefully connected *his* He-luo-chuan (which clearly should be identified with Etsin Gol) with the Uighurs of the Tang era. We should note that one of the most important routes from Tang ter-

[17] The text in question is to be found in line 9 of the inscription's south side. Tekin read this as *sin s(i)zdä küč q(a)ra sub (ä)rmüs* and translated it as "The grave(s) of (our ancestors) are in your possession. The power (you need?) is surely in the Kara-Sub (river)." See Tekin, "The Tariat (Terkhin) Inscription," 47 and 50. His translation is problematic, however, for in ninth-century Uighur, "tomb" is *sïn*, not *sin*; see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 832. Furthermore, one would expect a locative *–da* appended to *sub*.

[18] Tekin, "The Tariat (Terkhin) Inscription," 55.

[19] In the other major reading of the inscription, Kliashtornyi interpreted the text as *äsinsizdä küč-qara sub-ermis* and translated it as follows: "if power is in the hand of an unsound person, it becomes spring-water." See Kliashtornyi, "The Terkhin Inscription," 343 and 345. While the term *äsinsiz* is unattested, it forms a good (and obvious) parallel to *äsinlig* in the same line; the latter is attested in Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 249 (in the form *esenlik*) and in *DTS*, 183 (in the form *esänlik*); its general meaning is "good health," suggesting that *äsinsiz* would be its opposite, "ill health." In his reading, Tekin read Kliashtornyi's *äsinlig* as *sinläg*, which he translated as "cemetery." This word, however, is unattested for the period. The runiform text, available in Kliashtornyi's Russian-language article on the subject, appears to support either reading; see Kliashtornyi, "Terkhinskaia nadpis'," 88.

ritory to the Uighur capital passed through Gansu and then turned northward via Etsin Gol.[20] Still, it is not possible to reach a definitive conclusion to this problem with the material available.[21]

Li Deyu's letter to the Kirghiz ruler did not refer to the question of Kirghiz expansion into former Uighur territory, but did seek to enlighten him as to the fate of the Taihe Princess, informing him that she had been recaptured by the Uighurs, that her Kirghiz escort had been murdered, and that she finally had been rescued by Tang forces. Li's letter stated that Uighur captives soon would arrive at the capital, where they would be executed in a show of imperial gratitude to the Kirghiz qaghan for his efforts on the princess' behalf. The letter also urged the Kirghiz to strive for the complete annihilation of the remaining Uighurs, whose number it placed at less than 1000. After all, the letter warned, "if embers are left burning, they certainly will give rise to calamity later." The letter closed with a wish to bestow upon the Kirghiz qaghan a document of official Tang appointment and a title, but asked the qaghan to make his wishes known in this matter, after which the appropriate formalities would be carried out.

The Second Kirghiz Envoy

Before this letter was sent, however, the arrival of another Kirghiz envoy at the border had been reported to the court. This second envoy was instructed to come to Chang'an, and in anticipation of his visit Li Deyu composed a memorial to the emperor regarding the need for translators **[Doc. 53]**. This memorial, written on 12 February 843, expressed concern that the court's translators of Turkic languages, who were probably Uighurs or Sogdians, would harbor resentment

[20] See Yan Gengwang, *Tangdai jiaotong tu kao*, vol. 2, 607-636 and map 10.

[21] See also the remarks in Maliavkin, *Materialy po istorii Uigurov v IX–XII vv.*, 121-122, n. 239. It should be noted that there is yet another interesting twist to this problem. In his poem "The Road to the Yin Mountains" ("Yinshan dao"), the poet Bai Juyi, a rough contemporary of Li Deyu, discussed the Uighurs and the benefits they were extracting from China in the form of the horse-silk trade and marriages between the Uighur qaghans and princesses of the Tang imperial house. The poem contains the following line: "The He-luo Generals shout 'Long life!' and scoop up the gold, silver, and variegated silks which were granted." See Bai, *Bai Juyi ji*, vol. 1, 81. While this translation is far from elegant, it makes clear, given the poem's context, that "He-luo" refers to the Uighurs during the time of their empire in Mongolia. Still, this gets us no closer to a solution.

against the Kirghiz and so would not translate their message properly. Furthermore, Li feared that these translators would tell other Uighurs in the capital what the Kirghiz envoy had said, particularly if it was "disadvantageous to the Uighurs." Li Deyu requested permission to have Liu Mian and Li Zhongshun find non-Uighurs who were capable of serving as translators and have them sent to the capital city. This presumably was approved.[22]

On 16 March 843, the envoy, named Zhu-wu Alp Sol (Chinese Zhu-wu He Su), arrived at Chang'an with two horses as gifts from the qaghan to the emperor.[23] The emperor ordered Zhao Fan, who was named in the first letter as the envoy taking the letter to the Kirghiz, to offer him libations and gifts; this suggests that the first letter was never sent. On 19 March 843, the emperor Wuzong had Zhu-wu Alp Sol brought before him for an audience and "placed him above the envoy from Parhae."[24] This was an obvious show of favor.

Li Deyu's fears regarding translators were well-founded, for the Kirghiz envoy did indeed have something to discuss that would be disadvantageous to the Uighurs: the taking of Anxi, Beiting, and other areas to the west of Tang territory. This had already been mentioned as a possible plan by the first Kirghiz envoy, as indicated

[22] See Drompp, "A Note on Interpreters of Turkic Languages in Late T'ang China."

[23] *XTS* 217b: 6150 and *ZZTJ* 247: 7973. According to *XTS*, he traveled for three years before arriving in Chang'an. This makes little sense from a geographical viewpoint, although it could make sense from a moral viewpoint. In discussing the Chinese emperor's ability to effect the moral transformation of foreign peoples, Martynov wrote, "The 'transformed barbarian' had to face a test he could not avoid: to cope with the hardships of long travel and, driven by the desire to transform and to express sincerity, prove again the power exercised by the emperor's influence on the world and on himself. This explains why the subject of long and difficult travel figures without fail in Chinese medieval texts dealing with foreign embassies. A long journey was an element that made up the Middle Kingdom's political prestige." See Perelomov and Martynov, *Imperial China*, 118. *XTS* also states, "Zhu-wu is a barbarian (*lu*) surname. *Ho* means 'brave' and *su* is 'left.' [Thus the name] means one who is martially brave and good at shooting from the left." The surname Zhu-wu suggests nothing in Turkic; for the Tang pronunciation see *GKWD* 722 and 218. Chinese *he* is well known as a transcription of Turkic *alp*, "brave." The other identification also seems good, since "left" in Old Turkic is *sol*. On these words, see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 127-128 and 824. It should be noted that the final character in the man's name is rendered as Chinese *su* in *JTS* 18a: 595 and *XTS* 217b: 6150, but as *suo* in *THY* 100: 1785 and *ZZTJ* 247: 7973.

[24] *ZZTJ* 247: 7973. Parhae (Chinese Bo-hai) was a state in eastern Manchuria; see Herrmann, *An Historical Atlas of China*, 30-31.

in Li Deyu's letter to the Uighur minister **[Doc. 43]**. But now there was a new twist: the idea of a joint Kirghiz-Tang campaign into the Tarim Basin.[25] Zhu-wu Alp Sol apparently first discussed this matter with Zhao Fan while *en route* to Chang'an, or perhaps Zhao Fan had received advance notice of the Kirghiz proposal, for on 13 March 843—three days prior to the envoy's arrival—the emperor ordered Li Deyu and other high-ranking officials to discuss the Kirghiz plan, which had been brought to his attention in a memorial from Zhao Fan.[26] Of course it is also possible that the sources are confused concerning either the date of the emperor's order or that of the Kirghiz envoy's arrival, or both. If there are dating errors here, however, they are of no great consequence.

Wuzong was initially enthusiastic about the prospect of reestablishing Chinese control over the western regions of the northern Tarim Basin, but his hopes of returning the Tang state to its former glory were quickly deflated by Li Deyu. Li's argument against the Kirghiz proposal made several persuasive points regarding the great distances involved, the large numbers of troops required to guard these outposts (no fewer than 10,000 men for each place), and the difficulty of provisioning them. As Li pointed out, it was difficult enough for the Tang government to provide adequate manpower and supplies for much closer garrison cities such as Tiande and Zhenwu. He then mentioned several instances in the past when Chinese emperors had chosen to abandon control over distant regions to avoid draining the state treasury. The chief minister's argument closed with the assertion that the Kirghiz were aware that Tang strength was insufficient to hold these distant territories, and hoped to lure the Tang into collaboration on their capture simply to be able to obtain Chinese wealth ("gold and silks") to enrich themselves. In Li Deyu's opinion, to help the Kirghiz militarily would not only have no benefit for the Tang state and waste its resources, but would also help give rise to another powerful enemy to the north. In the face of these powerful arguments, the emperor agreed that the plan was not appropriate.[27]

While in Chang'an, Zhu-wu Alp Sol and his fellow envoys (seven

[25] This strengthens the assertion that there had been no Kirghiz attack on—or conquest of—Anxi or Beiting.

[26] *ZZTJKY* 247: 7974. Zhao Fan's memorial does not survive.

[27] *JTS* 174: 4522-4523. The version presented in *XTS* 180: 5337 is less complete.

in all)[28] had an audience at the Court for Diplomatic Relations and were questioned about the geography and customs of their nation. The result of this interview was a painting of the Kirghiz envoys, together with an account of the Kirghiz nation.[29] It is a matter of great regret that neither of these has survived.[30] Li Deyu wrote a preface to the account which is extant, but contains little of interest to this study.[31] His memorial offering the account of the Kirghiz and the accompanying painting to the throne **[Doc. 54]** also survives. The purpose of this memorial was to inform the emperor of the account and painting in the most flattering terms possible. It makes a pointed reference to Tang Taizong, the dynasty's most famous ruler, and his success in drawing foreigners to his court. Since Taizong had ordered the famous artist Yan Liben[32] to execute paintings of the various foreigners offering tribute, Li Deyu stated that it was fitting to do the same with the Kirghiz envoys.

The information presented above is based on Chinese sources which are contradictory in some regards. While we are told that Zhu-wu Alp Sol and his compatriots were sitting for their portraits and discussing their nation's customs with Chinese officials, it is also recorded that Wuzong sent an imperial commissioner to escort Zhu-wu Alp Sol to Taiyuan to welcome the Taihe Princess.[33] This was obviously intended to show imperial gratitude for Kirghiz efforts to return her to the Tang court, and would guarantee that her return to Chang'an would be in the company of a Kirghiz escort as the Kirghiz ruler had originally intended. If Zhu-wu Alp Sol arrived in Chang'an on 16 March 843 and was received by the emperor three days later, it seems unlikely that he would have been able to travel to Taiyuan

[28] *THY* 100: 1785.

[29] *XTS* 217b: 6150. The composition of such reports was one of the responsibilities of the Court for Diplomatic Relations, as set forth in *THY* 63: 1089, translated in Twitchett, *The Writing of Official History under the T'ang*, 27. The Court for Diplomatic Relations' reports of this nature were sent to the Office of Historiography, so that they could be used in the compilation of the official dynastic history.

[30] Despite the loss of the account, it is quite likely that it served as the basis for some of the information found in the account of the Kirghiz in *XTS* 217b: 6146-6151.

[31] That document may be found in *HCYPJ* 2: 11-12, *LWRWJ* 2: 8a-9b, and *QTW* 707: 9197-9198. Martynov quoted from it in his discussion of the emperor's power to transform foreigners (see above); see Perelomov and Martynov, *Imperial China*, 119.

[32] Biographies of Yan Liben may be found in *JTS* 77: 2680 and *XTS* 100: 3941-3942.

[33] *JTS* 18a: 595.

in time to join the princess, whose arrival at Chang'an occurred on 29 March. Li Deyu's memorial regarding the Kirghiz account and painting **[Doc. 54]** stated that on the 21st day, various officials had been authorized to make the account and painting in question. This presumably refers to the second lunar month, for which the 21st day would correspond to 25 March. The timing of events seems perfectly sensible except for the assertion in *Jiu Tang shu* that Zhu-wu Alp Sol was sent to Taiyuan to participate in the princess' procession to the capital. It may be that he was not sent all the way to Taiyuan, but went to meet her somewhere outside Chang'an so that he could be part of her joyous return.

Li Deyu composed the Tang court's response to Zhu-wu Alp Sol's mission: another letter to the Kirghiz in the emperor's name **[Doc. 55]**. It is fortunate indeed that no question of great historical import hinges on these first two letters to the Kirghiz, for in addition to this confusion over dating and the activities of Zhu-wu Alp Sol while in China, there is also some confusion concerning these letters. We have seen that, according to our sources, Li Deyu apparently wrote a letter in the emperor's name **[Doc. 52]** in response to the message brought by the first Kirghiz envoy Ta-bu-he-zu, but that this letter had not been sent when the arrival of the second envoy, Zhu-wu Alp Sol, was reported. Li Deyu then composed a second letter in response to Zhu-wu Alp Sol's mission, entitled "Letter to the Kirghi[z] King" **[Doc. 55]**. Only some editions of Li Deyu's collected works contain the second letter, which has the earmarks of a draft, although its title does not designate it as such.

If we look closely at the contents of the two letters, no solution is forthcoming. The first letter **[Doc. 52]** is more complete, and mentions Zhao Fan. It employs an older form of the ethnonym Kirghiz (Jie-gu-si) and the title qaghan for the Kirghiz ruler. The second letter **[Doc. 55]** employs what was then a more up-to-date Chinese transcription for Kirghiz (Xia-jia-si), but in a truncated form (Xia-jia).[34] It

[34] This new transcription for Kirghiz, Xia-jia-si, quite possibly was established during Zhu-wu Alp Sol's visit, as it is after this that it became the standard transcription in Chinese texts. The truncation to Xia-jia is used in other sources from the Tang era; see, for example, Du Mu's letter to Li Deyu discussing northern affairs (Du, *Fanchuan wenji* 16: 232-234 and *QTW* 752: 9864-9865) as well as *JTS* 182: 4710. But what was acceptable in an internal document would not have been so in a formal letter from the Chinese emperor to the Kirghiz ruler; this applies also to the use of the title of "king" (*wang*) for the Kirghiz qaghan (see the following note).

also refers to the Kirghiz sovereign as king (*wang*) rather than qaghan, which would have been demeaning to the Kirghiz sovereign.[35] Finally, we should note that this letter repeats much of the information found in Li Deyu's first letter to the Kirghiz.

It is apparently for such reasons as these that editors of Li's works tended to place this document **[Doc. 55]** outside the main body of the collection in an appendix. The Tang court never would have sent the letter in this form, which would have been insulting to the Kirghiz ruler. On the other hand, it is the only letter to refer to Zhu-wu Alp Sol and his gift of horses for the emperor. The situation regarding these two Tang letters to the Kirghiz is indeed problematic. It is not outside the realm of possibility that the missions of Ta-bu-he-zu and Zhu-wu Alp Sol were one and the same, and that the document which is regarded as Li's second letter to the Kirghiz **[Doc. 55]** was in fact a draft for that which is seen as his first **[Doc. 52]**.

The Chinese scholar Cen Zhongmian accepted the scenario of two Kirghiz missions and two letters in response to them, acting on the basis of Zheng Ya's preface to *Huichang yipin ji* which states that Li Deyu wrote "four letters to comfort the Kirghiz" (*wei Jian-kun zhi shu si*). Another source, however, numbers Li Deyu's letters to the

[35] As has been noted, prior to their destruction of the Uighur empire, the Kirghiz ruler was called by a title or name rendered in Chinese as *a-re*, the Turkic form of which has not been established; see *XTS* 217b: 6147. The Old Turkic runiform inscriptions of the eighth century refer to the Kirghiz ruler as qaghan, as does the Chinese text of the Karabalghasun Inscription erected by the Uighurs early in the ninth century; see Tekin, *A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic*, 267, 269, and 272, and Schlegel, "Die chinesische Inschrift auf dem uigurischen Denkmal in Kara Balgassun," 84. After 840, the Kirghiz ruler claimed the title of qaghan. One version of Wuzong's later decree of appointment for the Kirghiz ruler (*THY* 100: 1785) mentions the "king of the Kirghiz nation" (*Xia-jia-si guo wang*), but two others (*TDZLJ* 128: 692 and *QTW* 76: 994) omit the word "king" and mention only the "Kirghiz nation." This appointment, however, was never actually made (see below). Kaneko argued that **Doc. 55** should be regarded as the Tang court's first letter to the Kirghiz, and that a change of the term of address for the Kirghiz ruler (i.e., from "king" in **Doc. 55** to "qaghan" in **Doc. 52**) "was made as the T'ang side tried to induce the Kirghiz to attack the Uyghurs" and in recognition of the Kirghiz ruler's "entitlement to the designation 'khan' [i.e., qaghan] in place of the Uyghur leader"; see Kaneko, "T'ang International Relations and Diplomatic Correspondence," 89-94. This, however, ignores the historical data (such as the information from *ZZTJ* that Ta-bu-he-zu's mission preceded that of Zhu-wu Alp Sol) as well as the evidence from Li Deyu's writings. Both **Doc. 52** and **Doc. 55** encouraged the Kirghiz ruler to participate in the destruction of the remaining Uighurs, and the chief minister continued to refer to Ögä as "qaghan" well after these letters to the Kirghiz were composed—indeed, throughout the remainder of his writings concerning the Uighur crisis.

Kirghiz at five.[36] But there is also evidence to the contrary. In *Zizhi tongjian*, Sima Guang wrote, "In the third month [4 April—2 May 843], Chief Minister of the Court of the Imperial Stud Zhao Fan was made Kirghiz pacification commissioner. The emperor ordered Li Deyu to draft a letter to send to the Kirghiz qaghan."[37] Sima Guang then gave part of the letter's text. Since this occurred shortly after Zhu-wu Alp Sol's arrival and imperial audience in Chang'an, we would expect this text to match Li's second letter to the Kirghiz **[Doc. 55]**, apparently written in response to Zhu-wu Alp Sol's mission. But it corresponds to the first letter **[Doc. 52]** instead.

Because of the short time—no more than four months—between the arrival of the first and second Kirghiz mission, as well as the delay in writing the first letter, which was composed after the defeat of the Uighurs on 13 February 843, the problem is a difficult one to resolve. It may be that the second letter is indeed a draft, the final version of which no longer survives. Complicating the question is the vague but still striking similarity between the Chinese transcriptions of the names of the first and second Kirghiz envoys: Ta-bu-he-zu and Zhu-wu-he-su. In both, we appear to have a two-syllable name, Ta-bu/Zhu-wu followed by Turkic *alp* (Chinese *he*) and a syllable that in each case could approximate Turkic *sol* (Chinese *su/zu*).

Although it is not clear which of the two envoys (if indeed there were two) brought the request, the sources make it clear that one of the Kirghiz qaghan's reasons for contacting the Tang court was to request imperial appointment confirming his position. Li Deyu was in favor of this, and memorialized to the emperor that China should seek friendly ties with the new victors of the steppe, and should send out troops to punish both the remaining Uighur refugees (for murdering the Kirghiz escort of the Taihe Princess) and the Black Carts (who were now harboring those Uighurs). Wuzong, however, feared that granting such an appointment would cause the Kirghiz ruler to become as haughty and difficult as the Uighur qaghans had been. The chief minister was able to bring the emperor around to his own opinion, however, by pointing out several facts. First, he noted, the Kirghiz ruler already had styled himself qaghan. Second, the Uighurs had received extraordinary favor from China because of their assistance during the An Lushan rebellion, whereas the Kirghiz had never achieved merit approaching that, and so could not expect the same trading and marital privileges that the Uighurs had enjoyed. Li Deyu argued that if a treaty were concluded between the Tang and Kirghiz rulers, the latter "would certainly call himself a subject [of the Tang emperor], just as the Uighurs did, and than it will be suitable to grant him an imperial appointment." He also urged the emperor to consider the Kirghiz ruler as a member of the imperial family, apparently in the belief that acceptance of this supposed relationship would help to preserve good relations for generations. The emperor therefore agreed to follow Li's advice.[38]

[36] Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 218, n. 1.
[37] *ZZTJ* 247: 7975.

[38] *ZZTJ* 247: 7974.
[39] Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 220, n. 1.

The Elimination of the Remaining Uighurs

Although both of Li Deyu's letters to the Kirghiz urged them to destroy the remnants of the defeated Uighurs, the Chinese realized that they could not depend on this distant power to carry out their will. At about the same time that the two letters to the Kirghiz were composed, Li also wrote an imperial edict urging Zhang Zhongwu to exterminate the Uighurs and offering to assist him in the supply of his troops **[Doc. 56]**. This edict has been dated to the second or third month of the third year of the Huichang reign period (5 March–2 May 843).[39] The text states that the Uighurs had recently shifted camp once again. It seems that they were now in the vicinity of Youzhou, which is why Li hoped to convince Zhang to deal with them. As Li Deyu wrote, "One hesitates to say that the crafty barbarians' wicked hearts still harbor unsettling thoughts, but just when [they seem] to gently submit, they suddenly run away again." His point was that these Uighurs might yet cause troubles for China (including Youzhou). Praising Zhang Zhongwu with the claim that his accomplishments surpassed those of two great generals of the past, Huo Qubing and Li Jing, the edict urged Zhang to attack the Uighurs "when the border grass is not yet green and the barbarians' cavalry are in distress." By offering to subsidize this campaign, Li Deyu no doubt hoped to sidestep any objection that Zhang Zhongwu might have to doing the Tang court's work.

It was also at about this time that the crisis concerning the governorship of Zhaoyi province began.[40] Liu Congjian had died on 9 May 843,[41] after which his nephew Liu Zhen attempted to seize control of the province. Most officials of the Tang court advocated at least temporary recognition of Liu Zhen's claim because of the unresolved border situation with the Uighurs. Li Deyu, however, convinced the emperor to attempt to wrest Zhaoyi from the Liu family by force of arms.[42] In fact, prior to learning of Liu Congjian's death, and most likely in early May 843,[43] Li composed another edict to Zhang Zhongwu concerning this problem **[Doc. 57]**. This edict indicated that the court was concerned with impending turmoil in Zhaoyi, and so had withdrawn many of its troops from the north. It thus relied upon Zhang Zhongwu to serve as its "Great Wall" to defend the northern frontier, and for this reason urged him in particular to work to bring about the destruction of the remaining Uighurs.

But if the Tang court could not rely on the distant Kirghiz to complete the destruction of the Uighurs, it was no doubt also aware that neither could it depend entirely on Zhang Zhongwu. On 6 June 843, Li Deyu submitted a memorial to the emperor requesting permission to send Liu Mian against the Uighurs once again if Zhang Zhongwu took no action **[Doc. 58]**. His idea was that since the Taihe Princess had been rescued, prudence was no longer the court's first concern, so Liu Mian should do battle with the Uighurs again, "exterminating them completely so that none remain to cause later calamities." Li's memorial discussed the provisioning of the force to be sent out against the Uighurs, which he believed should be made up of some 3000 cavalry as well as Tu-yu-hun and Sha-tuo troops. But he did state that Liu Mian should be told to observe Zhang Zhongwu's actions, and to allow the latter to attack the Uighurs first if he were indeed going to do so. But if Zhang hesitated or seemed unwilling, then Liu was to attack.

Some time in the first half of July 843, another Kirghiz envoy, headed by the general Wen-wu Alp (Chinese Wen-wu He), arrived at Chang'an.[44] Later that summer, Li Deyu wrote a letter to the Kirghiz qaghan in the emperor's name **[Doc. 61]**, which he apparently submitted to the throne twice.[45] When the letter was first submitted for imperial approval, it was attached to a brief memorial indicating that the emperor had ordered him to compose the letter and that he had done so after receiving reports from other officials **[Doc. 59]**. This letter apparently was not completely to the imperial liking, as a second memorial **[Doc. 60]** makes clear. In this second memorial, Li Deyu apologized for his "crude sketch" of a letter, stating that he had not realized that the Kirghiz were the descendants of the ancient Jian-kun—an odd remark to make since his first letter to the Kirghiz **[Doc. 52]** mentioned the fact that Tang Taizong had conferred upon the Kirghiz chieftain the titles of general of the Left Encampment Guards and governor-general of the Jian-kun. Li Deyu wrote that he had since investigated the matter and thus revised the letter in accord with the emperor's wishes. Wuzong's criticism of Li's first draft letter

[40] See chapter 4.

[41] Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 220-221, n. 1.

[42] See *ZZTJ* 247: 7978-7981 and Dalby, "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," 665-666.

[43] See Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 220-221, n. 1.

[44] *ZZTJ* 247: 7985. The Tang Chinese reconstruction of Wen-wu, for which see *GKWD* 754 and 177 (using the homophone *wu* for *wu*, which is not contained in *GKWD*) does not suggest anything in Old Turkic.

[45] Cen Zhongmian believed that the letter should be dated to the summer of the fourth year of the Huichang reign period (17 June–16 October 844) rather than to the summer of 843 immediately following the envoy's arrival. As evidence, he cited a letter written by Li Deyu to a certain Guo Yi (a general serving Liu Zhen) and carried by Li Pi (whose biography may be found in *XTS* 214: 6020-6021), as well as a statement from *ZZTJKY*. See Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 229, n. 1. The letter to Guo Yi, which may be found in *HCYPJ* 9: 70-71, *LWRWJ* 9: 3b-5a, and *QTW* 707: 9192, states, "The Uighur qaghan's soldiers and horses have been exhausted. He alone has gone to join the Black Carts. Recently the king of the Kirghiz nation sent a general and more than 100 persons to come to court. They requested [permission] to send out a group of 400,000 of their own nation's troops to attack and pursue the qaghan, capture him, and send him to the [Tang] capital." Cen relied on the term "recently" to assume that Li Deyu was referring to events of 844. Even if this letter to Guo Yi could be proved to have been written in the summer of 844, for which I have found no evidence (since the letter itself mentions only "summer," with no specific year given), that is no proof that the events mentioned as "recent" had just occurred in that particular summer. After discussing the defeat of the Uighurs and the arrival of the Kirghiz envoy, Li Deyu also informed Guo Yi of the death of the Tibetan *btsanpo* and the enthronement of a child as the new ruler of Tibet—events that were reported to the Tang court in January 843 at the end of the second year of the Huichang era; see *ZZTJ* 246: 7969. Thus, Cen's first piece of evidence is not persuasive. Indeed, one could argue that since the matter of the Uighurs was placed prior to the news from Tibet, it would most likely refer to events prior to January 843. Cen's second piece of evidence is an error. The statement in *ZZTJKY* 247: 7999 that "the Kirghiz envoy came in the second month of the fourth year [22 February–22 March 844]" does not refer to the embassy of Wen-wu Alp, but to the fourth Kirghiz envoy. Thus there is no reason to accept Cen's date for the letter. Dating it to the summer of 843 makes better sense.

must have stung; the second memorial, offering a new version of the letter, contained far more obsequious language than was Li Deyu's general practice to employ.

This letter to the Kirghiz qaghan is an extremely important historical document. It begins with mention of the arrival of Wen-wu Alp and the qaghan's gifts to the emperor: 100 horses and ten falcons.[46] It then praised the qaghan's actions and abilities and repeated the court's acceptance of the qaghan's claim to be related to the Tang imperial house. To encourage his continued good will toward China, the letter presented a brief recitation of historical events in which Xiong-nu leaders (and, for a time, the Uighurs) who had pursued peace with China had thereby accumulated power and prestige for themselves. The letter then returned to a familiar theme. Some Uighur refugees remained at large, living between China and the Kirghiz, harbored by the Black Carts who feared their strength and thought that they might manage to recover their power. The imperial letter suggested that if the Black Carts and other small tribes were to learn of a close tie between China and the Kirghiz, they would renounce the Uighurs and instead choose to form bonds of friendship with the Tang and Kirghiz states.

Next came the topic of imperial appointment, which the emperor was willing to bestow upon the Kirghiz ruler. It is clear from the text that the qaghan had requested a title which was to be (or include) the Turkic words "Heavenly Qaghan" (*Tängri Qaghan*). The emperor's refusal to employ this term in the qaghan's imperial appointment is of great interest. The letter argued that Tängri Qaghan was a title that had been granted to Uighur rulers by the Tang court, but that "the Uighurs themselves did not decide on this name." Furthermore, the power of the Uighurs had been destroyed, and they were now to be shunned. For that reason, their old titles were inappropriate to use in the appointment of the Kirghiz ruler. Instead, the court expressed its wish to return to the old titles of the past: general of the Left Encampment Guards and governor-general of the Kirghiz (Jian-kun). We have already noted that Wuzong was not eager to grant imperial appointment to the Kirghiz qaghan, although he had finally agreed to do so

[46] Falcons and other raptors were used for hunting; see Schafer, "Falconry in T'ang Times." Like many of his imperial predecessors, Wuzong was fond of hunting (see *ZZTJ* 246: 7957), although it is not known if he made specific use of hunting falcons.

at Li Deyu's urging. The refusal to employ the powerful element *Tängri* in the title may have reflected imperial reluctance to set the Kirghiz up in a relationship with China that was in any way comparable to that which the Uighurs had enjoyed. It is clear, however, that the Kirghiz qaghan wished to appropriate for himself a powerful title such as those which had been used by previous Turkic sovereigns of the steppe. This, along with the Kirghiz interest in gaining control over the former Uighur lands and the Tarim Basin, reveals that the Kirghiz did indeed see themselves as inheritors of the traditions of the Türks and Uighurs, at least in a political sense.[47] The letter did suggest that the Chinese and Kirghiz could conclude an alliance, so long as it was based on Chinese—and not Inner Asian—models and formulas.

The imperial letter reminded the Kirghiz that the Uighurs had requested 100,000 Tang troops to assist them in the recovery of their homeland, and also had asked to use a Chinese border city in which to dwell until that campaign could begin. These requests had been refused, the letter rather disingenuously claimed, for the sake of the Kirghiz qaghan. The Kirghiz were urged to destroy the remaining Uighurs "root and branch" to promote peace on the steppe. Military cooperation in this venture (apparently suggested by Wen-wu Alp) would be difficult, the letter indicated, since the Kirghiz and China were "separated from each other by the various foreign peoples, making it difficult for our nations to join forces." From this (and other evidence) it seems clear that the Kirghiz nation remained centered on the upper Yenisei River valley in South Siberia, north of the Mongolian plateau.[48] The letter said that if the Uighurs approached China again, they would be destroyed. It urged the Kirghiz to work for their annihilation, and not allow them to submit. The letter's language in regard to this issue is particularly vehement: "If you accept the sinful horde, if you receive those runaway vassals, if you take in those whom We hate, it certainly will open a rift along our border. This would be like your nourishing a poisonous viper. You would bring disaster upon yourself." The emperor reminded the qaghan that the Uighurs had boasted that, like the Türks before them, they would manage to revive their nation despite their decreased numbers. Was this not a matter of concern for the qaghan? The letter then reported intelligence that the Uighurs of He-luo-chuan had not been destroyed, and urged the

[47] For more on this, see Drompp, "Breaking the Orkhon Tradition."
[48] See Drompp, "Breaking the Orkhon Tradition."

Kirghiz to eliminate those Uighurs as well. The emperor was careful to make it clear that China was not attempting to exert control on the steppe, but simply wished to achieve peace with the Kirghiz. At its close, the letter urged the qaghan to confer with his envoys returning from China and then formulate a reply. Once the court at Chang'an had received his reply, an official would be sent to the Kirghiz with the desired letter of imperial appointment.

The Continued Role of Youzhou

On 10 August 843, Li Deyu submitted a memorial which addressed both the Uighur problem and the crisis in Zhaoyi **[Doc. 62]**. This document reveals that the Tang court still hoped that Zhang Zhongwu would use his troops to destroy Ögä Qaghan and his followers, and suggested that an envoy be sent to Youzhou with an imperial decree. The man chosen as envoy was Li Hui, a member of the Tang imperial house but not a close relative of the emperor.[49] Li Hui carried a decree urging officials in Zhenzhou and Weizhou[b] to send out troops to attack Liu Zhen, and urging Zhang Zhongwu to send out troops to annihilate the remaining Uighurs **[Doc. 63]**. The decree stated that the Uighurs, suffering from hunger, had again harassed the frontier cities of the Tang empire, although this information is not corroborated in other sources.

Although it is not stated in the decree, Li Hui had an additional mission: to try to reconcile Zhang Zhongwu with Liu Mian. No concrete reason for the enmity between them is given in the sources, but these two men apparently were at odds with each other over the handling of the Uighur crisis. It is implied that Zhang was jealous of Liu's merit in defeating the Uighurs at Shahu Mountain and recovering the Taihe Princess.[50] Whatever its cause, the court at Chang'an wished to bring an end to this grudge and effect a reconciliation. Liu Mian, whose circuit of Hedong bordered not only Youzhou but also Zhaoyi, had been assigned to the campaign against Liu Zhen.[51] Busy with this campaign, the court was eager to have Zhang Zhongwu's help in bringing the

[49] See *ZZTJ* 247: 7987. Biographies of Li Hui may be found in *JTS* 173: 4501-4502 and *XTS* 131: 4517-4518.

[50] *ZZTJ* 247: 7992-7993.

[51] *JTS* 161: 4234 and *XTS* 171: 5195.

Uighur matter to a successful conclusion. Cooperation was deemed paramount in the extinguishing of the twin evils of Liu Zhen and the Uighurs, and the animosity between Liu Mian and Zhang Zhongwu could be an obstacle to such cooperation. Zhang Zhongwu, however, would not be mollified. According to *Zizhi tongjian*, "the court feared that he would allow a private hatred to spoil affairs." Thus, on 11 November 843, Liu was transferred from Hedong to serve as military governor of Yicheng. He was replaced in Hedong by Li Shi, who had been military governor of Jingnan.[52] Since the court considered Zhang's collaboration essential to Tang defense, and since he could not be forced to do anything against his will, the court was willing to sacrifice Liu Mian and transfer him to a post far from Youzhou.

Li Hui had returned to Chang'an no later than 29 September 843, the date on which Li Deyu submitted a memorial concerning Li Hui's report **[Doc. 64]**. This memorial reveals that while he continued to express solidarity with the Tang government, Zhang Zhongwu still had not committed himself to attacking the Uighurs. Li Hui apparently had been successful in the rather ticklish job of convincing Zhang Zhongwu that the Tang court's actions against Liu Zhen were justified, but not in convincing him to complete the destruction of the Uighurs. Li Deyu requested imperial approval for another communication with Zhang that would again urge him to exterminate the Uighurs in return for rewards that he would receive upon the successful completion of the task. The memorial also suggested that Li Deyu feared that Zhang Zhongwu would desire to get involved in the campaign against Zhaoyi and so abandon the mission to destroy the Uighurs altogether—hence Li's flattery of Zhang's meritorious actions at the northern frontier: "You alone have established merit along the northern border. Liu Zhen certainly will destroy himself." Although it is not specifically stated in the sources, it is likely that the emperor agreed to Li Deyu's request to send the decree to Zhang Zhongwu. It seems clear that the chief minister had no intention of forgetting the Uighurs, and that he would not allow Zhang to forget them either.

Despite Li Deyu's efforts, Zhang Zhongwu still did not act against the Uighurs during the remainder of 843 and most of 844. For that period there is virtually no information concerning the Uighurs, although on 9 February 844, Li Deyu stated in an imperial audience

[52] *ZZTJ* 247: 7992-7993. Biographies of Li Shi may be found in *JTS* 172: 4483-4487 and *XTS* 131: 4512-4516.

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that Zhang Zhongwu had "punished" (*tao*) the Uighurs the previous year (*qunian*).[53] This statement, however, is not elaborated on in the sources and refers to no recorded event of the previous year, i.e., the third year of the Huichang era (3 February 843–23 January 844). It may be that the Chinese should be translated "a previous year," or that the word "punished" refers to some small action, for after the defeat of the Uighurs at Shahu Mountain there is no recorded Chinese military action taken against the Uighurs at all.

One reason for this may be that at the end of 843, before the rebellious province of Zhaoyi had been brought under the control of the Tang central government, a new crisis had arisen: raids on Yanzhou, and later Ningzhou and Binzhou—both of which were not far from Chang'an—by Tanguts who were living within Tang territory. One of Wuzong's sons was appointed to pacify the Tanguts. He was to be assisted by Li Hui (who earlier had been sent to convince Zhang Zhongwu to attack the Uighurs) and Zheng Ya.[54] This crisis apparently diverted Li Deyu's attention from the Uighurs who were, after all, a distant and now relatively minor threat. He was, however, soon reminded of them by new intelligence from Youzhou and the arrival of a fourth embassy from the Kirghiz. The report from Youzhou informed the chief minister of dissension among Ögä Qaghan's followers. The qaghan wanted to migrate westward to Anxi, apparently to join other Uighurs who had fled to the west after the initial Kirghiz attack. Most of his followers, however, were of another mind. Many of them expressed a desire to stay together and submit to China, since they were dissatisfied with their situation among the Black Carts and feared what the future would hold for them if they continued on in such precarious circumstances. This not only suggests that the Uighurs may have received some news of their people to the west, but also reaffirms the assertion that the Kirghiz had not managed to gain control over Anxi, if indeed they ever really attempted to do so.

Li Deyu hoped to exploit this situation to China's advantage. Some time between 9 November and 13 December 844,[55] he submitted a memorial to the throne that discussed his plans to bring an end to

[53] *ZZTJ* 247: 7997.

[54] *ZZTJ* 247: 7993.

[55] *ZZTJ* 248: 8012 places this memorial between those two dates without being more specific. Cen Zhongmian proposed a slightly broader possibility, merely stating that the memorial must be dated after 21 September 844; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 231. n. 1.

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Communication Difficulties with the Kirghiz

The arrival of the fourth Kirghiz envoy, General Tätik Iznanchu (?) (Chinese Di-de Yi-si-nan-shu),[57] who apparently was the last such envoy

[56] This letter refers to Li Deyu by his title of "defender-in-chief" (*taiwei*) and so was written after 13 October 844, probably in the fall or winter of the fourth year of the Huichang era (i.e., before 11 February 845); see Fu, *Li Deyu nianpu*, 551-554. The text of the letter may be found in Du, *Fanchuan wenji* 16: 232-234 and *QTW* 752: 9864-9865. Biographies of Du Mu may be found in *JTS* 147: 3986-3987 and *XTS* 166: 5093-5097. According to those accounts, Li Deyu agreed with Du Mu's assessment.

[57] For the Tang pronunciation, see *GKWD* 1232, 451, 52, 580, 1442, and 692. The first two syllables seem to provide a reasonable correspondence to Turkic *tätik*, "quick-witted, intelligent," which is attested in Old Uighur; see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 455. The second element of the name, Iznanchu, is not attested in Turkic sources (unlike the very similar Inanchu; see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 187). In the Manichaean document known as *Maḫrnâmag* the form *'iznâčû* is found, which Müller rendered as Iznatschu; see "Ein Doppelblatt aus einem manichäischen Hymnenbuch (Maḫrnâmag)," 10, 11, and 31. Since the form "Iznanchu" is unattested, it is not possible to be certain if this is an appropriate form for Chinese Yi-si-nan-shu. In the Old Uighur Terkhin (Tariat) inscription the element Öz-Inanchu appears in two different

that Zhang Zhongwu had "punished" (*tao*) the Uighurs the previous year (*qunian*).[53] This statement, however, is not elaborated on in the sources and refers to no recorded event of the previous year, i.e., the third year of the Huichang era (3 February 843–23 January 844). It may be that the Chinese should be translated "a previous year," or that the word "punished" refers to some small action, for after the defeat of the Uighurs at Shahu Mountain there is no recorded Chinese military action taken against the Uighurs at all.

One reason for this may be that at the end of 843, before the rebellious province of Zhaoyi had been brought under the control of the Tang central government, a new crisis had arisen: raids on Yanzhou, and later Ningzhou and Binzhou—both of which were not far from Chang'an—by Tanguts who were living within Tang territory. One of Wuzong's sons was appointed to pacify the Tanguts. He was to be assisted by Li Hui (who earlier had been sent to convince Zhang Zhongwu to attack the Uighurs) and Zheng Ya.[54] This crisis apparently diverted Li Deyu's attention from the Uighurs who were, after all, a distant and now relatively minor threat. He was, however, soon reminded of them by new intelligence from Youzhou and the arrival of a fourth embassy from the Kirghiz. The report from Youzhou informed the chief minister of dissension among Ögä Qaghan's followers. The qaghan wanted to migrate westward to Anxi, apparently to join other Uighurs who had fled to the west after the initial Kirghiz attack. Most of his followers, however, were of another mind. Many of them expressed a desire to stay together and submit to China, since they were dissatisfied with their situation among the Black Carts and feared what the future would hold for them if they continued on in such precarious circumstances. This not only suggests that the Uighurs may have received some news of their people to the west, but also reaffirms the assertion that the Kirghiz had not managed to gain control over Anxi, if indeed they ever really attempted to do so.

Li Deyu hoped to exploit this situation to China's advantage. Some time between 9 November and 13 December 844,[55] he submitted a memorial to the throne that discussed his plans to bring an end to

[53] *ZZTJ* 247: 7997.

[54] *ZZTJ* 247: 7993.

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to reach Chinese territory during Wuzong's reign, probably occurred in the eighth month of the fourth year of the Huichang reign period (16 September—15 October 844).[58] The envoy brought two white horses for the emperor and also carried with him a document that spelled out various matters of interest to the Kirghiz ruler. Li Deyu was once again called upon to draft a letter in response to the Kirghiz letter. Li's memorial submitting the letter **[Doc. 66]** mentioned the Kirghiz "petition" and indicated that the chief minister had responded to each item in the Kirghiz letter. Li also mentioned that he had written the letter in a simple style so that the Kirghiz could understand his responses. This suggests some limits to the Kirghiz ability with written Chinese, confirmed in the text of the letter itself. Finally, Li Deyu's memorial urged the emperor to employ the same rituals used with the Uighurs in the official appointment of the Kirghiz qaghan.

Li Deyu's letter written in response to the envoy's message **[Doc. 67]** is to be dated some time in the spring of 845.[59] From the letter's

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names; see Kliashtornyi, "Terkhinskaia nadpis'," 89 and 91, as well as Klyashtorny, "The Terkhin Inscription," 341 and 344. Chinese Yi-sī-nan-shu thus may represent a variant (or poor transliteration) of Inanchu or Öz-Inanchu.

[58] *ZZTJ* 247: 7999 places his arrival some time within the third month of the fourth year of the Huichang era, but this is clearly an error for the second month (22 February–22 March 844), the date given in *ZZTJKY* 247: 7999. The text of *ZZTJ* does not give a date, but places the envoy's arrival after an entry for the third month and prior to an entry for the fourth. The entry for the third month states, "In the third month, on the first day of the month (*jiayin*) there was an eclipse of the sun." The cyclical day *jiayin* was the first day of the second and fourth months, however, not the third; see Hiraoka, *Tōdai no koyomi*, 280. *XTS* 8: 243 records, "In the second month, on the first day of the month (*jiayin*), there was an eclipse of the sun." Thus, "third month" in *ZZTJ* clearly is an error for "second month." Furthermore, every cyclical day given under *ZZTJ*'s "third month" here (*ZZTJ* 247: 7998-7999) occurs in the second month, not the third. It seems likely, therefore, that "third month" in *ZZTJ* is a misprint rather than an error on Sima Guang's part. Returning to the envoy's arrival, *JTS* 18a: 596 dates it considerably later, in the eighth month of that year (16 September–15 October 844). *CFYG* 980: 11517 erroneously dates it to the eighth month of the third year (29 August–27 September 843). This date is of course too early, and it is quite possible that "third year" is an error for "fourth year" in this source, lending some credence to the dating found in *JTS*. *CFYG* is plagued with such errors.

[59] See Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 234-235, n. 1. Cen is probably incorrect in his assertion that the statement found in *ZZTJKY* 247: 7999 that "the Kirghiz envoy came in the second month of the fourth year" refers to the embassy of Wen-wu Alp, the third Kirghiz envoy (see n. 45 above). It certainly was meant by Sima Guang to refer to Tätik Iznanchu (?), even if his dating of the second month is not correct. Sima Guang placed Wen-wu Alp's arrival in the summer of 843; see *ZZTJ* 247: 7985. Still, Cen's dating of Li Deyu's letter **[Doc. 67]** to the

contents, it seems clear that the matter of greatest concern to the Kirghiz was a general lack of understanding and a failure of communication between the Kirghiz and Tang courts. The Kirghiz qaghan had complained that since the return of General Wen-wu Alp, no Chinese envoy had been sent to the Kirghiz. The Chinese response pointed out that the letter carried by Wen-wu Alp had instructed the Kirghiz to send a petition to the Tang court, and then an official would be sent to confer the desired imperial appointment upon the qaghan. Since no such petition had been received in Chang'an, no Chinese envoy had been sent. The problem had arisen, Li Deyu pointed out, because the Kirghiz apparently did not understand the court's instructions. The Kirghiz letter also had indicated that the Stelae (Jinshi) Road,[60] apparently an important avenue of communication between the Kirghiz and China, had "become blocked." This road cannot be identified, nor is the reason for its obstruction explained.[61] Li Deyu simply pointed out that the blocking of this road also had served to hinder communications. The qaghan was to understand that it was not Tang unwillingness that had kept Chinese envoys from being sent to the Kirghiz.

It seems clear from this letter that the communication problems between the two nations had made the qaghan suspicious that the Chinese were attempting to distance themselves from him. This is further evidence that the Kirghiz had maintained their focus on the upper Yenisei River valley and did not have a significant, permanent presence on the Mongolian plateau, since a Kirghiz garrison of significant size could have served to facilitate communication and, presumably, keep the Stelae Road open. A general failure to communicate can be seen

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spring of 845 seems correct, based on the letter's internal evidence. There is no reason why Tätik Iznanchu(?) could not have arrived in 844 (especially if the date of the eighth month is preferred to that of the second month), spent the winter in China, and then returned homeward in the spring of 845. Indeed, this would make perfect sense, as the envoy may well have wished to avoid winter travel.

[60] The Chinese term *jinshi* typically refers to inscriptions on bronze and stone, although it could also simply mean "metal and stone." As Old Turkic and Uighur stelae were (and still are) significant landmarks in Mongolia, the road's name suggests that it passed through an area in which such stelae were to be found.

[61] Given the openness of the Mongolian steppe, it seems unlikely that the blocking of a single road would hinder communications. Perhaps this should be considered an indication that passage through the region of Old Turkic and Uighur stelae (most likely central Mongolia—i.e., the Orkhon/Selenga region) had become difficult because of the lack of political stability there.

in the fact that this latest envoy had once again asked about the fate of the Taihe Princess. As Li Deyu's letter pointed out, the qaghan had already been informed of the princess' return to China, an indication that the first letter to the Kirghiz **[Doc. 52]** had indeed been sent, but that it may not have been received or, if received, had not been properly understood.

The Kirghiz letter also indicated a wish to destroy the remaining Uighurs and occupy the Uighurs' territory—further evidence that there was at this time no real Kirghiz control of the Mongolian plateau. Li Deyu, long concerned about the Uighur refugees that were still at large, wrote a hearty approval to this plan. He pointed out that the Black Carts of the Shi-wei people were not a powerful tribe, but foolishly protected the Uighurs and thereby insulted the Kirghiz qaghan. The chief minister obviously hoped to arouse the qaghan's anger so that he would attack the Black Carts and seize the Uighurs; the letter assured the Kirghiz ruler that this would be "as simple as picking up something that one has dropped." Li Deyu also suggested that a Kirghiz presence in Mongolia would likely cause any remaining Uighurs to flee southward and submit to China. Either way, the Uighurs would be eliminated once and for all. But the Tang court would not agree to the Kirghiz request that Tang cavalry be sent out to help in an attack on the Black Carts, insisting that the Black Carts were too far from the Chinese frontier for effective Tang cooperation. Instead, the Tang court offered to post troops along the major routes to Anxi so that if any Uighurs attempted to flee southwestward they would be intercepted. Li pointed out that the Tang court had received word that at least some Uighurs were planning to migrate westward in the autumn; this presumably was in reference to Zhang Zhongwu's intelligence regarding the split among the Uighur refugees. The letter closed with a statement that a Tang official would be sent to confer imperial appointment on the Kirghiz qaghan, employing the same ceremonies used to confer appointments on the Uighur qaghans.

On 3 April 845,[62] Li Deyu submitted a memorial to the throne to

[62] The document itself carries a date corresponding to 3 April 845, but Sima Guang argued that the date was too late, and preferred to date the memorial to 14 March 844; see *ZZTJ* and *ZZTJKY* 247: 7999-8000. Although he provided no evidence for this decision, Sima Guang connected Liu Meng's appointment as an officer patrolling the border with the Tang court's discussion of recovering territory previously lost to the Tibetans (since the Uighurs were weakened and the Tibetans were suffering from internal difficulties) and so rejected the *Wuzong shilu* date of 5 April 845 for

put into action his plan of arranging troops to intercept any Uighurs who might flee a Kirghiz attack and attempt to reach Anxi **[Doc. 68]**. Li urged the emperor to approve plans that would show the Tang court keeping faith with the statements that had been made in the emperor's most recent letter to the qaghan. He hoped that troops could be selected, trained, and equipped for this action. In this maneuver he hoped to use both Chinese and non-Chinese (Tu-yu-hun, Sha-tuo, and others) troops, including soldiers and horses from Youzhou. He also suggested that important roads be repaired to facilitate this campaign, and that the frontier be prepared for the maneuver by the digging of city moats for defense as well as pits to trap the Uighurs' horses.

At the same time, the Tang court proceeded with its plan to grant official appointment to the Kirghiz ruler. On 4 June 845, Li Shi was appointed as the envoy to take the documents of imperial appointment to the Kirghiz.[63] Shortly thereafter, the emperor promulgated an edict giving the Kirghiz qaghan the title of Zongying Xiongwu Chengming Qaghan.[64] The first element, Zongying, denotes a heroic member of a clan (*zong*), once again indicating Tang acceptance of the Kirghiz claim to a blood relationship to the Tang imperial house of Li. The other elements can be translated "brave and martial, sincere and brilliant." With the exception of the word "qaghan," this title is entirely Chinese, quite unlike the grandiose titles conferred upon Uighur rulers. These contained very long Turkic elements (given in Chinese transcription in the various Chinese sources), usually with two Chinese words (that is, words to be read as Chinese, and not as Chinese transcriptions of Turkic) appended at the end. The title approved for the Kirghiz ruler may indicate the Tang court's reluctance to treat the Kirghiz—or even appear to be treating them—with the same inordinate favor that had been shown to the Uighurs. As has been shown, the Kirghiz qaghan

Liu Meng's appointment. Cen Zhongmian believed that Sima Guang was in error; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 238, n. 1. All available evidence supports the document's own date of 3 April 845. If one accepts that date, then 5 April 845 would be a reasonable date for Liu Meng's appointment.

[63] *ZZTJ* 248: 8015.

[64] This is the form of the title as it appears in *THY* 100: 1786, *XTS* 217b: 6150, and *ZZTJ* 248: 8015. The versions of Wuzong's edict of appointment preserved in *QTW* 76: 994 and *TDZLJ* 128: 692 have the fifth and sixth characters reversed to read Mingcheng.

himself had requested a title with more of a Turkic flavor, containing at least the element *Tängri*.

Reports of Ögä Qaghan

Not long after Li Deyu's memorial urging the readying of troops to intercept fleeing Uighurs, he submitted another memorial containing information that had been received from Li Zhongshun, the military governor of Zhenwu **[Doc. 69]**. According to the report, Ögä Qaghan had shifted his camp and was now 300 *li* (about 100 miles) or less north of Tiande, apparently having left the security of the Black Carts. In addition, a surrendered Uighur had informed the military governor that Ögä's followers now numbered only about 1500, were poorly equipped, and survived by raiding other tribes and stealing their domesticated animals. It was clear that the Uighur refugees were still in a precarious position.

Despite the weakness of Ögä Qaghan and his followers, Li Deyu also had received word from Ormïzt (Li Sizhong) expressing fear that the Uighur qaghan would position himself to join with other small tribes to intercept the Chinese envoy Li Shi as he traveled to take Tang imperial appointment to the Kirghiz qaghan. Such a warning would fit perfectly with the information regarding Ögä Qaghan's latest movement southward toward Tiande. Ormïzt suggested that Tang troops escort Li Shi to Tiande and then wait there until a Kirghiz escort arrived. Li Shi would then leave Tiande only under the protection of the Kirghiz. According to Li Deyu's memorial, the military governor of Zhenwu was prepared to carry out this suggestion.

Although he apparently was close to Tiande, Ögä Qaghan did not threaten the Tang frontier. He was clearly too weak to do so, although it was certainly possible for him to waylay a Tang embassy headed for Kirghiz territory. Li Deyu's hope now was that the Kirghiz qaghan, having been promised the Tang imperial appointment he desired, would attack the Uighurs in the autumn of 845. Tang troops would be poised to intercept those who fled southward or southwestward. All of this had been set into motion, but the chief minister's plan was not to be achieved. Although the Tang letter urging the Kirghiz to finish off the Uighurs and promising the qaghan imperial appointment was sent in the spring of 845, no Kirghiz attack on the Uighur refugees took place in the fall of that year. This may be due to the fact that Li Shi, the Tang official designated to lead the embassy of imperial

appointment, had not yet been sent on his mission to the Kirghiz court. The reason for this delay is not clear, but probably had to do with Tang fears of Uighur interference. Because of the real problem of communications between the Chinese and the Kirghiz and the silence of the available sources, we cannot be certain of what exactly was transpiring at this time. It seems likely, however, that each side was waiting for what it wanted from the other. The Kirghiz would attack the Uighurs, but only after receiving imperial appointment. The Tang court would grant imperial appointment, but only after the Kirghiz had eliminated the Uighurs.

The End of Wuzong's Reign

The Tang embassy of imperial appointment still had not been sent out when the emperor Wuzong died at the age of 31 on 22 April 846.[65] His death was preceded by months of illness, apparently brought on by the use of chemicals intended to prolong his life. These had been prescribed by Daoist adepts at his court, who assured him that his ailments were actually part of the process of achieving immortality.[66] Some sources suggest that the emperor was also suffering from mental deterioration as well. His temper became increasingly short, and he was able to attend to matters of governance less and less.[67] The Japanese monk Ennin—hardly a neutral observer—noted the emperor's issuance of several decrees that can only be described as bizarre, such as an edict prohibiting the keeping of black animals (since black was associated with Buddhism, while yellow was associated with Daoism) and another ordering provincial officials to send to the court the hearts and livers of fifteen-year-old boys and girls, apparently for use in various elixirs.[68] These are not recorded in any other source, however, and are therefore suspect.[69]

In a desperate attempt to improve the situation, the emperor had decreed on 11 April 846 that his personal name Chan was to be

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[65] *ZZTJ* 248: 8023 and *THY* 2: 13-14.
[66] *ZZTJ* 248: 8021.
[67] *ZZTJ* 248: 8020.
[68] Reischauer, *Ennin's Diary*, 385-386.
[69] See, however, the comments of Weinstein, *Buddhism under the Tang*, 200, n. 124. Weinstein (p. 135) dates these decrees to the ninth month, whereas Reischauer correctly places them in the eighth; see Ennin, *Nittō guhō junrei gyōki*, 195.

changed to Yan.[70] This was connected to the ancient Chinese theory of the five elements (*wu xing*). The Tang dynasty was associated with the element earth, while the emperor's given name Chan is written with the "water" radical and so was associated with that element. Since, according to the theory of the five elements, earth has the power to overcome water, the emperor was convinced that the dynasty's "earth power" was having a deleterious effect on his own "water power." His new name, Yan, is written with twin "fire" radicals. This appeared to be a good choice, since fire was regarded as having the power to overcome earth.[71] By changing his name, and thus ending the power of the dynasty's own element over his person, the emperor hoped to halt his physical decline. His efforts, however, were in vain.

Wuzong's short reign had been momentous indeed. The emperor considered his defeat of the Uighurs, persecution of Manichaeism, and development of ties with the Kirghiz to be among the most important events of his reign. These are mentioned, along with his victory over Liu Zhen in Zhaoyi, in all of the most important formal pronouncements of his last years on the throne. For example, on 20 November 844 the emperor had replied to his officials' request that he take a new title to celebrate his accomplishments. In this reply he celebrated the peace that had come to China after the defeat of the Uighurs and Liu Zhen: "[Now We have] sheathed our weapons and ceased military actions; [We have] fashioned weapons into agricultural [implements]." The imperial reply also mentioned the destruction of Manichaeism, which it branded as an evil and depraved doctrine. Its downfall was due to the fact that Heaven (*shangxuan*) had a hatred of calamity.[72] A few months later, the emperor followed through with the plan to take on a new and more grandiose title. Li Deyu composed the formal announcement to that effect on the first day of the new year, 11 February 845.[73] This text contains extensive reference to both the Uighurs and the Kirghiz. In highly formal language, the former were severely excoriated, although the submission of a "famous prince" (*ming wang*, i.e., Ormïzt) was celebrated, while the latter were

[70] *ZZTJ* 248: 8022. The edict is extant in *TDZLJ* 5: 34.

[71] Weinstein, *Buddhism under the Tang*, 135-136.

[72] *TDZLJ* 6: 41. *Shangxuan* is a Daoist term, reflecting the emperor's religious proclivities.

[73] *HCTPJ* 1: 2-4; *TDZLJ* 8: 49-50.

said to have kowtowed (as a show of subordination) and offered tribute to the Son of Heaven. Two days after this, on 13 February 845, the emperor issued an act of grace in conjunction with his sacrifice at the southern suburbs—one of the most solemn rituals an emperor could conduct.[74] This public pronouncement used ornate language to refer to the defeat of the Uighurs, the recovery of the Taihe Princess (who had been rescued from "a place of felt and furs"), the submission of Ormïzt, and the coming of the Kirghiz envoys. As for Manichaeism, the act of grace claimed that the "evil doctrine" had been done away with forever. Language that is nearly identical to this can be found in a later act of grace, dated 7 November 845, issued in conjunction with the emperor's taking of another new title.[75]

The emperor's valedictory edict was issued on the day of his death, 22 April 846.[76] It is therefore quite possible that it is a forgery, since the emperor had been for many days incapacitated by his illness, although it is possible that he had drafted its text while his conditioned worsened, in anticipation of his death. This solemn edict also mentioned the defeat of the Uighurs, the coming of the Kirghiz, the destruction of Liu Zhen, and the extirpation of Manichaeism, to which was added a reference to the removal of "the baleful influence of Buddhism." The edict also appointed Li Deyu to administer the empire until the enthronement of the new emperor, who was to be Wuzong's uncle, Prince Guang.

The New Son of Heaven

Wuzong's untimely death was to have far-reaching consequences. The new emperor Xuanzong (r. 846–859) had a marked antipathy

[74] *TDZLJ* 71: 398-399. On the importance of the suburban sacrifices, see Wechsler, *Offerings of Jade and Silk*, 107-122. Wechsler pointed out (p. 107) the importance of the suburban sacrifices in the confirmation of imperial authority: "These opulent ceremonies vividly substantiated the emperor's temporal power as well as his special relationship with Heaven, Earth, and the imperial ancestors. In the suburban sacrifices, so called because the altars on which they were performed were located in the near suburbs of the capital, the emperor personally acknowledged the Mandate bestowed upon him and thanked Heaven for its favor." See also Xiong, *Sui-Tang Chang'an*, 129-164, especially 129-134 and 146-149.

[75] *TDZLJ* 10: 62-63.

[76] The edict may be found in *TDZLJ* 12: 71. For the dating, see *JTS* 18a: 610.

toward Li Deyu and immediately removed him from high office.[77] Thus the man who had overseen the entire Uighur crisis and handled diplomatic relations with the Kirghiz was abruptly removed from the scene. Li Shi's embassy was not sent out because of the period of mourning for the deceased emperor. Afterward, Xuanzong's advisors counseled against sending the envoy since the Kirghiz were a "secluded, distant, and small" nation. After the deliberation of his high officials, the emperor agreed with this viewpoint and the matter was put to rest.[78] However, in the sixth month of the following year (16 July–14 August 847), Li Ye, president of the Court for Diplomatic Relations, was named as envoy to carry out the conferral of imperial appointment for the Kirghiz qaghan. The title to be granted the qaghan, Yingwu Chengming Qaghan, was a truncated and therefore less imposing version of the title that Wuzong had been prepared to bestow.[79] Most pointedly, this new title omitted any reference to the qaghan's kinship to the Tang imperial family.

No reason is given for the emperor's change of mind, which *Xin Tang shu* describes as "sudden" (*cu*).[80] His decision may have been prompted by an attack on Tang territory by a combined force of Uighurs, Tanguts, and Tibetans, apparently instigated by the Tibetans, in the previous month (17 June–15 July 847). The attackers were defeated by Wang Zai and the Sha-tuo leader Zhu-ye Chi-xin (Li Guochang).[81] We should note that the Uighurs involved in this probably were not from among Ögä Qaghan's followers, but from some other group, possibly those Uighurs who had fled to the Western regions after the Kirghiz invasion of 840.

Although Xuanzong sent Li Ye to confer imperial appointment on the Kirghiz qaghan, the emperor's interest in Chinese-Kirghiz relations was minimal. Diplomatic contacts continued, but they appear to have consisted primarily of Kirghiz envoys coming to Chang'an on an irregular basis. There was at least one other instance of Tang

[77] See Dalby, "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," 669-672. The reasons for this antipathy are not clear, although they may stem from Li Deyu's involvement in the well-known "Niu-Li" factional struggles which began in 821; see Dalby, "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," 639-659.

[78] *ZZTJ* 248: 8026.

[79] *ZZTJ* 248: 8030 and *XTS* 217b: 6150. The text of the edict of appointment has not survived.

[80] *XTS* 217b: 6150.

[81] *ZZTJ* 248: 8030.

imperial appointment being granted to a Kirghiz ruler. This occurred in 867 during the reign of the emperor Yizong (r. 859–873).[82] Records of later Kirghiz envoys to the Tang court or Tang envoys to the Kirghiz were lost.[83] The great distance separating the two nations, as well as the increasing internal problems faced by the weakening Tang dynasty, can account for this general loss of interest in relations with the Kirghiz.

As for those Uighurs who still adhered to Ögä Qaghan, their fate was decided after Li Deyu's fall from power. Some time in 846, Ögä Qaghan was murdered. According to *Jiu Tang shu*, the assassin was an Uighur minister named Yi-yin Chor who, after killing the qaghan in the region of the Altai Mountains, placed Ögä's younger brother E-nie Tigin on the throne.[84] *Xin Tang shu*, however, states that Ai Hongshun[85]—the Chinese name of that same Ayabïr who had been a high-ranking officer under Ormïzt and had submitted to the Tang along with him—bribed the Black Carts to murder Ögä. According to this source, the Black Carts "rejoiced" at the Uighurs' downfall.[86] This would place the qaghan's murder much further to the east—closer to where we would expect him to be if he were still involved with the Black Carts. At the time of the qaghan's assassination, his followers numbered less than 3000,[87] but it seems that this number increased to more than 5000 after E-nie's elevation to the throne.[88] The sources report that the Uighurs now shifted their dependence from the Black Carts to the Tatabï ruler Shi-she-lang. This information suggests that the Black Carts had indeed become hostile toward the Uighur refugees, whether they participated in Ögä's assassination or not. The Uighur shift to the protection of the Tatabï lends support to the suspicion that the sources are wrong to assert that Ögä met his death in the Altai region.

[82] *ZZTJ* 250: 8117.

[83] *XTS* 217b: 6150-6151.

[84] *JTS* 195: 5215. According to this version, Ögä Qaghan was murdered in the Altai Mountains (Jin Shan), but this seems too far west to be plausible. Sima Guang, however, did accept this; see *ZZTJ* 248: 8025. As for Yi-yin and E-nie, these suggest no Turkic name or title. For Tang pronunciations, see *GKWD* 1322 and 1432 as well as 1324 and 539.

[85] As has been noted, different sources give this man's Chinese name as either Ai Hongshun or Li Hongshun.

[86] *XTS* 217b: 6132-6133.

[87] *ZZTJ* 248: 8025.

[88] *JTS* 195: 5215.

In the fifth month of the first year of the Dazhong reign period (17 June–15 July 847), Zhang Zhongwu—who, just a few months earlier, had been granted further rewards by Xuanzong for his part in defeating the Uighurs[89]—inflicted a severe defeat upon the Tatabï.[90] After this attack on their protectors, the Uighurs were even harder pressed and their group diminished to fewer than 500 persons, dependent now upon the Shi-wei (although the sources do not make clear whether these were the Black Carts or a different group). When Zhang Zhongwu attempted to have E-nie captured, the new qaghan fled westward in the night with his wife, son, and nine cavalry. The remaining Uighurs, completely dispirited, were divided up among seven Shi-wei tribes.[91] But within days, apparently in March 848, a Kirghiz force said to number 70,000 men appeared under the leadership of a minister named Apa (Chinese A-bo).[92] After attacking and defeating the Shi-wei, Apa collected the remaining Uighurs and took them back to Kirghiz territory with him. Some Uighurs appear to have escaped by hiding in the mountain forests, and later plundered various other tribes to survive.[93] Those few Uighurs who had escaped the Kirghiz gradually made their way westward to Gansu and the court that had been established there by the Uighur Mang (or Pang) Tigin.[94]

The Uighurs who had come to China after the collapse of their steppe empire were finally completely eliminated from the area north of the Tang empire. They had come southward to seek some means of survival, but most of them found only death. Although Ormïzt and his closest relatives and followers were granted favor by the Tang court, the bulk of his followers had been put to death by Liu Mian. Ögä Qaghan's group had been shattered by the force of the Tang attack; their remnants managed to eke out a living on the steppe for a few years, but were finally eliminated by a combination of factors. We do

[89] *ZZTJ* 248: 8028. A note to this passage pointedly comments, "Wasn't it Shi Xiong alone who defeated the Uighurs?"

[90] *ZZTJ* 248: 8032.

[91] For the names of these seven tribes, which do not include the Black Carts, see the note to this entry in *ZZTJ* 248: 8032.

[92] On the Turkic name/title Apa, see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 5. For the Tang pronunciation, see *GKWD* 1414 and 553.

[93] *ZZTJ* 248: 8032.

[94] For the various forms of this prince's name, which is quite possibly Turkic *mänglig*, "joyful, happy," see Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 7-8 n. On *mänglig*, see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre–Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 770.

not know the fate of E-nie Qaghan. As for those few Uighurs who managed to find succor in China, the sources tell us very little. That Ormïzt (Li Sizhong) was still alive in the fifth year of the Huichang era (11 February 845–30 January 846) is shown by mention of his name in one of Li Deyu's final memorials on the Uighur question **[Doc. 69]**. It seems likely that Ormïzt remained in Chang'an, where he had been granted a residence. We should note the above reference to Ayabïr, suggesting that he was still alive in 846, and perhaps had the wherewithal to arrange the assassination of Ögä Qaghan.

And what of Li Deyu? The new emperor's intense dislike for him led to his rapid fall from power. In the words of Michael Dalby, he was "demoted in the customary stages, each post being more junior and more southerly" until finally he was sent to "the nadir of Chinese officialdom as a district officer on Hainan Island in the South China Sea."[95] Li Deyu's exile to Yaizhou in northern Hainan took place on 8 October 848.[96] He died there on 26 January 850 at the age of 63 *sui*.[97] In 852 his son Li Ye removed Li Deyu's coffin from Hainan and took it to North China for burial at Luoyang.[98]

Although his death no doubt was hastened by his exile to the unhealthy climate of Hainan, Li Deyu still outlived most of the primary characters of the Uighur crisis. We have seen that both Wuzong and Ögä Qaghan had died in 846. That was also the year of Liu Mian's death.[99] Shi Xiong died "disheartened" in 848. He apparently had

[95] Dalby, "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," 671.

[96] *ZZTJ* 248: 8035.

[97] *ZZTJ* 248: 8041 and *JTS* 174: 4528. Despite some discrepancies in the sources, this is most likely the correct date for Li Deyu's death; see the discussion in Chen, "Li Deyu bian si nian yue ji guizang zhang shuo bian zheng," 316-326 and 340. Several Western-language sources erroneously place Li Deyu's death in 849; see Schafer, *Shore of Pearls*, 87 and Waley, *The Life and Times of Po Chü-i*, 214. Zhou Jianguo took the unusual approach that since Li Deyu died before the arrival of the lunar new year, i.e., before the end of winter, his death should be placed "at the end of 849," even though the calendar date of his death was in January 850. Zhou thus preferred the *literary* date of 849 to the *historical* date of 850; see Zhou, "Consider the Sun and Moon: Li Te-yü and the Written Word," 89 and n. 18. It should be noted that the date of Li's death, the tenth day of the twelfth month of the third year of the Dazhong reign period, corresponds to 26 January 850, and not 17 January 850 as Zhou asserted; see Hiraoka, *Tōdai no koyomi*, 287 and Chen, *Zhong-Xi-Hui shi rili* 9: 13.

[98] Chen, "Li Deyu bian si nian yue ji guizang zhang shuo bian zheng," 326-341.

[99] *JTS* 161: 4234. Liu Mian was living in retirement in Luoyang when he died of illness at age 65. His funerary inscription may be found in Lu, *Baqiong shi jinshi buzheng*, vol. 4, (ch. 74) 1245-1248.

become ill after learning of Li Deyu's demotions, and he was unable to recover. Indeed, Shi Xiong was disliked by a powerful clique at Xuanzong's court, and they managed to have him cashiered by the new emperor after Li Deyu's fall from power.[100] His illness therefore may have had more to do with his own fate than with that of Li Deyu. Zhang Zhongwu died in 849. His son, unable to maintain control in Youzhou, fled to the protection of the Tang government.[101] Even the Kirghiz qaghan who had destroyed the Uighur steppe empire apparently had died some time during the Huichang era (i.e., prior to 6 February 847), assassinated by one of his officials, although this intelligence was not communicated to the Tang court until a later date.[102] It may be that the sudden Kirghiz attack on the Shi-wei and the capture of the remaining Uighurs, dated March 848, represents the policy of a new Kirghiz qaghan, eager to sweep away the last embers that his predecessor had left smoldering.

[100] *JTS* 161: 4236-4237.
[101] *ZZTJ* 248: 8039.
[102] *XTS* 217b: 6150.

CHAPTER SIX

THE RHETORIC OF THE CRISIS

"You should hearken to Our words!"

An Approach to the Texts

The survival of so many documents (albeit in reprinted form, as the originals have long since perished) concerning the Sino-Uighur crisis allows us a rare opportunity not only to examine the Tang court's actions and policies in regard to a specific set of events, but also to consider the rhetoric used in the formulation of those actions and policies. Rather than the terse abridgements often found in the standard histories and other later works, we have here the complete texts of Li Deyu's documents as they were written in the mid-ninth century. They have survived virtually intact, with only a few obvious errors or lacunae, and hence can be considered as primary sources that have much to teach us about the uses of rhetoric in late Tang China and beyond.

In a consideration of Tang imperial rhetoric as a prelude to his study of that of the early Song era, Wang Gungwu identified five broad rhetorical categories: "language that was largely moral and cosmological and expressed inclusiveness; the rhetoric dealing specifically with tribute; derogatory language justifying the use of force; routine communications stressing realism and flexibility; [and] the rhetoric of contractual relations."[1] He added, "There was obviously a difference between the rhetoric of 'inter-state relations' (or the language used between rulers) and that within the Chinese court among officials discussing what was to be done in 'foreign' relations. For each of the five sets of rhetoric … we may further distinguish between internal and external communications."[2]

My approach here is related to Wang's but uses as its starting point, rather than an addendum, a consideration of the very significant difference between rhetoric intended for internal purposes (essentially

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private correspondence, to which only a very few were privy) and that used for external purposes (essentially public pronouncements). In the documents relating to the Uighur crisis, the most significant categorical distinction in regard to rhetoric is that between private and public. The latter may then be divided between "interior" and "exterior" to distinguish those communications which were primarily intended for persons within the Tang state, and those which were primarily intended for persons outside it. We will see, however, that the rhetoric used in these two divisions is in many ways quite similar.

This approach yields a threefold division that may be summarized as follows:

- private: rhetoric intended only for the emperor and his inner circle;
- public (interior): rhetoric intended for the broader realm of Tang officialdom and, at times, for the general populace; and
- public (exterior): rhetoric of the type Wang considers typical of "inter-state relations," although in this particular case the communication was not always ruler-to-ruler, but could also include other levels of communication, such as minister-to-minister.

It is important to remember that in the Tang world, a clear division of "inner" and "outer" may have existed in a theoretical sense, but was far less distinct in reality and did not align itself clearly with ethnic divisions. Ever since foreign peoples had been brought into Chinese territory to serve as border guards in the late Han era, the history and political organization of North China had become inextricably linked with relations between ethnic Chinese and other peoples. In addition, we must note that intermarriage between ethnic Chinese and others was not uncommon, and has been noted particularly among the elite. Indeed, it has long been known that the Tang ruling house of Li was itself part of the "mixed elite" of North China that had resulted from centuries of foreign rule and intermarriage. The Tang emperors had close connections to the northern steppe, and did not hesitate to employ foreigners in their governments, particularly in the military.

Although one could argue that by the late Tang era this connection to the Inner Asian world had weakened and the Tang rulers had become more clearly "Chinese" in their outlook, it is important to realize that the late Tang realm still contained a significant Inner Asian presence. We have seen the importance of the "loose-rein"

peoples, specifically the Sha-tuo Türks, Tanguts, and Tu-yu-hun, to the development of the Uighur crisis, as well as the role played by military leaders of non-Chinese origin such as Qi-bi Tong and the Uighur prince Ormïzt. It is also clear that there were at this time Uighurs living in China who engaged in commerce and maintained the Manichaean temples whose construction their rulers had promoted within Chinese territory. Other foreign peoples were also present, particularly (for our purposes) the Sogdians. Furthermore, it should be noted that there were Chinese (and Sogdians) living within the Uighur realm at this time.

It is evident that there was at this time no clear demarcation between a purely Chinese "interior" and a purely alien "exterior." The amorphous frontier zone, populated by "loose-rein" peoples who maintained much of their traditional way of life and traditional leadership despite being a part of the Tang administrative structure, only serves to reinforce this. This does not mean, however, that Li Deyu embraced the concept of a Tang empire that went far beyond the geographical region that was dominated by traditional Chinese culture. We have seen his reluctance to promote Tang expansionism to the Western regions of the former Tang territories of Anxi and Beiting. We have also seen his use of the argument that "natural boundaries" had been established by Heaven to divide the interior from the exterior—a concept which will be considered at greater length below.

Despite this ambiguity of "inner" and "outer" in regard to ethnicity, there was a clear sense of "inner" and "outer" in regard to the realms of thought and morality. Chinese civilization, with its strong Confucian foundation, was the "interior" realm, while all others were "exterior," even though non-Chinese influences can be clearly seen in Tang culture. The Uighurs' support of Manichaeism only served to reinforce a cultural difference which was already, in Confucian eyes, profound. In Li Deyu's writings we can easily and repeatedly discern the chief minister's employment of Confucian values to promote his policies. His writings in all three categories (as defined above) reveal his masterful ability to use Confucian concepts to achieve his political goals. Of course, this distinction of "inner" and "outer" in regard to thought and morality also did not conform to clear ethnic divisions. A good example is Ormïzt, a foreign prince who was initially perceived as a denizen of the political and moral "exterior" but was given the opportunity to behave in accordance with Confucian norms. Once he had done so, he was welcomed into the political and moral "interior,"

incorporated into the Tang military structure and granted a Chinese name that linked him to the most eminent family in the empire.

Let us now consider the rhetoric of the three categories of communication as explained above.

Private Communications

This category includes all of the memorials (*zhuang*)[3] that Li Deyu composed concerning the Uighur crisis. This is by far the largest category of Li's writings regarding the crisis, comprising 46 of the 69 documents from Li's brush translated in this study—exactly two-thirds of the total. Their purpose was to inform and influence the emperor. As such, their rhetoric tends to be of the type that Wang described as "routine communications stressing realism and flexibility." In these memorials, Li dealt with virtually every aspect of the Uighur crisis. They therefore contain language that tends to be simple and straightforward, with attention paid more to the practical concerns of the time than to elegance of language or displays of erudition. While respectful, the language used to address the emperor is not obsequious, except in a few rare instances. Li Deyu conformed to appropriate Confucian propriety in his interactions with the Son of Heaven, but the urgency and frequency of his memorials promoted the use of straightforward prose.

Li's first memorial concerning the Uighur crisis **[Doc. 3]** is one of the most interesting from among these private communications. In it, the chief minister set forth his policy for dealing with Ormïzt and his followers: compassion for the "poor bird" which had flown to the Tang bosom for succor. Concerned with issues of border defense as well as the Tang image abroad, Li's memorial promoted a policy of imperial kindness toward these Uighurs for a number of reasons. First, he provided evidence that the Uighur state had indeed fallen into chaos. This not only explained Ormïzt's flight to the Tang frontier, but also excused it, as he had no viable sovereign to whom to cleave. Second, Li pointed out that the Uighurs had not committed any violations of the border; in this he employed language that praised the emperor, making it clear that Uighur forbearance was directly linked to the emperor's own virtue: "When people from afar have admired our righteousness (*yi*), they have not transgressed our borders." In the Confucian concept of sovereignty, the Son of Heaven was charged to uphold morality in his government; the greater his success in doing so, the greater his ability to draw foreign peoples to him. This was known as *huairou*—attracting outsiders through kind and proper (i.e., moral) actions—and was a very important concept in the rhetoric of Tang diplomacy. Of course, the fact of foreigners' attraction to the Tang court, which could range from diplomatic and military cooperation to complete submission, was generally a function of power and policy rather than one of morality: *Realpolitik* rather than *huairou*. But the Confucian conceptualization of the emperor's role required the rhetorical acknowledgement of the power of morality. Li Deyu's reference to the Tang court's righteousness, and the positive Uighur response to it, was calculated to incline the emperor toward a policy of compassion rather than one of belligerence.

In an effort to strengthen his proposed policy of kindness toward the Uighur refugees, Li praised the policy of Han Xuandi toward the Xiong-nu ruler Hu-han-ye—a policy promoted by the emperor's official Xiao Wangzhi which the emperor followed, leading to some 60 years of peace between the Han and Xiong-nu. This event was already nearly eight centuries in the past when Li Deyu wrote about it, but it still provided him with a powerful precedent. As we have seen, the Tang dynasty saw itself in many ways as the successor to the Han dynasty. Li's ability to employ the example of Han Xuandi and Xiao Wangzhi added great strength to his argument. Like the Uighurs, the Xiong-nu had fallen into political chaos. Like the border official Tian Mou, Han-era officials had encouraged the emperor to attack the Xiong-nu. Like Li Deyu, Xiao Wangzhi had promoted a policy of conciliation and succor. And like Han Xuandi, the emperor should adopt such a policy to bring about a long-lasting peace.

The precedent of Han Xuandi and Hu-han-ye was to play a central role in the rhetoric of the Uighur crisis, as will be shown. Li Deyu mentioned it repeatedly in order to promote his own policies. We should note that he certainly could have found a different precedent promoting an aggressive policy toward the Uighurs had he wished to do so, but that did not fit with the chief minister's desires or with the realities of the Tang border. Li knew that the border was weak,

[3] Memorials submitted to the throne were known as either *biao* or *zhuang* during the Tang era. The only difference lay in the status of the presenter, with *zhuang* reserved for high officials of the court; see des Rotours, *Traité des fonctionnaires et Traité de l'armée*, vol. 1, 23, n. 1. To distinguish them, des Rotours translated *biao* as "addresse à l'empereur" and *zhuang* as "mémoire à l'empereur."

and he had observed that the Uighurs still had not committed any significant acts of violence after many months at the border. He feared that an attack on the refugees would further weaken border defenses and give the Tang court a black eye in the opinion of other peoples. By accusing Tian Mou of acting out of personal motives, the basest motivation in terms of Confucian morality, Li cast the notion of attacking the Uighurs in the light of immorality and therefore made it more likely that the emperor would support his own approach to the problem. The chief minister believed that the Tang government should use force against the refugees only if attacked. Otherwise, the Uighurs should be treated with kindness and sincerity so that "even though they are barbarians (*rong di*), they certainly will be united in gratitude for our kindness."

Li Deyu's memorial abounds with references to Confucian concepts, particularly those of winning hearts through moral behavior (*huairou*) and the basic values of righteousness (*yi*), sincerity (*xin*), and kindness (*en*), all of which are central to Confucian ideals of morality and statecraft. The chief minister was able to use these concepts, along with a powerful historical precedent, to encourage the emperor to adopt his policy. He further strengthened his own argument by weakening that of others, accusing them of self-interest rather than concern for the nation. In the Confucian context, Li's memorial is a masterpiece of rhetoric that struck just the right balance, using the language of morality to establish a pragmatic policy that suited the circumstances.

Many of Li Deyu's subsequent memorials used the same themes to promote his policies. In his next memorial on the subject **[Doc. 4]**, for example, he not only extolled the wisdom of Han Xuandi, but criticized the aggressive expansionism of Han Wudi, whose policies he described as detrimental to the nation's well-being. Such an argument would not likely have been effective in the glory days of Tang power and influence, but was highly appropriate for the late Tang, when the empire's strength had significantly declined. Furthermore, Li was now acting on new intelligence from the border which indicated that Tang defenses were indeed poor. Again he argued for kindness toward the Uighur refugees. But in this text, his morality was tinged with a pragmatism that some might even consider cynicism, for he argued that even if the court planned to attack the Uighurs, it should first lull them into a sense of security through acts of kindness. Thus we should not take our notions of Li Deyu's adherence to Confucian morality too far. He could make effective use of Confucian rhetoric

when it furthered his cause, but he was too shrewd a politician to let the language of morality blind him to the political and military realities of the day. Indeed, it was not long before Li began urging the emperor to approve the sending of reinforcements to the border for defensive purposes **[Doc. 6]**. At this point the chief minister did not discount the possibility of an Uighur attack, but was more concerned about the Tibetans taking advantage of the situation to seize Tang territory. A second memorial on the subject **[Doc. 11]** is an excellent example of Li Deyu's straightforward prose in his command of the various details of reinforcement as well as the repair and supply of border fortifications.

Other memorials from early in the crisis continued to emphasize Confucian values and their pragmatic application. For example, one such memorial **[Doc. 7]** requested that an official be sent out to inquire after the Taihe Princess, the emperor's paternal aunt, whose fate was at this point unknown. This had a moral purpose: to show kindness to a family member in distress. It also had pragmatic purposes: to maintain Tang prestige and to test Ormïzt's sincerity, since he was to be asked to help the Chinese envoy reach the princess. As more than a year had gone by since the Kirghiz attack on the Uighur capital, the court's concern for the princess' well-being seems rather belated at best, but Li's memorial shows his political skills on many levels. A second example, which dates from about the same time, is a memorial **[Doc. 12]** urging the emperor to order the Tiande Army to put a stop to its practice of executing Uighurs who surrendered to them, as this would impede the Uighurs' "transformation to humaneness" (*ren hua*). Although it is not stated in the memorial, there surely was a pragmatic element to this as well, since Tiande's actions, if they became widely known, would not only tarnish the Tang image but also discourage Uighurs from submitting to Tang authority.

Most of Li Deyu's memorials regarding the Uighur crisis were of a practical nature, as befitted the situation. As such, they contain little beyond the language required to provide information and propose actions, and so have little more to reveal concerning the rhetoric of the crisis. It also may be that Li Deyu made less use of the rhetoric of Confucian persuasion as his policy gradually moved closer and closer to war with Ögä Qaghan, or it may be that the emperor's acquiescence to his policies made it less necessary for him to use such language to argue his position. There are, however, some exceptions. Confucian rhetoric was important in the memorials concerning the settlement of

those Uighurs who had submitted to Tang authority. In his recommendation that Ormïzt and his submitted troops be given the name of "Return to Righteousness Army" **[Doc. 14]**, Li Deyu focused again on the important Confucian moral virtue of righteousness (*yi*). This was also an important part of Li Deyu's memorial in which he offered to the throne a painting of the Kirghiz envoy Zhu-wu Alp Sol and an account of his homeland **[Doc. 54]**. According to the chief minister, his own preface to the account was written to extol the virtue (*de*) of the emperor's kindness (*rou*) toward distant peoples and to make known the emperor's righteousness. In a different context, Li's memorial arguing that the Tang court should not accept Uighur prisoners sent from Youzhou by Zhang Zhongwu **[Doc. 19]** made use of the important classic from the Confucian canon *Zuo zhuan* to present a precedent from antiquity whose purpose was to provide moral justification for the action the chief minister proposed.

Finally, we should note the one memorial related to this crisis in which Li Deyu's language was indeed much more obsequious than usual, his second memorial submitting a draft letter to the Kirghiz qaghan **[Doc. 60]**. The chief minister had been ordered to write a letter to the Kirghiz ruler, and had done so. But the emperor was displeased by the draft, as it made no mention of the Kirghiz being brought into the Tang administrative system (however loosely) during the reign of Tang Taizong. He ordered Li to rewrite the letter and include reference to Taizong granting titles to the leader of the Kirghiz. This certainly was because Wuzong wanted to remind the Kirghiz of their previous good relations with, and symbolic submission to, the Tang. The memorial that Li wrote to submit his revised letter used language rarely seen in his communications with the emperor. Of course, the chief minister typically referred to himself as "your servant" (*chen*, usually translated simply as "I" here) and sometimes used words and phrases expressing humility in his memorials. But in this particular memorial, Li Deyu felt sufficiently chastened to declare, "My knowledge is empty; my manner of writing is superficial," and to make a great show of subservience in presenting the memorial: "Prostrate, I am racked with nervous fear." Even this great chief minister could be made to know his place by the mercurial emperor he served.

Public Communications

This category contains far fewer texts than the previous one, but their use of rhetoric tends to be of greater interest. Because these were sent out from the court and could therefore be seen by large numbers of people, their language had to be much more carefully crafted than that of the frequent and essentially private memorials that Li Deyu wrote to communicate with the emperor. One important difference is that in these texts for public consumption, the chief minister was usually writing in the emperor's name. For this reason, the rhetoric employed was required to be of a more formal nature so as to express the lofty majesty of the Son of Heaven. In addition to the division between "interior" and "exterior" public communications considered above, these documents may be divided from another perspective into the different categories of imperial proclamations (*zhi*), imperial edicts (*zhao*),[4] imperial decrees (*chi zhi*),[5] and letters (*shu*). Edicts were sent to Tang officials or were promulgated for public knowledge. Letters included imperial letters and other communications. Imperial letters to foreign sovereigns were simply called "letters," while those to lesser-ranking foreign leaders were categorized as letters of imperial edict (*zhao shu*) or, less commonly, as letters of imperial decree (*chi shu*).[6] In addition to imperial letters, communications on the minister-to-minister level were simply called "letters." These were the only public communications connected to the Uighur crisis which were not written in the emperor's name.

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[4] According to des Rotours, *zhi* referred to imperial edicts, while *zhao* was a general term used for imperial edicts, decrees, mandates, etc. He noted, however, that these translations were to be regarded as "très approximative"; see des Rotours, *Traité des fonctionnaires et Traité de l'armée*, vol. 1, 22, n. 2. According to Wilkinson, *zhi* and *zhao* were similar types of documents, with *zhi* being used to designate "particularly important pronouncements"; see Wilkinson, *Chinese History*, 515. This is supported by Li Deyu's writings, in which *zhi* were public announcements of important events or appointments, while *zhao*, although far from private, were generally addressed to individuals. To avoid confusion, I have translated *zhi* as "imperial proclamation" and *zhao* as "imperial edict."

[5] The only imperial decrees connected to the Uighur crisis **[Doc. 51, Doc. 63]** were, like imperial proclamations, intended for the public. Their content, however, was generally less portentous. Wilkinson translated *chi zhi* as "rescript"; see Wilkinson, *Chinese History*, 515.

[6] Letters of imperial decree include the court's initial communication with the "rebellious" Uighurs **[Doc. 1]** and the letter to the Taihe Princess **[Doc. 28]**. There does not seem to be any significant difference between letters of imperial edict and letters of imperial decree.

Interior Public Communications

The first of these internal communications was an imperial proclamation sending an envoy to pacify the Uighurs **[Doc. 8]**. Written shortly after the court had finally received communication from the Taihe Princess and learned of the elevation of Ögä Qaghan, it reveals many of the important themes of subsequent communications of this type. It is important to remember that it was composed when the Tang court still believed that the Uighurs would, after receiving assistance from China, seek to recover their homeland. Its tone, therefore, is pacific and conciliatory.

The proclamation began with a consideration of the benefits to be gained by distant peoples who submitted to the authority of the Son of Heaven, who would then protect and nurture them. It included the Uighurs in this category, noting the marriage relations between the Tang imperial house and the Uighur qaghans and the great merit that the Uighurs had accrued by coming to the aid of the Tang government during the An Lushan rebellion. The edict refers to the Uighurs as "vassals" (*chen*)—a term which conforms perfectly to Confucian notions of diplomacy, but which implies a degree of subordination which certainly was not acknowledged, or even contemplated, by the Uighurs themselves during their years of empire. After this, the emperor briefly recounted the disasters which had befallen the Uighurs, and indicated his pity for them as well as his desire to help them. The example of Han Xuandi's assistance to the Xiong-nu ruler Hu-han-ye was then mentioned to show the propriety of the emperor's plan. Xuandi's assistance to Hu-han-ye had led to many years of peaceful relations between China and the nomads. As the proclamation asked, "Can We ignore the excellent examples of the past?" It concluded with the appointment of officials to oversee aid to the Uighur refugees. This aid, the proclamation makes clear, was to help the Uighurs prepare to recover their homeland. It ended with this telling remark: "The goodness of Our grace will last forevermore; when it is made manifest within China and without, all should understand Our heartfelt concern." The message was clear. Because of the Uighurs' past merit in assisting China, China would now assist them, but only for the purpose of recovering their own land. The benefits to be accrued from such imperial benevolence would be many, including the admiration of all, Chinese or foreign, who learned of it.

Some of the interior communications relating to the Uighur crisis

were imperial orders to specific persons. One was a letter of imperial edict (*zhao shu*) addressed to Ormïzt (Li Sizhong) **[Doc. 39]**. An examination of its language reveals that Confucian morality—in particular the virtue of loyalty (*zhong*), to which was often added the notion of honesty or sincerity (*cheng*)—played an important role in such communications. Ormïzt was now a part of the Tang military organization, leader of the "Return to Righteousness" Army which was made up of his own Uighur followers, reinforced by troops from "loose-rein" peoples at the northern frontier. The letter encouraged him to work within that framework to achieve merit and serve the Tang state. It is not surprising that the values most emphasized would be those most closely related to military service.

Later in the crisis, as the court prepared for a military confrontation with Ögä Qaghan, a secret imperial edict (*mi zhao*) to Liu Mian and Zhang Zhongwu **[Doc. 47]** set forth a solid justification for this policy. Just how secret this edict was intended to be may be questioned, for it ends with an exhortation for these men to send an envoy to the Uighurs to inform them of its contents. We therefore should assume that some of the language of the edict was intended to be used in communication with the Uighurs, and so was not so secret after all. In fact, it no doubt was intended to serve as a model to which Liu and Zhang should adhere closely, since the skill of military men lay in strategy and warfare, not in the rhetoric of diplomacy. Much like the imperial proclamation considered above **[Doc. 8]**, this edict began with a consideration of the meritorious efforts of the Uighurs during the An Lushan rebellion, and the subsequent marriages of Tang imperial princesses to Uighur rulers. Now that the Uighurs were in distress, the court had behaved with kindness, sending them grain and envoys, for "Righteousness (*yi*) urges Us to win hearts with kindness (*huairou*), to care deeply and love all equally (*jian'ai*)." We have already seen the importance of the concepts of *yi* and *huairou* in the rhetoric of diplomacy. The concept of *jian'ai*, often translated as "love without distinction," is better known as a Mohist tenet, although it is not out of place in this context. The edict added that the court had acted with trustworthiness (or sincerity, *xin*) and graciousness (*en*), and so had no cause for shame. Once again we can see the importance of images and perceptions. As it prepared to attack and annihilate those Uighurs under Ögä's command, the Tang court wanted to make clear—even in a "secret" decree—that it had behaved in accordance with Confucian moral norms.

The Uighurs, however, had not. In criticizing their behavior, the

edict referred to them as animals: wolves and rats. The first is a well-known symbol of rapaciousness, violence, and greed,[7] while the second reinforces the concept of greed. Later in the same text, the Uighurs are called vipers and scorpions. This language makes clear that these Uighurs (unlike those who had submitted along with Ormïzt) were bestial and dangerous, unable or unwilling to appreciate the moral rectitude of the court or follow its virtuous example. This set the stage for their destruction, essentially providing the justification for a moral or just war. To further justify the court's plan, the edict recalled two incidents from the classic *Zuo zhuan* that illustrated examples of appropriate behavior from the distant past to bolster the Tang moral position. The message was clear, and Liu Mian and Zhang Zhongwu were urged to attack the Uighurs if they did not respond to the court's commands in an appropriate manner.

According to the edict, "Great righteousness lies in pacifying the nation and sheltering the people." We thus can perceive a shift in the Tang approach, and hence in the Tang rhetoric, from **Doc. 8** to **Doc. 47**. Both texts made broad use of Confucian concepts, but while the former extolled the virtue to be found in giving aid to submissive foreigners who had come to the Tang for assistance, the latter criticized the Uighurs for their failure to behave in a submissive manner, and proclaimed the righteousness to be found in defending the Tang state and its people by eliminating the threat of foreign attack. The edict then stated that if the Uighurs did not respond to Tang demands, or if they behaved in a devious manner, then Liu Mian and Zhang Zhongwu should "advance with military majesty" to attack and expel them.

After the Uighurs were defeated at Shahu Mountain on 13 February 843, two additional imperial edicts were written to Zhang Zhongwu in Youzhou **[Doc. 56** and **Doc. 57]**. They had a practical purpose: to encourage the autonomous ruler of Youzhou to use his strength to complete the extermination of the remaining Uighurs. Because of his special position, the edicts contain language of extravagant praise for Zhang. In the first, he was told that his abilities surpassed those of the great Han general Huo Qubing, who led campaigns against the Xiong-nu, and the renowned Tang general Li Jing, who defeated the Eastern Türks and brought them under Tang control. If such praise were not enough, the edict also promised him material assistance in the

[7] Eberhard, *A Dictionary of Chinese Symbols*, 316.

form of provisions for his troops. The second was in much the same vein, and exhorted Zhang to serve as the dynasty's "Great Wall"—an interesting phrase, since at that time such a wall did not exist. Still, it must have remained a powerful symbol of defense for those familiar with the history of building such walls at China's northern frontier in earlier times.

A third text urging Zhang Zhongwu to complete the destruction of the Uighurs is that of an imperial decree appointing Li Hui as a special emissary to the three autonomous provinces of Hebei: Youzhou, Chengde, and Wei-Bo **[Doc. 63]**. The court was at this time still concerned with the campaign against Liu Zhen, and this also is mentioned in the text. Both Chengde and Wei-Bo bordered Liu Zhen's base of Zhaoyi, and did not have a frontier at the northern steppe. Thus, they were to assist in the destruction of Liu Zhen. Zhang Zhongwu, on the other hand, was once again told of the importance of eliminating the Uighur threat, since the Uighurs had apparently continued to harass the northern region.

One other interior communication of a practical nature also was promulgated after the defeat of the Uighurs. This was an imperial decree to disband the Return to Righteousness Army **[Doc. 51]**, and its language is quite straightforward. It simply praised the loyalty and meritorious service of Ormïzt (Li Sizhong) and his followers, and then announced the disbanding of the army. As we have seen, the plan to divide the Uighurs among various different military establishments within the empire ultimately led to tragedy.

A rich mine of rhetoric can be found in the last of the public interior communications under consideration here, which is one of the central documents pertaining to the crisis. This was a lengthy imperial proclamation **[Doc. 48]** which announced the Tang victory over the Uighurs. In its intention to justify the court's action, the text directly blamed the Uighurs for bringing the catastrophe upon themselves. Their failings were many: their tyranny had aroused the hatred of neighboring peoples; their deceitfulness had made a mockery of Tang compassion; their violent behavior had revealed their utter lack of morality. In a phrase that recalls both Li Deyu's first memorial on the subject **[Doc. 3]** as well as the secret edict to Liu Mian and Zhang Zhongwu **[Doc. 47]**, the victory proclamation heaped scorn upon the Uighurs for not behaving like wounded birds, as was fitting to their situation, but like "cornered beasts still fighting." It enumerated their crimes and chastised them for ignoring the marital

relationship between the Uighur and Tang rulers. The proclamation then praised Liu Mian and specifically mentioned the foreign cavalry under his command, thus acknowledging the non-Chinese troops who had been so important to this campaign. After expressing satisfaction concerning the rescue of the Taihe Princess and urging Tang officials to complete the destruction of the Uighurs, the proclamation then announced a matter of great historical significance: the beginning of the persecution of Manichaeism in China, along with the confiscation of property from Uighur individuals as well as Manichaean temples. In its summation, the proclamation considered (once again) the case of Han Xuandi's dealings with the rival Xiong-nu leaders Hu-han-ye and Zhi-zhi. Because the former submitted to the Han emperor, the Son of Heaven "gave him the grace of his protection." Because the latter "turned his back on propriety and righteousness," he was punished. The proclamation offered this judgment: "For these two savages (*lu*), calamity and happiness were entirely of their own choosing." The message to others was clear.

Beasts, "Barbarians," and Rebels

One of the most interesting things about "A Proclamation on the Punishment of the Uighurs" is that much of its rhetoric is similar to that which was typically used in documents concerning the punishment of rebels within China. That is, much of the language could be—and was—used to refer to those within the Tang community who had "turned their backs on propriety and righteousness." Even the use of animal imagery, such as the edict's likening of the Uighurs to wolves, is not unique to Tang rhetoric regarding foreign enemies. Virtually all of the bestial similes used in these texts have parallels in texts that have nothing to do with foreigners. In a consideration of rhetoric, the only elements that really mark these texts as dealing with foreigners are the occasional use of words meaning "foreign" or "foreigner" and the choice of which historical precedent to employ (most often the case of Han Xuandi and the Xiong-nu rivals). Otherwise there is very little difference between these texts and those considering Chinese rebels. They tend to follow the same basic pattern: the enemy is charged with immorality—the renunciation of virtue as well as ingratitude for the emperor's kindness—while his behavior is likened to that of wild beasts which possess no innate sense of morality. The destruction of such persons is then lauded as a righteous act. It is easy to see the

political object intended by the composers of such documents, for by casting the enemy from the realm of morality, he thereby becomes deserving of death. Bringing about his destruction brings an end to the threat of immorality, and thus preserves the moral order.

The rhetoric of immorality and beastly behavior thus permeates Tang texts that concern the punishment of any enemy of the state. One important and prevalent phrase that combines both concepts is that which mentions owlish cries (*xiao yin*) and wolfish glances (*lang gu*), which are mentioned in the decree appointing Li Hui to travel to Youzhou to encourage Zhang Zhongwu to eliminate the remaining Uighurs **[Doc. 63]**. The reference to the owl is important. Not only was the bird regarded as a creature of ill omen, but it was a well-known symbol of ingratitude and unfilial behavior, as it was widely regarded to habitually kill its own mother. This supreme act of immorality made the owl a perfect symbol for those who had turned their back on kindness, particularly when that kindness came from a parental figure. As both father and mother of the nation, the emperor could be regarded as the ultimate focus of proper filial devotion. The owl's shriek thus proclaimed to the world the Uighurs' lack of virtue. As for the wolf's glances, these can suggest nervousness but in this context are intended to suggest rapacious greed. One might note that, like the Türks, the Uighurs honored the wolf, using "wolf's-head" pennons as symbols of military power. The Chinese, however, had no such affection for this particular beast.

Rhetoric similar to that found in the decree appointing Li Hui is to be found in three documents on the Uighur crisis written by the court official Feng Ao.[8] In the days immediately following Shi Xiong's attack on the Uighurs, Feng was charged to compose the emperor's responses to congratulatory memorials presented to the throne by various officials. While those memorials do not survive, we may assume that they were numerous. Feng's replies, written in the emperor's name, concerned the officials' congratulatory remarks regarding the successful attack on the Uighurs,[9] the rescue of the Taihe Princess,[10] and the promulgation of the proclamation on the punishment of the Uighurs.[11] All three are

[8] Biographies of Feng Ao may be found in *JTS* 168: 4392-4393 and *XTS* 177: 5287.
[9] *QTW* 728: 9501.
[10] *QTW* 728: 9501.
[11] *QTW* 728: 9500.

essentially formulaic in their rhetoric. The first accused the Uighurs of forgetting the emperor's kindness, and mentioned their owlish cries and wolfish glances—the immoral conduct which had led to their destruction. The second mentioned constant problems caused by the nomads since the time of the Xiong-nu, and stated that the court had employed "the way of *huairou*" to bring about peace. But (again) the Uighurs had engaged in owlish cries and wolfish glances, and so were destroyed. The third text, written in response to the officials' congratulatory memorials regarding the formal proclamation on the punishment of the Uighurs, used much of the same language. The Uighurs had turned their backs on imperial kindness and their marital relations with the Tang and repeatedly troubled the frontier. In his criticism of their behavior, Feng once again mentioned their "owlish cries," and described them as possessing a "bestial nature."

It has already been mentioned that much of the rhetoric to be found in the formal documents dealing with the Uighur crisis is similar to that found in bureaucratic Tang prose regarding both internal and external enemies. A quick perusal of such texts in *Tang da zhaoling ji* reveals that some of the most commonly used phrases are those regarding owls and wolves, whether the miscreant is foreign or Chinese.[12] In these texts, the reference to the immoral owl is frequently strengthened by the use of the phrase *xiao jing*, as the *jing* was a wild feline creature believed to kill and eat its own father.[13] This phrase thus combines the animal world's two most unfilial, and hence most immoral, denizens. As a term of abuse that was tied to the symbolism of popular folklore as well as Confucian morality, it was a powerful rhetorical device. Its widespread use in the language of public edicts reveals that in the Tang mind, a bestial, immoral nature was not the domain of foreigners alone. Indeed, the symbol was far too rich to be used only on foreigners. It is important to note this, particularly since so much has been written regarding the "bestialization" of foreigners by Chinese writers. Indeed, most of the pejorative terms used to describe the Uighurs are used regularly, in official language, to describe all enemies of the state. Even the terms often translated as "barbarians" do not have the strength of the English word. Such terms as *yi*, *di*, *rong*, *hu*, and *fan* were by this time largely generic words meaning "foreign" or

[12] See, for example, *TDZLJ* 119: 630, 631; 120: 636, 640; 121: 646; 123: 656; 124: 664-668; and 125: 671, 674.

[13] Ren, *Shu yi ji* 1: 7a. See also *ZWDCD* 9073 and 7214-7215.

"foreigner," and were employed indiscriminately in official texts to refer to the Uighurs and other peoples; among generic terms for foreigners, only *man* was generally avoided in the rhetoric of the Uighur crisis, as it had such strong connotations with Southern peoples. The more pejorative *lu*, strictly meaning "a captive" and sometimes translated as "caitiff," was not used only to refer to foreigners, but could mean any enemy of the Tang state.

From this consideration, we can see that the rhetoric of the public and semi-public interior communications regarding the Uighurs conforms to that used by the Tang state in which it faced threats, either internal or external, to its survival. All such enemies had turned their backs on imperial kindness and virtue, and instead had embraced the vicious immorality of the owl and the wolf. And while the Tang state did not directly control all the regions of the world, they were all subject to the same moral norms. Those who violated them would be punished by Heaven and its agents.

Exterior Public Communications

The remaining documents from the Uighur crisis are those in which the court communicated with those beyond its borders. All of these have much in common with the category of interior public communications as described above, for both types of texts use highly formalized (as well as formulaic) rhetoric intended for public consumption. Indeed, one could argue that these two sets of public and semi-public texts are more similar in terms of rhetoric than either set is with the documents classified as internal—that is, essentially private communications between an official and his sovereign. Within the area of external communications, we can note further distinctions. The court's communications with the Uighurs were comprised of two types. The first type included those communications written in the emperor's name. During the initial phase of the crisis, when the Uighurs' situation was unclear and there was no qaghan leading them, the emperor's communications were called letters of imperial edict (*zhao shu*) or letters of imperial decree (*chi shu*), and so were not sovereign-to-sovereign communications. The court's communications with Ögä Qaghan, however, were simply called letters (*shu*), indicating a general acknowledgement of political parity. The second type of communication with the Uighurs consisted of exchanges on a lower level, which Li Deyu wrote in his own name directly to his counterparts

within the Uighur leadership. Finally, Tang communications with the Kirghiz were all imperial letters (*shu*) to the Kirghiz qaghan, written (like those to Ögä Qaghan) in the emperor's name.

Communication with the Uighurs began tentatively, for the court had little information about them. The first letter of imperial decree to the refugees **[Doc. 1]** branded them as "rebellious" but was not extremely harsh in tone. In it, the emperor immediately and forcefully reminded the Uighurs of their special position as the only foreigners linked to the Tang imperial house by direct marriage relations. The Chinese and Uighurs thus were "united in virtue and of one mind." This had resulted in long years of peace between the two peoples. But now the Son of Heaven was disappointed by the sudden and unexpected appearance of the refugees. He branded them as "utterly lacking in legitimacy and honor." Still, the emperor's displeasure quickly was transformed into concern for the stability of the Uighur nation. His interest in the enthronement of a new qaghan who would be friendly toward the Tang government is clearly self-serving, but his kindness in protecting the refugees by ordering the Tang border officials to refrain from harming them is couched in the moral language of compassion. He urged the Uighurs to exhibit "complete sincerity" and to restrain themselves as well. Thus we see the immediate employment of Confucian rhetoric, although at this point it remained light-handed.

In its second letter to the refugees **[Doc. 2]**, the Tang court now had a clearer notion of whom it was dealing with, and had learned much more of the details of their situation. Seeing that these Uighurs were in trouble and seeking help, the emperor (with Li Deyu's assistance) adopted a loftier tone. He reminded them that "We are lord over myriad nations," and with this assertion of universal moral leadership expressed both his responsibility and his eagerness to relieve the Uighurs. The letter contains familiar Confucian language of sincerity and loyalty, couched in the rhetoric of submission. But the imperial will was also made clear: the Uighurs should plan to leave the border and recover their homeland. Finally, we should note that the letter's statement that "we are separated by the Great Wall" should be taken as metaphorical.

A later edict to Ormïzt and his followers **[Doc. 5]** made clear that the refugees had expressed a desire to submit to Tang authority, but raised a new problem. The court had learned that a new Uighur qaghan had been enthroned, thus making Tang acceptance of the refugees' submission much more difficult. These Uighurs at the frontier

were now subjects of the new qaghan, and so should now be attached to him rather than to the Tang emperor. The emperor claimed that it would be improper to receive Ormïzt and the others, as such an act would be injurious to the new qaghan. The refugees were, after all, his people. For the Tang emperor to receive them would suggest that the new qaghan was not legitimate. Protocol demanded that the court wait to hear from the qaghan and then determine a proper course of action. Indeed, the court indicated that it could no longer communicate with the refugees until the qaghan had sent an envoy and received imperial appointment.

The edict provided a quote from the Confucian sage Mencius to make it clear that righteousness lay in supporting one's sovereign. This brings us to an important point. While it is clear that the Tang Son of Heaven could (and did) claim universal moral authority over all people, his claim to universal political authority was limited in practical terms. The emperor ruled his own state directly (although, as we have seen, he had no real authority in the autonomous provinces of Youzhou, Chengde, and Wei-Bo), and exercised a kind of indirect control over relatively weak, adjacent "loose-rein" peoples. But the Uighurs had belonged to a different category entirely, over whom imperial influence was only tangentially political. While the Tang court had continued to provide formal imperial appointments for the Uighur rulers, it could not pretend to exercise real political control over them.[14] By encouraging Ormïzt and the others to support the new qaghan, and by expressing its concern for proper protocol in its communications with the Uighurs, the Tang emperor recognized this political division of states that were essentially equal, at least in political (if not moral) terms. This also supported the Tang goal to get the Uighurs to leave the frontier and return northward to recover their homeland.

The court's first communication with Ögä Qaghan **[Doc. 9]** does begin with the word *chi* ("an imperial order"), but then immediately refers to the kind of political division mentioned above, as can be seen from its first sentences:

[14] This is what Martynov has described as "ritual vassalage," in which a strong foreign ruler's apparent subordination (through his envoys to the Tang court) was essentially limited to formalized encounters; see Perelomov and Martynov, *Imperial China*, 131.

> Our nation holds sway over myriad lands. Its [northern] boundary has [always] been arranged south of the Yin Mountains. The former qaghans always led their own tribes to establish their standards north of the great desert. Each [of our nations] has been content in [our respective] territories for more than 200 years. This is Heaven's separation of "inner" from "outer"; it may not be transgressed.

In this can be seen the ancient Chinese concept of Heaven's natural divisions of the earth—an idea which predated the Tang dynasty. While the emperor may have enjoyed a position of moral leadership throughout the world, his political control was limited by natural boundaries imposed by Heaven. This argument of course conveniently forgets the years of early Tang expansionism and instead recognizes late Tang realities. In this letter to the new qaghan, the emperor was careful to mention the Uighurs' beneficent services to China during the An Lushan rebellion, which had led to the marriage alliances between them. The letter pointedly referred to Confucian values of sincerity and kindness/grace. It also relied upon historical precedent to deny the qaghan his request to "borrow" a northern city in which to live temporarily. Such a thing had never been done. "We must adhere to the precedents set by previous generations and the laws of Our ancestors."

A subsequent communication with the Uighurs under Ögä Qaghan **[Doc. 10]** returned to many of the same themes, offering them assistance of various types and urging them to return to their homeland as soon as possible. It also repeated the court's refusal to loan the qaghan a northern city, and elaborated further on the concept of natural geographical (and hence political) divisions.

> Heaven and Earth have divided north and south by deserts, mountains, and rivers. We consider that since ancient times foreigners and Chinese have fully recognized this.... Moreover, foreigners and Chinese [occupy] different lands. What could they have in common? Furthermore, Our empire is that of Gaozu and Taizong.... How could We dare to disregard the natural boundaries [established by] Heaven and Earth, or to defy the laws of Our ancestors within China?

The argument is well constructed and irrefutable. Since Heaven and Earth had divided "inner" from "outer," and since earlier Tang emperors had never granted land to a foreign ruler in which to live, the qaghan's request for a city could not be approved. This argument contains a clear moral quality, for the letter implied that to go against the principles of Heaven and Earth, as well as to go against the traditions of earlier emperors, would be morally wrong. The letter stated,

"We dare not act on Our own authority." That is, the imperatives of Heaven, Earth, and the ancestors were higher than the needs or desires of the reigning sovereign. To transgress their higher authority would be to transgress the moral order.

The emperor's next letter to the qaghan **[Doc. 16]** contained more refusals and is important in its change regarding the relationship between Ögä and Ormïzt. By this time the court, which now clearly understood the hostility between the two as well as their different objectives, had decided to give refuge to Ormïzt—an act which was certain to anger the qaghan. The emperor's letter argued that since Ormïzt had long been separated from the qaghan and was in distress, it was appropriate for the court to receive him, particularly since he had not shown any intention of seeking to join forces with the Tang court to harm the qaghan. Of course, as we have seen, Ormïzt did indeed join in the Tang campaign against Ögä. But in this letter, the emperor wished to suggest that Ormïzt's submission would not lead to trouble for the qaghan. He also linked the court's acceptance of Ormïzt to the practice of virtue of winning others through kindness (*huairou*), which was always part of the emperor's practice of morality. To return the prince to the qaghan's authority would be a deviation from that virtue. Historical precedents from the Han era and the early Tang were also brought forth to legitimate the court's actions in this regard.

This letter's tone is generally more censorious than those which preceded it. It blamed the Uighur qaghans for their state's downfall in Confucian terms, arguing that they had "lost the way of [proper] governance and lacked the humaneness (*ren*) of love without distinction (*jian'ai*)." The concept of love without distinction is, as we have seen, typically associated with the philosophical school of Mozi, who argued that the graded love of the Confucians was harmful to society. In this context, however, the phrase refers to a sovereign's obligation to love all his subjects equally, rather than favoring some groups and oppressing others. It is clear from this that the Tang court was applying Confucian concepts of rulership to the Uighur qaghans. If their state had been lost, it was because of a lack of morality at the center. Only a return to morality and the exercise of humane love (*ren'ai*) would bring an end to chaos.

The remaining communications within this category include the court's final letter to the qaghan **[Doc. 27]** and a letter to the Taihe Princess sent at the same time **[Doc. 28]**. The rhetoric of the first

is familiar. China had been benevolent and generous to the Uighurs, and in return the Uighurs had behaved with a complete lack of morality. The emperor accused the qaghan of planning raids on the Tang frontier: "Although you say you follow the water and grass, your movements all draw you near to our cities and palisades." But he held out hope for an amicable solution. Dedicated to the principle of *huairou*, the emperor encouraged the qaghan to embrace the path of virtue. The letter to the princess struck a different tone, but contained the same message. In it, the emperor expressed his sympathy for his aunt's suffering and deprivations. After this polite show of familial concern, he encouraged her to serve as a mirror to which the Uighurs could look in order to correct their behavior, just as one uses a mirror to correct one's appearance. She was to command them to act with virtue. If they chose to ignore her commands, then the marital relationship between the Tang and Uighur ruling houses would be at an end.

In addition to the imperial letters to the Uighurs, all written in the emperor's name by Li Deyu, there are also three letters (*shu*) written on the minister-to-minister level. These were composed by Li Deyu and sent to the Uighur minister known as the *il-ögäsi*. Unlike imperial letters, these were not "bestowed" (*ci*). The first **[Doc. 21]** was written in response to a message that the Uighur minister had sent to the court. The minister was concerned about several matters: the payment of silk for Uighur horses, the submission of Ormïzt, and the refugees' situation in general. Although its language is less lofty than that employed in imperial letters, many of the same ideas can be seen. The rhetoric regarding Ormïzt is particularly revealing, reinforcing what we have already noted. It contains clear universalist claims:

> Our nation exercises authority over the four barbarians (*yi*); they are all like [the emperor's] children. If they are obedient to the nation [i.e., China], we should completely comfort and cherish them. As with the expanses of Heaven and Earth, there are none who are not covered and supported [by the emperor's grace]. As with the vastness of the rivers and seas, there are none who are not contained [within the emperor's embrace].

Again, "authority" did not mean direct political control. At the letter's end, Li Deyu also stated the need for the Uighurs to act with the virtues of humaneness and righteousness in order to avoid calamity.

Li Deyu's second letter to the *il-ögäsi* **[Doc. 30]** is an important example of the chief minister's ability to use Confucian principles as well as historical precedents in order to support his position. It also

made a case for expanding the emperor's authority over the Uighurs to the political realm. Li Deyu reminded the Uighur minister that, during the era between the two Türk empires (i.e., 630-682), the Uighurs had submitted, at least symbolically, to the political authority of Tang Taizong. It was, after all, only the Tang defeat of the Türks that had allowed the Uighurs a degree of political independence. Although they had lost that independence with the restoration of Türk power in 682, Li Deyu's assertion was that Taizong's establishment of an administrative organization for the Uighurs was the kernel from which the great Uighur empire had grown after the fall of the Türks. Now that the Uighurs were weakened and without a state, it was fitting for them to submit to China, just as Hu-han-ye had submitted to Han Xuandi. Indeed, Li argued, the Uighurs had been called vassals (*chen*) of the Tang empire for generations. This went well beyond what the imperial letters to the qaghan had claimed, and promoted the notion of real Tang political authority over the Uighurs. As noted earlier, this letter was the first communication between the Tang court and the Uighurs that suggested that the latter should submit to China rather than attempt to return northward. It is likely that the language of Uighur vassalage was used to encourage that submission, since it was now clear to the Tang leadership that the Uighurs were neither willing nor able to recover their homeland—although they were still encouraged to do so.

The letter's rhetoric achieves a level of drama not typically seen in Li Deyu's writings on the Uighur crisis. The chief minister accused the Uighurs of acting as they had when their empire was flourishing. They were "proud and tyrannical as before," causing all those who knew of their outrageous behavior to "gasp in alarm." Instead of wreaking vengeance on the Kirghiz as they should have done, the Uighurs threatened China, which had only treated them with benevolence. In this way the Uighurs had turned their backs on humaneness and righteousness. Li Deyu reminded the *il-ögäsi* of the fate of the Xiong-nu leader Zhi-zhi, who also had abandoned the path of virtue, pointedly asking, "Can the warnings of past events be of no concern to you?" The letter's language was indeed harsh, claiming that the Tang state had no fear of Uighur threats. Using quotations from the classic *Shi jing* (*Book of Poetry*), it taunted them with their willingness to inflict harm on the weak (the "loose-rein" peoples at the Tang frontier) and their fear of facing the strong (the Kirghiz). It reminded them that they had abandoned their homeland, so that now "the horizon separates you

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from the tombs of previous qaghans." As usual, blame for the Uighurs' predicament was placed squarely at their own feet. The letter accused them of wanting "to break off the amity of successive generations and give rise to calamity [between] our two nations." Still, it held out hope, informing the Uighur minister that it was not too late for him (and the Uighurs) to rectify their behavior.

The Tang court's last known communication with the Uighurs was the third of the minister-to-minister letters written by Li Deyu **[Doc. 43]**. At the time it was written, the first Kirghiz envoy had already reached China, and the information he brought was used to intimidate the Uighurs, who were warned that the Kirghiz had sent out an enormous army to find the Taihe Princess. Should that army arrive suddenly at the frontier, the argument ran, it would prove difficult for the Tang state to help the Uighurs. Li Deyu thus urged the Uighurs to send the princess to China "in order to avoid blame" and then to hide themselves from Kirghiz wrath in the nearby mountains and valleys. As Heaven had aided the Kirghiz in their rise to power, they now were seeking to extend their influence in many directions. The warning to the Uighurs was made clear: "After one has been abandoned by Heaven, it is difficult to prosper again." Li Deyu closed his letter with a suggestion that the only real solution for the Uighurs was to submit to China, a suggestion they did not heed.

The final category of exterior communication is comprised of the four letters which Li Deyu wrote in the emperor's name to the Kirghiz qaghan. All four employ rhetoric that was characteristic of the Tang court's most solicitous forms of international correspondence—a far more courteous language than was used in letters to the Uighurs after the collapse of their state.[15] All four of these letters praised the Kirghiz ruler's talents and abilities and urged him in the strongest terms to eradicate the remaining Uighurs so as to eliminate the possibility for future harm. There are, however, some points that deserve to be considered in some detail.

The first letter **[Doc. 52]** set the stage for communications between the two states. It treated the Kirghiz qaghan as an independent sovereign, but at the same time reminded him of the fact that Tang

[15] See Kaneko, "T'ang International Relations and Diplomatic Correspondence," especially 85-95. Kaneko described this Tang rhetoric as denoting a familial relationship (the relationship of "kinsmen") between the Tang emperor and the Kirghiz qaghan.

Taizong had been acknowledged as "Heavenly Qaghan" by the northern peoples, and that Kirghiz leaders had come to Taizong's court and accepted titles from him, after which the Kirghiz had sent tribute to the Tang court. This shows a clear jockeying for position, in which the emperor wanted to be assured of his own superiority, even if largely symbolic. The letter stated, "Thus, the Qaghan's ancestors already received Our nation's grace (*en*) and virtue (*de*)," suggesting that, as with the Uighurs, the Chinese wished the Kirghiz to understand that the origin of their state lay in the achievements (and virtue) of Tang Taizong.

The Uighurs, however, had distanced themselves from humaneness and righteousness. Having lost their nation, they had come to the Tang border not in "humble sincerity," but with "wolfish intentions." Although the court had aided them, it was finally forced to attack them. According to the letter, Uighur prisoners of war would be executed in the capital city as a show of gratitude to the Kirghiz ruler. Now that the Tang army had been victorious, only a small number of Uighurs remained at large. It was these that the emperor's letter encouraged the Kirghiz to seek out and exterminate.

It has already been noted that this letter gave formal Tang acceptance to the notion of a blood relationship between the Tang and Kirghiz rulers through the Han generals Li Guang and Li Ling, and that it offered the Kirghiz ruler a document of appointment. The letter contains no overt language of vassalage or submission, although it did place the Tang state in a superior position through its mention of Tang-Kirghiz relations during the reign of Taizong. A document of appointment was offered since the rulers of "outlying peoples" had always required such documents in order to effectively control their state. In the rhetoric of this letter we can see suggestions of Tang political paternalism that did not amount to direct political control. The Chinese superior position was made evident through references to past acts that clearly placed the Kirghiz in a subordinate position, and yet the Tang emperor could not truly command the Kirghiz qaghan to carry out his will. Again, it seems that the Chinese hoped to use a position of moral authority in order to exercise some degree of political influence.

In the second letter **[Doc. 55]**, which repeated the information that Tang forces had attacked and defeated the Uighurs, the emperor once again offered praise to the Kirghiz qaghan, and also reminded him of the early relationship between the Kirghiz and Taizong. The emperor noted the qaghan's "great loyalty" and acknowledged

receipt of the horses that the qaghan had sent as "tribute." In this letter, the qaghan was lauded in particularly meaningful Confucian rhetoric, including familiar terms such as propriety, righteousness, and benevolence/humaneness. Again, there was no overt mention of vassalage or submission, although the use of the term "tribute" suggests subordination.[16] As before, the Tang court's goal was to encourage the Kirghiz to attack and destroy the remaining Uighurs.

The third and fourth letters **[Doc. 61, Doc. 67]** present us with little that is new from the perspective of rhetoric. Full of praise for the Kirghiz ruler, they urged him in very strong language to eliminate the surviving Uighurs before they could cause further problems for the two states. The third letter offered a litany of historical examples to explain the wisdom of this policy. It is also interesting in that it offered a justification for not following the Kirghiz wishes in regard to the title to be given to the qaghan in his formal appointment (see chapter 5). The third letter also mentioned the Tang desire to conclude an alliance, and was careful to indicate that China would not use its contacts with the Kirghiz in an effort to try to control them politically. Again we can see a relationship that is essentially equal in political terms.

The formulaic aspects of the four letters to the Kirghiz are in keeping with Tang diplomatic practice. The repetitiveness of the letters is largely due to two factors: that communications between the two states were quite difficult, and that the Kirghiz had not yet complied with the Tang desire for them to do away with the last Uighurs still in the territory between their two states. Indeed, as we have seen, the Kirghiz did not fulfill the Tang wish until 848, several years after Wuzong's death and Li Deyu's removal from high office.

The Xiong-nu *Topos*[17]

In the rhetoric of the Uighur crisis, the historical precedent that was most cited was that of Han Xuandi and the rival *shan-yu*s Hu-han-ye

[16] This appears to be another aspect of the approach termed "ritual vassalage"; see n. 14 above.

[17] Portions of this section were originally published in Drompp, "The Hsiung-nu *Topos* in the T'ang Response to the Collapse of the Uighur Steppe Empire." As the editing of that article had introduced numerous errors (later rectified in a list of *errata* and *corrigenda*, published in *Central and Inner Asian Studies* 4 [1990]: 82), and as I had discovered some of my own as well, it seemed that a reconsideration of the topic would not be inappropriate here.

and Zhi-zhi. It was brought up again and again in various contexts, employed and manipulated to justify and add strength to the Tang court's position. As such, we find it most often in public forms of communication. Its appositeness to the situation was clear. Just as Han Xuandi encountered the Xiong-nu in turmoil, so did Tang Wuzong encounter the Uighurs. Just as the Xiong-nu leader Hu-han-ye manifested virtue by seeking the aid of the Son of Heaven and accepting (at least symbolically) his overlordship, so did the Uighur prince Ormïzt. And just as Zhi-zhi acted without morality and so was punished with death, so did Ögä Qaghan. The analogy was, as we have seen, proof of the transformative power of *huairou*. Hu-han-ye and Zhi-zhi thus were the central symbols within a cautionary tale which foreigners ignored at their peril. It should also be noted that Li Deyu was known to have been particularly well-versed in the *Han shu* and the *Zuo zhuan*, which he had studied assiduously in his youth.[18] This makes it all the less surprising that most of the historical precedents cited in Li Deyu's papers on the Uighur crisis are taken from these two texts.

The first Tang reference to this theme was oblique. In the court's second communication with the first group of Uighurs to arrive at the border **[Doc. 2]**, Li Deyu wrote that Ormïzt and his followers had offered submission at the Wuyuan Pass. Ormïzt's submission was actually offered at Tiande, however. While Tiande was in the same general region, Li Deyu's reference to the Wuyuan Pass was an allusion to the submission of Hu-han-ye in the winter of 52/51 B.C.E.[19] This was made clear by his very next piece of writing on the subject—a memorial requesting humane treatment for the Uighur refugees **[Doc. 3]**. In this memorial, the account of Han Xuandi and Hu-han-ye was directly addressed for the first time in regard to the border situation. Li Deyu pointed out that while many Han officials had wanted to attack the Xiong-nu while they were in turmoil, Xiao Wangzhi had convinced the emperor to treat them kindly. This had resulted in 60 years of peace at the border. For the chief minister, this was a good parallel to what was happening at the frontier. The Tang border official Tian Mou had requested permission to allow the various "loose-rein" peoples at the northern frontier to attack the Uighurs. Many at court supported this course of action, but Li Deyu

[18] *JTS* 174: 4509.

[19] See *HS* 94b: 3798 as well as *ZZTJ* 27: 885. On the location of the Wuyuan Pass north of the Ordos region, see Herrmann, *An Historical Atlas of China*, 10-11.

used the example of Xiao Wangzhi and Han Xuandi to encourage the emperor to reject their advice and instead follow a policy of kindness. As we have seen, he was successful. Li's memorial makes it clear that practical considerations accompanied his moral concerns, but it is telling that in his memorial the only historical precedent which he cited was that of Han Xuandi and the Xiong-nu. He clearly believed that this would help him to win his case with the emperor, who could be persuaded that by the exercise of benevolent restraint he would be emulating one of the great sovereigns of the past.

In his next memorial on the subject **[Doc. 4]**, the chief minister reinforced the effectiveness of his praise of Han Xuandi's "generous and soothing" policy toward Hu-han-ye by contrasting it with criticism for the aggressive policies of Han Wudi. Li Deyu was not the first to make such judgments; similar opinions can be found as early as the Han dynasty itself.[20] By the time that Li wrote his memorial, the debate over how best to handle the danger of the northern nomads had been going on for centuries. One of the most famous articulations of the debate between handling the nomads through peaceful means or warfare is to be found in the *Discourses on Salt and Iron* (*Yan tie lun*), written during the reign of Han Xuandi himself.[21] Although admiration for Han Xuandi's policies and censure for the expansionist Han Wudi might have been out of place in the early Tang, which was a powerful and expansionist state, they accorded well with the more modest political realities of Tang China in the mid-ninth century.

Li Deyu's use of Han Xuandi as a model for the treatment of Ormïzt was complicated by the arrival of Ögä Qaghan at the border. We have already noted how this presented political and diplomatic difficulties for the Tang court. But it should also be noted that the qaghan's presence created rhetorical difficulties as well. In the earliest use of the Xiong-nu *topos*, Ormïzt was, by implication, cast in the role of Hu-han-ye, just as Li Deyu played the role of Xiao Wangzhi and Wuzong that of Han Xuandi. With the arrival of the self-proclaimed qaghan, whose status corresponded more closely to that of the *shan-yu* Hu-han-ye, there was a danger of rhetorical confusion. In its communications with the new group of Uighurs, the court immediately brought forth

[20] See, for example, Dubs, *History of the Former Han Dynasty*, vol. 2: 8-13, 16-19, and 187-196, as well as Di Cosmo, *Ancient China and Its Enemies*, 286-290.

[21] For a summary, see Loewe, *Crisis and Conflict in Han China*, 96-98 and 107-108.

the example of Han Xuandi and the Xiong-nu; this can be seen in the imperial proclamation appointing Wang Hui as a commissioner to pacify the Uighurs **[Doc. 8]** as well as the court's first letter to the qaghan **[Doc. 9]**. The latter made explicit reference to Han Xuandi's policies to deny Ögä's request for a Tang border town.

In the writing of a subsequent letter to the qaghan **[Doc. 16]**, Li Deyu found a way in which to accommodate both Ormïzt and Ögä within the precedent established by Han Xuandi. In order to justify the Tang court's decision to grant refuge to Ormïzt, the chief minister dug a bit deeper into the story:

> Moreover, from former generations on down, all [affairs] have had precedents. During the Han dynasty, when the *shan-yu* Hu-han-ye[22] offered submission at the border, his subordinate grand generals Wu-li-qu and Wu-li-wen-dun came to submit at the same time, and Han Xuandi honored them as marquises.[23]

The role of Hu-han-ye thus could still be left to Ögä, as the court now likened Ormïzt to Hu-han-ye's subordinates. This rhetorical strategy was intended not only to lend legitimacy to the court's actions but also to avoid angering the qaghan, who would not have wanted to see his enemy (and, in his eyes, his own rebellious subject) likened to a sovereign ruler. It had the added benefit of clarifying the parallelism between the Tang present and the Han past.

When Ormïzt and his followers made their official submission at Tiande, the order that was promulgated on 2 June 842 to grant him various official titles continued the practice of linking the Uighur prince to the subordinates of Hu-han-ye rather than to the *shan-yu* himself. In this document, Li Deyu wrote of a Xiong-nu official, whose title was *yi-zhi-zi*,[24] who had counseled Hu-han-ye to submit to the Han.[25] But when Ormïzt arrived in Chang'an some weeks later, Li Deyu returned

[22] Here mistakenly written Hu-yan-ye.

[23] Wu-li-qu was Grand General of the Left under Hu-han-ye. His father Wu-li-wen-dun held the rank of *hu-shu-lei*, a Xiong-nu title of uncertain meaning. According to *HS* 94b: 3976, upon seeing the disorder into which the Xiong-nu realm had fallen, both men led their hordes of "several 10,000" persons southward to submit to the Han. Wu-li-qu was granted the title of Marquis of Xincheng while his father was named Marquis of Yiyang. For a similar account, see *ZZTJ* 27: 871.

[24] In this particular document, the Xiong-nu official's title is given as *zhi-zi*, but in a later letter to the Uighurs **[Doc. 30]** his title is given as *yi-zhi-zi*. In some sources his title is given as (*zuo*) *yi-zhi-zi* (*wang*); see *HS* 64b: 3797 and *ZZTJ* 27: 882.

[25] *HCYPJ* 8: 59, *LWRWJ* 8: 1b-2a, and *QTW* 697: 9067.

to the practice of comparing the prince to Hu-han-ye. This was certainly in order to elevate the significance of Ormïzt's submission for Chinese observers. The ceremonies surrounding Ormïzt's visit to the Tang capital included the execution of his portrait wearing Chinese clothing—an act of propaganda that could almost be seen as a type of "pictorial rhetoric" to reaffirm visually what had already been put into words. In a memorial announcing the completion of the official portrait of Ormïzt,[26] Li Deyu referred not only to Han Xuandi and Hu-han-ye, but also to the Han emperor Guangwudi and the submission of the Xiong-nu *shan-yu* Bi (d. 56 C.E.) in 50 C.E.[27] Bi, who was the grandson of Hu-han-ye, had also been involved in a succession dispute within the Xiong-nu realm, and subsequently submitted to the Han at the Wuyuan Pass in imitation of his grandfather's act a century earlier.[28] Li Deyu may have included this reference to Han Guangwudi and Bi in order to refer to an act of submission that, while less famous than that of Hu-han-ye, was ultimately more profound. At the urging of Xiao Wangzhi, Han Xuandi had treated Hu-han-ye as a guest of state, whereas Bi's performance of the kowtow to receive the edict of Guangwudi represented a deeper form of obeisance to the Chinese Son of Heaven as well as a deeper desperation in the heart of the Xiong-nu leader.

Ormïzt's visit to Chang'an was also celebrated by the writing of an account of 30 famous foreign leaders who had submitted to China, from the Qin dynasty to the Tang. As we have noted, the work is no longer extant, but Li Deyu's preface has survived.[29] This work is lavish in its praise for the emperor Wuzong, which includes parallels to both Han Xuandi and Han Guangwudi. All three were depicted as virtuous monarchs whose moral authority, rather than military

[26] *HCYPJ* 19: 159, *LWRWJ* 19: 1b-2a, and *QTW* 704: 9155.

[27] Bi is not mentioned by name, but the reference to his submission is clear.

[28] The civil war and Bi's submission to Han authority resulted in a major split within the Xiong-nu realm, now divided into northern and southern parts. The southern, which maintained allegiance to Bi, was subordinate to China, as was made clear by the fact that Bi kowtowed to receive the Han emperor's edict. Although Bi's regnal title was Xi-luo-shi-zhu-di *Shan-yu*, the parallels with his grandfather were so obvious that he was sometimes called Hu-han-ye *Shan-yu*. See *HHS* 89: 2939 and 2942-2943 as well as *ZZTJ* 44: 1407 and 1408. On the split within the Xiong-nu confederation which led to rival (northern and southern) Xiong-nu states, see de Crespigny, *Northern Frontier*, 227-242 and 251.

[29] The preface may be found in *HCYPJ* 2: 10-11, *LWRWJ* 2: 6a-8a, and *QTW* 707: 9196-9197.

might, had caused foreign leaders to submit to them. The Xiong-nu *topos* thus served not only to provide legitimacy for the Tang court's actions, but also to glorify the reigning emperor.

At the frontier, however, matters were far from settled, and the rhetoric of the crisis took on an ominous cast in a letter to Ögä Qaghan's minister, the *il-ögäsi* **[Doc. 30]**. In this letter, Li Deyu again recounted the story of Hu-han-ye's submission. Further on, however, he made the first mention of Hu-han-ye's rival Zhi-zhi, who had met defeat and death at the hands of a Chinese general after fleeing from his homeland.

> In the previous [Han] dynasty, the *shan-yu* Zhi-zhi did not serve the great Han, and [instead] depended on the Kirghiz [Jian-kun]. Subsequently, he entrusted [himself] to [the king of] Kang-ju farther away. He himself completed his [own] destruction. Can the warnings of past events be of no concern to you?

The scope of the Xiong-nu *topos* thus was expanded to include the cautionary tale of Zhi-zhi. And since the letter was addressed to one of the qaghan's officials, it also mentioned Hu-han-ye's official, the *yi-zhi-zi*, who had wisely encouraged the *shan-yu*'s submission. The *il-ögäsi* was urged to emulate the *yi-zhi-zi*—his counterpart in these analogous situations.

As the qaghan did not submit and conditions did not improve at the frontier, it finally became clear to Li Deyu that force would be necessary to expel these Uighurs from the border region. This meant, of course, a shift in rhetoric. No longer could the court simply praise the pacific policies of Han Xuandi and Han Guangwudi. A signal of the rhetorical shift necessary to prepare for war can be seen in the imperial proclamation appointing Liu Mian as Uighur pacification commissioner.[30] Written just a few weeks after Li Deyu's letter to the *il-ögäsi*, this proclamation continued to mention Hu-han-ye and extol the wisdom of Han Guangwudi. It then stated, however, that the Uighurs must submit to Tang authority or be forcibly expelled. In a different reference to the Xiong-nu, the proclamation mentioned the putting to flight of the "six-mules" (*liu luo*), which apparently was a term for a cart or chariot which served as the *shan-yu*'s conveyance in battle.[31] This added to the martial tone of the modified rhetoric regarding the Uighurs.

[30] *HCYPJ* 3: 18, *LWRWJ* 3: 7b-8b, and *QTW* 698: 9075-9076.

[31] On *liu luo*, see for example *SJ* 111: 2935. Burton Watson rendered this phrase

After the defeat of Ögä and his followers, the Tang court issued an imperial proclamation on the punishment of the Uighurs **[Doc. 48]**. This highly formal document invoked the tale of Hu-han-ye and Zhi-zhi in its final summation. Using language that had become common for all enemies of the Chinese state, the proclamation accused Zhi-zhi (and hence Ögä) of turning his back on propriety and righteousness. Noting that these two men had been the authors of their own fates, the proclamation urged all foreign peoples to note the lessons of the past, using the examples placed before them as a mirror with which to regulate their own behavior.

Even after the Uighurs had been defeated, Li Deyu made effective use of the Xiong-nu *topos*. In a letter to the Kirghiz qaghan **[Doc. 61]**, the chief minister sought to encourage the qaghan to adopt a friendly and submissive attitude toward China. In this effort, Li Deyu brought forth a number of historical precedents, including the one with which we have become so familiar. The letter praised Han Xuandi, "who drew [to his court all peoples] without distinction," and mentioned the virtuous Xiong-nu rulers Hu-han-ye and Bi as instructive models of appropriate moral behavior. It also added a new reference to the Xiong-nu, mentioning a Xiong-nu oath-taking custom: "What need is there to make a pact with the *jing-lu* sword or lift up the stirred wine?" In this ritual, the blood of a slain white horse was added to wine, and the two liquids stirred together by the precious *jing-lu*. The oath-takers then drank the mixture.[32] Li Deyu's purpose in posing this question is not entirely clear, but it may be that the Tang court wanted to avoid concluding a formalized treaty with the Kirghiz that would assert or even suggest equality between the Kirghiz and Tang rulers. It is also unclear how well the Kirghiz understood the various historical allusions in the chief minister's letter. As we have seen, however, the Kirghiz did know something of Chinese history and its manipulation, since their ruler's claim to descent from the Han general Li Ling made the Kirghiz qaghan a blood relative of the Tang imperial house. The Chinese were not the only people to make political use of the past.

Throughout the Uighur crisis, the Xiong-nu parallel had served the Tang court well. On repeated occasions circumstances had provided

as "a team of six mules"; see Watson, *Records of the Grand Historian of China*, vol. 2, 207.

[32] See Kao, "The Ching Lu Shen Shrines of Han Sword Worship in Hsiung Nu Religion," 223.

virtually impeccable counterparts for Hu-han-ye and Zhi-zhi in the persons of Ormïzt and Ögä. Minor flaws in the analogy were easily overlooked, and the parallels themselves could be manipulated whenever necessary. Not much manipulation was required, however, as the Xiong-nu *topos* allowed China to show benevolence toward those whose submission was sincere, and to use violence against those who abandoned the path of morality. It thus was a highly effective and flexible rhetorical device. Wuzong could rest secure in the knowledge that throughout the handling of this crisis he had followed a respected precedent from the Han era. Li Deyu could be satisfied that he had worked mightily to promote peace through the submission of the Uighurs, and that warfare had been only a last resort. The Tang actions therefore were historically legitimate, moral, and justified. Moreover, the practice of adhering to appropriate historical precedents in the formulation of policy was affirmed.

The power of the Xiong-nu precedent was important in the formulation of policy within Wuzong's government. Its influence goes beyond that, however, as it can be found in other writings from the period. One example, still from Li Deyu's brush, reveals how such stylized rhetoric could prove misleading. In his preface and formal eulogy for a stele inscription granted to Zhang Zhongwu to commemorate his role in the resolution of the Uighur crisis,[33] the Xiong-nu theme was liberally mentioned. As suits such a laudatory monument, the text of both the eulogy and its preface employed ornate language that was rich with historical allusions. For example, the inscription listed the *jing-lu* sword as one of the spoils of the recent struggle with Ögä Qaghan. While not literally true, such a reference served to strengthen the image of the Tang military's utter defeat of the Uighurs. Since the spirit of the inscription is martial, extolling Zhang Zhongwu's military prowess and trumpeting the defeat of the Uighurs, it is not surprising that Hu-han-ye was mentioned only briefly. But Zhi-zhi did appear in the formal eulogy as a reference to Ögä. The much longer preface discussed the Uighur qaghan's defeat as follows:

> Now, Ögä has cut himself off from imperial favor and has not dared to approach the border [again]. Planning to settle with the Ding-ling, he depends on Kang-ju for his life. He has completely shifted the remnants of his tribe, who have humbled themselves before the Black

[33] The text of the inscription may be found in *HCTJ* 2: 7-10, *LWRWJ* 2: 1a-6a, and *QTW* 711: 9247-9249.

> Carts. Entrusting themselves to a distant [land], they wander about as vagabonds, starving and freezing.

Of these statements, most reflect actual events. The sentence that mentions the Ding-ling and Kang-ju would have been understood by contemporaries not as literal truth, but as allusions to the past—albeit slightly confused, as the text should refer to the Jian-kun (i.e., the Kirghiz) rather than to the Ding-ling.[34] Despite this, it is clear that the passage in question was intended to compare Ögä to Zhi-zhi.

To readers in later times, however, the reference apparently was not so clear. Zhang Zhongwu's biographies in both *Jiu Tang shu* and *Xin Tang shu* state that Ögä Qaghan actually went to Kang-ju after his defeat, while the remainder of his tribe entrusted themselves to the Black Carts.[35] It seems certain that the biographers used the text of Li Deyu's inscription in the writing of Zhang's biographies. Li's allusion to the fate of Zhi-zhi, in a florid text full of such rhetorical devices, was taken as literal truth concerning the fate of Ögä Qaghan. This error, pointed out at least as early as the eleventh century by Sima Guang,[36] nevertheless remains in the standard historical texts to waylay the unsuspecting.

Another example of the use of the Xiong-nu *topos* is Liu Mian's funerary inscription. Although the stele is badly damaged, it is clear that the preface contains frequent mention of the Uighurs by name. The short formal eulogy which follows, however, is written in much more stylized language, and refers to the Xiong-nu rather than the Uighurs:

> The Xiong-nu rushed forth and continuously defied the authority [of the emperor]. [Even] in their decline they were not docile, and styled themselves strongmen of the north.[37]

In this passage, "Xiong-nu" clearly means "Uighurs"; the former term is used in place of the latter as a stylistic device. The composer of the inscription's text understood the facts of the matter, as revealed by the detailed recounting of events concerning the Uighurs in the preface. Despite the use of the ethnonym "Xiong-nu" in the formal eulogy, in this case the inscription's stylistic references to the Xiong-nu did

[34] The Jian-kun were said to be of Ding-ling origin; see *XTS* 217b: 6146-6147.
[35] *JTS* 180: 4678 and *XTS* 212: 5981.
[36] *ZZTJKY* 247: 7973.
[37] Lu, *Ba qiong shi jinshi buzheng*, 74: 19a.

not serve to distort the historical record. As for the inscription itself, a careful reader would quickly see that "Xiong-nu" meant "Uighur" in this context.

It is worth noting that in both the inscription praising Zhang Zhongwu and Liu Mian's funerary inscription, the Uighurs are mentioned by their proper name in the prefaces, but never in the formal eulogies. In Liu Mian's eulogy, they are referred to as "Xiong-nu," while in the eulogy praising Zhang Zhongwu they are called "foreigners" (*hu*) or "savages" (*lu*). In this same eulogy, the Kirghiz also are not called by any of their common ethnonyms from the Tang period, but are designated as "northern foreigners" (*bei yi*). In Tang stelae, the prefaces are typically longer and less stylized than the formal eulogies which follow them, since the prefaces usually explain the reasons why a person had been honored with an inscription. Nevertheless, it was a rhetorical flourish in the preface to Zhang Zhongwu's inscription that allowed an error to creep into the historical record. It may be that the authors of Zhang's biographies believed that they could trust the reference to Kang-ju since it appeared in the inscription's preface rather than in the more formal eulogy.

Liu Mian's funerary inscription is by no means the only text from this period in which the Uighurs were called Xiong-nu. Li Qi's "Account of Cai Xi" **[Doc. 70]**, written in 850/851, uses only the term "Xiong-nu" in its fascinating story of Liu Mian's spy among the Uighurs, and refers to Ögä (whose name is never mentioned) as *shan-yu* rather than qaghan. It is not clear why Li Qi made this choice; it may be that he wanted to give his narrative a more "literary" or formal flavor. Whatever his reasons, the account employs archaic terminology in regard to the Uighurs throughout, save for a single reference to an Uighur official as a *tarqan* (*da-yu*, an error for *da-gan*), which was indeed a title used by the Uighurs at this time. In regard to things Chinese, however, Li Qi employed contemporary terminology, mentioning the Huichang and Dazhong reign periods, the emperor Wuzong, and the other important Chinese characters in the drama: Liu Mian, Shi Xiong, and the Taihe Princess as well as Cai Xi. Li Qi's choice of archaic terminology for the Uighurs seems particularly odd in light of what we have already noted. Throughout the Uighur crisis, the Xiong-nu parallel was used in various forms of communication as a clear historical precedent upon which the Tang government could base its own policies. In formal texts using highly stylized rhetoric, however, authors could use archaic terms (such as Xiong-nu) to show

their own erudition or to provide a kind of "historical shorthand" which would call up rich images in the mind of an educated reader. Li Qi's account, however, is written in a straightforward prose style, and does not seem aimed at impressing the reader with his literary abilities. Rather, his purpose was to bring official notice to Cai Xi. Li Qi's decision to use archaic terms mixed with contemporary ones may have created confusion for a reader happening upon an account of "Xiong-nu" in the late Tang period, and so may explain why the text was ignored by modern researchers for so long.[38] It is worth noting that during the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126), the Chinese sometimes referred to the Khitans as "Xiong-nu."[39]

Since the rhetorical device of equating the Xiong-nu and Uighurs can be found in a variety of formal writings, it would not be surprising to encounter it in the poetry of the era as well. This is indeed the case, although it was part of a much broader poetic practice in which foreigners could be referred to by a variety of both generic and specific names. Style and historical resonance mattered much more than historical accuracy. Thus, for example, we find the Uighurs called "Xiong-nu" in a series of five poems by Rong Yu that deal with the period of the An Lushan rebellion.[40] Yet we also find Rong Yu using the term "Uighurs" (*Hui-hu*) in another poem, "Listening to Someone Play the Nomad Flute at Du Mountain."[41] Closer to the period of the Uighur crisis, the poems of Chen Tao, who lived during the Huichang era, also employ the term "Xiong-nu" to refer to the Uighurs. His "Four Ballads on Traveling in Longxi," which clearly deal with events of the Uighur crisis, refer to the Uighurs as "Xiong-nu."[42]

There are also poems in which the Uighurs were called by the equally archaic name "Wu-sun." This was particularly common in poems that considered the Tang imperial princesses married to the Uighurs, since the most famous poem attributed to a Chinese princess married as part of the policy of *heqin* was said to have been written by

[38] For more on this account, see Drompp, "A T'ang Adventurer in Inner Asia."

[39] See Tao, "Barbarians or Northerners," 72-73.

[40] *QTS* 270: 3006-3007. One of these has been translated in Hu-Sterk, "Entre fascination et repulsion," 28. In her translation of the poem, Hu-Sterk rendered the name Xiong-nu as "*barbares*."

[41] *QTS* 270: 3011.

[42] *QTS* 746: 8492. See also Chen's "Moon over Guan Mountain," *QTS* 745: 8475.

Xijun (ca. 110 B.C.E.), who had been married to the Wu-sun ruler.[43] Sun Shuxiang's "Seeing off the Xian'an Princess," composed in or shortly after 788 when she was granted in marriage to the reigning Uighur qaghan, contains the line: "A princess of the house of Han is wed to the Wu-sun."[44] A poem written by Bai Juyi around 843 to celebrate the rescue of the Taihe Princess states, "The Wu-sun Princess returns to the land of Qin."[45] We can see from both of these examples that, while archaic terms were used within the poems for purposes of style and historical allusion, the historical context of the events being commemorated were made clear by the poems' titles.

More generic terms for foreigners were also common in Tang poetry, which are peppered with references to *hu*, *fan*, *rong*, *yi*, *di*, and *man*.[46] With the exception of *man*, which was typically reserved for southern peoples, all of these terms could be used to refer to the Uighurs. As with formalized prose, these terms provided a kind of "shorthand" that was both meaningful and elegant in its allusion to China's antiquity. They also suggest that in the Tang mind, such peoples as the Xiong-nu, Uighurs, and Kirghiz were sufficiently similar to one another as to be in many ways interchangeable in the rhetoric of both prose and poetry.

[43] See Birrell, *New Songs from a Jade Terrace*, 232.

[44] *QTS* 472: 5358.

[45] *QTS* 460: 5242.

[46] See, for example, Hu-Sterk, "Entre fascination et repulsion." She notes (p. 19) that these words, "traduits communément par 'barbares', doivent être pris dans le sens large d'"étrangers""—although her own translations continue to employ that tradition.

CHAPTER SEVEN

GEOPOLITICAL CHANGE IN EAST ASIA AND INNER ASIA AFTER THE CRISIS

"Lose it in the east, receive it in the west ...."

Introduction

The collapse of the Uighur steppe empire had a striking impact on the geopolitical organization of much of Asia east of the Pamirs. While the Uighurs who fled to the Tang frontier after 840 soon disappeared from the notice of history, other groups of Uighurs were to play a significant historical role. Fleeing from the Kirghiz attack, they migrated to Gansu and the Tarim Basin, where they succeeded in establishing themselves as rulers of newly-organized states. The Kirghiz managed to assert their influence beyond their own homeland for a few years, but ultimately failed to dominate the Mongolian plateau and chose instead to remain centered on the upper Yenisei valley in Siberia. The resulting political incoherence of Mongolia, coupled with the swift downfall of the Tibetan empire and the more gradual but still inexorable breakdown of Tang power in China, allowed for the development of new powers in other contiguous parts of Inner Asia. The true beneficiaries of the demise of these three great empires were various groups which had been their subordinates—groups which lived in the interstices between the Uighur, Tibetan, and Tang empires. Freed from the pressure of their more powerful neighbors, these peoples gained greater autonomy and soon exerted their political influence in a vastly changed world.

The Western Uighurs

The exact circumstances surrounding the large Uighur migration from the Mongolian plateau to the southwest are unclear, due in large part to the deficiency of the sources. But within a few decades after their rout from Mongolia, the Uighurs had established two major political centers: one in the northwest region of the Gansu corridor, and

another farther west in the northern Tarim Basin.[1] The latter seems to have been on a reasonably firm footing by 856, since it was in that year that its qaghan was granted imperial appointment by the Tang court.[2] The Uighurs of Gansu did not achieve this distinction until 924, when their ruler received an appointment from the court of the Later Tang dynasty (923-936) in North China.[3]

That the Uighurs were able to create these new kingdoms was no doubt due to several factors, not the least important of which were the collapse of Tibetan power, the inability of the Kirghiz to extend their control into the region of Gansu and the northern Tarim, and the growing disinterest of the Chinese, who were far more concerned with internal matters and realized that they could no longer effectively influence affairs in such a distant place. Another important factor was the fact that the Uighurs themselves had at various times exercised political suzerainty over the Tarim Basin. By migrating to an area with which they were familiar and over which they had enjoyed political influence for many years (and where there were no doubt already Uighur communities), the desperate but still powerful Uighurs succeeded in creating for themselves a new homeland.

The political history of the Western Uighurs is not especially well known.[4] Those who settled in Gansu eventually came under the political domination of the Tanguts, who had absorbed their territory by 1028.[5] Further west, in the Tarim Basin and adjacent territories, the Uighurs developed a state centered on the cities of Qocho and Beshbalïq. Adaptation to their new homelands involved increasing sedentarization, as much of the region was not conducive to pastoralism. The Uighurs had already gained some experience with sedentary life in Mongolia, as the presence of Uighur cities there makes clear. In the urban centers of Gansu and the northern Tarim Basin the Uighurs developed a rich and diverse culture in which various religions, art

[1] Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 7-18.

[2] Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 142; Pinks, *Die Uiguren von Kan-chou in der frühen Sung-Zeit*, 61.

[3] Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 143; Pinks, *Die Uiguren von Kan-chou in der frühen Sung-Zeit*, 68.

[4] See, for example, Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 1-18 and 127-138. The assertion by Czeglédy ("The Foundation of the Turfan Uyghur Kingdom," 163) that one of the early Uighur leaders in the west (known in Chinese sources as Pu-gu Jun) was the son of the Taihe Princess is unfounded.

[5] Pinks, *Die Uiguren von Kan-chou in der frühen Sung-Zeit*, 88-89.

forms, literature, and commerce flourished.[6] This civilization was renowned throughout much of Inner Asia, and for many centuries the Uighurs served as cultural "guides" for other peoples of the region. Although not strong militarily, they developed accommodations with their more powerful neighbors and still found ways to maintain their identity and exercise influence over those neighbors.

Although their state had come under the political sway of the Karakhitai or Western Liao (see below) some time after 1130, the Uighur Kingdom of Qocho transferred its allegiance to the growing power of the Mongols in 1209. This voluntary act of submission gained for the Uighurs a great deal of prestige within the Mongol empire. The Uighur ruler Barchuq Art Tigin was regarded by Chinggis Qan as a "fifth son," and his special status within the empire was confirmed by his marriage to one of Chinggis' daughters. The Kingdom of Qocho and its ruler thus enjoyed a level of prestige and at least symbolic autonomy rivaled by no other people who had been absorbed by the Mongol state.[7] The success of the Uighur policy towards the Mongols stands in stark contrast to the fate of their neighbors the Tanguts, whose resistance to Mongol rule led to their annihilation.

Uighur culture had a great impact on the Mongols. Even before 1209, Chinggis had employed the Uighur Tatar Tonga to instruct his sons in the Uighur script. Of far greater consequence was the adaptation of the Uighur script for the writing of the Mongol language in the thirteenth century. One of the great strengths of the Mongol

[6] For a description of Uighur culture in the Tarim Basin, see von Gabain, *Das Leben im uigurischen Königreich von Qočo*. The assertion by Mote (*Imperial China*, 35) that it was only after 840 that the Uighurs embraced Manichaeism, became literate, and abandoned nomadism is incorrect. We have already noted the importance of Manichaeism among the Uighurs of Mongolia, particularly after their encounter with Sogdian Manichaeans in China in 762, and the existence of several stone inscriptions in the Old Turkic runiform script that date from the period of the Uighur steppe empire. The so-called "Uighur script," a cursive script derived from Sogdian, was the predominant script of the Uighurs of the Tarim Basin, but many scholars believe that it was developed and in use prior to 840; see Clauson, *Turkish and Mongolian Studies*, 106-109. As for the decline of nomadism, this had already begun for at least some elite Uighurs during the period of the steppe empire. There is no question that sedentarization increased dramatically after the Uighurs' move to the Tarim Basin, but settled (city) life was by no means unknown to the Uighurs prior to 840.

[7] On the political history of the Uighurs of the Tarim Basin during the time of the Mongol empire, see Allsen, "The Yüan Dynasty and the Uighurs of Turfan in the Thirteenth Century." The position of the Uighur kingdom within the Mongol empire after that empire was partitioned following the death of Chinggis remains unclear.

world empire was the willingness of its leaders to use non-Mongols in a variety of capacities. The Uighurs soon became the most important of the various Turkic peoples within the Mongol empire in terms of both administration and culture.[8] This influence was felt long after the collapse of the Mongol empire, as the Uighur-derived Mongol script was later used to develop the Manchu script.

Not only did the Uighurs survive and flourish long after the fall of their steppe empire in 840, but so too did the religion that they had patronized for so many years. Although Buddhism had become the dominant faith of the Uighurs of the Tarim Basin by the Mongol era (and probably earlier) and Nestorian Christianity enjoyed favor among many Uighurs as well, Manichaeism remained an important religion that contributed significantly to the culture and economy of the Uighur kingdom until the late tenth century.[9] For reasons that are not clear, the late tenth century witnessed the beginning of the disappearance of Manichaeism as a living religion in the Uighur Kingdom of Qocho. Manichaean temples were ordered to be turned into Buddhist temples, and the religion ceased to play a major role in the life of the Uighurs.[10]

The Kirghiz

In Mongolia, the Kirghiz did not replace the Uighurs as masters of the Orkhon. There is no evidence whatsoever that Kirghiz control extended over the Mongolian plateau in anything more than an ephemeral manner—although Western historians have for decades mistakenly written of a "Kirghiz empire" that replaced that of the Uighurs and for a time extended its control to the northern Tarim Basin. In fact, there was no such empire, and the Kirghiz remained largely in their traditional homeland on the upper Yenisei River.[11]

[8] On the importance of Uighurs as teachers and administrators in the Mongol empire, see de Rachewiltz, "Turks in China under the Mongols," and Brose, "Uighurs and Technologies of Literacy."

[9] See Lieu, *Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China*, 199-201, and Lieu, *Manichaeism in Central Asia and China*, 1-54 and 76-97. See also Chou, "New Evidence of Manichaeism in Asia." On Nestorianism among the Uighurs, see Gillman and Klimkeit, *Christians in Asia before 1500*, 222-229.

[10] Chou, "New Evidence of Manichaeism in Asia," 297-298.

[11] This matter has been examined in Drompp, "Breaking the Orkhon Tradition." The constant reference to a "Khirghiz empire" throughout much of the relevant literature reveals how historians of Inner Asia, particularly in the West, have accepted as undisputed fact an interpretation that was originally intended only as a hypothesis regarding a poorly-understood era.

Instead of becoming the center of power for a new empire, the Mongolian plateau was politically fragmented after 840, as no group there proved capable of exerting its authority over the region. It was not until the rise of the Mongols at the beginning of the thirteenth century that the old heartland of the steppe once again became the home of a great nomadic empire. Like their old enemies, the Uighurs, the Kirghiz too were absorbed into the Mongol state of Chinggis Qan.

China

In China, the successful resolution of the Uighur and Zhaoyi crises suggested a resurgence of Tang strength. Indeed, modern scholarship has made it clear that the late Tang empire, while severely damaged by the An Lushan rebellion, remained in many ways a strong and stable state, particularly under decisive emperors such as Xianzong, Wuzong, and Xuanzong.[12] Wuzong had proved a far stronger emperor than his father Muzong or especially his brothers Jingzong and Wenzong, who were under the powerful influence of court factions as well as palace eunuchs.[13] With the help of Li Deyu, Wuzong had weakened the influence of the eunuchs[14] and staved off threats to the stability of his empire. His uncle and successor, Xuanzong, was an equally strong ruler during whose reign "overt, large-scale factionalism" declined at court.[15]

Despite the strong reigns of Wuzong and Xuanzong, however, the ninth century saw increasing economic and social difficulties in the Tang empire that eventually led to a breakdown of the social and political order. The increasing economic burden on the peasantry, much of which stemmed from imperial efforts to regain control over the autonomous northeast and cope with other military affairs such as the Uighur crisis, created instability in areas, such as the lower Yangzi, which had earlier been stable. Financial problems and increasing popular disaffection eventually led to major garrison revolts in the second

[12] Dalby, "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," 675.

[13] Dalby, "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," 642-647 and 654-658.

[14] Dalby, "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," 663-664.

[15] Dalby, "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," 669-675.

half of the ninth century and ultimately the great popular rebellion of Huang Chao that finished off the dynasty.[16] China fell into chaos, with regional warlords carving out independent fiefs for themselves. Some of these were of foreign origin, including Li Keyong, son of the Sha-tuo leader Li Guochang (Zhu-ye Chi-xin) who had become involved in the political chaos of the Uighur empire's last days and the subsequent Uighur crisis at China's northern frontier.

Surprisingly, the Manichaean faith survived in China as a reminder of Uighur influence long after both Emperor Wuzong's persecution and the religion's eclipse in the Tarim Basin. Despite the emperor's grandiose claims, the persecution he launched during the Huichang era did not eradicate the religion of Mani from Chinese soil. The faith persisted. During the political upheaval of the Five Dynasties period (907–960), Manichaeism became solidly established in the coastal southeast, particularly the region of Fujian, where it endured at least until the last century of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644).[17] Perhaps the ultimate irony in this regard is that while the religion did not enjoy great popularity among the Chinese during the time that it was promoted by the Uighurs, after the Huichang persecution it was severed from its foreign ties and hence was forced to become a Chinese religion. In this it was only moderately successful in terms of gaining converts, but extraordinarily tenacious in terms of its longevity.

The Khitans

To the northeast of the Tang empire, in southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, the Khitans had been subjects of the Uighur empire. After the Uighur collapse, as we have seen, Zhang Zhongwu urged the Khitans to execute their Uighur overseers. This ultimately led to the Khitans transferring their allegiance to the Tang empire in 842.[18] Although the sources are sketchy, it is clear that the late ninth century saw an increase of Khitan power, which was finally manifested in the creation of a Khitan empire by A-bao-ji (872–926). This state, known by the Chinese name of Liao, enjoyed suzerainty over such Inner Asian peoples as the Black Carts of the Shi-wei and

[16] Somers, "The End of the T'ang," 682-700 and 720-762.
[17] See Lieu, *Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China*, 220-264 and Lieu, *Manichaeism in Central Asia and China*, 98-195.
[18] Twitchett and Tietze, "The Liao," 50.

the Tatars (Chinese Zu-bu). The Khitans also ruled over significant sedentary populations. They conquered the state of Parhae in 926 and in 937 absorbed a relatively small but politically important portion of China proper, the so-called "Sixteen Prefectures"—a swath of territory from the region of Datong to that of Youzhou.[19] The Khitans also succeeded in extending their control into Mongolia. When A-bao-ji campaigned into the Orkhon region of central Mongolia in 924–925, he did not encounter a "Kirghiz empire" or any other organized state, but only fragmented groups which could not effectively oppose him.[20] The Mongolian plateau thus came under foreign rule, the contours of which are still poorly understood. After extending its power onto the Mongolian region, the Khitan Liao state also enjoyed political influence over the Uighurs in Gansu. The destruction of the Uighur empire in 840 and the severe weakening of the Tang state after about 880, followed by the fragmentation of China into competing kingdoms (the so-called "Five Dynasties" era, 907-960), thus allowed the new Khitan empire not only to become effectively established in eastern Inner Asia, but also to absorb part of China and exercise political influence in such distant regions as Mongolia and Gansu.

Uighurs and persons of Uighur descent played an important role within the Liao empire. The royal clan of the Khitans, named Ye-lü, intermarried almost exclusively with the Xiao clan, which was of Uighur origin.[21] This family enjoyed tremendous influence during the Liao era. Liao empresses *née* Xiao were politically active; they commanded their own military organizations and sometimes directed the affairs of the empire.[22] Xiao men enjoyed access to important offices, some of which were exclusively theirs by hereditary right.[23] While the Xiao clan must have been highly Khitanized by the time of the Liao empire, their Uighur origin may well have been one of the reasons for their great prestige within the Liao state. The Uighurs were influential in other ways as well. There were Uighur communi-

[19] See Twitchett and Tietze, "The Liao," 66, 70 and 71, map 3.
[20] See Drompp, "Breaking the Orkhon Tradition," 398. The Kirghiz remained beyond Liao control.
[21] See Wittfogel and Fêng, *History of Chinese Society: Liao*, 191-192, 208-209, and 237-239, n. 3, as well as Twitchett and Tietze, "The Liao," 57 and 87. Note that the *Liao shi* makes specific reference to the first empress' Uighur ancestry; see Tuotuo et al., *Liao shi* 71: 1199.
[22] See Twitchett and Tietze, "The Liao," 68 and 87-91.
[23] Twitchett and Tietze, "The Liao," 77-78, 87, and 92.

ties within the Liao state,[24] and Uighur merchants were important to the Liao economy, with special quarters assigned to them in the Liao "supreme capital" Shangjing.[25] According to the *Liao shi*, the creation of the Khitan "small" script was the result of interactions with envoys from the Gansu Uighurs, whose alphabetic script provided a model for the Khitans.[26]

The Liao dynasty survived until 1122, when it was overthrown by the Jurchens, who had been subordinates of the Khitans. The collapse of the Liao state did not end the Khitan-Uighur connection, however. As their realm crumbled, some Khitans migrated westward and around 1130 established a new state centered in Jungaria; this was known as Karakhitai or Western Liao.[27] From their capital on the Chu River near the lake Issyk-kul, the Karakhitai rulers dominated a large empire that stretched from the Amu Darya to the Altai Mountains. From this base of power they soon extended their control to include the Uighurs of the Tarim Basin. The Uighurs remained subordinated to the Karakhitai until 1209, when they rebelled against Karakhitai domination and declared their allegiance to the rising power of the Mongols under Chinggis Qan.

The Sha-tuo Türks

Another group which benefited from the decline of the great East Asian powers in the mid- and late ninth century were the Sha-tuo Türks. Their involvement in Uighur politics, as well as their position as a people under "loose-rein" Tang control, has already been noted. Under the leadership of the Zhu-ye clan, the Sha-tuo took advantage of the absence of Uighur power to take the latter's place as military supporters of the Tang dynasty when China began to suffer from internal rebellions in the late ninth century. The 868–869 garrison revolt of Pang Xun was successfully put down in large part due to the assistance of 3000 Sha-tuo cavalry. It was because of his aid to

[24] Twitchett and Tietze, "The Liao," 77.
[25] Wittfogel and Fêng, *History of Chinese Society: Liao*, 23; Twitchett and Tietze, "The Liao," 63.
[26] Wittfogel and Fêng, *History of Chinese Society: Liao*, 240-243; Twitchett and Tietze, "The Liao," 67. The Uighur embassy is to be dated to either 924 or 925; see Wittfogel and Fêng, *History of Chinese Society: Liao*, 243, n. 24.
[27] See Wittfogel and Fêng, *History of Chinese Society: Liao*, 619-674.

the Tang dynasty in this time of distress that the Sha-tuo leader Zhu-ye Chi-xin, who had played an important role in the collapse of the Uighur state, was granted the imperial surname Li and the name Guochang, "Glory of the Nation."[28] As the Tang realm crumbled under subsequent revolts, the Sha-tuo continued to play this role. Li Keyong, son of Li Guochang, was instrumental in the quelling of the massive Huang Chao rebellion in 883.[29] After the complete collapse of the Tang dynasty, the Sha-tuo remained a powerful presence in North China. In fact, the descendants of Li Keyong established the state of Later Tang there and ruled as emperors.[30] Of the five successive dynasties that controlled North China from the fall of Tang in 907 to the establishing of the Song dynasty in 960, three were of Sha-tuo origin: Later Tang (923-936), Later Jin (936-946) and Later Han (947-950). After the demise of the Later Han, the Sha-tuo managed to maintain a small successor state around Taiyuan with the support of the Khitans. This kingdom, the Northern Han (951-979) initially resisted incorporation into the new Song empire, but eventually fell to the latter's forces.[31] After this, the Sha-tuo quickly disappeared from the pages of history.

The Tanguts

A third people who were able to benefit from the collapse of the Uighur and Tibetan states were the Tanguts, who also had played a role in the defeat of the Uighur refugees. As the Tang empire weakened, the Tanguts, living in the Ordos region and Gansu, became increasingly autonomous. Although the rising power of the Song dynasty in China threatened that autonomy, the Tanguts succeeded in creating a stable kingdom whose economy was based on trade as well as pastoralism. They gradually increased their power and influence until finally, in 1038, the Tangut ruler proclaimed himself emperor of the state of Great Xia, more commonly known in Chinese and Western sources as Xi Xia (i.e., Western Xia, to distinguish it from the ancient—and as

[28] See Peterson, "Court and Province in Mid- and Late T'ang," 558-559, and Somers, "The End of the T'ang," 700.
[29] Somers, "The End of the T'ang," 759-762.
[30] On the establishment of the Later T'ang, see Wang, *The Structure of Power in North China during the Five Dynasties*, 104-118.
[31] Mote, *Imperial China*, 106-107.

yet unattested—Chinese dynasty called Xia). After the Song reunification of China, the Tanguts found themselves in a delicate situation, faced by two strong neighbors, the states of Song and Liao. They managed this situation skillfully, and their state survived until it was obliterated by the forces of Chinggis Qan in 1227. Much like their neighbors the Uighurs of the Tarim Basin, the Tanguts developed a flourishing culture with a strong urban element. As with the Uighurs, Buddhism was a particularly potent force in the Xia state.[32]

Envoi

In the aftermath of the breakup of the Uighur empire, followed by the collapse of Tibetan power and the decline of the Tang, a new geopolitical order was created in East and Inner Asia. The states that emerged from this restructuring of power were of great importance to the political and cultural history of the region, although none can be said to have enjoyed the same kind of military power enjoyed by the Tang, Tibetan, or Uighur states at their heights. The most powerful of the new states—Song China, the Khitan Liao empire, and the Tangut kingdom of Xia—were compelled to develop an accommodation that was in many respects, despite the inevitable waxing and waning of the individual power of each of them, a relationship among equals. Ultimately, none of them was able to overawe the others. The overthrow of the Khitan Liao dynasty by the Jurchens really did not change this system. As for the smaller states, some (such as the kingdoms of the Western Uighurs) were forced into positions of political subordination, although they often could enjoy a high degree of autonomy in spite of this. In their relative isolation, the Kirghiz remained free from foreign influence, but their own influence did not spread far beyond their homeland.

This entire geopolitical system was changed drastically in the thirteenth century with the rise of the Mongols. Chinggis Qan and his successors absorbed all of these states into a new world empire, the likes of which the world had never seen. Chinggis had risen to power on the Mongolian plateau. The political fragmentation of the region that followed the Uighur collapse had created an environment

[32] On the Tanguts and Xi Xia, see Dunnell, "The Hsi Hsia" and Dunnell, "Who Are the Tanguts?" as well as Mote, *Imperial China*, 168-190 and 249-264.

in which he and his dynamic state organization could be established and ultimately flourish. From their capital of Qaraqorum, with the ruins of the Uighur capital of Ordubaliq nearby to remind them of the transience of power, the Mongol qans ruled the world. While they may not have known of the sad fate of the Uighur refugees who sought assistance at China's northern frontier in the ninth century, they certainly knew of the glory days of the Uighur empire.



Map 1. Northeast Asia, ca. 840 C.E.

Map 2. Important Sites in North China, ca. 840 C.E.



Map 3. Important Sites Relating to the Uighur Crisis, ca. 840 C.E.

APPENDIX

TRANSLATIONS OF DOCUMENTS

Translation is an arduous and treacherous occupation. Long hours of painstaking work can yield results that will be praised by one reader and scorned by the next. My primary goal in these translations has been utility rather than elegance, as will be readily apparent to my readers. This is an effort to be true not only to the purpose of this book as a work of history, but also to the texts themselves, which are typically centered on pragmatic concerns. Ninth-century Chinese bureaucratic language presents a number of challenges beyond those inherent in translation itself. While generally clear, it is also quite terse. Many concepts are implied rather than stated; for example, pronouns are frequently omitted since they can be inferred from the context. In my translations, I have used brackets to indicate substantial additions to the text that I have made for the purpose of clarity, but I have not employed them to indicate those elements (such as pronouns or articles) which are implied in the Chinese and necessary in the English. This was done so as not to over-burden the translations. Since utility was my goal, I was concerned that a heavy-handed apparatus could distract the reader from the texts themselves.

In the following translations, the documents by Li Deyu are presented in the order in which they are discussed in the book, which means that they are also in an approximate (but not absolute) chronological order. As was indicated in the introduction, these translations have been created through the comparison of extant versions of the documents; in this I have benefited greatly from the work of Cen Zhongmian, whose "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang" contains versions of the documents from Li Deyu's brush pertaining to the Uighur crisis. Aside from Li's writings, the only additional translation is appended as Doc. 70, the account of the spy Cai Xi written by Li Qj. The location of each document within the two editions of Li Deyu's works which were consulted (found in the bibliography as *Li Weigong* ***Huichang yipin ji*** and *Li Wenrao wenji*), as well as the location of each document within the compendium (*Qin ding*) *Quan Tang wen* are provided under the appropriate abbreviations (*HCYPJ*, *LWRWJ*,

and *QTW* respectively), along with all known additional translations: French (Chavannes & Pelliot, "Un traité manichéen retrouvé en Chine, traduit et annoté, deuxième partie"), Turkish (Tsai, "Li Tê-yü'nün mektuplarına göre Uygurlar (840-900)"), and Russian (Suprunenko, "Dokumentiy ob otnesheniiakh kitaia s eniseiskimi kyrgyzami v istochnike IX veka 'Li Vei-gun Khoichan ipin' tszi.'"). Those translations are complete except when otherwise indicated.

[Doc. 1] A Letter of Imperial Decree Granted to the Rebellious Uighurs

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 5: 33, *LWRWJ* 5: 7a-8a, *QTW* 700: 9101]
[Translation: Tsai, 101-103]

Recently We have received several memorial reports from Our border generals, and have learned that your homeland has suffered disruption and that your qaghan has met with calamity. Although We are not aware of all the details [of the matter], We are deeply grieved. Our nation and your homeland have been joined for generations by good marriages. We have long been related by marriage, united in virtue and of one mind, to the constant envy of all the [other] foreigners. For this reason the border has been without alarums; the frontier has been at peace. [But] you suddenly led an army of followers to camp south of the desert and frequently came to Tiande to raid and plunder, seriously disturbing the border peoples. The army that you have assembled is utterly lacking in legitimacy and honor. We are extremely disappointed that you have spoiled our former [good relations in this way].

If the new ruler whom your nation enthrones is not a close relative of the [former] qaghan(s), the people's hearts will not follow him, and your disorder will not be settled. You should simply report your plan of action to Us, put forth effort in faithful sincerity, and pacify your homeland in order to seek merit. Moreover, you should send an envoy to report to Us and explain all your intentions.

If the newly-enthroned qaghan is a close relative of China,[1] the

[1] This phrase (*Zhongguo zhi qin*) is ambiguous, primarily because the word *qin* can refer to either a relative or an intimate. If it is to be translated as "relative," the meaning still is not clear, since it is not known how many (if any) of the members of the Uighurs' ruling house were related by blood to the Tang imperial family.

people certainly will give their allegiance to him. You should promptly lead one another to preserve your nation and pacify your homes. Be of one mind with the [new] qaghan so as to repair our former good relations. What do you gain by staking your fate at Our border and causing your people and your army to suffer for so long?

Because Our feelings of affection for your nation are quite profound, [We have considered] our affairs as one and the same. Moreover, the [Taihe] Princess has been among you, but now We do not know if she is alive or dead. For these reasons We have sent as an envoy Our retainer Wei Mo[2] to inform you of Our thoughts. You should exhibit complete sincerity and avoid empty words. You should also forbid your armed forces to make any surprise attacks.

We recently heard that some army units patrolling near Tiande have engaged in skirmishes with you.[3] Since you have violated the border, such [skirmishing is considered] routine for Our border generals. Now We have ordered all of the garrisons not to engage in battle with you. You [in turn] should completely inform each of your tribes of this.

[Doc. 2] A Letter of Imperial Edict Granted to the Uighurs Ormïzt Tigin and Others

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 5: 33-34, *LWRWJ* 5: 8a-9a, *QTW* 698: 9082]
[Translation: Tsai, 54-56]

To the Uighurs Ormïzt Tigin, Naghïd Chor Tigin, the *Il-ögäsi*,[4] Ögä Yig Altïn Ö[gä]si(?) Bagha Tarqan [Chinese Yu-jie Yi A-dan Gan(Yu?)-[jia-]si Mo-he Da-gan],[5] Minister Inanchu Bilgä Tiräk

[2] Biographies of Wei Mo may be found in *JTS* 176: 4567-4571 and *XTS* 97: 3882-3884.

[3] This may refer to the apparent clash between Wen Deyi and an unidentified group of Uighurs in the fourth year of the Kaicheng reign period (see chapter 2), or could refer to minor skirmishes between Ormïzt's followers and Tang border patrols.

[4] We have noted that *il-ögäsi* is a title rather than a personal name. This entire list of persons is an amalgamation of personal names and titles, which often are not clearly distinguished in early Turkic sources.

[5] Bagha Tarqan is a well known Old Turkic title for which the Chinese transcription is established; see Müller, "Ein Doppelblatt aus einem manichäischen Hymnenbuch (Mahrnâmag)," 9 and 39. As for the elements preceding this term, *yu-jie* seems to be a transcription of Turkic Ögä, while *yi* could be a rendering of Turkic *yig/yäg*,

[Chinese Yi-nan-zhu Mi-jia Di-lue],[6] Batur Sangun Tirāk [Chinese Mo-duo Jiang-jun Di-lue],[7] and others: The memorial petition which you transmitted through the Tiande Army has arrived. Having read it over several times, We are deeply saddened. Ever since [the time of] Zhongyi Bilgä [Chinese Bi-jia] Qaghan,[8] your foreign land (*fan*)

"better," which appears to have been an element in Old Turkic titles; see Tryjarski and Hamilton, "L'inscription turque runiforme de Khutuk-ula," 174 as well as Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 909-910. For the Tang pronunciation, see *GKWD* 583, 1200, and 40. As for the remaining elements, the rendering of Altün Ö[gä]si is far less secure. The text reads *A-dan-gan-si*; for the Tang pronunciation, see *GKWD* 1414, 1045, 412, and 464. This suggests nothing in Old Turkic. *A-dan* is not a particularly good transcription of Turkic *altïn*, "lower, under, subordinate" (see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 131), but might make sense here as an indicator of rank—although there is no such attested use for *altïn*; see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 131 as well as Röhrborn, *Uigurisches Wörterbuch*, vol. 2, 110-111. It is also possible that *a-dan* is a rendering of Turkic *altun*, "gold," which is a known element in Turkic names and titles; see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 131. *Gan-si* is reminiscent of *yu-jia-si*, the common Chinese transcription of Turkic *ögäsi*, particularly if we note that the character *gan* is often an error for the very similar character *yu*. Indeed, Turkic *ögäsi* can be found erroneously transcribed as *gan-jia-si* in many sources. The reading here would also require that the character *jia* had been dropped—again, a common error in Chinese texts. This reading is therefore highly tentative.

[6] This is certainly the correct Turkic form of this title. The first two elements in particular are quite common in Old Turkic; see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 187, 340, and 543. An Inanchu Bilgä Tirāk is listed in the Pahlevi text studied by Müller in "Der Hofstaat eines Uiguren-Königs," 210-211.

[7] The Turkic form here is again not a serious problem. The title Batur Sangun is attested in the *Maḫrnâmag*; see Müller, "Ein Doppelblatt aus einem manichäischen Hymnenbuch (Maḫrnâmag)," 10. Nevertheless, it should be noted that with the exception of certain titles which commonly appear as compounds, such as Bagha Tarqan and Batur Sangun, it is difficult to know just where these titles should be divided, since the original text contains no punctuation. For alternative interpretations of several of these titles, see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang", 124 as well as Chavannes and Pelliot, "Un traité manichéen retrouvé en Chine, traduit et annoté, deuxième partie," 289 n. (but note that their text seems to have contained erroneous repetitions of some characters).

[8] According to Cen Zhongmian, this refers to the Uighur prince Yabghu (Chinese Ye-hu) , the Uighur heir-apparent who led more than 4000 troops to aid the Tang dynasty during the An Lushan rebellion; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 127, n. 6. Yabghu assisted in the recapture of both Chang'an and Luoyang, and for his meritorious service was granted the title of "Zhongyi" Prince; see Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, 56-61. Yabghu died or was executed before the death of the reigning qaghan in 758, however, and so never became qaghan himself; see Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, 69. The man who did ascend the throne, commonly known in Chinese sources as Mou-yu (Bögü?) Qaghan, was the ruler who introduced and promoted Manichaeism in the Uighur state after encountering Manichaean priests

for generations has been one of neighboring kinsmen [of the Tang imperial house]. We repeatedly granted you our beloved princesses [in marriage]; our grace and propriety were extraordinary. Throughout history there has been nothing approaching it.

We are lord over myriad nations, soothing and nourishing the various regions. If there is one which is not at peace, then it is fitting that [its representatives] come [to court] to announce it. This is especially so for the Tigin and others, whose grandfathers and fathers repeatedly came to court in sincerity.

Recently [Li] Rong, the heir of Prince Zhe,[9] who was sent to offer condolences [on the death of Qasar (Zhaoli) Qaghan] and to appoint the former [Hu Tigin] Qaghan [as Zhangxin Qaghan] returned.[10] [From him] We heard for the first time that there was destruction and chaos within your nation, and that all the tribes had rebelled. How could We forget established policies to relieve the sorrow of Our pitiable neighbor? Now, as part of Our plan to pacify you, We have commanded an envoy [to go to you].

Now We also have learned that the Kirghiz and others—altogether five tribes—deeply penetrated [your nation] and perpetrated cruelties. The qaghan was killed; the princess and the new qaghan fled elsewhere and have not yet returned to the [Uighur] capital. The Tigin and others were not strong enough to control the situation. Thinking of a far-reaching plan for [your own] preservation, you followed

in Luoyang. This qaghan's regnal title was, according to Chiense sources, Tängri Il-Tutmish Alp Külüg Yingyi Jiangong Bilgä Qaghan; see Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties*, 139 as well as Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, 192 for variant Chinese forms. In light of this evidence, it would seem that Zhongyi Bilgä Qaghan should not be identified with Yabghu, but rather is an erroneous amalgamation of both Yabghu and Mou-yu Qaghan. The former was known as "Zhongyi" Prince, while the latter's title contains the element Bilgä Qaghan as well as Yingyi, which is similar to Zhongyi. A Chinese writer who was not well acquainted with the facts might have though that Yabghu and Mou-yu were the same person, since it had been known in China that Yabghu was the heir-apparent, expected to take the Uighur throne. At any rate, there was no such person as Zhongyi Bilgä Qaghan.

[9] On the unresolved identity of this person, whose given name can also be pronounced Yong, see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 128, n. 10, as well as Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, 182, n. 292. Tsai simply calls him "Wang Jung" (i.e., Wang Rong) with no commentary; see Tsai, "Li Tê-yü'nün mektuplarına göre Uygurlar," 54.

[10] Wenzong's order of appointment for Hu Tigin Qaghan as Zhangxin Qaghan is preserved in *QTW* 75: 979 and *TDZJ* 129: 697-698. Both of these sources give the personal name of the man carrying out the appointment as a similar but different character, still pronounced Rong.

one another and fled, coming 10,000 *li* to entrust yourselves to Our authority.

We also have learned that you hoped to bring the princess with you when presenting yourselves at an imperial audience, but your loyal plan could not be carried out. You have passed over south of the great desert and together offered submission at the Wuyuan Pass, sending out a single envoy to proclaim your sincerity.

We reflect upon your difficulties and sigh in distressed sympathy. We consider that you are all brave leaders from the [Uighur] royal clan. Dwelling in a battlefield, with feelings of longing for your homeland, how can you settle down? How can you not wish to attack and expel the bandits from outside [i.e., the Kirghiz] and recover your homeland? Harboring this ultimate loyalty, you have requested Our great assistance.

However, because We do not know your objectives, it is difficult for Us to act in accord with you. Furthermore, We are anxious lest the border officials see you arrive suddenly and, either harboring suspicions or [thoughts of] opposing you, may not act in accordance with Our wishes. For this reason We have sent Chief Minister of the Court for Diplomatic Relations Zhang Jia to gallop forth [with a charge] to pacify you.

We commend your loyal submission, and respond in sincere faith. Although we are separated by the Great Wall, it seems as though we have already met face-to-face. You must deeply understand Our innermost feelings and disclose all your thoughts [to Us]. Tell them to Our envoy one by one, and then have him return quickly to memorialize on what he has heard. We are waiting to hear your sincere desires. Our subsequent directives then surely will accord with your [needs] in this emergency. We certainly do not begrudge you Our efforts in this matter. We urge you to develop a plan that will preserve your loyal merit.

The autumn is hot. [We hope that] you and the subordinate officials of your tribe, as well as the left wing[11] tribes of Alpaghut [Chinese

[11] The word translated as "wing" is *xiang*, a variant of the word commonly used (also pronounced *xiang*); see Wang, "Hei Chezi Shi-wei kao," 625 as well as Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 130, n. 18. Both scholars cited a passage in *TD* 199: 1078 which describes the Western Türks as being divided into left and right "wings." Wang also pointed to evidence from the Chinese-language Karabalghasun Inscription which indicates that the Uighurs also might have used this sort of organizational system. Unfortunately, the text of the inscription is damaged at a crucial point; see Schlegel, "Die chinesische Inschrift auf dem uigurischen Denkmal in Kara Balgassun," 108-114.

A-bo-wu],[12] etc., and the Black Carts [Chinese Hei Chezi],[13] Tatars [Chinese Da-da],[14] and others are at peace and well. To facilitate the dispatch of this missive, We do not address their large number here.

[Doc. 3] A Memorial Discussing Tian Mou's Request to Allow the Tanguts to Take Revenge on the Tribes of the Uighur Ormïzt

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 13: 101-102, *LWRWJ* 13: 1b-3a, *QTW* 704: 9152-9153]

I and others, although unskilled in military matters and ignorant of border affairs, nonetheless have deliberated on the principles of this

[12] The Tang pronunciation (for which see *GKWD* 1414, 723, and 102) suggests Turkic *alpaghut*, "warrior"; see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 128. While the Chinese transcription is not attested, the use of this term as an element in Old Turkic titles is attested in a text transcribed in Müller, "Zwei Pfahlinschriften aus den Turfanfunden," 23.

[13] The "Black Carts" were a branch of the Shi-wei people, and apparently are to be identified with the He-jie Shi-wei mentioned in *JTS* 195: 5215. The Black Carts were at this time located in the vicinity of the Khingan Mountains; see Wang, "Hei Chezi Shi-wei kao," 624. This is the first mention of the Black Carts in any Chinese text. This fact was pointed out by Wang and repeated by Pelliot, who erroneously placed this first mention in 842 rather than 841 as it should be; see Pelliot, "L'Édition collective des oeuvres de Wang Kuou-wei," 124. On the Shi-wei, see Ratchnevsky, "Les Che-wei étaient-ils des Mongols?"

[14] The Tatars are mentioned in both the Kül Tigin and Bilgä Qaghan inscriptions of the 730s, where two apparently different groups, the Thirty (*otuz*) Tatars and Nine (*toquz*) Tatars, are both mentioned; see Orkun, *Eski Türk Yazıtları*, vol. 1, 30-31, 34-35, and 64-65. This document, dated 841, is the first mention of them in Chinese sources. Note the implication in Wang, "Da-da kao," repeated in Pelliot, "L'Édition collective des oeuvres de Wang Kuou-wei," 124-125, that this document should be dated to 842. Wang suggested that the Tatars mentioned in conjunction with the Black Carts in Doc. 2 should be identified with the Thirty Tatars of the Old Turkic inscriptions, while those mentioned in conjunction with the cities of Beiting and Anxi in the Western Regions in Doc. 43 should be identified with the Nine Tatars; see Wang, "Da-da kao," 639-640. According to Pelliot, the Tatars did not divide into two distinct groups (eastern and western) until later. He argued that the Tatars of both the Old Turkic inscriptions and those of Li Deyu's writings should be located in eastern Mongolia, and that a southward migration of Tatars occurred between 842 (841) and 848; see Pelliot, "L'Édition collective des oeuvres de Wang Kuou-wei," 125. Since Doc. 43, dated to 842, mentions Tatars in conjunction with cities in the region of the Tarim Basin, it would seem that any southward migration must have taken place prior to 842, despite Pelliot's remarks. On these Tatars, see also Bailey, "A Khotanese Text Concerning the Turks in Kantşou."

affair, and found the facts of the matter to be evident. I humbly hope that [Your Majesty] will deign to examine this with sacred compassion.

Of late, Your Majesty has been constantly concerned about whether the Uighur nation actually has been scattered or not. Now I have received a letter from Wo-a-ni Inanchu Alp[15] and others which states, "Here we no longer have any place to live." Thus, the news is true. Furthermore, the Uighur An Xiaoshun[16] said that the [Uighur] minister Chi-xin asked him, "Do those in China look favorably on your Uighurs or not?" This suffices to show that they depend on our great realm. Their wishes are quite diligent and earnest.

Now, if we allow Tian Mou to comply with the Tanguts' avaricious designs, then, without calculating their own strength, they would assault the [Uighur] barbarians who are in a desperate situation, and thus put an end to [the Uighurs'] sincere [desire] to come and submit. Even if [Tian Mou] wins a victory in this affair, it will [still] diminish his men and equipment and cause a great loss of [the Uighurs'] good will and trust. If he is not successful, then it will result in endless troubles along out border, and we will become the laughingstock of the four barbarians.

Now, a poor bird has flown to our bosom, and we must still be compassionate. When people from afar have admired our righteousness, they have not transgressed our borders. From the sixth month [23 June – 21 July 841] until today, [the Uighurs] have not seized a single person guarding the frontier beacons, nor have they stolen a single thing from the Tanguts. They have offered submission as a display of sincerity, crying out in misery as they look toward the [Tang] imperial palace [for succor]. Their memorial which was recently offered to the

[15] The first element of this name or title, Wo-a-ni, suggests nothing in Old Turkic; for the Tang pronunciation, see *GKWD* 503, 1414, 381. The Chinese transcription of Inanchu Alp, *yi-nan-zhu he*, is what one would expect.

[16] Although An Xiaoshun is described as an Uighur, his name is Chinese. The surname An was commonly used by Sogdians of Bukhara when in China; see Pulleyblank, "A Sogdian Colony in Inner Mongolia," 319-320. Pulleyblank also noted that while many of the surnames used by Central Asians in China were also used by those who were not Sogdians, the surnames An and Kang usually indicate Sogdian origin during the Tang era; see Pulleyblank, "A Sogdian Colony in Inner Mongolia," 321-322. An Xiaoshun thus could have been a Sogdian from Bukhara or someone whose family had come from Bukhara. Like a much more famous An, the eighth-century rebel An Lushan, he could have been of mixed ancestry, only part of which was Sogdian. Although the text calls him "the Uighur An Xiaoshun," it probably should be interpreted to mean "An Xiaoshun of the Uighur state."

throne [contains] earnest words and [shows] an obedient attitude. To reject them and refuse to receive them, [and instead] to give priority to killing them: this is the first thing which cannot be countenanced.

If there had not been some rift within the Uighur nation and all the tribes were at peace, and then Ormïzt had rebelled and come [to our border], then we would have to reject him. But the qaghan himself lost his kingdom, and his tent is no more. Leading the wounded remnants [of his tribes] he has taken refuge in another place. Ormïzt and the others, pressed by hunger and other difficulties, each wanted to save his own life. Tian Mou insists that they have turned their backs on their nation and fled ignominiously. This is because his evil clique followers of last year all seem, like [Wen] Deyi, [to want to] wipe out their humiliation [at having been defeated by the Uighurs] by using the Tanguts to take their revenge.[17] If one examines [Tian Mou's] feelings, [one can see that] he certainly is not acting out of concern for our nation. This is the second thing which cannot be countenanced.

During the Wufeng reign period [57–53 B.C.E.] of Han Xuandi, the Xiong-nu were in great turmoil. Many of those [at court] who discussed [the matter] said, "The Xiong-nu have long caused us injury. Because of their ruinous chaos we can raise troops and exterminate them." Xiao Wangzhi replied, "We should send an envoy to make consoling inquiries and rescue them from calamity. When the four barbarians hear of it, they will all honor China's humanity and righteousness." Consequently, the Southern *Shan-yu* [i.e., Hu-han-ye] submitted as a vassal, and for 60 years there were no incidents along the border. Now, even if we cannot help [the Uighurs] in their weakness, how could it be fitting because of that to take pleasure in their calamity? This is the third thing which cannot be countenanced.

I humbly hope that [Your Majesty] will compose an edict [ordering] Taiyuan and Zhenwu to arrange their cavalry and troops along the border, and strictly guard against surprise attacks. [They should] wait for aggression against our nation's cities and garrisons, and [only] after that use military force to expel [the Uighurs]. If [the Uighurs] only rob the Tanguts and the Tui-hun [i.e., Tu-yu-hun] a bit, we should tolerate those tribes taking their own revenge, but we must not assist them with weapons or troops. If we are consistent in bringing [the

[17] See n. 3 above. It seems clear that Wen Deyi had suffered a defeat in a skirmish with some Uighurs and now desired to regain his lost honor.

Uighurs] to place great trust in us, and in finding means to conciliate them, then even though they are barbarians, they certainly will be united in gratitude for our kindness.

If we wait for Zhang Jia to return, then we will completely learn all the facts of the matter.[18] Nevertheless, I hope that [Your Majesty] will order Tian Mou not to act on his own authority and perpetrate clever schemes or recklessly contrive unusual [ways to gain] merit. I also [hope that Your Majesty] will order [Zhang] Zhongwu not to entertain the suspicious talk of his generals and officers and [thereby] give rise to [unfavorable] developments for the nation.

If I receive permission, I humbly hope to transmit this to the Hanlin Academy for consultation on how to put these ideas into effect.

[Doc. 4] A Memorial Requesting That Goods and an Edict Be Granted to the Uighur Ormïzt and Others

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 13: 102-103, *LWRWJ* 13: 4a-4b, *QTW* 701: 9119]

Recently we had been waiting only for the envoy Zhang Jia to return. Now he has been back for several days, and we must prepare another dispatch as soon as possible. Ever since the Uighurs entered our border, we have not [been able] to ascertain their numbers. Tiande's military strength is quite small, so we must employ conciliatory means [in dealing with the Uighurs]. I humbly submit that since ancient times there have been only two ways to resist the barbarians. One is to give generously to mollify them; the other is to use force to expel them. The advantages and disadvantages of such affairs have been obvious, and since ancient times they have had clear results. Han Xuandi was generous and soothing to Hu-han[-ye], and so greatly enjoyed the benefits in that the borders were without incident for 60 years. Han Wu[di] controlled the Xiong-nu with force, and [as a consequence] the entire realm was exhausted, and [the number of] living persons was reduced by half.

Now, if we do not show a bit of kindness toward Ormïzt, and make him completely happy, then we must use all our strength to expel him;

[18] Zhang Jia had been sent out before this memorial was submitted. Otherwise, Li Deyu would have included a request to dispatch Zhang Jia within the memorial.

[otherwise] I certainly fear that it would cause interminable troubles at the border. Even if his horde is broken and scattered so that it would not be difficult to destroy them, we should still show kindness to them at first, so as not to raise their suspicions. The ancients said, "If you wish to take something, [first] you must give something."[19] [This saying] is *à propos* to this [matter].

I and others have discussed [this matter]. Even if we do not lend [the Uighurs] grains and other foodstuffs, we cannot be too stingy in the things which we do give them. If we stop at giving things only to the *tigin*s and ministers, I truly fear that our mission will not be successful. We should be rather generous; if this would not be [too] wasteful and harmful to the court, it could preserve our safety. The multitudes at court and in the wilderness all hope that it will be like this. I humbly hope that [Your Majesty's] sage compassion will grant a special assent [to my request].

[Doc. 5] An Imperial Edict Granted to the Uighurs Ormïzt and Others

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 5: 34-35, *LWRWJ* 5: 9a-10a, *QTW* 698: 9082-9083]

An imperial command to the Uighurs Ormïzt Tigin, Naghïd Chor Tigin, Xi-wu Chor Tigin,[20] Wu-li-si Tigin,[21] the Minister Chi-xin, and

[19] This is from chapter 36 of the Daoist classic *Dao de jing*; see Chen, *Laozi jin zhu jin yi*, 141 and n. 3. In his study of the Mawangdui manuscripts of the *Dao de jing*, Hendricks translated the passage as follows: "If you wish to snatch something from it, You must certainly give something to it." This is followed by "This is called the Subtle Light. The submissive and weak conquer the strong." See Hendricks, trans., *Lao-tzu: Te-tao Ching*, 258-259. Hence the military application is evident.

[20] The Chinese Xi-wu suggests no known Turkic name or title, although it is possible that Chinese *-wu* represents Turkic *–bir*; see chapter 1, n. 77. This high-ranking Uighur remained loyal to Ormïzt throughout the latter's difficulties with the minister Chi-xin that were to follow. Xi-wu later was granted the title Duke of the Commander of Changhua and the name Li Siyi; see *XTS* 217b: 6132. His name is given as Xi-wen in *THY* 100: 1799.

[21] This is no doubt the same person as the Wu-luo-si mentioned in *XTS* 217b: 6132; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 135, n.2. For the Tang pronunciation of both variants, see *GHWD* 789, 1443/1026, and 464. This suggests a name or title such as Oros/Urus; see Golden, "Cumanica III: Urusoba."

others: Zhang Jia and the others have returned, and We have learned that you wish to come to the imperial palace from afar to display your loyal submission in person. [Hearing them] speak admiringly of your strong determination [in this matter], how could We forget Our heartfelt concern [for you]?

We have heard that recently your nation suffered from famine, and because of this was scattered, that relatives and subjects [of the former qaghan] rebelled, that various outside tribes encroached [on your territory], and that the newly established qaghan has not yet [restored] peace and security. But since [the new qaghan] was raised up by those of your nation, he is your sovereign and relative.[22] The ancients said, "There has never been a humane person who abandoned his relative, nor a righteous person who neglected his sovereign." We presume that your basic intention must be to support [the new qaghan].

Moreover, for generations the Uighurs have been strong north of the desert, overawing all the [other] foreigners. Now that you have suffered injury, this is cause for great grief and indignation. If you all wrangle among yourselves for dominance, not looking to your sovereign but each occupying one corner, you certainly will be weakened even further. We are quite concerned that, following this, you will not be respected by the other foreigners.

For generations we have been connected with your nation by marriage, and long have fostered good neighborliness. Every time We think about this, We are moved to great sympathy [for your present plight]. In making a plan with you, We must attend to the far-reaching and the wide scope. Nothing would be better than for you yourselves to encourage each other to unite and serve the [new] qaghan, recover your nation, and again strive for strength and prosperity.

We would like to summon you to the imperial palace to convey Our concerns to your personally, but We fear that the qaghan will learn of it and say that We rejoice in his distress and thus have summoned and received you. We wish thoroughly to preserve the integrity of your nation and, at the same time, allow you to avoid the resentment [of the new qaghan]. Thinking in this manner, it is thus difficult for Us to

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This man was also among Ormïzt's loyal followers, and later was granted the title duke of the commandery of Ningshuo and the name Li Sili; see *XTS* 217b: 6132 and *THY* 100: 1799.

[22] As we have seen, the actual familial relationship between Ormïzt Tigin and Ögä Qaghan, if any, cannot be determined from the available sources. But it does seem clear that they represented rival factions within the Uighur nobility.

comply with your request. You should promptly return to your own homeland and remain [at the Chinese border] no longer.

Your petition requested weapons and armor. We are sovereign over myriad nations, not merely a single foreign land. We dare not transgress [the bounds of] the old regulations of Our ancestors. Our nation has never granted weapons or armor to any of the foreign peoples. You should be perfectly aware of this. If We were gracious in [this] one instance, then a precedent would certainly be established.

In the orderly arrangement [of official rounds], according to the old regulations We should wait for the qaghan to send [envoys with] camels and horses to be imperially welcomed; only then should We order [Our delegation] to be sent forth [to meet the qaghan]. Since the qaghan's envoy has not arrived, it is difficult for Us to send out [a delegation].

The gifts which We now bestow upon you are all recorded separately. Considering that you were the first to turn to Us, We have specially manifested Our abundant grace to you.

Since the new qaghan has not yet received imperial appointment from the court, We fear that it is not appropriate for Us repeatedly to send envoys to your tribe. [Thus], the things which We are granting you [must] stop at this point. We think that you will comprehend and be understanding of Our concerns. Herewith We order the high-ranking official Wei Jingxiu to convey this edict, which We think should inform you fully.

[Doc. 6] A Memorial Requesting Increased Military Preparations at Taiyuan

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 13: 103, *LWRWJ* 13: 4b-5a, *QTW* 703: 9142-9143]

Since the homeland of Ormïzt and the others has been destroyed, they have no place to which to return. They have been loitering about the border now for a full year. Although we recently bestowed upon them the gifts of [Your Majesty's] grace and instructed them to return [to their homeland], still their own land is not at peace. Now winter is here, and their horses and [other] domesticated animals are lean and few in number. It certainly would be difficult for them to set out on a journey [under such conditions].

The Uighurs have been on good terms with us for many years, and

long have manifested loyalty and devotion [to China]. Although they are within our border, we doubt that there is any [cause] to worry about a surprise attack. What does worry me and others is that the Tibetans will employ various devices to deceive us. We cannot predict this. Perhaps they will say, "The Chinese [court] is now preparing against the northern barbarians [i.e., the Uighurs], and so has no time to defend the West." Or perhaps they will say, "Ormïzt has requested rice [from the Tang] and is making the Uighurs sweat it out [waiting to see if it will be granted to them]. [Let us] take advantage of this opportunity and plot to capture Fengzhou[a]." This sort of thing already happened in the 13th year of the Yuanhe reign period [9 February 818 – 29 January 819].[23] We must not be unprepared. Although the stipulated number of troops for Taiyuan has been maintained, they have all been dispersed by the generals to various places. To bring these [troops] together in one place in an emergency would be quite difficult.

I and others have discussed the matter. We request that 3000 infantry from Chen[zhou] and Xu[zhou], as well as 3000 infantry from Zheng[zhou] and Hua[zhou], be sent out and ordered to camp together at Taiyuan. If there should be an alarum at the northern border, then the Datong Army will be right in the bandits' path, and this will be adequate to cope with [such] an event. If there is [cause for] worry about [an attack by the Tibetans on] Hexi, then we can order [these troops which will be levied] to cross the Yellow River via Lan[zhou] or Shi[zhou], and thus get there expeditiously.

Moreover, in these two circuits [i.e., Chen-Xu and Zheng-Hua] people's hearts are loyal, and it will not be difficult to levy [troops]. It would be just like any year's defense preparations against autumn [incursions], and will not require prohibitive expenditures.

I and others have deliberated [about this] in an open discussion. We all wish to guard against this [possibility of an attack]. Our humble thought is that Your Majesty perspicaciously will grant a special assent [to this request].

[23] This apparently refers to Tibetan attacks on China's northwest border in the winter of 818-819; see *ZZTJ* 240: 7754 and *JTS* 15: 464-465.

[Doc. 7] A Memorial Requesting That an Envoy Be Sent to Inquire After the Taihe Princess

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 13: 103-104, *LWRWJ* 13: 5a-5b, *QTW* 703: 9143]

I humbly point out that during the Yuanhe reign period [806–821], when the Uighurs repeatedly requested a marital alliance, [Emperor] Xianzong refused. At the beginning of the Zhangqing reign period [821–825], [Emperor] Muzong considered that the northern barbarians for generations had been connected [to China] by good marriage [relations]. China had no cause for anxiety; the borders were at peace, and mortals were blessed. Thus, he parted with one he cherished and granted [his sister, the Taihe Princess, to the Uighurs], marrying her off beneath her status to display his benevolence and win their hearts.[24]

Now the Uighur nation has been laid waste, and we do not know where the princess is. If we do not send an official to inquire after her and comfort her distress, the barbarians certainly will say that when our nation gave the princess [in marriage] to the barbarian court, we really did not care anything about her. Then they will think lightly of [relations with] us and will never have respectful feeling for us. Not only will we deeply hurt the barbarians' feelings; we truly will be turning our backs on the princess as well.

I and others have discussed this. We hope to order Miao Zhen[25] to lead ten or 20 light cavalry to take her an imperial letter. First, he [should] go to Ormïzt's dwelling and have him [i.e., Ormïzt] send an escort with them to the place where the princess is. If Ormïzt accepts the court's command, [this will] certainly display his obedient heart. If he makes excuses and declines this undertaking, it will amply reveal evidence of his rebelliousness. As a result of this intelligence mission,

[24] This account is not strictly accurate, in that Xianzong did at last agree in 820, after several refusals, to grant a Chinese princess to the Uighur qaghan. The emperor died very soon after this, however, and it was left to his successor Muzong to carry out the marriage arrangements. See Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, 44-46.

[25] Miao Zhen's given name is written in other forms; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 138, n. 4. In Wuzong's imperial order to send the envoy, the name of the person sent is given as Miao Wan; see *QTW* 76: 997. This name also appears in the account in *THY* 6: 78. The similarity of the various names makes it likely that they all refer to a single person, who remains otherwise unidentified.

there will be no [way for him to keep his] feelings secret.

I humbly hope for an imperial command to grant this special inquiry.

[Doc. 8] An Imperial Proclamation Sending Wang Hui and Others to Pacify the Uighurs

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 3: 13-14, *LWRWJ* 3: 2b-3a, *QTW* 698: 9075]
[Translation: Tsai, 61-62 (partial)]

An imperial order.

Since ancient times, wise rulers have soothed [those who] submitted from the wilderness. Those who were loyal to our nation thus obtained gracious [confirmation] of their [line's] continuance; those who were obedient to the Way thus obtained righteous [assistance] for their survival. Therefore, [China] has generously [rewarded] their facing toward civilization and been abundantly [pleased] at reports of their merit.

For successive generations the Uighurs have been related [to the Tang imperial house] by marriage, and long have cultivated the propriety of vassals. They have submitted to Our name and influence, and preserved this trust and sincerity. We remember their excellent loyalty in the past when our nation was in difficulties. Severe frost reveals the strongest pine; harsh wind reveals the toughest grass. We will always speak of their meritorious efforts. How could We forget them?

Now We have heard that [the Uighurs] have been attacked by the Kirghiz. Their troops have been decimated and their horde has revolted; their animals and possessions have been greatly depleted and their nation's people have [suffered] repeated famines. Wandering about from place to place, [some have come] from afar and passed over the desert [to China].

Recently, because the Taihe Princess sent an envoy to court, We learned that the newly established qaghan is residing at the border. She has told Us of their poverty and asked for sanctuary, [since] they have no place to which to return. Whenever We contemplate their distress, We feel deep pity. Now We wish to relieve their poverty and hardship, and soothe them in their distress. This will cause [people] everywhere to know that We do not forget former merit, and preserve [those who exhibit] great obedience.

In the past, when the Xiong-nu were in disorder, Hu-han[-ye] offered submission at the border. Han Xuandi had grain transferred to relieve him. This was the right thing to do for the time and circumstances. As a result [of his actions], for three generations [the Xiong-nu] called themselves vassals [of China] and alarums ceased along the northern frontier. Can We ignore the excellent examples of the past?

It is fitting for Us to order Grand General of the Right Imperial Insignia Guard and President of the Censorate Wang Hui[26] to take the emblems of command and serve as grand imperial pacification commissioner. Vice-President of the Court of Imperial Clan Affairs and Vice-President of the Censorate Li Shiyan will serve as assistant [imperial pacification] commissioner. They will go specially to make solicitous inquiries [of the Uighurs] and also to aid them with 20,000 *shi* of rice and other grains in order to gather and settle those who have scattered, so that those who gradually have come south of the desert may recover their former territory. The goodness of Our grace will last forevermore; when it is made manifest within China and without, all should understand Our heartfelt concern.

[Doc. 9] A Letter Granted to the Uighur Qaghan

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 5: 29-30, *LWRWJ* 5: 1b-2b, *QTW* 699: 9094-9095]
[Translation: Tsai, 67-70]

An imperial order.

Our nation holds sway over myriad lands. Its [northern] boundary has [always] been arranged south of the Yin Mountains. The former qaghans always led their own tribes to establish their standards north of the great desert. Each [of our nations] has been content in [our respective] territories for more than 200 years. This is Heaven's separation of "inner" from "outer"; it may not be transgressed.

Recently, We have heard that you were defeated by the Kirghiz, in addition to suffering from famine. Your nation's capital has become a mound of ruins, and corpses lie stiff along the roads. Now the Qaghan

[26] On the question of Wang Hui's title (some sources read "Left Imperial Insignia Guard," while others read "Right Imperial Insignia Guard"), see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 140, n. 8.

has gathered together some of those who were scattered, and gradually has approached Our border cities. If We are to discuss a far-reaching plan, first We should issue a pronouncement. Thus, We hereby send Our envoy. You should hearken to Our words!

For successive generations the [Uighur] qaghans have evinced sincerity towards China. In the past, when the Central Plain [i.e., China] was in difficulty, they aided [China] in exterminating a host of evils. Every emperor in the [dynastic] line recognized their merit, and constantly bestowed abundant favors on them. The Ningguo and Xian'an Princesses were given to the northern court in marriage,[27] and in a preceding reign [i.e., Muzong's] this good [practice] was carried on with the [granting] of the present [Taihe] Princess [to a previous Uighur qaghan]. Moreover, since your land does not produce silk, we sent you silken goods every year. Our grace and your propriety grew more profound by turns. All the [other] foreigners declared their admiration of this, and [consequently] have long maintained sincerity and trust. We two have put an end to suspicion and mistrust simply by employing our nations' former regulations. Foreigners and Chinese [occupy] different lands. If you transgress this arrangement [even] slightly, how can We regard this with equanimity?

Last year, Ormïzt Tigin arrived near the [Chinese] border. The border generals were roused to anger, and requested [permission] to drive him away. But We remembered that he had no sovereign to whom he could return, and so ordered that he be settled and comforted. Now the Qaghan has been established. Once the others have returned to allegiance, you should lead them gradually to recover your former territory. Drifting about and dwelling by the Great Wall certainly is not a good plan.

Moreover, We have received a petition from the minister *il-ögäsi* and others [asking] to borrow a city in Zhenwu as a temporary residence for the Qaghan and the princess. The regulations of China are not the same as those of foreigners outside. We must adhere to the precedents set by previous generations and the laws of Our ancestors.

[27] The Ningguo Princess was a daughter of the emperor Suzong (r. 756–762). In 758 she was given in marriage to the Uighur ruler Yingwu Weiyuan Bilgä Qaghan (r. 747–759), better known as Mo-yan Chor. The Xian'an Princess was a daughter of the emperor Dezong (r. 779–805). In 788 she was given in marriage to the Uighur ruler Qutlugh Changshou Tianqin Bilgä Qaghan (r. 779–789), better known as Ton/Tun Bagha. See *THY* 6: 75 as well as Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire*, 62-65 and 97-99.

In the past, during the Han dynasty, the [Xiong-nu] *shan-yus* were in disorder. Hu-han[-ye] came to the border in submission. [After receiving him, Han] Xuandi sent the *shan-yu* [Hu-han-ye] out via Jilusai[28] to the northern regions, assisting him only with rice and grain.[29] At the beginning of Our state [i.e., the present dynasty], Emperor Taizong ordered Li Simo to establish his standard south of the desert. The remains [of his settlement] are still there. Both of these affairs can be verified. Never has a [major foreign group] deeply entered the Chinese borders [to dwell] nor borrowed a city. It truly would demean the Qaghan's honor if you were to become like the common people of the petty mongrel tribes of Tui-hun and Tanguts [which dwell within the Chinese border]; moreover, it would upset China's old practices. If, because you have not recovered your homeland, you want to move to some other good place and [thus] seek the aid of Our great nation while quelling the dissension among your various tribes, you should then lead those people who wish to come and stop [just] south of the desert. We naturally will allow the princess to come to court for an audience to inquire personally about what should be done in this matter. In the event that We may expect to receive her, We certainly will show no regard for expense.

We wish to cause your nation to be at peace henceforth. Would that not be what is called leaving danger behind and going toward peace, or turning calamity into good fortune? If the princess will come and inform Us of the Qaghan's sincerity, Our heart will be deeply moved.

In establishing regulations [between our two nations], we must remain far-sighted. Thus We are sending Grand General of the Right Imperial Insignia Guard and President of the Censorate Wang Hui and his assisting officer, Vice-President of the Court of Imperial Clan Affairs and Vice-President of the Censorate Li Shiyan, to gallop forth and explain our feelings to you. When you have agreed upon a place for you to dwell, then [we shall] conclude a covenant. With the gods as witnesses, how could We retract Our promise? The Qaghan likewise [should] preserve singleness of mind and thus, for your part, seek abundant felicity.

[28] This pass was located in the Ordos region, on the northwest bank of the Yellow River; see *ZGGJDM* 1334.

[29] This is not strictly true. Han Xuandi also provided Hu-han-ye with a military escort, although these certainly were not intended for combat duty; see *ZZTJ* 27: 887-888.

[Doc. 10] A Draft of a Letter Granted to the Uighurs

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 5: 30, *LWRWJ* 5: 2b-3b, *QTW* 699: 9095]
[Translations: Chavannes & Pelliot, 290-291 (partial), Tsai, 71-72]

We consider that because [the Uighurs] long have cultivated good neighborliness, and [because China] repeatedly has granted them excellent wives in marriage, the Qaghan and the princess [now] look toward Our nation as if they were coming home to their relatives. We constantly think to allow them to be received magnanimously, and certainly do not harbor the slightest suspicion of them. But Our generals, ministers, and important retainers repeatedly have expressed [the results of] their open discussions. They consider that the [Uighur] qaghans for generations lived in the isolated desert and came to control all the [other] foreigners [by means of] their reputation for bravery and their numerous tribal forces. [But] now you are loitering around Our border and have drawn near the border cities. The common people do not feel secure; peoples' hearts are full of suspicion. Ploughing and sowing have been completely abandoned; soldiers and horses are utterly wearied.

For the past two years We have sheltered the Qaghan's entire nation by preventing criticisms from high officials within [the capital] and by preventing protestations from the border generals without. Moreover, We have treated the Qaghan with the utmost sincerity. The Qaghan must take a hard look at the facts and effect a return [to your native land] as soon as possible.

As for the grain that you have requested, and the matters of providing security for the Manichaeans [in China] and making an official investigation into the plundering done by the Tui-hun and Tanguts, as well as other affairs; these should all be addressed and settled. They must be taken care of satisfactorily. However, regarding your proposal to borrow a city, from ancient times on down [to the present] this has never been done. Heaven and Earth have divided north and south by deserts, mountains, and rivers. We consider that since ancient times foreigners and Chinese have fully recognized this. It is simply as in [the case of] Chang'an: to the east is the Tong Pass, to the west is the San Pass, to the south is the Lantian Pass, and to the north is the Pu Pass. Now, [all within] the four seas is one family, but even the capital city of the Son of Heaven has its boundaries and divisions. Moreover,

foreigners and Chinese [occupy] different lands. What could they have in common? Furthermore, Our empire is that of [the emperors] Gaozu and Taizong. In preserving Our ancestors' perfect accomplishments, We often have feelings of dread and awe. How could We dare to disregard the natural boundaries [established by] Heaven and Earth, or to defy the laws of Our ancestors within China? Whenever We desire to issue an order or enact a command, all of them are reported at the imperial ancestral temples. We dare not act on Our own authority. As a matter of principle, We must cease discussion of your borrowing a city. We consider that the Qaghan must then put this idea to rest and not mention it again. As for everything else, We have ordered Yang Guan to go specially to explain Our feelings.

[Doc. 11] A Memorial Enumerating What Should Be Done to Prepare the Border North of Taiyuan

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 13: 105-106, *LWRWJ* 13: 7a-8b, *QTW* 705: 9167]

To the north of Yunzhou, all [previous military] positions have been abandoned. It is important to attach them to Batoufeng for our defense preparations. Now, although Fu Che's repairs have been completed, reinforcements have not been added within Batoufeng to guard it. This is the same as making futile arrangements. I fear that it does not suit the [present] circumstances. Before Batoufeng was neglected there were troops within Batoufeng guarding several positions, [but] since Batoufeng has been neglected they have been withdrawn altogether. I hope to order the officers of the border patrol to meet soon with Fu Che to make plans for the soldiers who were previously withdrawn to resume their former positions. If the former troops have become few, then in the area between [Batoufeng] and [the land] outside the walls of Taiyuan [we should] levy troops. [Men in] the area contiguous to the region east of the mountains, as well as the troops of the northwest garrisons, are not to be included in this levy. If we wish to build more walled fortifications, we may delegate [these levied troops] to establish them one by one.

The three Cities for Receiving Submission are 400 *li* [about 133 miles] apart from each other. Since the establishment of the Tiande Army and the Military Governorship of Zhenwu, the Eastern City for Receiving Submission has been within their jurisdiction. For the most

part, the city has no soldiers or horses for guarding it. Then, within the Central City for Receiving Submission, there are no more than 30 to 50 people. The old city wall has become broken down, and nowhere has it been repaired. Now the barbarian hordes are north of the Yin Mountains, and have traversed all the routes within the mountains. If they suddenly emerge south of the mountains and enter [the area of those] two cities, then Tiande and Zhenwu will at that time be cut off [from each other]. The Cities for Receiving Submission were originally the Fu-yun shrine of the Türks.[30] They are strategically very important places. Now the manpower of Tiande is inadequate [for their defense]. I hope to order [the officials at] Taiyuan and Zhenwu together to send out 3000 men to repair the walls rapidly and then guard [the cities]. Thereupon Tiande will strengthen its own situation, and the barbarian cavalry will not dare to spy on our border.

In recent years, the Eastern City for Receiving Submission has been newly fortified, [but] within the city walls there is no [source of] water. [The inhabitants] take water from the Gold River [Jin He]

[30] According to *TD* 198: 1074, the Central City for Receiving Submission stood on the site of the former Fu-yun shrine (*ci*) of the Türks. Before 708, the Yellow River had served as a boundary between Tang China and the Eastern Türks. Whenever the latter planned to attack China, they would first visit this shrine to make sacrifices and ask for good fortune in the upcoming campaign. Cen Zhongmian suspected that Fu-yun should be seen as a transcription of Turkic *Burqan*, "Buddha," but took this idea no further; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 146, n. 9. *Burqan* was indeed the common designation of the Buddha in Old Turkic texts, although it was also used as an epithet for Mani during the Uighur period. Clauson wrote that *Burxan* (i.e., *Burqan*) is a "compound of Chinese *fu* [usually transcribed as *fo*] and presumably *xan* [i.e., the common Turkic title *qan*, "khan, ruler, emperor"]. The Chinese character was the one chosen to transcribe Buddha, and was pronounced approximately *bur* in NW China in [the] VII-VIII [centuries]. This word, corresponding properly to some phr[ase] like *Buddharājā*, was the one chosen to represent Buddha in the earliest Turkish translation of Buddhist scriptures, which must have antedated the appearance of Manichaeism among the Turks, and was taken over by the Manichaean missionaries to translate words like 'prophet' applied e.g. to Mani himself"; see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 360-361. Cen's hypothesis seems plausible in the light of the Tang pronunciation of Fu-yun; see *GKWD* 511 and 1446, as well as Csongor, "Chinese in the Uighur Script of the T'ang-Period," 92 and Sinor, "À propos de la biographie ouigoure de Hiuan-tsang," 575 on the use of Tang Chinese final *-t* to render Turkic final *-r*. If a Chinese person recording the information about the Türks' "shrine" on the northern bank of the Yellow River did not realize that it was a Buddhist temple, it would not be surprising that he did not employ the Chinese term *fo*, but instead attempted to transcribe Turkic *Burqan* to the best of his ability. On Buddhism among the Türks, see von Gabain, "Buddhistische Türkenmission" as well as Kljaštornyj and Livšic, "The Sogdian Inscription of Bugut Revised."

outside the city walls to fulfill their drinking [needs]; moreover, ten to 20 wells have been dug near the west gate of the city wall. If the city were besieged, then it certainly would be in dire distress. Recently, an outer wall was constructed to protect those getting water from the wells. The old wall [built by] Zhang Renyuan[31] should be regarded as strategically very important. Zhang Weiqing erroneously memorialized that he feared that the Yellow River would damage it by erosion.[32] [But that] former worthy's [i.e., Zhang Renyuan's] constructions all have had protection from the gods. [Although the wall] has been neglected for the past 20 years, its foundation is as before, and the gardens of vegetation which were planted are still there today. [The city] is separated from Shengzhou by the [Yellow] River; they are several *li* away from each other. I hope to depute a commissioner of the border patrol to plan with Liu Mian how to restore the wall to its former [condition] and make it very secure and effective.

As for the above items, I and others feel that since the Uighurs are at the border, we must make immediate preparations. When the border preparations have been strengthened, it will not be difficult to control [matters]. My inquiry into the strong and weak points [of the border situation] is as roughly stated here.

It is imperative[33] that we send an envoy specially to investigate personally [the feasibility of] the lines of action [suggested above], and [then] to prepare a carefully itemized [report] as above. As for

[31] Biographies of Zhang Renyuan may be found in *JTS* 93: 2981-2983 and *XTS* 111: 4151-4153. In 708 (erroneously given in *TD* 198: 1074 as 711; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 146, nn. 9-10), Zhang took advantage of the absence of the Türk Qaghan Qapghan, commonly known in Chinese sources as Mo-chuo, to seize some territory north of the great bend of the Yellow River that previously had been under Türk control. He then built the three Cities for Receiving Submission to block future Türk invasions. It is clear that the three cities had become neglected over time, no doubt in part due to the Tang court's relatively peaceful relations with the Uighurs after the An Lushan rebellion.

[32] As a military official stationed at the Eastern City for Receiving Submission, Zhang Weiqing (for whom there is no known biography) memorialized in 825 that because the city was near the banks of the Yellow River, its parapets were slowly being broken down, apparently because of erosion caused by the river. Although he requested permission to transfer his headquarters to another location, Emperor Jingzong instead granted him funds to repair the city walls. These repairs apparently were completed within the year. See Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 146-147, n. 11.

[33] The text here may be slightly corrupt, with possibly two characters missing; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 148, n. 13.

those items which are not accomplished, I hope to depute a commissioner of the border patrol to discuss [those matters] with the military governor of the place [in question] and to submit a memorial that has been carefully prepared as above.[34]

[Doc. 12] A Memorial Discussing the Uighur Captives Taken by the Tiande Army

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 13: 108, *LWRWJ* 13: 11a-11b, *QTW* 9159-9160]

Today I and others have seen the memorialist from the Tiande Army, Wang Kedu, who stated that whenever there are Uighurs who surrender and come to the city, [the army] takes five or ten persons. Since they do not dare keep them in the military city, after receiving information from them they then dispose of them all.

I humbly consider that the Uighurs are in distressed poverty and that their situation is pitiable. If they are repeatedly killed or wounded, I fear that this will thwart their transformation to humaneness. I hope to have the Hanlin Academy bestow an edict on Tian Mou and [Zhang] Zhongwu [to the effect that] sooner or later, whenever this sort [of situation] arises again, then [the surrendered Uighurs should be] sent on to Taiyuan and caused to be distributed among the various provinces for settlement. This would be more satisfactory [than doing as Tiande now is]. I do not know if this is permissible or not.

Huichang second year, third month, fourth day.

[Doc. 13] A Memorial Discussing Ormïzt Tigin and Others

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 13: 107, *LWRWJ* 13: 10b-11a, *QTW* 704: 9159]

Since the Uighurs have approached our border, people's hearts have been filled with suspicion and fear. [But] the majesty and virtue of the Imperial influence are able to spread far; as a result, Ormïzt

[34] In all editions of *HCYPJ* and *LWRWJ*, Doc. 17 has been mistakenly appended to this text as if it were part of that text; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 148, n. 14.

looked toward the imperial city with thoughts of submission and led his followers to offer his services [to China]. We must reward him abundantly and make it known in all directions to let the barbarians afar hear of it, so that all may be affected by [Your Majesty's] grace and faithfulness.

I hope quickly to send an imperial commissioner to soothe the *tigin* Ormïzt as well as the princes and others, together with the several generals he controls—altogether seven persons. I wish to bestow on each of them variegated brocades and silver implements. As for the cavalry under Ormïzt, I wish to grant them 5000 *shi* of rice,[35] and to have the Department of Public Revenue give them 3000 rolls of *juan* silk. [We should] use goods [obtained from] the Ministry of Finance to make up the calculated amount, and quickly depute Zheng Kang to transport it [to the Uighurs]. Furthermore, [Your Majesty should] consent that the tribe(s) [of these Uighurs] not be dispersed [among the various circuits for resettlement]. [We should] wait until we really know the circumstances, and then continue the discussion of enacting [the redistribution of these Uighurs].

[Huichang second year, fifth month, fourth day].[36]

[Doc. 14] A Memorial Discussing the Granting of a Name to Ormïzt and His 2618 Generals and Officers

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 13: 107-108, *LWRWJ* 13: 11a,[37] *QTW* 704: 9159]

The generals and officers under Ormïzt have already been given clothing and provisions; they have also been granted caps and sashes [i.e., Chinese-style clothing]. If we grant their army a [legitimate] name, it truly will strengthen our reputation along the border. In pacifying these people there is nothing more urgent than this.

I and others have discussed this. We wish to bestow upon them

[35] According to Balász's figures, 5000 *shi* = 362,720 kg., which is equivalent to approximately 799,652 lbs. avoirdupois, or almost 400 U.S. tons.

[36] This date is not given in any edition of *HCYPJ* or *LWRWJ*, but was known to Sima Guang; see *ZZTJJKY* 246: 7961 as well as Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 157, n. 1.

[37] The title of this document has erroneously been omitted from the table of contents for ch. 13 in editions of *LWRWJ*.

the name of Return to Righteousness Army. Furthermore, we wish the Hanlin Academy to grant an imperial letter proclaiming Ormïzt's subordinates to be generals, officers, etc. of the Return to Righteousness Army. As for Ormïzt, we hope, moreover, to have him serve concurrently as imperial commissioner of the Return to Righteousness Army.

If this meets with [Your Majesty's] approval, then [we should] add to [his title of commissioner] an appointment as [honorary] president of the Ministry of Works and have this proclaimed. Furthermore, the Secretariat-Chancellery [should be] notified of this.

Huichang second year, sixth month, twenty-first day.

[Doc. 15] A Memorial Discussing Ormïzt's Family Members and Others

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 13: 108, *LWRWJ* 13: 12a, *QTW* 705: 9163]

Ormïzt has already been granted a military designation, and [now] has requested [permission] to settle the members of his family at Taiyuan. He, with all his younger brothers and the others, has [truly] risen foremost over hardships.

I and others have discussed this. Ormïzt has sincerely turned toward the imperial capital [in submission] and has defended the border with the utmost effort. [Compliance with] his request to send all his kindred to the interior [of China] would not only eliminate his concern [for them], but would also strengthen his spirit to fight [for China]. I hope to order Liu Mian and [Lü] Yizhong[38] to select an unoccupied fortified city in Yun[zhou], Shuo[zhou], or another province, and according to the situation build earthen houses [for them]. As for the family members of Ormïzt and the [Uighur] minister Ayabïr, [we should] build other strong, clean houses for them to settle in. As for their Chinese family members and others who should return, the adults [should be] given three *dou* of rice[39] per month to serve as provisions, to be supplied monthly by the Department of Public Revenue through the imperial military commissioners. Also, [we should] charge Liu Mian

[38] This man's surname is revealed in *JTS* 18a: 599, where he is named as an army inspector in Hedong. He has no known biography.

[39] Using Balász's figures, 3 *dou* = 21.7632 kg., or approximately 48 lbs. avoirdupois.

to send Chinese troops to guard and assist [Ormïzt's Uighurs] as may be needed. We must not allow [other] tribes nearby to encroach [on them] and make disturbances.

[Doc. 16] A Draft of a Letter Granted to the Uighur Qaghan

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 5: 30-31, *LWRWJ* 5: 3b-5a, *QTW* 699: 9095-9096]

[Translations: Chavannes & Pelliot, 293-295 (partial), Tsai, 90-93]

Yang Guan has arrived. We have inspected your petition asking for provisions, cattle, and sheep. The provisions have already been permitted; you yourself should use the silk [received in the past as] payment for horses and go to Zhenwu to purchase 3000 *shi* of grain.[40] Since China regards agriculture as its foundation, it has the greatest regard for plough-oxen. Those bred by the common people are not many, and it has often been forbidden by law to slaughter them. Sheep are a product of northern lands; they are not raised in China [proper]. Only the [various subject] foreign peoples near the border engage in animal herding. The court has never requisitioned them; they must remain settled there.

It is difficult to grant either your current requests or your petition that we restrain Ormïzt and send him back [to you]. Ormïzt himself recently submitted to Our border generals; he has frequently shown the sincerity of his submission. From the beginning of the destruction of your native land, he fled and was the first to arrive at the [Chinese] border. He has not followed the Qaghan and the princess for two years. Worried that you might suspect and dislike him, he has felt sadness and fear. Impoverished and distressed, he has entrusted himself to Us, hoping that We would maintain him. He has never spoken of our joining together [against the Qaghan], nor has he sown dissension between our two nations.

The former [Uighur] qaghan(s) lost the way of [proper] governance and lacked the humaneness of love without distinction; he/they invaded

[40] Using Balász's figures, 3000 *shi* = 216,632 kg., which is equivalent to 477,586.9 lbs. avoirdupois, or approximately 239 U.S. tons.

and caused disturbances among the various foreign peoples, treating them with reckless cruelty. Therefore, inside [your nation] relatives rebelled, and outside the [other] tribes separated from [the Uighurs]. That your nation was destroyed and your family ruined is truly because of this. Now the Qaghan has lost his land and is in peril as a stranger in a faraway land. It is important that you feel remorse for former wrongs in order to pacify the rebellious. If your humane love does not reach them again, your kindred will destroy one another. Among the Qaghan's trusted officials of the left and right, who would venture to guarantee his own [safety]?

We govern myriad nations, not merely one foreign land. As for those who do not yet cleave to Us, We must devote Ourself to winning them with kindness. As for those who have submitted sincerely, it is then fitting for Us to preserve and cherish them. If We follow the Qaghan's idea [and return Ormïzt to you], We truly would be deviating from Our nurturing mercy. Now in granting special permission [for Ormïzt] to come and submit, We merely [thought to] preserve his tribe, and certainly had no other design. In order that you [also] may receive Our trust, it is up to the Qaghan to maintain Our grace and mercy and avoid losing the good faith and charity of Our court. There is no reason why both parties [i.e., the Qaghan and Ormïzt] cannot be treated properly and an excellent and most harmonious plan be formulated.

Moreover, from former generations on down, all [affairs] have had precedents. During the Han dynasty, when the *shan-yu* Hu-han-ye[41] offered submission at the border, his subordinate grand generals Wu-li-qu and Wu-li-wen-dun came to submit at the same time, and Han Xuandi honored them as marquises. Also, at the beginning of Our dynasty [lit., "nation"], when Illig Qaghan was [utterly] defeated, those [among his subordinates] who submitted were quite numerous. When his [former] chiefs and leaders arrived, the court honored them as generals. Of more than a hundred people, all were received charitably. We hope that the Qaghan deeply understands Our meaning and will not speak of [this matter] again.

The Manichaean religion was forbidden in China prior to the Tianbao reign period [10 February 742–12 August 756]. After that, its propagation was allowed because of the Uighurs' devout faith, and

[41] Here mistakenly written as Hu-yan-ye.

it was ordered that the religion be taught in all the several garrisons of Jiang[xi] and Huai[nan]. Recently We have received memorials from each of these circuits [stating that] since hearing of the destruction of the Uighurs, those who believed in the [Manichaean] faith consequently have become remiss [in their devotion]. The foreign priests who are members [of your sect] seem to be rather without support. Wu and Chu [i.e., the central and lower Yangzi region] are watery places; people's dispositions [there] are inconstant. Their faith has already gone, and the harmonious practice [of the Manichaean religion] is quite difficult.

Moreover, the Buddha was the Great Teacher[42] who esteemed the propagation of faith according to circumstances. When there is no affinity [for the religion] among the people, force is of no avail. We have deep consideration for the [Manichaean] priests who have come from distant lands, and wish them to be settled securely. Thus, We have ordered them to practice their religion in the areas of the two capitals [i.e., Chang'an and Luoyang] and of Taiyuan where there are believers. All of the [Manichaean] temples in Jiang[xi] and Huai[nan] have been temporarily closed. We will wait until the Uighurs' homeland is at peace [again], and then We will rescind the order [so that things will be] as before.

[Doc. 17] A Memorial Enumerating What Should Be Done to Attend to Tiande's Attacking and Expelling the Uighurs

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 13: 106-107, *LWRWJ* 13: 8b-10b, *QTW* 705: 9167-9168][43]

The interior imperial commissioner whom I requested be sent to take an imperial order to Yun[zhou], Shuo[zhou], and Tiande has returned. He has informed the various tribes of the unassimilated and assimilated Tui-hun, Tanguts, and others [that they should] wait until Tiande engages in battle [with the Uighurs], and then at their own discretion they may send out an army to attack and expel them. If

[42] Great Teacher (*da shi*) is one of the 10 titles of a Buddha; see Soothill and Hodous, *A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms*, 88.

[43] Note that in *HCYPJ*, *LWRWJ*, and *QTW* this document has erroneously been appended as part of Doc. 11; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 152, n. 1.

[these peoples] take sheep, horses, money, goods, slaves, etc. [from the Uighurs], their native rulers will be at liberty to gather [these things] together themselves [for distribution]. The [Chinese] officials will in no way interfere. Then, according to how many of the Uighurs were massacred, we will discuss generous rewards [for them].

In sending out armies, since ancient times all [armies] have had seconds-in-command to assure that the chief general has [proper] cause [before taking action]. Thus, it is necessary for us to obtain such a person. Shi Xiong is brave and skilled in warfare. At present there are none who are his equal [in military matters]. I hope to have him made assistant defense commissioner of the Tiande Army and [foreign] tribes as well as supreme commander of cavalry and infantry to assist Tian Mou in the attack. Thus [he should be] ordered to avail himself of this transfer and proceed to the Tiande Army.

As for the Uighur Yaghlaqar Yuan-zheng and his horse-price silk, I hope moreover to have him remain at Zhenwu and to order an interior imperial commissioner and [Li] Zhongshun together to inspect, inventory, and take control of [these Uighurs and their silk]. If Tian Mou has already used troops [in combat against the Uighurs], then I hope [Li] Zhongshun can be deputed to collect [the silk] from this Yaghlaqar Yuan-zheng and make a record of it. If [Yaghlaqar Yuan-zheng] asks to submit, then he [should be] brought under escort to Taiyuan in the orderly sequence [of official rounds]. With the exception of the [tribal] leaders [with him, we should] depute Liu Mian to divide [the Uighurs in Yaghlaqar Yuan-zheng's entourage] among Yi[zhou][a], Qin[zhou], Lan[zhou], Shi[zhou], and other prefectures that are far from the border in order to settle them. They should also be given government provisions. If [Yaghlaqar Yuan-zheng] is not willing to surrender, then we must detain him and wait until later to dispose of the matter. As for Zhao Jinyong and the others, I also hope that Liu Mian can be ordered to take over their management and settle these leaders in government residences. [?] Changxing and the others should be farmed out to various locales.[44]

Tian Mou seems altogether not to understand military tactics. It appears from his memorial that he has already sent out 3000 men to resist the Uighurs. If one calculates [the number of] his troops, this certainly must be his entire army that has been sent out. If something

[44] This meaning of this reference to these unidentifiable persons (i.e., Zhao Jinyong and [?] Changxing) is unclear.

untoward should suddenly occur, how could the city be anything but empty [i.e., without defensive troops]? The barbarians are good at rushing about on horseback, but not at besieging walled cities. Tian Mou should simply strengthen and guard the city walls and wait for reinforcements. I hope that an edict may quickly be sent to Tian Mou [stating that] he must not hurriedly send out troops to do battle in the open, [but should] wait until soldiers from various [other] places arrive [as reinforcements]; then he may attack and expel [the Uighurs] as he sees fit.

The Uighur cavalry is difficult to oppose. They trust to the forests to protect themselves from danger. We should make use of [archers with] strong crossbows [to oppose them]. I hope that 400 crossbow archers from Zhexi and 300 from Xuanzhou may be selected and ordered to take the Twisting River (Hequ) Road to Tiande. If they should encounter the Uighurs at some place, then they [should be] ordered to hold to a narrow [place] and, keeping to the thick woods, shoot [the Uighurs'] horses. The Twisting River Road goes directly to Tiande; it also passes through Yan[zhou], Xia[zhou], and other prefectures.[45] All the strategic places there should then be able to meet emergencies. After [these archers] reach Tiande, they should temporarily be placed under Tian Mou's command.

Although Ormïzt has sincerely offered his submission, we do not [really] know whether it is genuine or not. Nevertheless, he must be granted special official ranks as soon as possible. Even if he is not sincere, we can make use of his break with the others [i.e., Ögä Qaghan's group] for our own purposes. Furthermore, we must commend his loyalty [while] making a name for punishing [wrongdoing]. This will let all the foreign peoples far and near know that we at court merely condemn the qaghan for acting in a disorderly manner, and do not desire to exterminate the Uighurs.

Since the Uighurs are in want of provisions and have suffered bitterly for several years, their people's hearts should be easily moved, and we certainly can [successfully] beckon them to submit. Moreover, I hope that Tian Mou may quickly be sent [to act] as the one who beckons them to submit; he can be permitted to give them generous rewards [for doing so]. If there are barbarians who do submit, he

[45] Although the exact location of this road is unknown, some understanding of its route can be gleaned from this text.

should thereupon give them provisions and then have them taken to Taiyuan to obtain [more] generous rewards, rather then keeping them at Tiande.

I have deliberated with others [and concluded that] if we wait for a memorial to arrive from Tiande [before acting on these points], I fear it will be too late to take advantage of the [present] opportunity. I hope that this [memorial] may be transmitted to the Hanlin Academy to compose a secret edict for each [point], and that an interior imperial commissioner may be ordered to go forth and carefully examine the state of affairs. If [Tian Mou] has already met [the Uighurs] in battle, then we must settle the matter on this basis. If this is permitted, Shi Xiong should be given his orders today. I do not know if this is permissible or not.

Huichang second year, fourth month, eighteenth day.

[Doc. 18] A Memorial Reporting What Should Be Done about the Uighurs

[Edition: Lu Xinyuan, *Tang wen shi yi*, vol. 1, 411][46]

I and others have met with Yang Guan, who stated that since the cavalry that were subordinate to the Uighur Chi-xin have largely dispersed to the north of the [Yin] Mountains, [the qaghan] fears that they will join together with the Tatabï [Xi], Khitans, and Shi-wei and cut him off; therefore the qaghan dares not go far abroad. Now, since Hua Fengyu[47] has returned, we hope that an imperial

[46] This document has been omitted from modern editions of *HCYPJ*, *LWRWJ*, and *QTW*. Lu Xinyuan found the text in a Song-period edition of *HCYPJ*, and so included it in his *Tang wen shi yi*. That the document is genuine is proved by the fact that its title appears as the fifth item in the table of contents of chapter 14 of many editions of Li Deyu's collected works; see for example *LWRWJ* 14 (table of contents) as well as Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 153-154, n. 1. That Sima Guang had access to this text is shown by the fact that the information contained within it is used in *ZZTJ* 246: 7963. It appears that some time during or after the Song dynasty the text was inadvertently dropped from editions of Li Deyu's works, but the title remained in the table of contents, to be edited out only in some editions.

[47] There is a minor corruption of the text here, as two characters have been inverted. It reads *Hua Feng hui yu*, but should read *Hua Fengyu hui*. Although there is no known biography for Hua Fengyu, who was a functionary in Zhang Zhongwu's government in Youzhou, the correct form of his name is known from another text; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 154, n. 2.

edict may be sent to [Zhang] Zhongwu, ordering him to dispatch a general who has a clear understanding of the situation to go to the Tatabï, Khitans, and other tribes to proclaim the will of the court. Since the Uighurs formerly [evinced] loyal devotion [to the Tang], and also because they have been defeated [by the Kirghiz] and have attached [themselves] to our nation, the proper practice of the court should be to inquire after them and relieve them. [We should thus] order the Tatabï, Khitans, and others to join forces to attack and expel the scattered troops which were subordinate to Chi-xin, in order to allow the qaghan gradually to leave the Chinese border with no hindrance.

If this is permitted, I hope to transfer this [memorial] to the Hanlin Academy to approximate this idea and compose an edict, as well as an edict to [?] Kegong.[48] I do not know [whether this is permissible or not].

[Doc. 19] A Memorial Concerning Zhang Zhongwu's Sending of Uighur Prisoners, Camels, and Horses

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 12: 98, *LWRWJ* 12: 8b-9a, *QTW* 704: 9151]

I and others have long read the veritable [historical] records in order that [the past] not be forgotten. We humbly consider that through [the reigns of] successive emperors there has never been a precedent for such [action]. I respectfully cite the *Zuo zhuan*: "No feudal lords handed over prisoners of war to each other." In the past, Lu received prisoners from Qi, but this was criticized by Zuo [Qiuming], and all the feudal lords also considered it improper.[49] How much more so should

[48] This person, whose surname is unknown, cannot be identified. He is also mentioned in Li Deyu's "A Memorial Discussing What Should Be Done about Affairs in Youzhou," which is not translated here; see *HCYPJ* 13: 104, *LWRWJ* 13: 6a-6b, and *QTW* 703: 9143).

[49] This refers to an event of 662 B.C.E., when the Marquis of Qi handed some Rong prisoners and spoils of war over to Duke Zhuang of Lu; see Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, vol. 5: *The Ch'un Ts'ew, with the Tso Chuen*, 118-119 (of the text, not the prolegomena). Legge has translated the *Zuo zhuan*'s commentary on this as follows: "This affair was contrary to rule. When a prince has gained successes over any of the wild tribes, he presents the spoils to the king, who employs them to terrify other tribes. Spoils taken by one State from another are not so presented; and the princes do not send of their spoils to one another." Legge thus considered the Marquis's actions to have been "a piece of vainglory and display." Li Deyu's use of this example seems

we officials? We have unworthily prepared a balanced judgment. It is necessary to respect rules of conduct. If we improperly receive [that which] is wrongfully handed over, and do not observe the ancient statutes, then how [could we] sustain Your Majesty and [establish] a pattern that will be imitated by all the princes?[50] I humbly hope that Your Majesty graciously will allow me completely to refuse and return [everything that has been sent by Zhang Zhongwu]. Henceforth it will be as with former affairs. Also, I hope that [Your Majesty] will allow me to write a letter in reply, causing [Zhang Zhongwu] to understand our national regulations completely. I will write successive drafts of the letter and present them to the Throne to make [their content] known [to Your Majesty].

[Doc. 20] A Memorial Concerning Ormïzt's Request That the Horse-Price Silk in His Possession Be [Imperially] Granted to the Qaghan

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 13: 109, *LWRWJ* 13: 12b-13a, *QTW* 705: 9163]

I have deliberated with others [and consider that] granting the qaghan [what he has requested] would very much preserve the integrity of our nation. I hope that the Hanlin Academy may be charged to compose a letter to grant to the qaghan [stating]: "We have received Ormïzt's declaration which said that when [he and the Qaghan] were in their native land, each had his own horses. The price in silk for his horses

curious, for the *Zuo zhuan* does indicate that it is proper for a feudal lord to send spoils of war to the Son of Heaven. Thus, Zhang Zhongwu's offering of Uighur prisoners would seem perfectly in accordance with the proper ritual behavior set forth in that text. It should be noted that although the Rong usually are considered "western barbarians" in texts of the classical period, neither the identity nor the exact location of the particular Rong mentioned here can be established. For the locations of the ancient states of Lu and Qi, see Herrmann, *An Historical Atlas of China*, 6-7.

[50] On the translation of this rather peculiar phrase, *yi xing bai pi*, see Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, vol. 4: *The She King, or The Book of Poetry*, part IV, book I [i], ode IV, 573, in which the phrase *bai pi qi xing zhi* is translated, "It will secure the imitation of all the princes," as well as part III, book I, ode I, section 7, 431, in which the phrase *yi xing Wen Wang* is translated, "Take your pattern from King Wan." Li Deyu's phrase seems to be a reference to the first, and perhaps the second, of these passages.

has been granted in full.[51] [But Ormïzt now] has requested to offer [this silk to the throne]. Considering that the Qaghan's native land has been destroyed and that you have long been at Our border, We have already prepared to grant [the silk due to you]. As for Ormïzt's and his subordinates' own portion of horse-price silk, it [also] will be bestowed upon the Qaghan."

I also hope that Ormïzt may be granted a proclamation extolling his loyalty [stating]: "When you, Sir, led your horde to come to Our nation, you feared that if the silk payment for horses were granted to you, then the qaghan would develop an even deeper resentment toward you. And in this state of affairs, you also were anxious that this would be disadvantageous; therefore, you and others requested in a memorial that the horse-price silk be presented [to the throne] and then granted to the qaghan. Our hope is that [the qaghan's] tribe will depart as soon as possible and allow you, Sir, and the others each to preserve peace and tranquility."

It is my hope that if things are handled generally in accordance with these ideas it will be truly satisfactory.

Huichang second year, seventh month, nineteenth day.

[Doc. 21] A Draft of a Letter Taken by [Li] Zhongshun in Response to the Uighur Minister

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 8: 63, *LWRWJ* 8: 7a-8a, *QTW* 707: 9188]

Your dispatch stated that you have not yet received [the silk due to you, to be brought] in the orderly sequence of official rounds [so that you could] return to your [native] land, that you do not know from day to day when [this will be possible], and that if the [other] Uighurs hear of this matter, they will be distressed. Our nation is rich, possessing the four seas; how could we begrudge trifling commodities? Recently at the capital, when [the silk] was delivered to Yaghlaqar Yuan-zheng,[52] he was not constrained in any way. But because the qaghan's capital is not in a fixed place, [Yaghlaqar Yuan-zheng] found

[51] The text appears slightly corrupt here; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 164, nn. 2-3, and his rectification of the text on the basis of *QTWJAJ* 246: 7964, the text of which is more complete than the version of the document preserved in Li Deyu's collected works. I have followed Cen's revision.

[52] Here mistakenly written as Jiu-zheng

communications irregular. Moreover, he did not have a great number of camels and horses, and so feared that if he himself undertook the official round [to transport the silk], he would be robbed by the various foreign peoples. It was necessary to be a bit more cautious. He wanted an escort [to see him] beyond the northeast mountain ranges, but [again] was concerned that if [the mission] by chance were scattered and lost, he would also be blamed by [the qaghan]. We [now] hope that, as before, you will send camels and horses to transport [the silk], and that cavalry will be ordered to escort them.

[Your dispatch] also said that the prince Ormïzt should not approach near [to China]. Our nation exercises authority over the four barbarians; they are all like [the emperor's] children. If they are obedient to the nation [i.e., China], we should completely comfort and cherish them. As with the expanses of Heaven and Earth, there are none who are not covered and supported [by the emperor's grace]. As with the vastness of the rivers and seas, there are none who are not contained [within the emperor's embrace]. Moreover, Ormïzt is the descendant of previous qaghans. Now the [deceased] qaghan's brothers have submitted [to China] in desperation, so we have all the more cause to pity them. If we reject their sincere submission, how can that be [considered] graciousness to those far away? The Uighurs should be ashamed of themselves for not pitying [the former qaghan's] brothers. You have caused them to be ill as ease, and furthermore wish to pursue them. How can this be right? If your chieftains were oppressed by hunger and thirst and desired to come to our nation, we would treat them favorably. We must do no differently for Ormïzt. I believe that you know the depth of the court's affection toward the Uighurs. If the qaghan complies with the imperial decree as soon as possible and does not enter our border, but simply comes south of the desert to await [the emperor's] commands, what regrets can the court have?

[The dispatch] also said that the Uighurs formerly were foreigners who were easy to move to action but difficult to pacify, and that they cannot [easily] be regulated. The court merely desires that the Uighurs receive [its commands] in obedience to the nation [i.e., China], habitually do good, act only with humaneness and righteousness, and not be refractory. [If they comply with the court's desires], then the day will not arrive when the court wishes to separate itself from the Uighurs. [But] if you are only intent on invading and harassing the Chinese border and stealing cattle and sheep, and regard this as strength, we truly will not be afraid. If you act like this, how will it be regarded by

all the [other] small tribes? You wish them to recognize the Uighurs as a great power, but how could they be willing to honor you?

The border general [Li] Zhongshun is coarse; his nature is blunt and direct. Take this as a sincere warning, and favor me by thinking this over [carefully].

[Doc. 22] A Memorial Discussing the Army Garrisons of Taiyan and Zhenwu and the Tui-hun, Tanguts, and Other Tribes Trading Cattle, Horses, Camels, etc.

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 13: 109, *LWRWJ* 13: 12a-12b, *QTW* 705: 9163]

Since the Uighurs have recently received the silk payment for horses, we have learned upon inquiry that the military personnel at the border and the various ["loose-rein"] foreign tribes [there] make illicit profits in [the trade of various] goods, and that they are not chary of [parting with] their camels and horses [to obtain them]. I certainly fear that they will use them [i.e., horses and camels] for trading, to entice the outside foreigners [i.e., the Uighurs]. How can we simply give financial assistance to the barbarian [i.e., Uighur] troops? This truly would diminish [the efficacy of our] border preparations. I hope that Liu Mian, [Li] Zhongshun, [Lü] Yizhong, [?] Shouzhi,[53] and others can be ordered to put all [such animals] under lock and key. If there are any who disobey [the injunction against selling to the Uighurs], then [they will be dealt with] according to military regulations. The horses and market goods [concerned] should be officially confiscated. If someone informs the authorities [of violations of these regulations], then they may be rewarded with the goods so confiscated.

[53] This person, whose surname is unknown, cannot be identified. He is also mentioned in Doc. 26 and Doc. 45.

[Doc. 23] A Memorial Discussing What Should Be Done to Make a Surprise Attack on the Uighurs

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 17: 141-142, *LWRWJ* 17: 2a-2b, *QTW* 711: 9132]

I have received successive imperial edicts regarding the Uighurs' gradual approach to Batoufeng, the necessity to attack them as soon as possible, and the question of how we can obtain the [Taihe] Princess. I have long contemplated [these problems], examining [everything] with great care. The Uighurs are all cavalry and are good at fighting in the wilderness. If [the attack should take place on] desert land, we would have difficulties fighting them. Even though our generals are excellent and our troops strong, we would not be victorious. I have recently heard that the barbarians do not understand siege warfare. Consequently, except for knowing how to rush to and fro on horseback, they are quite unaccomplished in other [ways of warfare]. I suspect that they do not have scouts along the roads, since we have not made any sudden attack on their camp. If we order Shi Xiong to go with 1000 mounted troops of the Yiwu Cavalry and also select 1000 Tui-hun cavalry and carefully-chosen infantry to serve as flanks, and [then] gag [these troops] for a night attack, it will certainly be easy to achieve success. Morning and evening I have calculated; there is nothing better than this plan. If [such a plan] is permitted, I respectfully hope that secret decrees can be sent to each [unit] to implement it. I respectfully hope that this will be kept in the inner [chamber] and not be let out [for public knowledge].

[Doc. 24] A Memorial Discussing What Should Be Done Concerning the Uighurs

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 14: 111, *LWRWJ* 14: 2a, *QTW* 705: 9163-9164]

I and others have been thinking carefully for many days. It has already been some days since the Uighurs arrived north of Batoufeng. Reports [from that region] state that they have been quiet, much less have they committed any encroachment. Examining their circumstances, [this current situation] is simply like that [when they were at] the border near Tiande and Zhenwu earlier. A few days ago, Assistant

Secretary of the Department of State Affairs Zheng Su and others all saw me and spoke earnestly; they wish us to exercise patience in order to achieve [a long-term goal of] grace and loyalty, [and they counseled] giving repeated injunctions [to the Uighurs to keep the peace]. Even if we desire to drive out [the Uighurs], this can only be brought about by the border generals. As a rule, we let [the onus of] wrongdoing rest with the other side. We should not yet give [the generals] the authority to engage them in battle. I hope that again Liu Mian can be ordered to send an envoy with an invitation [to the Uighurs] to meet [with him]. If this is not achieved, it will not be too late to expel them. I fear that if Liu Mian writes a letter, it will not completely express the court's ideas. I hope the Hanlin Academy can be charged to grant a letter to Liu Mian explaining [the court's wishes]. On the first of this month, I and others deliberated about sending Shi Xiong to attack the enemy camp. We now hope he can be ordered to halt and re-examine the [current] state of affairs. We also hope that at the same time a decree can be sent to [Luo] Suitai[54] to handle matters [accordingly].

Huichang second year, eighth month, seventh day.

[Doc. 25] A Memorial Requesting That Troops Be Sent Out from Chen, Xu, Xu-Ru, Xiangyang, and Other [Prefectures]

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 14: 111, *LWRWJ* 14: 2b, *QTW* 705: 9164]

Yesterday I and others memorialized in person at the Yanying [Hall],[55] requesting that Taiyuan, Zhenwu, and Tiande each increase military preparations [so that] in the future there will be less coming and going [of troops] to rescue them [in times of crisis]. We humbly received the Imperial favor of assent. We [now] submit another memorial to request the raising of troops from Chen[zhou], Xu[zhou], Xu-Ru, Xiangyang, and other [prefectures].

Now, although the Uighurs have withdrawn [from the Datong

[54] Luo Suitai, for whom there is no known biography, held the rank of imperial commissioner; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 170, n. 10.

[55] On the significance of the Yanying Hall and its location within the Daming Palace, see Xiong, *Sui-Tang Chang'an*, 91 and maps 4.1 and 4.2.

region], Kang Zhiliang[56] has stated that the Tui-hun have gone [from their settlements in the north] and seized [land near] Lan[zhou], Shi[zhou], and other prefectures. We consider that they surely are returning to Ling[zhou] and Xia[zhou]. Also, the Tanguts [living within] the bend of the [Yellow] River [i.e., the Ordos region] have always hated the Uighurs. When the time arrives that the rivers are frozen over, I deeply fear that the qaghan suddenly will come out and cross the river and join in league with the Tibetans. [This] would be no trifling calamity, and I deeply wish to guard against [such] an unfavorable development. The troops raised from all our circuits would, I fear, not be able to stop [a combined force of Uighurs and Tibetans]. We must have each [unit of reinforcements] in its place before the time when the ice has formed. I respectfully have drawn up a special memorial to make this known [to Your Majesty]. I do not know whether this is permissible or not.

Huichang second year, eighth month, tenth day.

[Doc. 26] A Memorial Requesting a Secret Imperial Edict [Concerning] What Should Be Done at the Border

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 13: 102, *LWRWJ* 13: 3a-4a, *QTW* 704: 9153]

According to the Taiyuan memorialist Sun Chou, Uighurs recently arrived at the Hengshui Palisade and massacred military personnel and civilians. Now they have withdrawn to the east of Shijiabo. They are approximately 300 *li* west of the qaghan. We do not yet know if these Uighurs [east of Shijiabo] are under Naghïd Tigin or if they were sent by the qaghan. Now we must consider that these Uighurs are criminals. It is said that they have not acted because of the qaghan's commands, [but rather] have acted on their own volition to plunder the border. I request that Liu Mian and [Zhang] Zhongwu secretly be commanded to calculate and first arrange a plan [for dealing with] these bandits. If it is possible to attack them and drive them away, the action will be justifiable. And, if we destroy this one branch, the qaghan himself certainly will know fear.

[56] This person cannot be identified. His surname suggests that he may have been a Sogdian from Samarkand, or someone whose paternal ancestry included Sogdians from Samarkand; see Pulleyblank, "A Sogdian Colony in Inner Mongolia," 320-322.

I have recently heard that the [Taihe] Princess and the qaghan habitually dwell in separate tents. Each time they see a Chinese envoy, they have separate interviews. I hope that Liu Mian, [Li] Zhongshun, and [?] Shouzhi may secretly be commanded that every time an envoy goes [to the qaghan's camp, he should] be ordered secretly to look for an opportunity to inform the princess of our intentions and to let her know that the descendants of the [imperial] ancestral line live or die only for [the good of] the state, and that sometimes they must make plans to extricate themselves and return to our nation. She should not go with the qaghan, disturbing the border. If by chance [someone] obtains the princess, he should not bring her to the capital [right away]; they must remain at the border and control the Uighurs. If their strength is inadequate [for this], they can simply avail [themselves] of the princess' celebrated title to control the foreign peoples.

I am also anxious that the Uighurs will place their aged and weak family members securely beyond the mountains and [then] lead picked troops to press near our cities and palisades, harassing the [Chinese] common people. If this occurs, then we must fortify our defenses and leave nothing outside available [to the enemy]. We must not engage them in battle. The defenses and troops of these small cities are weak and inadequate to protect [these] places securely. I hope [their troops can be] withdrawn into the large cities [of the region]. Even if the Uighurs take the small cities, they still will have no use for them. Then [we should] select a brave general to surreptitiously take out troops and seize their [i.e., the Uighurs'] family members and baggage. This is the best plan for securing a victory.

I humbly [submit] the above items in the hope that for each [point] a secret decree will be granted, surreptitiously ordering that [action be taken] accordingly.

[Doc. 27] A Letter Granted to the Uighur Qaghan Including a Letter of Imperial Edict to the [Taihe] Princess and the Minister of the Nine Clans

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 5: 31-32, *LWRWJ* 5: 5a-ba, *QTW* 699: 9096]
[Translation: Tsai, 104-106]

Since We have come [to govern] the entire kingdom, We act as the father and mother of the people, simply employing the virtue of loving [all] living things, and not wishing to make a name [for

Ourself] through excessive warfare. Thus, in the several years since your nation suffered misfortune and was destroyed by the Kirghiz, and you came to Our border, We have succored all of you in every way. In the beginning, We thought of your hunger and shortages and granted you provisions. Subsequently We learned of your losses and completely paid the horse price [in silk]. Throughout this time, We sent envoys to inquire consolingly [about your welfare]; they met [coming and going] rushing on the roads. When you committed minor disturbances, We completely overlooked them.

Now, then, the Qaghan still camps near the border and has not yet spoken of returning abroad. The court's great officials and the military governors and generals of the four directions all harbor suspicion and anger [against you]. They all have requested [permission] to mobilize troops. However, We sincerely devote Our attention to cherishing all things and so have not issued the order [to mobilize]. Recently, several of Our envoys returned; they all said that the Qaghan was only waiting for the payment for horses [in silk]. At the time when We ordered it to be delivered to you, We also heard that you frequently had shifted your dwelling place, that some [Uighurs] had invaded and robbed Yun, Shuo, and other prefectures, and that others had belligerently interfered with all the Qiang [i.e., Tanguts] and [Tui-]hun tribes. We cannot understand your intentions. If, because We had not yet given you the horse price, you had approached the Great Wall, then in the course of your moving and stopping you should have first informed the border generals [of your intended movements]. How can you come suddenly and go unexpectedly, shifting your abode with no regularity? Although you say you follow water and grass, your movements all draw you near to our cities and palisades. From a distance We try to discern your deep meaning; it seems that you presume upon the circumstances of our good marriage connections. Every time We observe your movements, [it seems that] you truly harbor the intention to rush in suddenly [upon China].

Furthermore, [some Uighurs] recently arrived below the Hengshui Palisade and massacred very many [people]. How can you greedily drive away and steal the cattle and sheep of the foreign peoples? What crime have the black-haired people [i.e., the Chinese] committed that they should all suffer injury and murder? Thus the central court's great officials and others all say that since the Uighurs have approached the border, they already have shown disregard for our alliance. Yet

again, they have killed the border people; they certainly have deviated from that which is most honorable. [These persons] are united in their desire to eradicate you because of this, in order to avenge the injustice of the deaths [of Tang subjects].

However, Our will is in winning hearts with kindness, in being thoroughly accommodating. We would prefer that the Qaghan be virtuous; We have never abided taking pleasure in the calamities [of others].

Shi Jiezhi has long been at the capital. He fully knows that peoples' hearts are angry and resentful. He has put forth a sincere supplication, strongly requesting to go himself [as an envoy to the Qaghan]. We praise his insight on current exigencies, and cannot oppose [his wish]. The Qaghan himself should judge [the current situation] by questioning [Shi Jiezhi] and quickly choose a good plan. Do not be unrepentant; otherwise you will hand down regrets to your descendants.

[Doc. 28] A Letter of Imperial Decree Granted to the Taihe Princess

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 5: 32-33, *LWRWJ* 5: 6a-7a, *QTW* 699: 9096-9097]
[Translation: Tsai, 123-125]

An imperial command.

Our Paternal Aunt was given in marriage to a far-off, distant land more than 20 years ago. Your travels have been dangerous and difficult; you have experienced a full measure of grief and bitterness. Each time We think on this, We feel very much at a loss. We respectfully consider that the Former Emperor and Former Empress[57] were of many years; their compassion and love [for you] were deep and great. Recently We have hoped that Our Paternal Aunt could come to court for a visit, to tell again of your sorrows and joys. Suddenly it

[57] According to Cen Zhongmian, this refers to the princess' father, Emperor Xianzong, and his Empress Guo; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 176, n. 3. Empress Guo was in fact still living at this time. She had been named dowager empress in the intercalary first month of the fifteenth year of the Yuanhe reign period (18 February–17 March 820), shortly after the death of Xianzong on 13 February 820. She died on 25 June 848; see *THJ* 3:30 and 1:10. It is not recorded whether the Taihe Princess was the biological daughter of Empress Guo or not.

is already the end of the year, silent and without news. We think that when Our Paternal Aunt sees the cities of your own homeland, can you not be overwhelmed by feelings? Looking at the Chinese generals' banners, you surely shed tears. Now the northern winds have arrived; sleet and snow are already falling. That isolated country is bleak and cold, and extremely difficult to dwell in for long. How can felt walls and woolen curtains withstand the winter? Meat for food and koumiss for drink are not palatable.

We pacify myriad lands and nourish the many peoples. If one thing is not at peace, then even while eating We sigh repeatedly. Moreover, Our Paternal Aunt has been without a fixed abode for several years; when could We forget it? We think Our Paternal Aunt is superior in intelligence and certainly is [like] a suspended mirror. Our Paternal Aunt has received the overflowing blessings of the [imperial] ancestral temple. You are an esteemed relative of the royal family.[58] Formerly, the court gave up a treasure by giving you away in marriage [to the Uighurs], in order to gain peace for the [imperial] family and the nation. It was said that the Uighurs certainly would be able to guard against the insults [of foreign powers], pacify [the area near] the Great Wall, and allow the border peoples and their descendants to be free from warfare. Those who shoot and hunt [for sustenance] dared not face west in fear of the tower of Xuanyuan.[59]

Now the Uighurs' [current] behavior is highly unreasonable. The foreigners [at the border] are Our people; the common people and cattle and sheep likewise are possessed by Our nation. Because they depend on China's land, consequently they have propagated their increase. [But] the Uighurs have recklessly invaded and plundered [these border peoples] on the pretext of [settling] a personal grudge.

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[58] Some editions of this text read *wang shi*, "royal family," while others read *san shi*, "three families" or "three households." Cen Zhongmian preferred the latter, claiming that this referred to the three emperors Muzong, Jingzong, and Wenzong, the three emperors whose reigns occurred between those of Xianzong, the princess' father, and Wuzong, the reigning emperor; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 176, n. 4. Muzong was the princess' brother (or half-brother), while Jingzong and Wenzong (as well as Wuzong) were her nephews.

[59] This refers to the place where the legendary Yellow Emperor (Huang Di, whose personal name was Xuanyuan) was said to have overcome the rebel Chi You; see *ZWDCD*, 14168. According to the *Shu jing*, Chi You was the first rebel in Chinese history; see Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, vol. 3: *The Shoo King, or Book of Historical Documents*, 590. A fuller account of Chi You's rebellion, capture, and execution may be found in *SJ* 1: 3.

When every horse's head turns southward, can Our Paternal Aunt not fear the majesty and divinity of [Emperors] Gaozu and Taizong? When [the Uighurs] seek to invade and trouble the border, can Our Paternal Aunt not think of the compassionate love of the Former Emperor and Former Empress?

You are their queen, able to command. If the Uighurs cannot accept your commands, then this is [tantamount to] renunciation of our good marriage connections. From today hence, they must not use Our Paternal Aunt as an excuse. If they rely on Us as a relative, and thus receive Our Paternal Aunt's commands, then they themselves must cease their warlike actions in order to continue our former felicity.

We think that if Our Paternal Aunt could convey [the sense of] Our letter to their generals and ministers, it would cause those who understand the difference between [right and wrong] to display even less wrong [behavior].

[The lands] beyond the border are severely cold. Moreover, [people there] have no silk [garments]. Every time We [wear] the imperial fur garments, We then think of the others [i.e., the Uighurs] who have not given you [proper] clothing. How can the Uighurs be so deceitful and haughty, forgetting our affectionate relations? Now We are sending several items of winter clothing [for you]; these are all recorded in another document.

[Doc. 29] A Memorial Discussing the Uighur Shi Jiezhi

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 14: 111-112, *LWRWJ* 14: 2b-3a, *QTW* 705: 9164]
[Translation: Chavannes & Pelliot, 291-293]

These past two days, I and others have stealthily overheard outsiders' discussions. They say that Shi Jiezhi has long been in the capital city; in affairs, no matter how great or small, there are none with which he is not fully acquainted. Recently, because he was received at the [Court for] Diplomatic Relations, he feared that the court would take charge of him [i.e., take him into custody]. Therefore, he sought a commission [as envoy to the Uighur qaghan], hoping to escape in this way. They also said that Shi Jiezhi previously had two men who ran away; they certainly have already entered Uighur [territory]. Considering their departing like that, how could they [have gone out of] a desire to devote their hearts [to China]?

We humbly consider that since the qaghan has [come to] the border, we have already sent three envoys—Miao Zhen, Wang Hui, and Yang Guan—to deliver edicts [to him]. We have also directed Chang Zhao and An Luqing[60] to go with them and remain at the border. But in the end [the qaghan] was not penitent. Shi Jiezhi is only one insignificant leader. How could he be moved to understand [the court's intentions]? Moreover, since the coming of summer we have twice made a list of the Manichaeans and Uighurs [in China], and the favor [which we have shown to] Ormïzt has been quite substantial. I fear that [Shi] Jiezhi's followers certainly harbor suspicion and resentment. This departure [of his] is not only without advantage; I am truly concerned that it will give rise to villainy. I humbly hope that Liu Mian can be ordered to restrain [Shi] Jiezhi and his entourage] at his position and return [them to the capital]. This truly will allow us peace of mind. Yet again, I also hope that a decree can be conferred on Cui Juxuan.[61]

[Doc. 30] A Letter Taken by Liu Mian to the Uighur Minister *Il-Ögäsi*

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 8: 61-62, *LWRWJ* 8: 5a-7a, *QTW* 707: 9187-9188]

Huichang second year,[62] eighth month, twentieth day.

The great Tang Military Governor of Hedong and Honorary Left Vice-President of the Department of State Affairs Liu Mian conveys this letter to the Honorable Minister *Il-Ö[gäsi]* of the Uighurs of the Nine Clans.[63]

[60] These two persons cannot be identified. As we have seen, the surname An could indicate Sogdian ancestry; see Pulleyblank, "A Sogdian Colony in Inner Mongolia," 320-323.

[61] This person cannot be identified. Chavannes and Pelliot gave his name as Cui Juyuan, but this is an error; see their "Un traité manichéen retrouvé en Chine, traduit et annoté, deuxième partie," 292-293. They apparently were using a Qing period (1644–1912) text, in which *yuan* was used (as it was in all Qing texts after 1662) to replace the tabooed *xuan*, which was part of the personal name (Xuanye) of the Kangxi Emperor (r. 1662–1722).

[62] The text actually reads "third year," but this is an error; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 181, n. 1.

[63] The term "Nine Clans" (*jiu xing*) is thought to correspond to the Toquz Oghuz ("Nine Oghuz") mentioned in the Old Turkic inscriptions. The question of the exact composition of the Toquz Oghuz has long vexed scholars of Inner Asian history. For various considerations of this problem, see Pulleyblank, "Some Remarks on the Toquzoghuz Problem," Hamilton, "Toquz Oγuz et On Uyγur," Czeglédy, "On the Numerical Composition of the Ancient Turkish Tribal Confederations," Czeglédy, "Zur Stammesorganisation der türkischen Völker," and Senga, "The Toquz Oghuz Problem and the Origin of the Khazars."

Formerly, because the Yan-tuo[64] were in disorder, the Uighurs submitted their hearts to China. Taizong himself went to Lingwu to receive those who submitted. He established the Hanhai Government General and classified it as an "interior land" [i.e., under Tang jurisdiction].[65] From the beginning, this enfeoffment came from the deep beneficence of our [nation]. The Uighurs' establishing a state and a [royal] family is certainly due to the virtue of the Tang.

The emperor has heard of the Uighurs' [internal] disorder, which was followed by natural calamities and an attack by the Kirghiz. Your nation having been destroyed, the qaghan led a wounded horde [to the Chinese border] with bed and baggage. The [Tang] court sent envoys to announce its proclamations, hustling and bustling around foreign places. It certainly is fitting that you respectfully hearken to our imperial decrees and gradually come south of the desert. Our nation should employ the grace of granting you safety from danger, and the rites of completely welcoming and leading you by the hand.

In the past, the *shan-yu* Hu-han[-ye] also submitted and adhered to the Han court in order to leave disorder behind. In the beginning of

[64] The Yan-tuo, more commonly referred to as Xue-yan-tuo, were a presumably Turkic tribe who were part of the Tie-le confederation (which also included the Uighurs). An account of the Xue-yan-tuo may be found in *XTS* 217b: 6134-6139; a portion of this has been translated in Chavannes, *Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) occidentaux*, 94-96. On the debunking of the notion that Xue-yan-tuo was a Chinese rendering of "Syr Tardush," see Boodberg, "Three Notes on the T'u-chüeh Turks," 5-7.

[65] Although the Uighurs had joined with the Xue-yan-tuo in a rebellion against the Eastern Türks—who, suffering from internal disorder and external pressure, submitted to the Tang dynasty in 630—the Uighurs soon became enemies of the dominant Xue-yan-tuo, rebelling against them in 645. Tang Taizong intervened and the Xue-yan-tuo, as well as other Tie-le tribes, declared themselves vassals of the Tang. Taizong himself journeyed to Lingwu in the autumn of 646 to receive their submission; see *JTS* 195: 5195-5196 and Wechsler, "T'ai-tsung (Reign 626-49) the Consolidator," 230-231. These submitted tribes were organized within the Tang administrative structure, although this does not mean that the Tang court enjoyed direct control over them. The Uighurs were organized as the Hanhai Government General; Hanhai referred to the Gobi Desert. The Uighur *elteber* Tu-mi-du was named Huaihua grand general as well as Hanhai commander-in-chief. Note once again the term *huaihua* ("cherishing transformation") used in a title granted to a submitted leader of a non-Chinese people. At this time, Tu-mi-du also began to style himself qaghan; see *JTS* 195: 5196 and *ZZTJ* 198: 6236-6245 *passim*.

this arrangement, he sent his son to come and serve [at the Chinese court]. After offering submission, he also came to court [in person] in the capital city. Having properly become a subject [of the Han], he truly gained the respect of the [various] border peoples. Afterwards, the Han [imperial] family protected him when he went out from the border, and greatly favored him with aid in his distress. Should it not be [this way] for the Uighurs, who have cultivated the rites of subjects? You should simply first request [permission] to visit the court, and yourself make a statement as to [the nature of] your difficulties and dangers.

The Taihe Princess is a beloved daughter of the imperial house who was [greatly] cherished and remembered by the Former Emperor and Former Empress. The qaghan should accord with the human feelings and propriety of [the current situation] and send her to the court. Even if the emperor does not consent [to your submission], you should diligently persist in your request, stressing your pitiable condition and sincerely entrusting yourselves [to the court's mercy]. How could this not move the heart of our enlightened ruler [i.e., the emperor] and fulfill the hopes of both Chinese and barbarians? Thus, there would be no disgrace in our relieving your distress.

But [on the contrary] you have looked covetously upon our border cities, proud and tyrannical as before. Your requests are [excessive] beyond hope, as if you were [still] in your native land. Among peoples [both] distant and near, there are none who do not gasp in alarm. Moreover, now you have deeply penetrated our border and been malicious and cruel to the people. Using [harassment by] the Tui-hun as your justification, you have cruelly plundered without cessation. The black-haired people have hidden or run away, and no one dares to settle in one place. The autumn sheaves fill the land, but no one has time to reap the harvest. And now you desire the assistance of our great nation because of the circumstances of our good marriage connections. You should be devoting your attention to our mutual happiness. How could you [behave] like this?

Your letter also stated that foreigners are easy to rouse to action but difficult to pacify. After they have been made wrathful, one cannot restrain them. But the Uighurs were besieged by the Kirghiz [and not by China]. How can you abruptly forget it for [even] one day? The remains of your entire nation's generals and ministers have been abandoned in the undergrowth. The horizon separates you from the tombs of previous qaghans. You certainly should weep blood and use

lances as pillows [for military preparedness] and, with a desire for vengeance, plan to wipe away the shame of this great injustice and acknowledge your gratitude to the souls of the dead. The Uighurs' angry hearts should be directed toward them [i.e., the Kirghiz], but instead you desire to destroy and abandon humaneness and righteousness, and to have your way with China. How can the spirits of Heaven and Earth bear this? The [*Book of*] *Poetry* says, "Do not spit out that which is hard; do not eat that which is soft."[66] The Uighurs consider the strength of the Kirghiz and do not dare to take revenge. This can be called "spitting out that which is hard." You look down upon the weak Tui-hun and only devote yourselves to wounding and killing them. This can be called "eating that which is soft."

The [*Book of*] *Poetry* also says, "If a lord shows anger, disorder probably will stop."[67] The lord shows anger to stop disorder. I have never heard that he thus gives rise to disorder. I hope that you, Sir, will think deeply on the meaning of this, and not speak frivolously again.

Now, in distress and anxiety, I rely upon the Uighurs' good faith and do not dread the Uighurs' anger. If you contract enmity with China externally and are expelled by the Kirghiz internally, and thus shift and [re]group like a flock of birds, scattered and wandering, then, in [Liu] Mian's estimation, in the end it will be difficult [for us] to aid you.

In the previous [i.e., Han] dynasty, the *shan-yu* Zhi-zhi did not serve the great Han, and [instead] depended on the Kirghiz [Jian-kun]. Subsequently, he entrusted [himself] to the [king of] Kang-ju farther away. He himself completed his [own] destruction. Can the warnings of past events be of no concern to you? In the past, because of Hu-

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[66] See Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, vol. 4: *The She King, or the Book of Poetry*, part III, book III, ode VI, 543-544. Verse 5 of this ode, extolling the virtues of one Zhong Shanfu, has been translated by Legge as follows: "The people have a saying:—/'The soft is devoured,/And the hard is ejected from the mouth.'/But Chung Shan-foo/Does not devour the soft,/Nor eject the powerful./ He does not insult the poor or the widow;/ He does not fear the strong or the oppressive." This reference thus urges the Uighurs not to avoid the difficult path of returning northward to face the Kirghiz, and disparages them for harming the relatively weak Tu-yu-hun (Tui-hun).

[67] See Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, vol. 4: *The She King, or the Book of Poetry*, part II, book V, ode IV, 341. The reference is to the second verse, which Legge translated as follows: "Disorder then comes to the birth,/When the first untruth is received./Its further increase/Is from our sovereign's believing the slanderers./If he were angry [with them],/The disorder would probably quickly be abated;/If he were to show his joy [in the good],/The disorder would probably quickly cease." This refers, of course, to righteous anger.

han[-ye]'s defeat, his subordinate, the *yi-zhi-zi*, advised Hu-han[-ye] to declare himself a subject [of China] and serve the Han, to obey the Han and seek credentials. Hu-han[-ye] accepted and employed this plan, and finally preserved his [own] safety.[68] Moreover, the Rong viscount (*zi*) Juzhi was about to prepare an alliance with Jin. Those who directed the government [of Jin] believed that he had an inconstant [heart]. Several times at court in person, Juzhi himself then said that he had not encroached or rebelled—what evil could he have done? Those who directed the government [of Jin] admired him and quickly ordered the matter promptly [to be carried out].[69]

Now, you, Sir, employ admirable talents and great strategies to assist the qaghan. Not possessing the intelligence of the [*yi-*]*zhi-zi*, you should be prudent in great affairs; not possessing Juzhi's [powers of] discrimination, you should try to attain his sincerity. But, [on the contrary,] you desire to break off the amity of successive generations and give rise to calamity [between] our two nations. Although you say you are expiating hatred, how can you be tolerated?

Moreover, the ancients said, "Lose it in the east, receive it in the west."[70] If you yourself reform, it really will not be too late. I fear that you have not thought about this. Please indicate your feelings as to whether you lend credence to [what I have written] or not. Whatever is not written here, [Liu] Mian will explain.

[68] I have been unable to find any reference to the *yi-zhi-zi* aside from this particular anecdote, which is preserved in *HS* 64b: 3797 and *ZZTJ* 27: 882. His title is given once as *zuo yi-zhi-zi wang*, "left *yi-zhi-zi* king," and once as *zuo yi-zhi-zi*, "left *yi-zhi-zi*," in each account. The meaning of this title is unknown, but the person in question must have been of high rank within the Xiong-nu empire.

[69] This refers to an event of 558 B.C.E., during the fourteenth year of Duke Xiang of Lu. The Rong people under the leadership of Juzhi became loyal subjects of the state of Jin, frequently assisting the latter in military ventures; see Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, vol. 5: *The Ch'un Ts'ew, with the Tso Chuen*, 459-460 and 463-464.

[70] This quote comes from an imperial letter from the emperor Guangwudi of the Han to his general Feng Yi, commending him for his victory over the Red Eyebrows at the time of the restoration of the Han dynasty. The quote apparently refers to the fact that the battle initially went against the Han forces, but gradually turned in their favor; see *HHS* 17: 646.

[Doc. 31] A Memorial Enumerating Important Things Which Should Be Done at the [Northern] Border

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 12: 112-113, *LWRWJ* 14: 3b-5a, *QTW* 9164-9165]

Because the Uighurs are still at Yunzhou, they very much disturb the border. Judging from the evidence from two prefectures, they certainly have no far-reaching plan. What concerns me is that villainous persons along the border will go join the Uighurs and devise strategy for them, causing them from Yun[zhou], Shuo[zhou], and other prefectures to cut off the post-horse station roads to Tiande and Zhenwu. We certainly must make preparations, taking precautions against [such a] calamity before it begins to develop. I hope that the Ministry of Finance can quickly be ordered to send an official secretly to authorize and plan for actions along the Hexi route.[71]

In the eighth year of the Yuanhe reign period [5 February 813–24 January 814], a branch of Uighurs came to the [Chinese] border south of the desert and took the Willow Valley Road[72] to strike the Tibetans. A memorial arrived from the imperial defense commissioner of Tiande, Zhou Huaiyi.[73] The court could not fathom the reason [for the Uighurs' movements], and everyone felt grief and fear.[74] Your servant [Li] Deyu first memorialized requesting the reestablishment of abandoned [post] stations in eleven places from Xiazhou to Tiande, in order to have rapid courier communications. I also requested that 500 troops be dispatched from Xiazhou and used along with the old

[71] The use of Hexi ("west of the river") is again problematic here. See chapter 4, n. 4.

[72] According to Cen Zhongmian, this refers to an unidentified road beyond the Chinese frontier; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 183, n. 5.

[73] Although Zhou Huaiyi has no biography in the standard histories, he is mentioned briefly in that of his son Zhou Bao, which may be found in *XTS* 186: 5415. The final character of Zhou Huaiyi's given name is written with several variants; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 182 as well as *JTS* 15: 449, where Zhou Huaiyi's death is reported to have occurred in 814.

[74] For an expanded account of this episode, see Li Jifu, *Yuanhe jun xian tu zhi* 4: 105-106. By his own account, Li Jifu was the only person at the time who understood that the Uighurs had not come to attack China. By mentioning this incident, Li Deyu was not only citing a pertinent historical precedent, but also reminding the emperor of the wisdom of Li Jifu—who of course was Li Deyu's father.

Jinglüe Army[75] to respond to [any problems] along the postal courier route and to guard the Tanguts. I and others did not know that this road's old lodges already were abandoned and in ruins. Some remain, however, which still could be rehabilitated. I hope that [Li] Zhongshun can be ordered to assess the situation along this route and repair [some of] the old lodges in order to facilitate the courier dispatch of urgent memorials from Tiande.

I have learned upon inquiry that between the two prefectures of Lin[zhou] and Sheng[zhou] there is a place named Rich Valley (Fugu). Its people are thriving and numerous, and have laid up substantial [provisions]. I hope that the Ministry of Finance can be ordered to select someone with talent in managing affairs to serve as an official to buy grain. When fall arrives, he should go [there] to buy grain and store it. Moreover, under the guise of purchasing grain, the military governors should be ordered to meet secretly and make preparations with him [concerning the supply of the northern troops]. If by some chance we do not make contact with Zhenwu, then [we should] change [that official's function] to that of officer transporting grain to the Tiande Army. Shengzhou is separated by the [Yellow] River ten *li* [about three miles] from the Eastern City for Receiving Submission.[76] From the Eastern City for Receiving Submission to Zhenwu is 130 *li* [about 43 miles]. If there are [stores of] provisions along this route, then eastward they can fortify Zhenwu, and westward they can relieve Tiande. We hope to make arrangements before anything happens, and thus avoid the trouble of [having to respond to events] after they have occurred.

[Doc. 32] A Memorial Discussing What Should Be Done [Concerning the Area] North of Zhenwu

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 14: 112, *LWRWJ* 14: 3b, *QTW* 705: 9164]

The Uighurs' camp has gradually shifted eastward, coming rather close to the border at Zhenwu. Now, since the grass is green and [the Uighurs'] horses are strong, I am deeply concerned that [the

[75] On the Jinglüe Army, see *ZZTJ* 239: 7703-7704.

[76] Shengzhou was to the river's south, while the Eastern City for Receiving Submission was on the north side of the river.

Uighurs] intend to spy on the border [in preparation for an attack]. I hope that Liu Mian can be ordered to add reinforcements at the strategic border site of Yunjiaguan and rigorously increase preparations for an emergency.

Formerly the two circuits of Zheng-Xu and Chen-Hua were ordered [to send officials] to get provisions for their troops and horses at Daizhou. Now since all the land north of Batoufeng has been abandoned, if the Uighurs by chance suddenly rush in, there will be no reinforcements prepared to resist them. Then the tribes of the Tui-hun would be the first to be attacked and wounded; the region north of Taiyuan would not escape vexation. I hope that the Hanlin Academy can be charged to bestow a decree on Liu Mian, ordering him to consider the situation and determine the true circumstances of the Uighurs. Also, regarding reinforcement of installations north of Batoufeng, [Liu Mian] should be ordered quickly to examine the advantages and disadvantages and then make known his findings in a memorial [to the court]. If this meets with [Your Majesty's] approval, I humbly hope that a decree dealing with the situation can be composed generally in accord with these ideas. I do no know whether this is permissible or not.

[Doc. 33] A Memorial Concerning What Should Be Done about Expelling the Uighurs

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 14: 113-114, *LWRWJ* 14: 5a-5b, *QTW* 705: 9165]

I and others have deliberated for several days. This was like our disposition of the ninth day of the eighth month [16 September 842]. [At that time we counseled that] disciplined troops be stationed along each of Taiyuan's three roads [to the north] to defend them, and that Liu Mian also be ordered to send an envoy to deliver our proclamation. When spring came and the Uighurs' men and horses were lean and in difficulties, we [then] planned to expel them. Thus the Chinese soldiers would avoid the bitterness of the [winter's] cold, and it would be easier for them to put forth effort. Having thought this over, we [still] consider it to be a good plan. If such [a plan] can be effected, then I hope that the cavalry of Youzhou can be ordered to camp assembled at their own border and to wait until action is taken. After they enter Taiyuan [i.e., Hedong], then we will have to supply them with provisions sent out to the frontier. [Having them enter Hedong early]

would be of no use; our daily expenditures would be extensive. I fear that the resources of the Ministry of Finance would not be adequate to the task of providing supplies [for the Youzhou cavalry].

If one is concerned that, after ice forms [on the rivers], then the Uighurs will suddenly rush [in on us, and that we thus] should expel them as soon as possible, then we must make a plan quickly. After the tenth month, the freezing cold turns severe, and I fear that our efforts would not be effective. We would have to seize an opportunity within three to five days. Moreover, Taiyuan's infantry is demoralized and weak, and always has been regarded lightly by [the peoples] north of the [Yellow] River. Moreover, memorialists native to that circuit [i.e., Taiyuan], Sun Liao and Sun Chou, themselves have said that Taiyuan's troops are incapable of opposing the Uighurs. Thus, in [areas] near [the region] north of the [Yellow] River, we must levy other troops to obtain a full 10,000 men. Only then may we complete this affair. We must order them to achieve success within one or two months. In this way we will be able to avoid wasting material, and soon will obtain peace along the border.

I humbly consider that since the two Han [dynasties], every time there is an affair [concerning] the four barbarians [the emperor] must order the senior officials to gather and discuss [the matter], for we consider that among the great affairs of the nation, the greatest are those concerning the military. During the Yuanhe period [806– 821], [the government] subjugated Wang Chengzong[77] and Li Shidao.[78] During the Changqing period [821–825], it subjugated Li Jie.[79] In each [case, the senior officials] were ordered to gather and discuss [the matter].

[77] Biographies of Wang Chengzong may be found in *JTS* 142: 3878-3883 and *XTS* 211: 5956-5959. He was the military governor of the autonomous province of Chengde, south of Youzhou. While Chengde was able to retain its autonomy under Wang, it was forced to make concessions to the Tang central government; see Peterson, "Court and Province in Mid- and Late T'ang," 527-529 and Dalby, "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," 613-614.

[78] Biographies of Li Shidao may be found in *JTS* 124: 3538-3541 and *XTS* 213: 5992-5995. He was the governor of the autonomous province of Pinglu in the region of Shandong. Pinglu was forced to surrender to the Tang central government and was partitioned by the emperor Xianzong. Li Shidao was murdered by his subordinates before the Tang attack; see Peterson," Court and Province in Mid- and Late T'ang," 533-534 and Dalby, "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," 616.

[79] On 31 July 822, the army of Bianzhou mutinied, drove out the military governor, and set up Li Jie, who has no known biography, in his place. The area soon was brought back under the control of the Tang central government by force of arms. Li Jie was captured and executed; see *JTS* 16: 498-499 and *ZZTJ* 242: 7819-7821.

Moreover, I have heard that in discussions of external [affairs], there are [always] differences [of opinion]. If in times of disagreement we do no promptly ascertain the general opinion, [then] in the end we will be vexed by idle chatter. I hope that the senior officials can be ordered to assemble and discuss [this matter] and memorialize on it within two days. I wish to have exhaustive discussions among the many [high officials], and thus quiet and conciliate popular feeling. I do not know if this is permissible or not.

Huichang second year, eighth month, twenty-seventh day.

[Doc. 34] A Memorial [Concerning] Insufficiently Considered Points in the Senior Officials' Joint Discussion of Necessary and Feasible Actions, Which They Should Be Ordered to Analyze Again and Memorialize on. [These Points Are] Carefully Written out One by One as Follows

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 14: 114, *LWRWJ* 14: 6a-7a, *QTW* 705: 9165-9166]

The discussants' memorial stated, "In the selecting of generals and drilling of soldiers, we have not obtained many good men." Now, those among the officers under the border garrison generals who are most incompetent and those among the ranks of the civil and military officials who are most able to assume military command must [all] be pointed out and their situations discussed. We must not speak vaguely or imprecisely.

It also stated, "For guarding and resisting at strategic places, we have not made many preparations. In pincers movements, the two sides do not respond to one another, and in dual formation movements, they do not rely on each other." Now, at what places [should we] station troops so that they are in "strategic places"? At what places [should we] increase preparations for "mutual response"? Both must be [clearly] indicated.

It also stated, "If [the Uighurs] come, then [we should] expel them; if they go, then [we should] not pursue them." The recent order was to assemble and discuss sending out an army to expel [the Uighurs]. If when [the Uighurs] go, [our troops] do not pursue them, and both sides keep to themselves in this way, when will [this problem] ever end? Troops and provisions will be wasted daily, and in the end the

border will have no peace. It is crucial in the selection of an important plan that it be workable.

It also stated, "We need not hinder the [foreign] tribes which can themselves attack [the Uighurs]." But among the various foreign peoples at the border, the large [groups] comprise 1000 or 2000 tents, and the strength of the small [groups] moreover is insufficient [for such an undertaking]. Each [of these foreign groups] has family members, domestic animals, and possessions which they themselves habitually protect with care. Recently, when Uighurs came to Yunzhou for a time, all the foreign peoples [in that region] fled in haste. The various barbarians then were not united. Who [among them] is willing to put his heart into [resisting the Uighurs]? Now, it must clearly be stated which tribes [the senior officials] want to attack and expel [the Uighurs].

It also stated, "Each time a border general is appointed, he [should] take [with him to his post troops] that he has raised himself. The troops which have been serving in the faraway [border] campaigns gradually should be withdrawn proportionately." This matter certainly is familiar to the court. Only last year we used clothing and provisions from the six circuits of the Jiang and Huai [region][80] [in an attempt to] enlist government troops [to serve] at Tiande; almost one year has passed, and yet not [even] one man has been recruited. Li Zhongshun requested [permission] to take it upon himself to enlist [troops], but after half a year he has obtained only 600 men. In preparations to guard the border, even if we manage to enlist 1000 or 2000 men, all these would not [be enough] to help matters. How can we withdraw troops [already stationed at the frontier]? We must then arrange another strategy.

I have respectfully written out the former [points] as above [in view of] the recent Imperial command which stated, "Moreover, you must urgently address the situation and must no longer engage in empty discussion." Now, having carefully examined the discussants' memorial, [I find that] it by no means has urgently [addressed] the situation. I and others have deliberated; we hope that Niu Sengru and [Chen] Yixing can be ordered to discuss [the matter] together [with me] to make a careful analysis and [then] memorialize [regarding our suggestions] within two days. I do not know if this is permissible or not.

[80] This refers to circuits along the Yangzi and Huai Rivers, but exactly which six is not certain.

[Huichang second year, ninth month, second day.][81]

[Doc. 35] A Memorial [Concerning] Niu Sengru's and Others' [Response to] an Imperial Order [to Discuss the Matters Raised in the Above Memorial], "Insufficiently Considered Points in the Senior Officials' Joint Discussion of Necessary and Feasible Actions, Which They Should Be Ordered to Analyze Again," Carefully Following Up the Previous Points

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 14: 115, *LWRWJ* 14: 7a-8b, *QTW* 705: 9166-9167]

I and others respectfully have examined the discussion by the senior officials, and we still [consider that] it has not addressed the essentials [of the matter]. The memorial stated, "The border generals do not make their methods for attacking and guarding known. If they would inform the court, then the generals' strategy could be understood. Furthermore, [although the number] of soldiers raised from all the circuits is not few, they are [like] flocks of crows, and do not respond uniformly to orders. Moreover, the Uighurs recently attacked and plundered Yunzhou, and have gradually entered our interior lands. Those ranked as garrison commanders have been unable to repress [the invaders], and they have not been rescued from one side or the other by [troops from] neighboring walled defenses and palisades."

Venturing to scrutinize these ideas, [we find that] they come from looking only at general conditions, and actually do not deal directly with the immediate situation. The court's recent behavior [toward] the Uighurs has been simply to put forth favor and trust, exhort them to fulfill their proper role, and leave it to them to withdraw voluntarily. [As for] the border troops that have been raised, we have only ordered them to prepare for defense and have not intended to mount an offense. The Uighurs who recently came [to the border] were pressed by famine and hardship. Arriving at Yunzhou, they stole cattle and sheep. Their having already encroached violently, the situation called for walled cities and palisades to fight with the enemy. [This was an instance of] what in the *Art of War* is called "being startled

[81] On this date, see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 186-187, n. 1.

by a thunderclap and not having time to cover the ears."[82] Thus, for the discussants to say that [our commanders] have been "unable to repress [the invaders]" seems exceedingly false.

Since ancient times, the words "flocks of crows" have referred to provisional recruits who have not been through training, as when Han Xin urged on men from the marketplace to wage war; these were "a flock of crows."[83] [But] the troops of Chen[zhou], Xu[zhou], Zi[zhou], Qing[zhou], and other [prefectures] are a disciplined army, long experienced in warfare. They simply require unified direction to execute orders in unison. They certainly cannot be called "flocks of crows."

[The memorial] also stated, "If Chinese soldiers go afar for an attack, we fear [they will be] lost—seized by the barbarians." In the *Art of War* it is said that he who is good at using soldiers is a master at making others go places; he does not go himself.[84] That which is called "making others go places" means causing them to come [to him] of their own accord. Since the barbarian cavalry comes suddenly, as fast as the wind and lightning, we certainly should not lead troops afar to attack them. Now we can formulate a stratagem around the

[82] This refers not to the text of Sunzi's famous treatise, *Sunzi bing fa*, but to the commentaries which have been associated with that work. In the seventh chapter of his work, Sunzi urged a general on campaign to "move like a thunderbolt"; see Sunzi, *Sunzi bing fa* 7: 14a, translated in Griffith, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War*, 106. The commentary to this passage written by the Tang encyclopedist Du You (and not translated in Griffith's work) reads, "In [matters of] urgency there is no time to respond. Of old, Duke Tai said, 'When the sudden thunderclap comes, there is no time to cover the ear; when the sudden lightning flash comes, there is no time to close the eyes.'"

[83] Biographies of Han Xin, Marquis of Huaiyin, may be found in *SJ* 92: 2609-2630 and *HS* 34: 1861-1878; the former has been translated in Watson, *Records of the Grand Historian of China*, vol. 1, 208-232. At the time of the founding of the Han dynasty, Han Xin discussed his victory over Zhao as follows: "Moreover, I did not have at my disposal troops that I had trained and led from past times, but was forced, as the saying goes, to round up men from the market place and use them to fight with"; see Watson, *Records of the Grand Historian of China*, vol. 1, 217. Han Xin should not be confused with King Xin of Han (Han Wang Xin), the subject of biographies in *SJ* 93: 2631-2642 and *HS* 33: 1852-1858. The former has been translated in Watson, *Records of the Grand Historian of China*, vol. 1, 233-238, where the translator spells the king's name "Hann Hsin" to avoid confusion with the Marquis of Huaiyin. King Xin of Han surrendered to the Xiong-nu and later joined them in attacking the Han.

[84] This is a paraphrase of a statement in Sunzi, *Sunzi bing fa* 6: 2b. The original text has been translated, "And therefore those skilled in warfare bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him"; see Griffith, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War*, 96.

circumstances that they [i.e., the Uighurs] have family members and baggage [with them], and cannot go more than 200 to 300 *li* from the Chinese border. Once they have a fixed [dwelling] place, we can make a plan. When Wei Wu[di] destroyed the Wu-wan,[85] and when Li Jing[86] captured Illig [Qaghan],[87] both employed this method.

The senior officials *et al.* did not discuss any of [the above matters] adequately, and it seems that they did not see this situation [clearly]. When they recently were ordered to assemble and discuss [the matter], they were simply asked which of the two plans—expelling [the Uighurs] or preparing a defense [against them]—was preferable. Now they have stated that the superior plan is to prepare a defense through the winter and then plan to approach and take [the Uighurs in the spring]. This we can carry out. Since this [policy] is in close accord with the recent appointment of Liu Mian as pacification commissioner, [and since] he moreover is to carry an imperial proclamation [to the Uighurs], we fear that there is no time to hold another inquiry. I do not know if this is permissible or not.

Huichang second year, ninth month, seventh day.

[Doc. 36] A Memorial Requesting the Purchase of Foreigners' Horses

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 14: 116, *LWRWJ* 14: 9a-9b, *QTW* 705: 9169]

I have sought information concerning foreigners' sheep and horses [and learned that] there are many at Hunhechuan.[88] I fearfully report

[85] Wei Wudi is none other than the famous Cao Cao (155–220 C.E.). This reference apparently is to campaigns he conducted against the Wu-wan (Wu-huan) in 205–207; see *ZZTJ* 64: 2061 and 65: 2069-2070, as well as Chen, *Sanguo zhi* 1: 27-30. The account of the Wu-huan in *TD* 196: 1061 connects them with the Dong-hu of earlier times. That same account states, "In the twelfth year of the Jian'an reign period [15 February 207–3 February 208], Duke Cao himself attacked the Wu-huan." Herrmann, *An Historical Atlas of China*, 10-11, 14-15, and 17-19, placed the Wu-huan in the area just west of the Liao River.

[86] Biographies of the Tang general Li Jing may be found in *JTS* 67: 2475-2482 and *XTS* 93: 3811-3816. The latter has been translated in Sawyer, *The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China*, 313-320.

[87] As has been noted, Illig Qaghan was defeated and captured by Li Jing in 630; see, for example, the account in *JTS* 194a: 5158-5160, as well as Liu, *Die chinesischen Nachrichten zur Geschichte der Ost-Türken (T'u-küe)*, 142-145 and *ZZTJ* 193: 6072-6074. This event brought the Eastern Türks under Chinese dominion for a period of 52 years, until their empire was restored in 682 by Qutlugh Iltärish Qaghan.

[88] This is likely an error for Hunhezhou, a Tang "loose-rein" prefecture located

that the barbarians' [i.e., the Uighurs'] intentions are to come again to invade and plunder. The Uighurs have not withdrawn; [thus] we must protect the border still further. Currently, the court's greatest lack is of war horses. Because of this, in collecting and purchasing them, [we should] effect a sensible policy, and should obtain strong horses and order them to enter east ...,[89] in order to protect them and keep them from being scattered or lost.

I and others have deliberated [on this matter]. We hope that Liu Mian may be commissioned to convince the foreigners [at the border] that since the Uighurs constantly harbor the intention to rob [them of their horses], we fear that the foreigners will be unable to hold onto them. [Taking control of their horses] will adequately fulfill [our need for] dressed and armored strong horses. Further, in collecting and buying them, goods from the Ministry of Finance which are stored at Taiyuan could serve as the price paid. When the purchase is made, then [these horses should be] handed over to the [government] stock-farm of Loufan[90] to be taken charge of. Then they may be counted and granted to [any of] the various circuits which has a deficiency [of war horses]. If this meets with [Your Majesty's] approval, I hope to hand this over to the Hanlin Academy to grant Liu Mian a decree to put it into action. I do not know if this is permissible or not.

Huichang second year, ninth month, eleventh day.

[Doc. 37] A Memorial [Concerning] the Matter of Conscription and Deployment of Cavalry for the Garrisons and Prefectures

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 14: 115-116, *LWRWJ* 14: 8b-9a, *QTW* 705: 9168-9169]

The memorialist Sun Chou from Taiyuan has just arrived and stated that the Uighurs have shifted their camp southward by 40 *li* [about

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just north of the great bend of the Yellow River; see *ZGGJDM*, 912. This might also be connected with the Sanggan River, also known as the Hun River (Hun He); the upper reaches of the Sanggan River are not far from where the Tang prefecture of Hunhezhou was located; see *ZWDCD*, 8317.

[89] At least one character appears to be missing here.

[90] The stock-farm of Loufan was under the direction of the prefect of Lanzhou; see des Rotours, *Traité des fonctionnaires et Traité de l'armée*, vol. 1, 402-403, n. 4.

13 miles]. Liu Mian believes that it is certainly because they are no longer in league with the Khitans and [thus] fear a surprise attack from the rear. Therefore they have shifted camp.

Moreover, the memorialist Sun Fang reported that when [Zhang] Zhongwu defeated the Uighurs, he obtained the wife [or: wives] and son [or: sons] of the ruler of the Shi-wei tribe(s). Recently, the ruler of the Shi-wei tribe(s) desired to ransom his wife and son with sheep and horses, gold and silk. [Zhang] Zhongwu did not want [the ransom]; he simply ordered [the Shi-wei ruler] to kill the Uighur overseers, and then he would return his wife and son. The Shi-wei envoys have already led the army generals of Youzhou to go together and kill the Uighur overseers. Since the army generals have not yet returned, [Zhang] Zhongwu did not dare to memorialize.

According to this state of affairs, it is certainly proper [for us] to expel [the Uighurs]. I and others asked Sun Chou [about the possibility of] joining forces with Youzhou to press forward to [the Uighurs'] new camp. [We asked him,] "Would that be effective to expel them? How much of an increase in [the number of] troops and horses would this require?" Sun Chou replied that if indeed [the Uighurs] have shifted camp, then it is not necessary for the most part to increase soldiers and horses. But since the troops of the Datong Army are few, if we obtain 1000 men from Yi[zhou][b] and Ding[zhou] to add to [the garrison at] Datong, it will be effective. As for these garrison and prefectural cavalry, I and others have deliberated [on this matter]. [We feel] that it will be safe and convenient not to use conscripts. I do not know if this is permissible or not.

Huichang second year, ninth month, twelfth day.

[Doc. 38] A Memorial Requesting That Qi-bi Tong and Another Divide Control of Altogether 6000 Sha-tuo and Tui-hun Cavalrymen

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 14: 116, *LWRWJ* 14: 9b-10a, *QTW* 705: 9169]

An imperial decree declared [that since Li] Sizhong had requested that the strength of the cavalry troops which were previously divided [now] be combined, a deliberation was ordered, from which a memorial was to come. I and others have deliberated. [We consider that] Liu Mian and [officials of] Youzhou, Zhenwu, and Tiande [should be] ordered to send out a great army together to establish camps and

palisades, and gradually move forward to press [the Uighurs] closely. Then [Li] Sizhong [should be] ordered to lead foreign cavalry to penetrate deeply [into the land now occupied by the Uighurs]. We calculate that when they encounter [Li] Sizhong's military might, [those around] the qaghan's tent certainly will have a change of heart; if we [then] beckon those who [wish to] submit, it will be easy [for our troops] to succeed.

These foreign troops [under Ormïzt/Li Sizhong should be] divided into two wings, and a foreign general ordered to control and lead each [wing]. This will be most safe and convenient. He Qingchao and Qi-bi Tong are foreigners; each [could] control one wing. We hope that [since they are] well-acquainted with barbarian matters, it will be easy for them to direct [these cavalry troops].

If this [proposal] meets with [Your Majesty's] approval, He Qingchao's planning and departure [should] not be far-off [from today]. I hope then for him to be sought [immediately] with a document from the Secretariat-Chancellery. I do not know if this is permissible or not.

Huichang second year, ninth month, thirteenth day.

[Doc. 39] A Letter of Imperial Edict Granted to [Li] Sizhong

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 5: 35, *LWRWJ* 5: 10a-10b, *QTW* 698: 9083]

Lü Wei and the others have arrived. We know that you and the qaghan have been unable to cease hostilities; this has greatly disturbed the border. When We announced Our proclamation, [the qaghan] still did not reform, so We must use force of arms to expel him. Your sincere loyalty has burst forth. Wishing to establish distinguished meritorious service, you have requested Tui-hun, Sha-tuo, and other tribes to combine their strength, war horses, weapons and armor, etc. [with yours to use against the qaghan]. Now We have already approved your memorial; for each [matter] there is another imperial edict to put it into execution.

Now We have ordered the general of the Left Guard, He Qingchao, and the prefect of Weizhou[a], Qi-bi Tong, to divide the leadership of the foreign tribes. We select you to direct them. We have already earnestly warned He Qingchao and the other [i.e., Qi-bi Tong] to assist you with all their hearts and strength, and to aid you with loyalty and sincerity. When you advance to take [the qaghan, He Qingchao and Qi-bi Tong should] completely employ your strategy.

In every matter, you should deliberate with [Li] Hongshun and others, estimating the pros and cons of [each] policy. Do not advance frivolously! Only achieve the departure of the qaghan [so that] he dares not remain, and the border will be pacified. Thus, your meritorious efforts certainly will not allow you to fall into his [i.e., the qaghan's] crafty plan to injure Our majestic nation. We have also ordered high-ranking Luo Suitai to serve as temporary overseer of the expeditionary generals and officers. You and he [should] calculate and plan, and continuously memorialize [to the throne concerning the plans you devise].

[Doc. 40] A Memorial [Concerning] Foreign Cavalry Subordinate to Li Sizhong

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 14: 117, *LWRWJ* 14: 10a, *QTW* 705: 9169]

I and others have learned upon inquiry that the Tui-hun and the Uighurs have long been enemies. I fear that after their forces are combined, [the Tui-hun] will not be in agreement with [Li] Sizhong, and that this may give rise to another [troublesome] matter. It is imperative that [Luo] Suitai be ordered to investigate [the situation] and deliberate with Liu Mian. If there are [Tui-hun] who are to be doubted, then in that case [we should] make an excuse and dismiss them. As for the Xingtang, Ganyi, Fengcheng, and other armies,[91] as well as the Qi-bi, Tui-hun, and other tribes, each previously had their own military governors and governors-general. It is necessary that the tribal leaders themselves be ordered to go [on the campaign].

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[91] The location of these armies is not entirely clear. *ZGDM, wei* 59, lists a Xingtang *xian* that was established during the Tang era; it was under the control of Weizhou[a] in the circuit of Hedong. The Ganyi Army presents a greater difficulty. According to *ZGDM, mao* 10, there was a Ganyi *xian* in Lingnan province during the Tang dynasty, but this would not seem to be an appropriate identification, since Lingnan was in the far south, and therefore quite distant from the area in question. *ZGGJDM*, 1004 lists a Ganyi Army, but directs the reader to the entry for the Zhaowu Army (*ZGGJDM*, 626), which states that the military governorship of Ganyi was established during the Guangqi regin period (885 – 887), and that it was controlled by Fengzhou[b]. This is, of course, too late for our purposes. As for the Fengcheng Army, *ZGDM, chou* 85, lists a Fengcheng prefecture, which it describes as a "loose-rein" prefecture in the circuit of Hebei.

Then the troops we have obtained and the generals all will be well-acquainted with each other, [and the troops will be] easy to direct. I hope to transmit this to the Hanlin Academy so that Liu Mian, [Li] Zhongshun, [Luo] Suitai, and the others may be granted decrees to carry out this [plan].

Huichang second year, ninth month, twenty-seventh day.

[Doc. 41] A Memorial [Concerning] Hedong's Memorial Requesting That Sha-tuo Cavalry Be Kept Behind

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 14: 117, *LWRWJ* 14: 10b, *QTW* 705: 9169]

[Li] Sizhong originally requested foreign cavalry since, as their speech is mutually understandable, it would be easy for him to direct them. If we order troops from Yi[zhou][b] and Ding[zhou] to go [to be under his command], I fear that it will not be suitable. Wei Chu also stated that in an advancing army facing north, in every important military matter [there should be] one or two hundred foreign cavalry to lead the way. If we order all [foreign troops] to be taken out and withdrawn [from the various armies to be handed over to Ormïzt], the [other] armies would not be able to advance.

I and others have discussed this. We hope that Liu Mian will be allowed to count one half of his Sha-tuo troops and leave them behind. This one half near the front [should then] be ordered to combine forces with [Li] Sizhong. If this [proposal] meets with [Your Majesty's] approval, I hope that Liu Mian may be granted a decree to carry it out.

Huichang second year, tenth month, fifth day.

[Doc. 42] A Memorial Requesting That He Qingchao and the Other [i.e., Qi-bi Tong] Divide the Leadership of Foreign Troops under Li Sizhong

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 14: 117, *LWRWJ* 14: 10b-11a, *QTW* 705: 9169-9170]

The day before yesterday [i.e., 11 November 842], I and others deliberated about ordering Qi-bi Tong and the other [i.e., He Qingchao]

not to be under [Li] Sizhong's command, [ordering] He Qingchao to divide the leadership of the tribes [with Li Sizhong], and [ordering both He Qingchao and Qi-bi Tong] to accept [Li] Sizhong's command in a crisis. Yesterday [10 November 842], [such an order] was promulgated. [Now, however,] we fear that Qi-bi Tong and the other [i.e., He Qingchao] will not accept [Li] Sizhong's command and that they will not wish to divide the leadership [of the tribes with him]. We are deeply concerned, and dare not refrain from once again initiating a discussion of the matter.

The Sha-tuo tribes recently came under [Tang] government control at Taiyuan. Their disposition is quite docile; they are well-acquainted with human feelings. It is [even] possible to control them without ordering other people [i.e., outsiders, probably meaning Tang officials] to do it. As for those savage Tui-hun, Zhang Xianjie, [the prefect of Yunzhou,] recently wanted to accuse and punish them, since he suspected them of having done something evil. We anxiously fear that [Li] Sizhong will be unable to control them, and that they will refuse him [as their commander], causing problems to arise from this.

Qi-bi Tong originally was a prince among the foreigners, and previously was [prefect] at Weizhou[a]. Now, if we send him to divide the leadership [of the tribes with Li Sizhong], he certainly will understand the circumstances completely, and there will be nothing more to be concerned about. Moreover, although [Li] Sizhong's will is sincere and his devotion commendable, when we [now] begin to employ him as an official, we cannot [give him] sole authority. If the Chinese generals divide leadership [of the foreign troops with Li Sizhong and the others], then the matter also would be satisfactorily [resolved]. Although Qi-bi Tong and the other [i.e., He Qingchao] are foreigners, they are already experienced at serving as officials. If we urgently and sincerely encourage them again, how can they dare not to obey [Li] Sizhong? Such is the view held by myself and the others. We humbly hope that [Your Majesty] will judge [the circumstances] with sagacious brilliance. I do not know if this is permissible or not.

Huichang second year, tenth month, eighth day.

[Doc. 43] A Draft of a Letter Taken to the Uighur Minister by Liu Mian

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 8: 63-64, *LWRWJ* 8: 8a-9b, *QTW* 707: 9188-9189]

The Kirghiz have specially sent seven persons—General Ta-bu-he-zu, Tarqan Ge-xi-he-hai-yi,[92] Executive Officer Yuan-yin-suo-yi-han-a-yi-shi,[93] and others—to Tiande to offer a petition [to the emperor]. It stated that, "When we destroyed the Uighurs, we obtained the [former] emperor's daughter, the Taihe Princess. Because our nation originally was of the same surname as the Great Tang, we certainly did not dare to detain the princess. We deputed General Du-lü-shi Alp[94] to escort her back to the southern [i.e., Chinese] court. Up to now we have not learned any news [of her]; we do not know if [the princess and her escorts] were able to reach the Great Tang, or whether they were cut off on the way by some wicked person(s), and because of this our envoys have not returned. Now we have sent out 400,000 troops to search [for them]. If they have been detained by some other person(s) and not released, we ask you to [send us] a careful report. Then we will send men to go search for them; ascending to Heaven and entering the Earth, eventually we certainly must find them. If the officials escorting the princess have gone to the land of Tibet, then we will go to the Tibetans ...."[95] The emperor himself personally inspected the [Kirghiz] petition, and regarded it with great emotion.

Because we have long cultivated good neighborly [relations] with the Uighur qaghans, [because] we have granted them marriages [with princesses of the Tang imperial family], and [because] during a time

[92] The Tang pronunciation suggests nothing in Old Turkic; see *GKWD*, 116 (using a homophone for *ge*, since the form here is not contained within this work), 474, 929, 40, and 1030.

[93] The Tang pronunciation suggests nothing in Old Turkic; see *GKWD*, 102, 259, 232, 525, 708, 1414, 401, and 600. It is possible that the final three syllables are a rendering of Turkic *ayaz*, "bright, cloudless," which does appear in a few Uighur personal names or titles; see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 276.

[94] The word *alp* (Chinese *he*), a very common element in Turkic names and titles, presents no difficulties. The Tang pronunciation of the first three syllables suggests something like Tölish; see *GKWD*, 1347, 222, and 583.

[95] There appears to be a lacuna here of four characters; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 203, n. 6.

of difficulties [i.e., the An Lushan rebellion] they accrued merit, our affection [for you Uighurs] is greatest. In joys and in sorrows it has been the same. [But] now the Kirghiz have enmity for the [Uighur] qaghan and are looking for the princess. We certainly are anxious that they will raise up a great army, gathering together the various foreigners, and rush southward right up to our border. At present, the qaghan's horde is suffering from famine; the number of our troops is not great. If a strong enemy comes, how will you resist him? It is not only that it is quite difficult for the strength of the Great Tang to assist you; we also fear that the people of the border cities will suffer calamities because of this [situation]. The qaghan should discuss this thoroughly with his generals and ministers, and must come up with a good plan as soon as possible. [You should] rely on nearby mountains and valleys to hide yourselves securely, and send the princess back to China in order to avoid blame. Then, even if the Kirghiz come, you will be quite able to avoid calamity.

Ta-bu-he-zu also stated that ...[96] when the Kirghiz move to He-luo-chuan and occupy the Uighurs' former land, they also will obtain Anxi, Beiting, and five tribes of Tatars and others. He also stated that recently the 2000 cavalry [sent] to escort Ta-bu-he-zu to go [back] north of the desert were ordered to kill any Uighurs whom they met on the connecting roads. When Ta-bu came from his own nation to Tiande and the Western City [for Receiving Submission], he did not meet with a single Uighur; there were none to be killed. Furthermore, he fears that the Uighurs will be in communication with Tibet, and has already ordered cavalry to block the Sanhekoudao Road.[97] Thus they devise their strategy on the strength of their cavalry. When examined thoroughly, this becomes obvious.

Moreover, flourishing and destruction are in the hands of Heaven. Adversity and felicity are matters of fortune. The Kirghiz have turned a few into a [conquering] horde, and have turned weakness into strength. How can this be mere human planning? Certainly it is Heaven which has aided them. The ancients said, "Great fortune comes but once."[98]

[96] There appears to be a lacuna here of two characters; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 203, n. 7.

[97] The location of this road, the name of which means "the way (or circuit) of three rivers' mouths," is unclear. *ZGGJDM*, 31-32, lists a Sanhekou *zhen*, while *ZGDM* lists a Sanhe *xian*. Neither of these was located in a region which fits the context here. See also Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 204, n. 1.

[98] This quote from the *Zuo zhuan* is attributed to King Ling of Chu during the

After one has been abandoned by Heaven, it is difficult to prosper again. If you wish, then, to depend on the Black Carts for long years at a time, you will be not only pitied by the brave and virile, but also scorned and ridiculed by the various foreigners. If the Kirghiz follow you and draw near, how can the hearts of the Black Carts be guaranteed? [Relying on them] is not as good [a plan] as coming to our great nation as soon as possible, and [thus] preserve your own safety. [You should] obey the decree of Heaven in order to distance yourselves from danger, and trust to our good marital relations in order to seek happiness.

The emperor graciously waits to inquire after [your health] and relieve [your distress]. He certainly will then grant you favor. I have unceremoniously given you good advice, and will rejoice if you deign to receive it. Since I feared that you [might] wish to see the Kirghiz's original memorial, I have hereby sent a copy.

[Doc. 44] A Memorial Requesting That an Imperial Edict Be Conferred on Liu Mian

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 14: 118, *LWRWJ* 14: 11a-11b, *QTW* 701: 9119]

I have learned upon inquiry that Liu Mian is quite practiced in border affairs; but only when a crisis is at hand does he decide on a plan [of action]; he does not avoid delay and doubt. The *Art of War* states, "In employing troops [we have] only heard of clumsy haste, but have not heard of a clever delay."[99] I deeply fear that [Liu Mian] will overstep the bounds of [prudent] caution and gradually let an opportunity slip away. I hope that Liu Mian can be granted an edict [stating], "Recently the Uighurs had not invaded or harassed [the border], and thus we devoted ourselves to comforting and cherishing them. [But]

thirteenth year of Duke Zhao, i.e., 528 B.C.E. Legge translated the phrase as "Great happiness is not obtained twice"; see Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, vol. 5: *The Ch'un Ts'ew, with the Tso Chuen*, 649.

[99] This is a paraphrase of Sunzi, *Sunzi bing fa* 2: 4b, which has been translated as "Thus, while we have heard of blundering swiftness in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged." This phrase is immediately followed by the statement, "For there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited"; see Sunzi, *Sunzi bing fa* 2: 5b. The translations are from Griffith, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War*, 73.

now they have massacred people at the border and driven off stolen cattle and horses. We have already issued an urgent edict ordering their rapid expulsion. You yourself [should] calculate [what is] advantageous and act according to the dictates of circumstances. You must not harbor over-anxious doubts so that in every case you wait for orders [from the court before acting]. When the court bestowed titles [on you], we ordered you to be commander of the various armies. Border affairs are all your responsibility. From now on, if you wish to shift camp or advance your army, you yourself should choose an altogether convenient opportunity [to do so]. You need not always wait [for orders from Chang'an] to advance or stop!" I do not know if this is permissible or not.

Huichang second year, tenth month, seventeenth day.

[Doc. 45] A Memorial Requesting That 500 Cavalry Be Sent Forth from Hezhong to Ride to Zhenwu

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 14: 118, *LWRWJ* 14: 11b-12a, *QTW* 702: 9126]

I, [Li] Deyu, received [Li] Zhongshun's memorial requesting that he himself [be allowed] to go to the border in order to be near the bandits' [i.e., the Uighurs'] camp especially to observe the situation in person [so as to] take the lead in exterminating them. Since at this time the circuit's troops and horses are few in number, he has requested [reinforcements of] 1000-2000 cavalry.

I and others have deliberated [on this matter]. Because the [Uighur] qaghan, having shifted camp, has already approached Zhenwu, [Li] Zhongshun, who is brave in warfare, certainly can track him down. The region of Hezhong is tranquil; its cavalry has the established habits of the northern regions. [The soldiers] all anxiously await ....[100] I have long been fully aware of this. I hope that a cavalry corps of 500 riders can be sent out [from Hezhong] and that Wang Zongbu can be ordered to go [with them] to Zhenwu to accept [Li] Zhongshun's command. At present the Uighurs are enfeebled, and we wish to expel them when the time is ripe. In [such] matters, [one must] adapt oneself

[100] There appears to be one character missing here; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 200, n. 4.

to the situation. One cannot shrink from troubles.

Furthermore, I hope that 1800 rolls of silk can be bestowed [to finance this plan], of which 300 rolls [will be used] as generous rewards for the persons who serve to direct [the troops]. [We should] use stuffs from the Ministry of Finance to fill [this order]. [They can] estimate the expenses, deputize a principal, and [then] send [the silk]. I also hope that an interior commissioner can be ordered to accompany [the party transporting the silk].

If this [proposal] meets with [Your Majesty's] approval, I hope to give this to the Hanlin Academy [to compose] an edict to be granted so that it may be carried out, as well as an edict to notify [Li] Zhongshun and [?] Shouzhi. As for [Li] Zhongshun's memorial, I respectfully append it in an envelope. I do not know if this is permissible or not.

Huichang second year, twelfth month, tenth day.

[Doc. 46] A Memorial Requesting That Li Sizhong Be Allowed to Advance His Army to Baoda Palisade and Camp [There]

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 14: 118-119, *LWRWJ* 14: 12a-12b, *QTW* 701: 9117]

I humbly consider that this year in the eighth month it was arranged that we would wait for the various circuits to advance their armies and shift camp, and [they would] press the [Uighur] qaghan's camp; then Li Sizhong [i.e., Ormïzt] would lead numerous foreign cavalry to penetrate deeply [into the region occupied by Ögä Qaghan] and overturn his lair. In addition, since Liu Mian and Zhang Zhongwu claimed that they would not be able to advance their armies in the cold of winter, they requested [permission] to wait until the beginning of the year [to do so]. Now that time has [almost] arrived. I hope that Liu Mian and Zhang Zhongwu can be ordered to advance their armies simultaneously in order to strengthen [Li] Sizhong's cavalry. I am afraid that [Li Sizhong] ...[101] [should?] not be ordered to go to the Central City for Receiving Submission, [but should] be ordered to camp at Baoda Palisade. This will be rather secure and convenient. [If this proposal meets with Your Majesty's approval], I hope to hand this over to the Hanlin Academy to grant [Li] Sizhong and [Luo] Suitai edicts to carry it out. As for a draft of the edicts to Liu Mian and Zhang Zhongwu, I respectfully have included them in an envelope and offer them [to Your Majesty].

Huichang second year, twelfth month, twenty-seventh day.[102]

[101] There is a lacuna here; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 200, n. 3.

[Doc. 47] A Secret Imperial Edict Granted to Liu Mian and Zhang Zhongwu

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 6: 44, *LWRWJ* 6: 11a-11b, *QTW* 698: 9083]

An imperial order to Liu Mian, etc.

Since the Uighurs' homeland was destroyed, they have entrusted their fate to Our northern border. We consider that in a time of distress [i.e., the An Lushan rebellion] they often toiled and [put forth] their loyal efforts [for the Tang imperial house]. After the pacification [of the rebels], we contracted a marital relationship [with the Uighurs]. Righteousness urges Us to win hearts with kindness, to care deeply and love all equally. We have already transmitted grain to relieve [the Uighurs] and sent envoys to pacify them. We have manifested sincerity and extended graciousness; We have nothing to be ashamed of. But the wolves are looking over our border, the rats' heads [are poised at] Yunzhong [i.e., Yunzhou]. Having heard that we are prepared [to defend ourselves against them], although they shifted their camp [away] for a time, they [now] have availed themselves of a pretext to approach the border once again. Judiciously examining their circumstances and plans, [it is apparent that] they really do not [intend] to return [to their homeland].

We respectfully bear the responsibility of the Great Plan to soothe myriad households and maintain the precepts of Our ancestors. Thinking to order and pacify the black-haired people, how can We harbor a den of vipers at the Great Wall? [How can We] nourish venomous scorpions in Our bosom and sleeves? Taking advantage of their rush-

[102] *ZZTJ* 246: 7969 erroneously dates this memorial to the cyclical day *bingyin*, which was the seventh day of the twelfth month (10 January 843). The memorial itself carries the date of the twenty-seventh day (cyclical day *bingxu*, 30 January 843). This latter date must be correct, since the memorial itself states that the beginning of the lunar new year was near.

ing about, We certainly wish to expel them.

In the past, the marquis of Jin rewarded the merit of Chu and evaded Ziyu in three stages.[103] Ranming refused the favor of Qin and defeated Mengming at the two [ridges of] Yao [Mountain].[104] Great righteousness lies in pacifying the nation and sheltering the people. You should send an envoy [to the Uighurs] to counsel them and clearly explain Our wishes. If they delay [in their response], or if they still are devious, then you should separate into two wings to meet them, and advance with military majesty. We urge you to devote your attention to this excellent plan and to help bring it to certain fruition.

[103] This refers to an event described in the *Zuo zhuan* and dated 632 B.C.E. Ziyu was the *zi* of Cheng Dechen, a military officer of the state of Chu. He pursued the Marquis of Jin, apparently to the disapproval of the Viscount of Chu, who had expressed admiration for the marquis. The marquis retreated before Ziyu in three stages of 30 *li* each, to show gratitude for a kindness that had been shown to him earlier by the state of Chu. But Ziyu continued to hound him, and their forces finally clashed. Ziyu was disgracefully defeated. See Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, vol. 5: *The Ch'un Ts'ew, with the Tso Chuen*, 208-210. An interesting account of the battle between Ziyu and the Marquis of Jin, as well as some of the events leading to it, may be found in Kierman, "Phases and Modes of Combat in Early China," 47-56. Kierman points out that the marquis' 90-*li* retirement put him in an "unassailable moral position" in relation to Ziyu and the forces of Chu.

[104] This refers to an event described in the *Zuo zhuan* and dated 626 B.C.E. Ranming was the *zi* of Zong Mie of the state of Zheng; Mengming was the *zi* of Baili Shi, a man of Qin. The new Marquis of Jin wished to attack Qin. Some of his advisors argued that this was not proper since Qin had rendered a service to the previous marquis (the current marquis' father). But the opposing argument prevailed that it would be proper to attack Qin, and Ranming (then in the service of Jin) then defeated Qin's forces under Mengming, who was taken prisoner. See Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, vol. 5: *The Ch'un Ts'ew, with the Tso Chuen*, 225. On the two ridges of Yao Mountain, see Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, vol. 5: *The Ch'un Ts'ew, with the Tso Chuen*, 221.

[Doc. 48] An Imperial Proclamation on the Punishment of the Uighurs

[Editions: *HCYPC* 3: 14-15, *LWRWJ* 3: 3a-4b, *QTW* 698: 9076-9077, *JTS* 18a: 594, *TDZLJ* 130: 707][105]
[Translations: Chavannes & Pelliot, 298-300 (partial), Tsai, 129-131]

As for those who have been abandoned by Heaven, it is difficult to grant the favor of restoring what they have lost. As for those who have been rejected by men, one should employ a policy of scorning and repudiating them. Each time We think of this admonition, how could We forget the wisdom of its words?

The Uighurs recently presumed upon their own military strength and have long been tyrannical and proud, opposing the various tribes and arousing hatred among their close neighbors. The Kirghiz secretly moved troops and swept [the Uighurs] away; their vaulted dwellings collapsed. [The Uighur] race [at one time] was the most prosperous in the steppe wilderness, [but] subsequently their tribe has fallen among thorns and brambles. Now the qaghan has fled and lost his nation, usurping titles and setting himself up [as ruler of the Uighurs]. From afar he passed over the desert, entrusting his life to the [Tang] frontier. In Our deep consideration for [the Uighur's] decline, We subsequently granted them merciful relief. [But] whenever they submitted a memorial, they employed many deceitful and flattering words. Whenever they received Our envoys, they [treated them] as in the days when they were flourishing. They did not exhibit the demeanor of wounded birds weeping and wailing; [rather] they had the hearts of cornered beasts still fighting. Last year they secretly entered Shuochuan[106] and stole a great number of cattle and horses. This spring they made a surprise attack on Zhenwu, pressing near the city moat. The qaghan himself was completely in command of his picked troops; he took the lead in plundering, unashamed to wreak destruction and with no regard for our marriage relations.

[105] For a discussion of the discrepancies between the texts found in *HCYPJ*, etc., and that found in *JTS*, see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 206-207, n. 2.

[106] This is almost certainly an error for Shuozhou.

Liu Mian, the military governor of Hedong, formulated a plan to oppose and chastise them, and seized the opportunity to bring about a victory. He sent out foreign cavalry to serve as a vanguard. They seized the flags of [the enemy's] plumed marquises, captured them in their lairs, and engaged in fierce combat with short weapons in front of their tents. The most wicked ones were scattered while drawing their bows. Then the brigands mounted their six-mule [carts][107] and their horde [fled as] one body. We have already put forth effort to store up provisions [for a continued campaign] and [need only] plan the day when they may be seized.

The Taihe Princess' residence was not the same [as the qaghan's]; her affection [for the Uighurs] had long since come to an end. She longed for her native land and was in great dread; she frequently heard "The Song of the Brown Goose."[108] Having lost her position and in grief, she preferred to avoid the [sorrowful] sighs of "The Green Robe."[109] Our heart was often distressed thinking of her bitterness at dwelling abroad. Recently she renounced the wolfish [Uighurs] and once again looked toward the gates of the imperial palace, [wishing] above all else to relieve the past exasperation of the ancestral temple [i.e., the former emperors and empresses, including the princess' own father] and next to soothe the deep compassion of the [current] Emperor and Empress. She has returned to lasting repose, and We are most gratified.

Since the Uighurs have already been destroyed, righteousness lies in exterminating them. It is fitting for Us to order the troops and cavalry of the various circuits to advance together and punish them. The generals and officers on down who establish(ed) merit in Hedong

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[107] This is a reference to the Xiong-nu. According to *ZWDCD*, 16460, the six-mule (cart) is mentioned in both *SJ* and *HS* as a mode of conveyance for the Xiong-nu *shan-yu*.

[108] This is the title of a poem attributed to Xijun, a woman related to the Han imperial house who was married to the ruler of the Wu-sun people by the emperor Han Wudi. This poem can be found in Xu Ling, *Yutai xin yang jian zhu*, vol. 2, 9: 390-391. A translation by Anne Birrell reads, "My family married me to a lost horizon,/ Sent me far away to the Wusun king's strange land./ A canvas hut is my mansion, of felt its walls,/ Flesh for food, mare's milk to drink./ Longing ever for my homeland, my heart's inner wound./ I wish I were the brown goose going to its old home." See Birrell, *New Songs from a Jade Terrace*, 232.

[109] This is the title of a poem from the *Shi jing*. Legge has characterized it as "the complaint, sad but resigned, of a neglected wife"; see Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, vol. 4: *The She King, or the Book of Poetry*, 41-42 for the text and a translation.

will be rewarded liberally; [rewards will be] distributed in order [i.e., by rank] one by one.

Those Uighurs who have cultivated merit and virtue [as clerics] in the outer neighborhoods of the capital and in the eastern capital [i.e., Luoyang] should be constrained to wear the cap and sash [i.e., Chinese secular clothing]. Each [should be] parceled out to the various circuits, [which will] take over the management of them. As for Uighur and Manichaean temples, shops, dwellings, money, goods, etc., We will depute the Commissioners of Merit and Virtue, the Tribunal of Censors, and the Prefecture of the Capital each to appoint skilled and capable officials to manage the affair, making an inventory of [everything which is] collected. We must not permit all types of [unofficial] supervisors and wealthy persons of the neighborhood markets unceremoniously and secretly to take possession [of these things]. If there are offenders, they should [suffer] the extreme penalty; their money and goods will be confiscated by officials. As for the monks of the Manichaean temples, We shall depute the Secretariat-Chancellery forthwith to make an orderly record [of them] and memorialize [on the matter].

Alas! In the past, Han Xuandi encountered the Xiong-nu in disorder; he rejected that which was destroyed and strengthened that which remained. The *shan-yu* Hu-han[-ye] left his nation and submitted [to the Han]. He came to court and [then] guarded the border [for the Han]. The emperor thus gave him the grace of his protection. The *shan-yu* Zhi-zhi turned his back on propriety and righteousness, wounding and destroying his august [reputation]. The Han historians therefore illustrated his crime worthy of punishment. For these two barbarians, calamity and happiness were entirely of their own choosing. The four *yi* [barbarians] and hundred *man* [barbarians] should use this as a mirror [to correct their own behavior]. This [should be] announced in China and abroad to show the deep consideration in Our bosom. [We depute] those in charge to carry this out.

[Doc. 49] A Memorial Requesting That Troops Be Sent Out beyond the Mountains Once Again to Intercept the Uighurs

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 15: 121, *LWRWJ* 15: 2b, *QTW* 701: 9117]

Since the Uighurs already have been attacked and expelled, we should cause them to be [completely] exterminated. Now the qaghan is in

dire straits, and we certainly can capture him. If by any chance he suddenly passes through and enters [the territory of] the Black Carts tribe, I do fear that this will lengthen the time [required to capture him]. [It would] weary our army and be expensive. I hope that a decree can quickly be issued to [Li] Zhongshun ordering him to advance his troops beyond the mountains to intercept the Uighurs on their way to the Black Carts. I fear that since Zhenwu's troops and horses are few in number, [we should] then order He Qingchao to lead the 500 Sha-tuo cavalry and 1000 cavalry from Yi[zhou][b] and Ding[zhou] which were subordinate to Li Sizhong, and go [with them] together with [Li Zhongshun]. If they reach the foreigners north of the Yin Mountains and realize that the Uighurs are still in their old habitat, then [we should] order them to advance troops from the north and attack [the Uighurs] from behind. Then [the Uighurs] will be assailed from both the front and back; there certainly will be none who escape. I do not know if this is permissible or not.

Huichang third year, first month, twenty-fifth day.

[Doc. 50] A Memorial [Concerning] Proper Actions for the Annihilation of the Uighurs

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 15: 121-122, *LWRWJ* 15: 2b-3a, *QTW* 701: 9117]

I and others have deliberated [on this matter]. The Uighurs are enfeebled; [success in] taking them lies in speed. We should bring about the completion of this affair altogether before the third month [i.e., before 4 April 843]. If Your Majesty desires to see meritorious results as soon as possible, [Your Majesty] should encourage men's hearts. Since ancient times, all [rulers] have offered rewards to influence the troops they employed. If we use this [technique] to promise [rewards] to the masses, people certainly will regard life lightly [in the carrying out of this matter].

Now, since [?] Jingdu[110] and others have gone to Youzhou, Taiyuan, and Tiande, I hope that a letter of imperial decree may be granted to each of these three circuits [stating that] if any great leader below [the rank of] commander takes the qaghan, he will be granted [the

[110] This person cannot be identified; he is also mentioned in Doc. 58.

title of] lesser general of the Imperial Insignia [Guards] and prefect of a large commandery, and [also] given 10,000 strings of cash [money]. If [such a man] takes an [Uighur] minister, he will be granted [the title of] concurrent president of the Tribunal of Censors, and [also] given 5000 strings of cash [money]. If it is a lesser general who goes far to capture an [Uighur] without official standing, then he will be granted [the title of] concurrent vice-president of the Tribunal of Censors. All rewards [will be granted] in accordance with this [plan].

Now the qaghan and his ministers are only four men. The price of giving these rewards will be only 25,000 strings of cash coins [i.e., 10,000 for the qaghan and 5000 for each of the three ministers]. This expenditure is only one-fifth that of supplying the army for a month. If [our generals] then achieve righteousness by knowing of [Your Majesty's] encouragement like this, the crafty barbarians will not escape them. I humbly hope that it will issue from the Imperial heart to grant a brilliant imperial order as soon as possible to carry out [this plan]. I do not know if this is permissible or not.

Huichang third year, first month, thirtieth day.

[Doc. 51] An Imperial Decree to Disband the Return to Righteousness Army

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 7: 56, *LWRWJ* 7: 11b, *QTW* 700: 9106]

An imperial order to Li Sizhong.

As the leader of foreign troops, [once before] you came to the imperial city in sincerity. Remembering your loyal submission, We [now] specially allow you to come to court [again]. Moreover, you have long admired Chinese customs, and desired to stay in the capital so that you might take part in guarding [the imperial palace]. Employing [the fulfillment of your desire] as a reward for your meritorious service, it is fitting that your Return to Righteousness Army [now] be disbanded.

The generals and officers, etc. [of the Return to Righteousness Army] have harmonious and righteous hearts, and therefore We should show them abundant favor. Moreover, We have heard that the various circuits, armies, and garrisons are still experiencing difficulty in obtaining foreigners to establish cavalry [units]. Since these generals [of the Return to Righteousness Army] are strong and experienced at shooting from horseback, they greatly surpass ordinary [people at these skills]. If they are placed under [Tang] military command [literally, "flags"],

this will be sufficient to strengthen the military outposts [which require foreign cavalry]. It will [thus] be suitable to divide them among the militias of the military governors of the various circuits, to be placed under their control. Then the [officials of] the circuits themselves can give them clothing and supplies; they gradually will become more settled and secure, and certainly will find their proper place(s).

[Doc. 52] A Letter to the Kirghiz Qaghan

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 6: 37-38, *LWRWJ* 6: 1b-4a, *QTW* 700: 9101-9102]
[Translations: Tsai, 155-159, Suprunenko, 72-74]

The Emperor respectfully inquires after the Kirghiz Qaghan. The summer days are lengthening; We hope that the Qaghan is resting peacefully. We soothingly approach the myriad realms and nourish the people [there] as Our own children, thinking to bring about harmony and effect the utmost probity.

General Ta-bu-he-zu and the others have arrived. We have inspected your petition. We fully understand that the Qaghan was born in a place under the Great Dipper and lives in a rustic land of frosty dew. In intelligence and strategy you are keen and effective; your abilities and determination are serenely heroic. Your majesty moves the northern regions; your fame has quickly reached the gate of the imperial palace. We admire your great achievements, which deepen Our regard for you.

The sacred virtue of Our [ancestor] Taizong Wen Huangdi[111] was greater than that of a hundred kings; his bravery and talent surpassed those of a thousand ancients. Within, he stabilized all the Chinese; without, he gained the submission of the hundred barbarians. In the fourth year of the Zhenguan reign period [18 February 630–6 February 631], the chieftains of the foreigners to the northwest came to his court and kowtowed, requesting that the Emperor assume the honored title of "Heavenly Qaghan." After that, an official imperial pronouncement was issued [to the effect that] all the chieftains of the foreigners to the northwest were to call the Emperor "Heavenly

[111] This is an abbreviated version of Taizong's complete title: *Taizong Wenwu Dasheng Daguang Xiao Huangdi*; see *XTS* 2: 23.

Qaghan." His governance of the barbarians of the four [directions] really began from this.

In the sixth year of the Zhenguan reign period [27 January 632–13 February 633], Taizong sent the envoy Wang Yihong to the Qaghan's own nation with an order that it be pacified. In the twenty-first year of the Zhenguan reign period [10 February 647–29 January 648],[112] the chieftain of the Qaghan's own nation came to court in person, and Taizong conferred upon him the titles of general of the Left Encampment Guards and governor-general of the Kirghiz (Jiankun). His tribute came to the court uninterruptedly until the end of the Tianbao reign period.[113] Thus, the Qaghan's ancestors already received Our nation's grace and virtue. Surely in the Qaghan's nation there are persons surviving from former times who have passed down this [information] themselves. We [now respectfully] receive and carry on [Taizong's] great plan, thinking to extend our previous good [relations].

Recently We heard that after the Tianbao reign period you were cut off [from China] by the Uighurs, who long hindered your sincere [intentions]. The Uighurs called themselves the favorites of Heaven and did not cultivate humanity or righteousness. Their reckless actions were cruel, and they oppressed all the foreign peoples. We know that the [Kirghiz] qaghans have been their enemies for generations, and [now] you have actually taken revenge, destroying their capital city and completing [your revenge] by establishing yourself as sovereign and expelling the Uighur leaders, who have all crossed over the desert. In recent times your excellent achievements and strong principles are without equal.

At the time when China was chastising rebels, the Uighurs meritoriously displayed their power. Successive emperors commended their great compliance and repeatedly favored them by forming marriage relations [with them]. Recently they lost their nation and fled, lodging at Our border. At the [very] least they should have come [to Us] early in their humble sincerity, to receive Our soothing touch. Yet they acted violently, increasingly harboring wolfish intentions. Beyond

[112] Although the text reads "twenty-first," both *ZZTJ* 198: 6252 and *XTS* 217b: 6149 date this event to the twenty-second year of the Zhenguan era (30 January 648–16 February 649). A note to *ZZTJ* 247: 7975 points out that in this letter to the Kirghiz qaghan, "twenty-first" is an error for "twenty-second."

[113] The Tianbao period ended in 756 with the abdication of the emperor Xuanzong (r. 712–756) during the An Lushan rebellion.

the Yin Mountains, they beguiled the smaller foreign [tribes]; catching us off guard, they came to raid and plunder. They threw off restraint and afflicted the border for four years.

We levied armored troops on a large scale and long wished to eradicate them. We recently ordered the military governors of the two circuits of Youzhou and Taiyuan to serve as pacifying [commissioners] in order to display Our comforting affection. [In doing so,] We hoped that [the Uighurs] would be penitent, and We still considered it important to be lenient and nurturing. But they treated the [Taihe] Princess with contempt and repeatedly intended to injure Us. Galloping suddenly toward Our border cities, they dared to plot robbery and thievery.

Recently Liu Mian, military governor of Taiyuan, could no longer control his anger and secretly sent out a detachment of troops [to attack the Uighurs]. Taking advantage of their self-delusion, he made a surprise attack on their camp. The barbarian horde was greatly vanquished, and their vaulted tents were completely burned. We have already retrieved the Taihe Princess and brought her back to court. The surviving Uighur troops, which do not even number a full thousand, have scattered for safety into the mountain valleys. They could certainly be seized within ten days.

When I see the princess once again, I am most deeply satisfied [by this turn of events]. Since the Qaghan is already [the Uighurs'] enemy, it is imperative that you destroy these barbarians completely. If embers are left burning, they certainly will give rise to calamity later. We consider that when those far away have heard of this, they will be contented and at ease.

We have heard now how the Qaghan originally received Our family name and became of Our own clan. The governor of [You]beiping (*Beiping taishou*), [Li Guang] of the Han dynasty, was unequaled on earth in ability. In early adulthood he managed border affairs, and his skill in archery was such that [his arrow] could pierce a stone.[114]

[114] Li Guang's biography contains the following anecdote: "Li Kuang was out hunting one time when he spied a rock in the grass which he mistook for a tiger. He shot an arrow at the rock and hit it with such force that the tip of the arrow embedded itself in the rock. Later he discovered that it was a rock, but another day when he tried shooting at it again, he was unable to pierce it." See *HS* 54: 2444; the translation is from Watson, *Courtier and Commoner in Ancient China*, 17. A similar passage may be found in *SJ* 109: 2871, translated in Watson, *Records of the Grand Historian of China*, vol. 2, 146.

After him, many of his sons and grandsons studied military strategy; for generations his was a family of commanders, down to Commandant (*duwei*) [Li Ling], his direct descendant through his primary wife. [Li Ling] led 5000 picked troops and penetrated deep into the great desert. The [Xiong-nu] *shan-yu* mobilized his entire nation to counter this, but none dared resist his awesomeness. Although he fell into [misfortune], his name terrifies the barbarians to the south and north.

Our nation has continued as descendants of the governor of [You]beiping, and the Qaghan is a descendant of the commandant. Because of this, we are of the same clan, and our respectful relationship is evident. We recently heard that the Taihe Princess was rescued by some of the Qaghan's soldiers. Since our nations are of the same surname, the Qaghan sent her to be returned [to Us]. It is clear from this that the Qaghan adheres firmly to his proper and righteous heart, and stresses the goodness of loving his neighbors. We are deeply moved to sigh [in admiration], even to the point of weeping. It pains Us greatly to recall how the princess subsequently was kidnapped by the Uighurs and [so] for a long time could not return, and how the official escorts sent by the Qaghan were all massacred. To this day We have not forgotten this.

We recently saw in the Qaghan's petition your inquiry after the princess, [in which it was said that] even if the princess had ascended to Heaven or entered the Earth, you certainly would find her. Now, out of outrage and alarm, the border general [Liu Mian] already has performed this meritorious service. The [captured] Uighur criminals will arrive any day now, whereupon they will be executed to show Our gratitude to the Qaghan. How much more imperative it is that the [remaining] barbarian Uighur tribes be completely annihilated! Then We will be neighboring nations with the Qaghan, and each will preserve his former border. Our good [relations] will continue, the people will be at ease, and our affairs will be conjoined as though of one body. After this, alarums along the borders will cease; bows and arrows will be sheathed. Certainly the various tribes will follow [this example], hoping for their own well-being. Knowing that our two nations will forever have a close alliance, they will believe that the Qaghan is wise and of course has calculated well.

Therefore, We have ordered President of the Court of the Imperial Stud and Vice-President of the Tribunal of Censors Zhao Fan to serve as the envoy carrying the emblems of imperial insignia, as a

response of deep sincerity. We pledge before the gods to preserve the great trust [between our two nations]. Our words are not duplicitous. Surely We need urge you no further.

Moreover, since ancient times, [leaders of] outlying peoples all have required documents of appointment from China before they could control a region. Now We wish to bestow such on the Qaghan and specially add a fine title. But since We do not know the Qaghan's wishes, and moreover have been [concerned here with] expressing Our feelings, We will wait until the day Zhao Fan returns to order another envoy to carry out those formalities, thereby extending [Our wishes for] friendly relations.

We also [wish to] inquire after [the health of] the generals and ministers of your nation. To facilitate the dispatch of this missive, We do not address their large number here.

[Doc. 53] A Memorial Concerning Translators

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 15: 121, *LWRWJ* 15: 2a, *QTW* 701: 9117][115]
[Translation: Suprunenko, 78-79]

Shi Foqing[116] and the others are all of the Uighur race, so they must have some feeling for their native land. After the Kirghiz special envoy arrives at the capital, I fear that they will not translate [for us] whatever he has to say that is not advantageous to the Uighurs, but will secretly report what has been said immediately to the [other] Uighurs in the capital. I hope that Liu Mian and [Li] Zhongshun can be instructed to select men who can understand and translate foreign languages, and who are not of the same tribe as the Uighurs, and to send them to the capital with the [next available] courier. I hope that they will be able to consult together and verify [everything] so that we may avoid falsification and concealment. I do not know if this is permissible of not.

[115] Note that the title of this document is not listed in the table of contents of some editions of *LWRWJ*.

[116] This man was probably a Sogdian from Tashkent, or someone whose paternal ancestry included Sogdians from Tashkent; see Pulleyblank, "A Sogdian Colony in Inner Mongolia," 320. His given name means "Blessings of the Buddha," suggesting that the Sogdian presence in East Asia was not entirely Manichaean. We have also noted that in the Uighur milieu, however, "Buddha" (*Burhan*) was used as an epithet of Mani.

Huichang third year, first month, tenth day.

[Doc. 54] A Memorial Offering an Account and a Painting of the Kirghiz Tribute Mission

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 18: 152, *LWRWJ* 18: 3b, *QTW* 703: 9141]
[Translation: Suprunenko, 79]

On the twenty-first day, I memorialized in person in the Yanying Hall that Lü Shu[117] and others had been imperially authorized to inquire about the customs in the Kirghiz capital and to compile this [information] into one *zhuan*. Now it has been completed; it seems to have been prepared rather carefully. I humbly observed that at the beginning of the Zhenguan reign period, because all the four barbarians came to court, Taizong ordered Yan Liben[118] to sketch the clothing and appearance of each of them, making a painting of them offering tribute. [Thus,] I respectfully ordered a painter to make a sketch of the appearance of Zhu-wu Alp Sol and the others, to be placed at the beginning of the *zhuan*. At the same time Your servant, not considering his inferior ability, wrote a preface to the account, hoping [to cause] the virtue of Your Majesty's gentleness toward the distant peoples to be greater than that of a hundred kings and [to assure that] the distant lands' feelings of admiration for [Your Majesty's] righteousness will be perpetuated forever. It is presumptuous toward Your Majesty. Prostrate in increasing dread, I respectfully offer this up [to Your Majesty].

[Doc. 55] A Letter to the Kirghi[z] King

[Editions: *HCYPJ fuyi* 1: 285-286, *QTW* 700: 9130-9104]
[Translation: Suprunenko, 71-72]

The Emperor sends his regards to the King of the Kirghi[z]. The season is growing warm, and We hope that you are well and content.

[117] There is no known biography for Lü Shu. According to Yue, *Taiping huanyu ji* 199: 783, he was a sub-director of the Department of the Imperial Library.

[118] Biographies of Yan Liben may be found in *JTS* 77: 2680 and *XTS* 100: 3941-3942.

Zhu-wu Alp Sol and the others have arrived. We have examined your petition as well as the matter of the horses you presented; everything is in order.

The King is the strongman of the Yin Mountains, the hero of the northern wilderness. Your entire being is replete with perspicacious strategies. Exuding sincerity and understanding, you have [won over] the hordes. Your fame is great among the barbarian tribes, and your majesty is imposing on the frontiers. You have specially sent an official from afar to offer famous horses as tribute; your sincere inclination toward civilization having been made manifest, your loyally-proffered devotion is most illustrious. When We went to the pavilion We examined your petition, and when We rested for a meal We sighed in admiration. When We regard your great loyalty, We would sooner forget to sleep or rise [than forget it].

Not long ago, during the Zhenguan reign period, your nation regularly [sent envoys] to come to court to offer tribute and accept official and noble titles. Imperial favor was bestowed, and [then your officials] returned home. Later we scarcely heard anything from you, and long regarded this as odd. We did not know that [in the meantime] you had been cut off [from us] by the Uighurs. Only when We read your [recent] petition [were We sufficiently informed] to commend your excellent plans. Having stored up weapons for many years, you seized an opportunity to launch a major campaign and quickly wiped out your grievance and anger, venting what had been pent up in your heart. Now that the Uighur camp has been leveled, the mountains and rivers of our [two] nations are no longer separated. Now that you have become a neighbor on our border, [We are again able] to examine your tribute and petitions.

We have also learned that when you defeated the Uighurs, you retrieved the Taihe Princess and sent a special envoy to escort her back to the imperial palace. However, We learned that while on the way she was kidnapped by the Uighurs. In your country, the King respects propriety and righteousness, and promotes them peaceably. You distance yourself from the ridicule and suspicion of those in your own tribe and respond graciously to the favor and trust of your close neighbor. You are thus so enlightened that We are both abashed and gratified in a way that is difficult to describe.

The Uighurs recently cited the loss of their country to approach our frontier and entrust [themselves to Our care]. Remembering their merit and their relationship [to Us by marriage], We aided and succored

them several times. But they never recognized Our graciousness, and gradually became more and more evil. They abandoned the princess like something worthless and cruelly raided the common people. Every day they sought a fight, and often stole cattle and horses. Wishing to preserve our previous good relations, We did not issue an order to punish them. Year by year, month by month, it became worse, and the border generals became weary of it. Each of them used good tactics and continually manifested extraordinary merit. They burned down [the Uighurs'] tents, and the princess was returned home. Slipping through the nets, [some of] the perpetrators of evil escaped, and [now] they look to see upon whom their remaining numbers can depend.

When the King hears of this from afar, We imagine that he will share Our deep feelings of gratification. Nonetheless, We still fear that among those [Uighurs] who fled and hid there are still cruel and treacherous persons. Also, We are anxious lest they invade your frontiers to take vengeance. The King therefore must sternly prepare and plan, devising excellent and clever strategies so that together we can devote ourselves to doing away with them. If we exterminate them root and branch, no [possibility] will be left for later calamities.

We urge you to continue your previous cultivation of practicing benevolence and being neighborly. Think of our mutual [relation], and do not speak of the distance [between us]. Let this constantly be your waking thought.

Since Zhu-wu Alp Sol is going back, We are not issuing a proclamation. As for other ceremonies and orders, We will send other envoys specially to proclaim them and comfort you. We thought that you should know everything.

[Doc. 56] An Imperial Edict for Zhang Zhongwu

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 6: 44-45, *LWRWJ* 6: 11b-12b, *QTW* 698: 9083-9084]

An imperial order for [Zhang] Zhongwu.

Zhou Yu has arrived. We have examined your petition and know that the [Uighur] qaghan, still suspicious and fearful, has recently moved his camp. You yourself control your army and have repeatedly suppressed the wild brigands. When the brave and majestic move, the heroic and proud all follow; those soothed by humanity and righteousness are soon followed to allegiance by others. Recently the qaghan

came near the border and made petitions, [but] he was already drawing his bow [to raid and plunder]. One hesitates to say that the crafty barbarians' wicked hearts still harbor unsettling thoughts, but just when [they seem to] gently submit, they suddenly run away again. After all, it certainly is difficult from afar to guarantee or believe in estimations of the barbarians' feelings.

In the past, [Huo] Qubing[119] deeply penetrated the great desert and there exterminated the Xiong-nu barbarians.[120] [More] recently, Li Jing again attacked [the barbarians'] vaulted dwellings and then captured Illig [Qaghan]. How much more triumphant [than theirs] are your military strategies! Your talents surpass those of the ancients. You should select strong troops and surprise [the Uighurs] in their unpreparedness. [Thereby you should] see to it that Lü Jia is beheaded for his duplicity and that Meng Huo is taken captive for following along.[121] In this way you could establish wondrous merit that will shine forever.

We have already ordered Liu Mian to return with the army; they have withdrawn and entered [China] through the eastern border area. After your own circuit has completed the meritorious [act of attacking the Uighurs], We will order him to return to guard [the region]. The matter of determining strategy is entirely up to you. You should, when the border grass is not yet green and the barbarians' cavalry is in distress, set forth and then destroy them so that none remain. Earlier, you sent out 10,000 cavalry and foot-soldiers to guard the border at the great frontier plain. Now, since the [Uighur] qaghan has entered [the region] which you control, he is already in your net. How can you still [keep] picked soldiers in camp, guarding useless land? They

[119] Biographies of the Han general Huo Qubing (d. 116 B.C.E.) may be found in *SJ* 111: 2928-2939 and *HS* 55: 2478-2489; the former has been translated in Watson, *Records of the Grand Historian of China*, vol. 2, 200-210. Huo Qubing was the nephew of Han Wudi's Empress Wei; see Loewe, *Crisis and Conflict in Han China*, 116. He was a contemporary of General Li Guang, from whom the Tang ruling house claimed descent.

[120] The term used here is not actually Xiong-nu, but Xun-rong. *Xun* is an element used in other names sometimes associated with the Xiong-nu, e.g., Xun-yu; see Di Cosmo, *Ancient China and Its Enemies*, 163-166. *Rong* is an archaic term for foreigner or "barbarian." On Huo Qubing's campaign against the Xiong-nu in 119 B.C.E., see Watson, *Records of the Grand Historian of China*, vol. 2, 207, as well as Di Cosmo, *Ancient China and Its Enemies*, 239-240 and de Crespigny, *Northern Frontier*, 368-369.

[121] Since neither of these two men can be identified, it is unclear to what this sentence refers.

should go back to your own circuit, combine their strength [with your other troops] and exterminate [the Uighurs].

Since your army is quite numerous, the expenses incurred are especially heavy. We have already ordered those in charge to disburse provisions [for your army's campaign] out [beyond] the border. You should do your utmost to eliminate the enemy in order to assist [in the fulfillment of] Our wishes.

[Doc. 57] An Imperial Edict for Zhang Zhongwu

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 6: 45-46, *LWRWJ* 6: 13b, *QTW* 699: 9087]

You have distinguished yourself in [military] strategy and have specially manifested loyal sincerity. Each time you set forth [an idea] in a memorial, it completely agrees with Our heart. Speaking or thinking of your strong plans, We do not forget them waking or sleeping.

Now, because [Liu] Congjian's illness has made him quite weak, We are deeply concerned that the generals and field officers [under him] will plot sedition and take reckless measures. The land of Taiyuan connects with Heshuo; the city and prefecture are empty [of troops]. We have already ordered Liu Mian to return with the army, to withdraw back to its original commandery. And since the remnants of the Uighurs have not yet been destroyed, precautions certainly must be taken at the border. We rely on your great talents to prevent any insult [to China]. Since all matters of guarding the border are committed to you, you should deeply understand Our concerns. We urge you [to devise] a great strategy for the control and management of the northern border, and thus serve as our "Great Wall." You should effect the destruction of the remaining goblins as soon as possible to everlastingly purify the isolated desert. [You should] assist in accomplishing this deputed charge and thereby preserve your reputation for meritorious action.

[Doc. 58] A Memorial [Stating] Why It Is Fitting to Attack the Uighurs

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 15: 122-123, *LWRWJ* 15: 4a-4b, *QTW* 701: 9117-9118]

I and others humbly have observed that only after Li Jing repeatedly attacked Illig Qaghan did he finally capture him. I hope that [this information] can be handed over to the Hanlin Academy to record the account of Li Jing in an edict, so that it can be made known to Liu Mian. It [should] proclaim, "Previously, when we had not obtained the [Taihe] Princess in doing battle with the Uighurs, the court's strength was somewhat inadequate [to annihilate them]. It was considered more prudent to let the matter go [for the time being]. Now that we have obtained the princess, [we should] do battle with the Uighurs again, [this time] exterminating them completely so that none remain to cause later calamities."

[Liu Mian should] also be ordered to select Tui-hun and Sha-tuo [troops], along with 3000 cavalry, and to arrange them in formation, as well as to dry and take along ten days' worth of dried grain and dried steamed cakes for the 3000 men. I have heard that at the border 500 coins will buy one cow; [he should] also be ordered to dry and take along [enough] dried beef for approximately that many men.

Then, arranged in order like that, [he and his men] should wait for [?] Jingdu [and?] the envoy from Youzhou to return.[122] Liu Mian [should then] be ordered to depute a reliable army general to go to [?] Jingdu and make numerous inquiries into [border] affairs. If [Zhang] Zhongwu is then willing to send out troops to attack [the Uighurs], he should thereupon yield to [Zhang] Zhongwu and not wrangle [with him over who will be the one to obtain] merit. But if [Zhang] Zhongwu is not ...,[123] [and if] his words are slow and meditative, [suggesting that] he does not want to go, then, as the grass at the border is not yet green and the barbarians' horses are lean and weak, the foreign army [i.e., the Tui-hun and Sha-tuo troops] must be ordered

[122] Doc. 50 indicates that [?] Jingdu had been sent to Youzhou. This must refer to his return from there, apparently in the company of an envoy from Youzhou to the Tang court.

[123] The text here is lacunose.

to make a surprise attack [on the Uighurs]. Certainly [then we will] see complete success.

As for the matter of the account of Li Jing, I respectfully offer up [a draft], humbly hoping that the Divine Brilliance will receive it [with favor].

Huichang third year, fifth month, fifth day.[124]

[Doc. 59] A Memorial Submitting a Draft Letter to the Kirghiz [Qaghan]

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 6: 40, *LWRWJ* 6: 6a-6b, *QTW* 706: 9182]
[Translation: Suprunenko, 79]

On the thirteenth day of this month in the council chamber, I respectfully received in [Your Majesty's] presence an imperial decree to compose a letter [to the Kirghiz] and present it. I requested [permission] to wait until Zheng Su[125] and the others had made a complete report. Now I have finished writing [the letter], and respectfully offer it up [to Your Majesty].

[Doc. 60] A Memorial Submitting a Draft Letter to the Kirghiz Qaghan

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 6: 40, *LWRWJ* 6: 6b, *QTW* 706: 9182]
[Translations: Tsai, 164, Suprunenko, 79-80]

Having respectfully received the [imperial] command, I have inserted the matter concerning the Jian-kun into the letter. Since I had not investigated this and did not know that the Kirghiz were the descendants of the Jian-kun, I fear that my words perforce were a crude sketch, and I could not have written about it clearly. Now I have changed and added to [the letter's contents] in accordance with [Your Majesty's] command. If there are places where the meaning [still] is not complete, further changes and additions should be made.

[124] Some editions incorrectly have "second year"; see Cen, "Li Deyu Huichang fa pan ji bian zheng shang," 222-223, n. 1.

[125] Biographies of Zheng Su may be found in *JTS* 176: 4573-4575 and *XTS* 182: 5365-5366.

My knowledge is empty; my manner of writing is superficial. Once again I display this [letter] before the majestic screen [in the imperial audience chamber]. Prostrate, I am racked with nervous fear. Again I respectfully seal this and offer it [to Your Majesty].

[Doc. 61] A Letter to the Kirghiz Qaghan

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 6: 38-40, *LWRWJ* 6: 4a-6a, *QTW* 700: 9102-9103]
[Translations: Tsai, 161-163 (partial), Suprunenko, 75-77]

The Emperor respectfully sends his regards to the Kirghiz Qaghan. General Wen-wu Alp has arrived. We have inspected your letter, as well as the 100 horses and ten falcons[126] that you have offered, and We have found everything complete.

The Qaghan is especially endowed with a courageous bearing, has a natural understanding of military strategy, and has spiritedly displayed an awesome might to pacify the northern peoples. You have swept away the vaulted dwellings of the Uighurs, avenging [past] wrongs with justice. You have guarded the [Taihe] Princess' felt curtains and have undertaken great things with dedication. Moreover, you have sent trusted officials of noble clans to come with carts and on horseback across the northern desert; famous horses and birds of prey from afar have passed through the shifting sands. Having shown the affection of those who bear the same surname, you are worthy of Our soothing decree. Taking note of your meritorious deeds, Our heart is deeply comforted.

We have been entrusted with the Great Plan to pacify the myriad nations. How can We hope to bring about trust and restraint, or to attain the brilliance of [Emperor] Tang of the Yin dynasty[127] in attracting tribute [to China]? We honestly fear that Our virtue has not reached everywhere. We are ashamed before the magnificent [example] of Han Xuan[di], who drew [to his court all peoples] without distinction. This

[126] The classifier used here is *lian*, "binding, bond," which was used to count hawks that were "sent as tribute, leashed to a perch or to a carrying pole." See Schafer, "Falconry in T'ang Times," 312, n. 4.

[127] According to Chinese tradition, Emperor Tang overthrew the tyrant Jie, last emperor of the Xia dynasty (traditional dates 2205–1766 B.C.E.) and established the Yin (or Shang) dynasty (traditional dates 1766–1122 B.C.E.).

is especially so regarding foreign peoples who separate the "outer" [i.e., themselves] from the "inner" [i.e., China] and are not granted the correct [i.e., Chinese] calendar. Since they do not practice the [proper] rites, how can they be properly governed? But we cherish the Qaghan's desire, as an allied nation, to preserve his original name [i.e., his relationship to the imperial Li family]. To carry out the Qaghan's far-reaching plan it is necessary to eliminate [those who would cause] disaster later. The [following account concerning] calamity and good fortune throughout history which have been written down are sent to you as an expression of Our utmost regard.

In the past, the problems of the *shan-yu* Hu-han-ye's state had not been resolved because of the continued existence of [the rival *shan-yu*] Zhi-zhi. [Hu-han-ye then] declared himself a vassal and served the Han; the [resulting] good fortune lasted down through his sons and grandsons. In the Later Han, the *shan-yu* Bi was secure because his grandfather had depended on the Han. He succeeded to [his grandfather's] title and petitioned at the border, [stating that he wished] forever to protect [the land] south of the desert.[128] Subsequently, peace was achieved along the northern border, and beacon fires long went unused. Then, in recent times, the Uighurs rendered assistance to China and became paramount in the northern regions. All the tribes followed their leadership, none daring not to submit. [Thus] they were at peace and content in their one corner [of the world] for more than a hundred years.[129] These affairs will be quite clear if the Qaghan considers them.

Now the Uighur race is not yet extinguished, but live between [you] foreigners and [we] Chinese. As for the Black Carts, they have long feared [the Uighurs'] might and have always submitted to them, anticipating that they would rise again [to power]. [The Black Carts] have constantly wavered between both sides [i.e., the Uighurs and

[128] Bi (d. 56 C.E.) was the grandson of the *shan-yu* Hu-han-ye who had submitted to Han Xuandi. Prior to taking the supreme title of *shan-yu*, he was known in Chinese sources as *Yu-jian ri-zhu-wang* Bi; afterwards, he was known as *Xi-luo-shi-zhu-di Shan-yu*, the "Southern *Shan-yu*," and even Hu-han-ye. These last two appellations reflect the fact that Bi submitted to the Han emperor Guangwudi on the twenty-fourth year of the Jianwu reign period (4 February 48–21 February 49) following a succession struggle within the Xiong-nu realm; see *ZZTJ* 44: 1406-1408 and 1428 and *HHS* 1b: 74-77, as well as de Crespigny, *Northern Frontier*, 227-242 and 251.

[129] The Uighurs actually were paramount rulers of the Mongol steppe for slightly less than a century, from 744 to 840.

China]. We should let [these] minor foreigners know that We have formed close relations with the Qaghan; then they will renounce the Uighurs and will be truly and decisively reconciled with Us. If they come to allegiance and make a treaty [with China], then treacherous designs and villainous plots will have no way to enter [their land]. Thus We wish openly to grant you an [imperial] appointment and make it known clearly far and wide.

Now, *Tängri Qaghan* is a former Uighur title which was granted by Our nation in recent years. The Uighurs themselves did not decide on this name. Now the Uighur nation has been destroyed, and for this reason should be despised and shunned. Because the Qaghan's ancestor came to court personally back in the Zhenguan reign period, and Taizong granted him the titles of general of the Left Cantonment Guards and Jian-kun governor-general, We would like to follow Taizong's precedent. You likewise should honor the wisdom and sincerity of your ancestor. Thus We will make you the Jian-kun nation, and will include this [term] in the [imperial] appointment, adding this fine title to show Our admiration and affection [for you]. *Jian* is a word meaning "imperishable," and *kun* is a way of saying "to have posterity." [Thus, together they] indicate a remembrance of your origins. Is this not felicitous?

We recently ordered President of the Ministry of Rites Zheng Su and others to set forth Our great plan to your officials face-to-face. General Wen-wu Alp and the others all understand Our wishes. We desire to conclude an alliance. What need is there to make a pact with the *jing-lu* sword or lift up the stirred wine?[130] The preservation of our [mutual] trust will be guaranteed by [this], its beginning.

Recently the Uighurs came to Our border and requested 100,000 of Our nation's select troops to escort them back north of the desert so that they could gradually return to their native land. They also asked to make use of a certain Chinese border city to recover from their exhaustion and weakness in order to plan for a revival. For the Qaghan's sake We completely refused to accede [to their requests]. Now the Uighurs are Our nation's rebellious vassals, and are the Qaghan's enemies. We must destroy them root and branch so that everlasting

[130] This refers to an ancient Xiong-nu oath-taking custom. The *jing-lu* sword was a "precious blade" of the Xiong-nu which probably had some connection to Xiong-nu religion; see Kao, "The Ching lu Shen Shrines of Han Sword Worship in Hsiung nu Religion," 223.

peace can be preserved. At this time that Heaven has abandoned them, it would be easy to attack and take them over. The ancients said, "If one does not take what is granted by Heaven, then one will suffer calamities [from Heaven]."[131] The Qaghan should take advantage of this opportunity to attend to the early elimination [of the Uighurs]. Until the Uighurs are completely destroyed, the Qaghan should take no pleasure in food or drink, nor revel in the hunt. Embolden your soldiers, fatten your horses, and do not slacken even for a moment.

It is most regrettable that we are separated from each other by the various foreign peoples, making it difficult for our nations to join forces. If [the Uighurs] should once again approach Our border, how can We once again postpone putting them to death? We fear, moreover, that the remaining evil ones may come to submit [to you], and the Qaghan would not be able to annihilate them. If you accept the sinful horde, if you receive those runaway vassals, if you take in those whom We hate, it certainly will open a rift along our border. This would be like your nourishing a poisonous viper; you would bring disaster upon yourself.

The year before last, the Uighur minister and others told the Chinese envoys that after Li Jing had captured Illig [Qaghan] there were only 20 or 30 persons in the [Türk] nation, but still it revived, and that although they [i.e., the Uighurs] were [now] in grievous peril, still they would flourish [once again]. If the Qaghan examines these words carefully, how can you not be concerned?

We have also heard that the tents of the Uighurs of He-luo-chuan have not been completely destroyed. We think that their cherishing thoughts of their homeland assuredly includes a determination to return to it. You should quickly flatten the tribes of that region, allowing none to remain. Once the success [of this venture] is made evident, [the Uighurs] should lose hope.

The Qaghan has already vented your righteous indignation for many years; you have made yourself a hero of the age. In regard to your place of dwelling, clothing, and insignia, they should all be changed significantly. How can you be content with your habitual ways? If

[131] This quotation is from *SJ* 92: 2624, which presents the words of Kuai Tong of Qi to Han Xin, Marquis of Huaiyin. The translation in Watson, *Records of the Grand Historian of China*, vol. 1, 225 reads as follows: "he who does not take when Heaven offers, receives misfortune instead." This is followed by "he who does not act when the time comes, suffers disaster instead."

you go along indifferently, how then can you overawe the northern regions and control all the tribes?

We cherish China, loving and nourishing [all] living beings. We continually fear that the common people are not secure, or that something will become out of place. Why should We wish to extend power strategies to control important wilderness regions from afar? It is just that Our destiny is to preserve Our peaceful alliance with the Qaghan. It is fitting that we share the same sorrows and joys. We wish to talk this over thoroughly. We expect that the Qaghan, after consultation with your generals and ministers, will reinforce this, Our sincere intent. On the day that this envoy arrives, you certainly will understand Our heart. Then you should immediately send a reply to Us. When this is done, We will send an important official with the [imperial] appointment.

The summer is hot. We hope that the Qaghan is resting peacefully. At the same time, We ask after the well-being of your generals, ministers, and those below [in rank]. To facilitate the dispatch of this missive, We do not address their large number here.

[Doc. 62] A Memorial [Concerning] Envoys to Youzhou, Zhen[zhou], and Wei[zhou][b]

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 15: 124, *LWRWJ* 15: 6b-7a, *QTW* 701: 9119]

Since the autumn winds have already come, we are about to discuss the advancement of troops. [The army of] Youzhou should seize the [Uighur] qaghan as soon as possible. [The armies of] Zhen[zhou] and Wei[zhou] should quickly pacify Liu Zhen. It is necessary that an envoy be sent to each [of these three places] with an imperial decree. [This envoy also] will secretly inquire into the military affairs of [these] three garrisons ....[132]

Huichang third year, seventh month, eleventh day.

[132] The remainder of the text is concerned with other issues unrelated to the Uighur crisis, and so has not been translated here.

[Doc. 63] An Imperial Decree [Appointing] Li Hui as Pacification [Commissioner] for Three Circuits

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 7: 56-57, *LWRWJ* 7: 12a-12b, *QTW* 700: 9107]

An imperial order.

The Chengde Army and Wei-Bo have each sent out armored troops which have arrived near the brigands' border [i.e., near the border of Zhaoyi]. The autumn weather has already come; this is the time to attack [Liu Zhen]. [Wang] Yuankui[133] and [He] Hongjing[134] have prepared an excellent plan of attack that certainly will be successful. You certainly should employ an envoy to inquire from afar into [their] admirable plan.

Moreover, although the Uighurs have already fled [from the border], their remnants still exist. Now the north wind has begun [to blow] strongly and the border grass is withering. Still, We are concerned that We have not yet rid [Ourself] of the owl's shriek. [The Uighurs] dare to look back wolfishly [toward the border] and, oppressed by famine, they again have harassed Our border cities. [Zhang] Zhongwu long has desired to destroy them utterly. To [bring about] the completion of his determined project and strengthen his power and influence is the charge of Our envoy, who goes to convey Our intention.

Each of you should be determined and stern, and establish special merit as soon as possible. [Those who have] left military service [may be] rewarded to return [to active duty]. [You should] avoid waiting until the depths of winter to put a stop to the fighting and suppress evil. Now is the time to extend the utmost [effort to bring about] a period of long-lasting humaneness. Your commanders [hereby] are ordered to assist Our deputy.

It is fitting that We order Vice-President of the Ministry of Justice and Vice-President of the Tribunal of Censors Li Hui to serve as pacification [commissioner] for the circuits of Youzhou, Zhen[zhou], and Wei[zhou][b].

[133] Biographies of Wang Yuankui may be found in *JTS* 142: 3888-3889 and *XTS* 211: 5961.

[134] Biographies of He Hongjing may be found in *JTS* 181: 4688 and *XTS* 210: 5937.

[Doc. 64] A Memorial Requesting That an Imperial Edict Be Granted to [Zhang] Zhongwu

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 15: 127, *LWRWJ* 15: 9b-10a, *QTW* 701: 9121]

I and others have been informed by Li Hui that [Zhang] Zhongwu doubted that Liu Zhen had [committed] any [real] criminal offense. [But] when he was told of [Liu] Congjian's accumulated evils and excesses by Li Hui, he announced that if the criminal charges were of this nature, then the court certainly should execute [Liu Zhen]. I and others have deliberated [on this matter]. Because he carries out border affairs, we hope that [Zhang] Zhongwu may be granted a letter proclaiming our deep thoughts. It should say, "....[135] You should quickly order the various foreign tribes together to destroy the [Uighur] qaghan. You alone have established merit along the northern border. Liu Zhen certainly will destroy himself. We will record your meritorious service and order rewards for you; We will place your circuit first [above all others]. You should deeply understand Our concerns and further exhibit [that understanding] to your high-ranking military officers."

If this meets with [Your Majesty's] approval, I hope that the Hanlin Academy can be charged with approximating these ideas in a written edict. I do not know if this is permissible or not.

Huichang third year, ninth month, second day.[136]

[Doc. 65] A Memorial Discussing What Should Be Done about the Uighurs

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 17: 147-148, *LWRWJ* 17: 10b-11b, *QTW* 703: 9139]

Ever since Liu Zhen was pacified, I have long desired to memorialize requesting that an interior imperial commissioner who knows the circumstances be sent with a proclamation to [Zhang] Zhongwu, ordering

[135] The omitted section of this text concerns Liu Zhen and contains nothing relevant to this study.

[136] The text in *LWRWJ* carries a date corresponding to 1 October 843, two days later than the date given in *HCYPJ*.

him to destroy as soon as possible the barbarians which still remain, and to find out what [Zhang] Zhongwu had to say after observing the pacification of Liu Zhen. Twice [before], because many things were discussed in the Yanying [Hall], I did not get to make [such] a statement in a memorial.

Yesterday the memorialist Lun Boyan came and passed [Zhang] Zhongwu's words on to me. He recently has obtained some news of the Uighurs. Their people are not at all of one mind. The qaghan desires to attach himself to Anxi, [but] the common people of his tribe all say, "Our kindred are all present [here]; we wish to go southward to the nation [of China]." They also say, "We have not found a [proper] place with the Shi-wei. According to the circumstances of the time, we should submit [to the Tang]. If we do not, we will destroy one another."

I humbly hope that this opportunity can be taken to specially send an official at the Emperor's disposition—one with talent and discernment—to serve as an envoy [to Youzhou]. At the same time, I hope that an edict may be granted to [Zhang] Zhongwu, saying, "Liu Zhen has been pacified and all under Heaven is without [troublesome] affairs, except that remnants of the barbarians have not been destroyed. [This one matter] often vexes the Emperor's mind. You, Zhongwu, still bear [the title and responsibilities of] northern chastisement commissioner, so you should finish off the remaining barbarians for the sake of the nation. When this task has been completed, you will have surpassed Zhen[zhou] and Wei[zhou][b] [in merit]. The court will [then] certainly reward you with the utmost generosity and reverence."

I believe that [Zhang] Zhongwu covets the merit established by the two circuits [of Zhenzhou and Weizhou in the pacification of Liu Zhen] as well as the favor and rank [their leaders] were granted. Moreover, he knows that within the court [i.e., nation] there are no dastardly men [for him to pacify to earn such merit]. It is sufficient that he defend the border. [Zhang] Zhongwu is a man who sees opportunities; he certainly will think to exert his strength [to accomplish the destruction of the Uighurs and thereby achieve merit]. If he is ordered to effect the submission [of the Uighurs] by any means within the year, and at the same time to indicate that the [Uighur] qaghan will be treated favorably, [this] certainly will bring [the Uighurs] to their proper place.

Since our nation has long been enemies with the Uighurs, our [mutual] recrimination is deep. Although just now we have ceased

hostilities, we [still] must have a prepared strategy. Now, if we can cause them to submit, that above all would be advantageous.

I have respectfully memorialized with a secret memorial. I hope that this memorial will be kept within [the palace] and not let out [for others to see].

[Doc. 66] A Memorial Submitting a Draft Letter to the Kirghiz [Qaghan]

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 6: 42, *LWRWJ* 6: 8b-9a, *QTW* 706: 9183]
[Translations: Tsai, 167-168, Suprunenko, 80]

The above is what I have written in respectful [compliance] with [Your Majesty's] order. I have discussed in detail each item of their petition and replied to them one by one, not omitting anything. At the same time, I have not written in literary language, so that their delegates can understand it easily. When the time comes to confer imperial appointment [on the Kirghiz qaghan], we must insist that they declare themselves vassals, and must say that the rites for the imperial appointment should be according to the Uighur precedent. If they make additional demands, then they must wait until the court appoints another envoy and bestows other documents. This would be a more satisfactory [procedure]. I respectfully offer up [this draft letter to Your Majesty], not knowing whether it is acceptable or not.

[Doc. 67] A Letter to the Kirghiz [Qaghan]

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 6: 40-42, *LWRWJ* 6: 6a-8b, *QTW* 700: 9104-9105, CFYG 980: 11517-11518 and 994: 11672-11673][137]

The Emperor sends his regards to the Kirghiz Qaghan. General Tätik Iznanchu (?) has arrived. We have inspected your letter and the two white horses [which were offered to the throne], and have found everything complete.

The Qaghan came into the world under the Pole Star. Through your bravery north of the desert you have become a ruler. Your

[137] The versions of the text in *CFYG* are replete with errors and should be used only in consultation with other editions.

natural endowments sparkle like the Pleiades. Parting the Tianjie ("Heavenly Route") stars,[138] you have established a nation. You have an especially heroic bearing. Early on, We praised your ability to exercise widespread authority. We always have had high regard for your admirable plans, and for years have sighed deeply in amazement [at your accomplishments].

The letter which came [from you] said that after General Wen-wu Alp returned to your nation, Chinese envoys did not come. On the day that Wen-wu Alp left, We wrote saying that you should quickly send a petition, and then We would send an important official to confer imperial appointment. [Because] the Qaghan did not understand this idea, your reply has come rather slowly. Thus, although We wished to send an envoy to you, We delayed, waiting for your letter to come.

Your letter also said that the Stelae Road has become blocked. Because that region is distant, We have not been able to make a connection with the lands appointed to the Qaghan. It is not that there is any obstruction in sentiment between our two nations. We hope the Qaghan realizes this, and does not again become doubtful.

Your letter also said that our two lands send letters [back and forth], but we do not [fully] understand one another. Now, writing cannot fully express one's speech, and speech cannot fully express one's thoughts.[139] Furthermore, foreign and Chinese writing are transmitted and translated differently. The long-term preservation of good will in our alliance lies in simply promoting mutual trust. Why should

[138] According to Zhang Shoujie, the Tang-period author of the *Shi ji bian zheng yi*: "The two stars of the 'Heavenly Route' are located between [the constellations] Bi and Mao, and govern the nation's frontier. To the south of the 'Route' is the nation of China (*Hua-Xia*); to the north of the 'Route' are the states of the barbarians (*Yi-Di*)"; see *SJ* 27: 1306, n. 4. The constellations Bi and Mao were considered to be two of the 28 celestial "lodgings" (*xiu*) through which the moon traveled in its monthly cycle. For a Tang-era chart of the 28 lunar "lodgings," see Schafer, *Pacing the Void*, 81; for a map showing the location of the "Heavenly Route" stars, see *ZWDCD* 9525. The famous Han historian and astronomer Sima Qian incorporated nomadic peoples into his consideration of Chinese cosmological thinking, noting that the constellation Mao was that of the "barbarians" (*hu*) while the constellation Bi was connected to military engagements at the frontier and hunting; see *SJ* 27: 1305-1306. The "Heavenly Route" thus was considered "the cosmic equivalent" of China's northern frontier with Inner Asia; see Di Cosmo, *Ancient China and Its Enemies*, 305.

[139] This is a paraphrase of a passage in the so-called "Great Commentary" (*Da zhuan*) to the *Yi jing*. See Peterson, "Making Connections," 98, where the passage is translated as "writing does not bring out exhaustively what is said, and what is said does not bring out exhaustively what is thought."

it be necessary to use fancy phrases? In view of this, in our friendly intercourse you should always keep in mind Our previous grace and good intentions toward you, and not be suspicious. Then there will be understanding and sincerity [between us].

Your letter also said that you desired to do away with the evil thorns between our two pillars [of state]. Your words in this one matter are truly admirable. Because the Uighurs forcibly took possession of the northern lands and for generations were its rulers, all the [other] foreign peoples submitted to them for more than a hundred years. Now the Qaghan has swept away their vaulted dwellings and greatly avenged your grievances. Your achievements already have surpassed those of past ages; your awesome presence already has caused the northern wilderness to quake. You certainly should devote yourself entirely to a far-reaching plan [to destroy the Uighurs]. How can you still leave some embers [burning]? The Black Carts do not [properly] measure their own virtue or strength, and dare to protect those hated bandits. This is an insult to the Qaghan. They alone do not face toward the civilizing influence. If this is tolerable, what cannot be tolerated?

Moreover, word that previously came from the Qaghan said that you were looking for and inquiring after the [Taihe] Princess, and that even if she had ascended to Heaven or entered the Earth you would surely find her. If you now put aside this matter and do not investigate it [thoroughly], how can this inspire confidence in Our breast?

We think that the Qaghan should take advantage of autumn's prosperity to send out your best cavalry to bring the Uighurs to justice for running away and punish the Black Carts for subsequently submitting to them. To take them would be as simple as picking up something that one has dropped. Such action would never have to be undertaken again. After this instability has been settled, will everything not be fine?

Your letter also said that you sent the princess back to Us, but not one word has come [back to you about her]. The princess was captured by the Uighurs only five days after she left the Qaghan. All the envoys you sent [with her] were killed, and the princess then wandered about in the desert for two years. Now this affair is long past, so We have not mentioned it again. But on the day that Zhao Fan left, We wrote down Our feelings of gratitude and happiness [over her return] as an adequate expression of Our solicitous thoughts.

We have also heard that this autumn you wish to move to the Uighurs' camp. By destroying their great nation and then occupying

their former place, you will thereby cause all the foreign peoples to be in awe of your majesty. The Uighurs would then lose hope and draw near Our border. This can be called quite a good plan.

As for your request that We send out cavalry to meet you at a [prearranged] time at the place to which you are going, since the Black Carts are still more than a thousand *li* from the Chinese border, in the middle of the desert, Chinese soldiers have never before reached them. [However], We recently heard that the Uighurs have long had a strong desire to escape to Anxi, and are waiting for the coming of autumn [to start out]. We could order the four border garrisons of Youzhou, Taiyuan, Zhenwu, and Tiande to send out troops along the major routes, in the expectation that when the Qaghan attacks the Uighurs, they certainly will run for refuge. If each [of the garrisons] is ordered to intercept them, then they can be killed or captured. For such coordinated [action] our armies will need matching tallies [for mutual identification]. We hope that the Qaghan will have complete trust and be of one mind [with Us].

We have already met with Tätik Iznanchu (?) in person in the three halls and have favored him with a feast and entertainments. In full compliance with your petition, We will not detain him further.

We subsequently will send an important official as plenipotentiary to confer imperial appointment [on the Qaghan]. Therefore, We are sending ahead this imperial decree in order that your nation will be fully apprised concerning the ceremony of imperial appointment, which is to accord completely with the way it formerly was done with the Uighur [rulers]. The Qaghan has begun to establish a nation and is becoming foremost among all the foreign peoples. You must exhibit the deep sentiments of a neighboring land, be faithful to our alliance, and take seriously [the maintenance of] propriety [in our mutual relations]. If thereby we can secure and pacify [the northern regions], who will dare not to follow? It is fitting that we have mutual empathy and work together in a far-reaching plan.

The spring is warm. We hope that the Qaghan is resting comfortably. We inquire after the health of your generals, ministers, and those below [in rank]. To facilitate the dispatch of this missive, we do not address their number here.

[Doc. 68] A Memorial Concerning an Officer of the Border Patrol, Liu Meng

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 16: 136-137, *LWRWJ* 16: 9b-10b, *QTW* 702: 9130-9131]

According to Li Hui and the others, the Kirghiz envoy said that this winter [the Kirghiz] certainly wish to go to the Black Carts to gather together the remnants of the Uighur qaghan's [tribe], and they urgently hope that our nation's troops and horses can coordinate with them. On the day that the Kirghiz envoy returned [to his native land], he was given an imperial letter promising to order Youzhou, Taiyuan, Tiande, and Zhenwu each to send out troops along the roads to intercept [any fleeing Uighurs].

I humbly consider that in controlling the foreign barbarians, the most [important thing] is to show good faith. We have already made an agreement for a certain time; we cannot allow any irregularities. We must send an official as soon as possible to make [the necessary] arrangements. As it happens, Liu Meng[140] wishes to go from Lingwu to Tiande and Zhenwu, and then take the Taiyuan road to the capital. Our military strength is generally complete, and our foreigners [who can serve as troops] are quite numerous. We need only order the preliminary selection and training [of troops] and the preparation of equipment. Since [the commanders in those cities] have been employing troops for several years, I expect that what they most lack are weapons. We should make preparations as soon as possible. We can still order replacements for all the northern armies and garrisons to make up the deficiency [caused by] the desertion of regular able-bodied [soldiers], and also to check carefully the Tui-hun, Sha-tuo, and other tribes and arrange them in formation to prepare adequately for the [coming] autumn. Moreover, each should be ordered to make camp in the strategic garrison cities within [the region of] Batoufeng until we have news of the Uighurs' intentions. Then they may intercept [the Uighurs] beyond the mountains. As for Tiande, the "thieves' road" threads through the Yin Mountains from the Western City for Receiving Submission to Zhenwu [with Tiande lying between those two cities]. If there are important roads which have been cut off or places

[140] A biography of Liu Meng may be found in *XTS* 149: 4799.

which have been blocked by trees or stones, [we should] get to work restoring them as soon as possible. Also, along the important roads [we should] dig deep city moats and arrange many pits to trap [the Uighurs'] horses. We must guard against the Uighurs abruptly entering our border while being pursued from the north by the Kirghiz.

Because the military strength of the two areas of Tiande and Zhenwu is quite small, I fear that we must provisionally attach [troops to them which have been] borrowed [from other regions]. I hope that Liu Meng and the military governors and imperial defense commissioners will give this matter careful consideration, based on accurate reports from their subordinates, and not recklessly make requests [for additional troops]. Youzhou's troops and horses are most numerous. We must not cause them to be arranged in formation [for battle, but should] wait until the beginning of winter to begin sending successive imperial commissioners to carry edicts [to the Youzhou army].

If this [plan receives Your Majesty's] assent, I hope that the Hanlin Academy can be charged to approximate each of these ideas and issue edicts to carry them out. I do not know if this is permissible or not.

Huichang fifth year, second month, twenty-third day.

[Doc. 69] A Memorial Presenting a Communication Sent to Me by Li Zhongshun, Military Governor of Zhenwu

[Editions: *HCYPJ* 17: 148, *LWRWJ* 17: 11b-12a, *QTW* 703: 9139]

Today a memorialist from Zhenwu, Lüqiu Hong, arrived and said that he had in fact received two men from the party of the captured [military] official of Hedong, Yang Weiqing, who said that the Uighur qaghan is 300 *li* [about 100 miles] or less north of Tiande. Yesterday I saw Li Sizhong's subordinate general Yan Yu, who told me [Li] Sizhong's thought that since the court will grant [imperial] appointment to the Kirghiz [qaghan], he [i.e., Li Sizhong] fears that the Uighur qaghan certainly will be jealous and will join his strength with various minor foreign [tribes] to intercept the Chinese envoy [to the Kirghiz]. He requests that Chinese troops be ordered to stop and wait at Tiande in order to meet the Kirghiz cavalry [sent to escort the Chinese envoy]. Only then should [the Chinese envoy] start out [on his journey]. Now [the Uighurs] have unexpectedly approached Tiande; this seems to verify [Li Sizhong's suspicions]. In regard to [Li

Sizhong's] recommendations [concerning] the border, Li Zhongshun himself has submitted a request to carry out all of them.

Li Zhongshun has also sent a memorial saying that a man from the party of the Uighur Alplïq Ha (?) (He-lu Ha)[141] has surrendered. In making his offer [of submission], he said that the [Uighur] qaghan presently has only 1500 men with him, with approximately 60 or 70 suits of armor and [only] three signal-horns and four signal-drums. Every time they strike the various foreign [tribes], they obtain sheep and horses, but in very small numbers. Subsequently, he himself separated [from them]. From this instance of surrender we can entirely reach the truth. Li Zhongshun was suspicious that the foreigner [i.e., the surrendered man] was deceitful and false, so he did not dare to memorialize [concerning the intelligence he had received from Alplïq Ha's man]. As for [what he did write in] this other memorial, I respectfully seal it in an envelope and offer it up [to Your Majesty]. I humbly hope that the Imperial Mercy will increase vigilance as soon as possible, in order to be prepared for unforeseen dangers. I [also] request that this memorial be kept within [the palace] and not let out [for others to read].

[Doc. 70] The Account of Cai Xi (by Li Qi)

[Edition: *QTW* 803: 10649-10650]

Cai Xi is, in his own words, an assistant general. The origin of his family is unknown. From their [known] beginnings their posterity, down to Xi, have lived in the Zhenwu Army [administrative unit] in the north. [Xi] was a student of fencing; he was calm and brave, and achieved distinction through his fondness for unusual strategies. At first, before anyone knew of him, he behaved recklessly. He got into a fight with someone, and [apparently] had killed him. At that time, since the [later] Minister of Works Liu Mian had been made

[141] The first two syllables of this name form a reasonable correspondence to Turkic *alplïq*, "bravery"; see Clauson, *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, 128. It has already been noted that Chinese *he* is commonly used to transcribe Turkic *alp*. Chinese *lu* (for the Tang pronunciation, see *GKWD* 926) is found in transcriptions of many Turkic names and titles to form the Turkic denominal noun suffixes *-ligh*, *-lig*, *-lugh*, *-lüg*, *-lïq*, *-lik*, *-luq*, *-lük*; see Tekin, *A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic*, 105-106 and von Gabain, *Alttürkische Grammatik*, 61. The syllable *ha* (not found in *GKWD*) suggests nothing in Old Turkic.

military governor of Zhenwu while serving as right vice-director of the Department of State Affairs,[142] he heard of [the matter] and had Xi imprisoned. [Cai Xi] was about to be executed by whipping, but in the night the "dead" man revived. Thus Xi escaped death; [instead] he was banished to do garrison duty at the frontier for several years. Mian [later] was transferred to guard Hedong.[143]

At the beginning of [the reign of Emperor] Wuzong, the Xiong-nu[144] violated the border. [The emperor] ordered that troops be sent out from [Liu] Mian's [circuit of] Hedong and from other circuits to attack them. When Xi heard that there was an incident at the border, he wished to avail himself of [the situation] to establish merit, so he escaped from the place where he was working and came to beseech Mian. He said, "In the past, Your Lordship spared Xi's[145] life. This [act] was one of Your Excellency's stretching the law to extend mercy, and it was Xi's great fortune. Now the Celestial Troops are attacking the northern savages. I humbly wish to serve at the vanguard of the army like a dog or horse. At best I would be able to repay Your Lordship's mercy; at least I beg to make amends for my own wrongdoings. Whether [the matter] concludes in life or death, [I care not]!"

After hearing this, [Liu] Mian considered him resolute and upright, and ordered that he be placed among the soldiers of the government army. When they reached Daning, they heard that the Xiong-nu already had entered the border at Zhenwu. At this time the Taihe Princess had been abroad [among the northern nomads] for many years; [the government troops] also heard that [the military officials of] Zhenwu wanted to rescue the princess. Mian was afraid that the princess would be taken by [the military officials of] Zhenwu, and for this they would obtain great merit. He schemed and planned, but did not know what to do, nor could his generals and officers come up with a plan. Xi then requested permission to pretend to be pursuing (an) escaped criminal(s) and so reach the Xiong-nu camp to sow doubt among them, causing them to enter the border at Hedong. Mian strongly approved of this plan, and so sent Xi on his way.[146]

[142] This appointment was made ca. October 835.

[143] The appointment was made in May 842.

[144] That is, the Uighurs.

[145] Here, and in a few other places where he is quoted, Cai Xi uses his given name (*ming*) to refer to himself.

[146] Probably November or December 842.

When Xi arrived at the place where the Xiong-nu [were camped], he spread the word: "Those who guard Zhenwu wish to kill you all. In Hedong, Vice-Director of the Department of State Affairs Liu is pacification commissioner.[147] If you do not shift [your camp] you surely will be destroyed by the forces of Zhenwu." There were those among the Xiong-nu who, having heard these words, hurried to Ningwu [to submit]. [The remainder] subsequently shifted as divisions and regiments, and arrived at [the area] west of Quyue City. They were already at the border of Hedong, [but] still were more than 200 *li* from the government army.

When Xi returned and reported to Mian, [the latter] wanted to memorialize to the throne [concerning the matter], but feared an imperial edict [requiring] prisoners as evidence. Xi again [acted on Liu Mian's behalf and] captured twelve prisoners and fifteen horses. The commander (i.e., Liu Mian) then wrote [a memorial] concerning the matter. After the emperor had learned of it, there were repeated imperial edicts ordering [Mian] to obtain the princess. Mian was distressed that the camp of the Xiong-nu was [still so] far away; he wanted them to come closer, but again could not [think of a way to bring this about]. Xi then requested permission to enter their territory with goods and provisions to entice them [to approach nearer]. Mian agreed with him.

Once Xi was among the foreigners, he saw the princess, who wept while telling him of the destruction of [the state of] the northern foreigners, and of their sickness, famine, isolation and danger, with no one to whom to appeal. Xi said to her, "The emperor is sagacious. How could the Princess not discuss entering [China for succor] along with the *shan-yu*,[148] and memorialize to the emperor concerning your distress?" The princess replied, "I already have discussed with the *shan-yu* [the question of] letting me go. He certainly will not reconsider the matter since he already has refused!"

After she had finished speaking, Xi requested an audience with the *shan-yu*. The high-[ranking] *tarqan*[149] said, "The *shan-yu* [now] is

[147] Liu Mian was appointed Uighur pacification commissioner in October 842; see chapter 4.

[148] *Shan-yu* was of course the title of the Xiong-nu ruler; the Uighur ruler should be called *qaghan*, but this is in keeping with Li Qi's archaic terminology.

[149] *Tarqan* was indeed an official rank of the Uighurs, and so is the only Inner Asian term used correctly in this source.

separated from his native land. While he is on the path of restoring [his reign], it is not suitable for him to meet with envoys. If you have a matter [to be brought to his attention], you may only discuss it with our minister."

Xi then met with their minister. The minister said, "We are sick and hungry, having fled from ruin. The Tang [government] does not take pity on us. Today a Tang envoy has come, rejoicing that there is nothing left [of us even] to comfort." Xi replied, "Since we did not know the news of [what had happened to] the *shan-yu*, we captured twelve Xiong-nu; upon questioning them, only then did we learn that you have been [just] beyond the Tang border for several months. Liu Mian, vice-director of the Department of State Affairs in Hedong, ordered me to bring ten camel-loads of goods and provisions to deliver to the princess, the *shan-yu*, and the chief ministers. He also sent an imperial edict commanding that if you are able to move southward, then it will be easy to aid those who are in need. Now your tribe is quite far [from the border]. Since [the situation] is like this, how could we have known of your thirst and hunger?" The minister said, "People are unable to comprehend legalities [when they are in such dire straits]. Recently we were starving to death and had no alternative, and so we committed offenses [against the Tang]. Certainly you have come today because of this, to mislead and kill us." He then pushed Xi out of the tent, ordered foot-soldiers with crossbows to encircle him, and said, "If you do not disclose the [actual] facts [of your coming here], they will shoot to kill!"

Xi said, "In truth, my nation ordered me to welcome you and show pity to you. If you believe me, then go [southward]; if you doubt me, then why not leave this place? For you foreigners, it will be too late for regrets! What benefit would there be in mistreating me now?" The minister said, "If we leave, what regrets can we have?" Xi said, "The *shan-yu*, who is a great foreign [leader], is a relative of the Tang [imperial house].[150] There is [between them] the kindness of uncle and nephew, and the strength of mutual reliance. If you have suffered ruin, it is only fitting that you come to the Tang. But if you enter [the territories of] the various petty foreign peoples and are held in contempt by those petty foreigners, how can this not be regretted?"

The minister then said, "We would go to the Tang now, but fear that

[150] That is, by marriage.

your superiors will deceive us. If you truly welcome us and encourage us to come, then swear a weighty oath with us." Xi said, "Generally those who take an oath are anxious and so there are myriad complications. Xi's oath-taking is different from this." He then stretched out his hands in front of the minister and asked him to cut off his left hand at the wrist in order to take the oath. His complexion was unchanged and his speech was quite resolute. The minister did not agree [to cut off Xi's left hand] and said, "Now, if you will cut open [the flesh above] your heart for me so that blood comes forth, and then drink it yourself, this will suffice to earn my trust." Xi then let blood flow from [the flesh] above his heart into a vessel and swore an oath, saying, "If I duplicitously mislead you into entering the Tang border, then may Heaven strike me dead – boil me alive and mince me for pickling." After he had finished speaking, he drank all the blood that was in the vessel.

The Xiong-nu then trusted him, and so shifted their camp to the valleys and mountains of the frontier north of Yunzhou, 60 *li* [about 20 miles] eastward from the government army. Later they were again deceitful and, saying they were going hunting, raided and plundered Zhenwu. They did not profit from being led to come [to Tang territory]. Xi had been at the savages' court for many days and feared that he would not be able to return home, so he lied to the *shan-yu*, saying to him that at Yunzhou and Shuozhou he would obtain more goods and provisions for the foreigners. Therefore he was then able to return home. He told Mian everything: how he had enticed the Xiong-nu to approach the border, how the Xiong-nu recently had plundered Zhenwu so that their troops returning [from the raid] were wearied and worn, and also how they had made no preparations [for battle] because the Tang [imperial] family welcomed them. [He added that] if Mian would obtain the princess, he certainly should take advantage of the moment and go quickly.

Mian agreed and ordered his high-ranking military officers Shi Xiong, Wang Feng and others all to go with Xi to the *shan-yu*'s camp. They surrounded it and soundly defeated [the Xiong-nu].[151] Xi rushed into the camp and helped the princess onto a horse. They came out ten odd paces; [Xi] feared that the government army would not know them and would injure them by mistake, and so shouted, "This is the

[151] In February 843.

princess!" Shi Xiong heard him and secured them with 30 foot-soldiers. The princess was sent to Hedong, and the whole of the affair was ascribed to Liu Mian. Furthermore, [Mian] had written Xi's name in a letter, which he promised to make known to the emperor, and also said to Army Supervisor Lü Yizhong, "If not for Cai Xi, I would not have come back alive!" His [merit] thus was known [to many involved in the incident]. But when the princess was returned to the capital, Mian was elevated to [the rank of] Minister of Works and Shi Xiong was appointed defense commissioner of the Tiande Army. Only Xi was not made a high official. The chief commanders who knew of [his role] did not memorialize to the throne about it, and also the princess ultimately was unable to speak of it. [Xi's] achievements and strategies subsequently were obscured and were not made known. And yet the destruction of the Xiong-nu by [the forces of] Hedong and the settling and clearing of the border dust up to now had their origins in the strength of Xi's strategies.

In the third year[152] of the Huichang period [3 February 843–23 January 844], Liu Zhen seized Shangdang in rebellion. At Taiyuan, Yang Bian took advantage of the situation and disobeyed orders, and [soon] was captured. In the fourth year [of the Huichang period, 24 January 844–10 February 845], Shangdang was pacified. Now it is the fourth year of the [current] emperor's Dazhong reign-period [16 February 850–4 February 851], and the Tanguts of Nanshan[153] have rebelled. From the second year of the Huichang period until the present, Xi has performed meritoriously in all punitive military expeditions. His achievements all have been noted in the records of Hedong. And when the Xiong-nu were defeated, he was foremost in the attainment of merit. But this was closed off from the ears [of the emperor] by others. Up until the present there are none among the high military officers of his division and regiment who do not praise his wisdom and bravery.

I, Li Qi, say that he is great! His merit and name have been obscured; it has been altogether this way. But when the ancients said that "one's rank can be set, but one's fame cannot be taken away," it is as though they were speaking of Cai Xi. Can it be taken away

[152] The text has "second year" (14 February 842–2 February 843), but this is an error, as Liu Zhen's rebellion occurred in the third year of the Huichang period.

[153] Nanshan was located where the modern provinces of Gansu and Ningxia meet.

from him, or can it not? At first, from the capital (i.e., Chang'an) to Luo-[yang], I heard [nothing but] talk greatly praising the merit of Liu [Mian] and Shi [Xiong] in the defeat of the savages. When I reached Taiyuan and heard of Cai Xi, only then did I realize that I had been misled by [others having been] elevated instead of him. I grieve that his meritorious service and eminence still can be suppressed. Does he not have [outstanding] abilities? I consider his diligence, which has been without profit, and for this reason have investigated the matter completely and written an account to tell of it.

GLOSSARY

(Note that words are alphabetized as if the hyphens were not present. For example, "Bai Juyi" is alphabetized before "Ba-xi-mi.")

A-bao-ji	阿保機
A-bo	阿播
A-bo-wu	阿波兀
A-bu-si	阿布思
A-dun	阿墩
A-dun-ning	阿敦寧
Ai Hongshun	愛弘順
Ai-ye-wu	愛耶勿
An Luqing	安魯卿
An Lushan	安錄山
An Xiaoshun	安孝順
An Yunhe	安允合
Annan	安南
Anxi	安西
A-re	阿熱
A-shi-de Yuan-zhen	阿史德元珍
A-shi-na Si-mo	阿史那思摩
A-shu	阿熟
Bai Juyi	白居易
bai pi qi xing zhi	百辟其刑之
Baili Shi	百里視
Baoda	保大
Batoufeng	把頭烽, 杷頭烽
Ba-xi-mi	拔悉蜜
bei	輩
bei yi	北夷
Beihe	北河
Beiping taishou	北平太守
Beiting	北庭
benji	本紀
Bi (constellation)	畢

from him, or can it not? At first, from the capital (i.e., Chang'an) to Luo-[yang], I heard [nothing but] talk greatly praising the merit of Liu [Mian] and Shi [Xiong] in the defeat of the savages. When I reached Taiyuan and heard of Cai Xi, only then did I realize that I had been misled by [others having been] elevated instead of him. I grieve that his meritorious service and eminence still can be suppressed. Does he not have [outstanding] abilities? I consider his diligence, which has been without profit, and for this reason have investigated the matter completely and written an account to tell of it.

GLOSSARY

(Note that words are alphabetized as if the hyphens were not present. For example, "Bai Juyi" is alphabetized before "Ba-xi-mi.")

A-bao-ji	阿保機
A-bo	阿播
A-bo-wu	阿波兀
A-bu-si	阿布思
A-dun	阿墩
A-dun-ning	阿敦寧
Ai Hongshun	愛弘順
Ai-ye-wu	愛耶勿
An Luqing	安魯卿
An Lushan	安錄山
An Xiaoshun	安孝順
An Yunhe	安允合
Annan	安南
Anxi	安西
A-re	阿熱
A-shi-de Yuan-zhen	阿史德元珍
A-shi-na Si-mo	阿史那思摩
A-shu	阿熟
Bai Juyi	白居易
bai pi qi xing zhi	百辟其刑之
Baili Shi	百里視
Baoda	保大
Batoufeng	把頭烽, 杷頭烽
Ba-xi-mi	拔悉蜜
bei	輩
bei yi	北夷
Beihe	北河
Beiping taishou	北平太守
Beiting	北庭
benji	本紀
Bi (constellation)	畢

Bi (*shan-yu*)	比
Bianzhou	汴州
biao	表
Bi-jia	苾伽
Bi-jia Dun Xie-jin	毗伽頓頡斤
bingxu	丙戌
bingyin	丙寅
Binzhou	邠州
Bo-hai	渤海
Cai Xi	蔡襲
Cao Cao	曹操
Cao Moni	曹磨你
Chang Zhao	常照
Chang'an	長安
Changhua	昌化
Changqing	長慶
Changshou Tianqin	長壽天親
Changxing	長行
chen (vassal, "your servant")	臣
Chen Tang	陳湯
Chen Yan	陳黯
Chen Yixing	陳夷行
cheng	誠
Cheng Dechen	成得臣
Chengde	成德
Chen-Hua	陳滑
Chenzhou	陳州
chi shu	敕書
Chi You	蚩尤
chi zhi	敕旨
Chi-xin	赤心
Chu	楚
Chunqiu	春秋
ci (bestowed)	賜
ci (shrine)	祠
cishi	刺使
congdi	從弟
cu	卒

Cui Juxuan	崔巨玄
Cui Juyuan	崔巨元
Cuojia	錯甲
Cuozi	錯子
da shi	大師
da shouling	大首領
Da zhuan	大傳
Da-da	達怛
da-gan	達干
Dahe	大和
Daizhou	代州
Daizong	代宗
Dajie	大界
Daming	大明
Dang-qiang	黨羌
Dang-xiang	党項
Dao de jing	道德經
Da-shi	大食
Datong	大同
da-yu	達于
Dazhong	大中
de	德
di	狄
Di-de Yi-si-nan-shu	諦德伊斯難殊
Dingan Dachang Gongzhu	定安大長公主
Ding-ling	丁零
Dingzhou	定州
Dong-hu	東胡
dongmian zhaofu Hui-hu shi	東面招撫回鶻使
dou	斗
Du Mu	杜牧
Du You	杜佑
Dudu	都督
duhufu	都護府
Du-luo-wu	咄羅勿
Du-lü-shi	都呂施
duwei	都尉

en	恩
E-nie	遏捻
fan	蕃
fanhun	蕃渾
Feng Ao	封敖
Feng Yi	馮異
Fengcheng	奉誠
Fengzhou[a]	豐州
Fengzhou[b]	鳳州
Fo (= Buddha)	佛
Fu (prince)	撫
fu (prose rhapsody)	賦
Fu Che	苻澈
fubing	府兵
Fugu	富谷
Fuguicheng	富貴城
Fujian	福建
Fu-yun	拂雲
Gansu	甘肅
Ganyi	感義
Ganzhou	甘州
Gaochang	高昌
Gaozong	高宗
Gaozu	高祖
Ge-kun	隔昆
Ge-luo-lu	葛邏祿
gengyin	庚寅
Ge-xi-he-hai-yi	邁悉禾亥義
Gongzhucheng	公主城
Guang	光
Guangqi	光啓
Guangshun	光順
Guangwudi	光武帝
Guiyi	歸義
Guo	郭
Guo Yi	郭誼

Hainan	海南
Han	漢
Han Wang Xin	韓王信
Han Xin	韓信
Hanhai	瀚海
Hanlin	翰林
He Hongjing	何弘敬
He Qingchao	何清朝
Hebei	河北
Hedong	河東
He-gu	紇骨
He-gu-si	紇扢斯
Hei Chezi	黑車子
He-jie	和解
He-lu Ha	合祿哈
He-luo-chuan	合羅川
Hengshui	橫水
heqin	和親
Hequ	河曲
He-sa (r. 824-832)	曷薩
He-sa (r. 839-840)	盧駁
Heshuo	河朔
Hexi	河西
Hexi Dang-xiang dujiang	河西党項都將
Hezhong	河中
Hongzhou	洪州
Hou Tang xian zu ji nian lu	後唐獻祖紀年錄
hu (foreigner)	胡
hu (measure)	斛
Hu (Tigin)	胡
Hu/Gu-luo-wu	嗢羅勿
hua	華
Hua Fengyu	華封輿
Huai	淮
Huaihua	懷化
Huainan	淮南
huairou	懷柔
Huaixin	懷信
Huaiyin	懷陰

Huang Chao	黃巢
Huang Di	黃帝
Hua-Xia	華夏
Huazhou	滑州
Hubei	湖北
Hu-han-ye	呼韓邪
hui	迴
Huichang	會昌
Hui-he	回紇
Hui-hu	回鶻
Hui-hu nanmian zhaofu shi	回鶻南面招撫使
Hui-hu nanmian zhaotao shi	回鶻南面招討使
Hui-hu xi'nan zhaotao shi	回鶻西南招討使
Hui-hu-cheng	回鶻城
Hun (= Tu-yu-hun)	渾
Hunhe	渾河
Hunhechuan	渾河川
Hunhezhou	渾河州
Huo Qubing	霍去病
hu-shu-lei	呼遬累
Hutuo	呼沱
ji zhi jue ting	即至闕庭
Jia Dan	賈耽
Jia-jia-si	戛戛斯
jian'ai	兼愛
Jian'an	建安
Jiang	江
jiangjun	將軍
Jiangxi	江西
Jiangxia	江夏
jianhui	姦回
Jian-kun	堅昆
Jianwu	建武
Jiaozhou	交州
jiaren	家人
jiayin	甲寅
Jie	桀
Jie-gu	結骨

Jie-gu-si	紇扢斯
Jilusai	雞鹿塞
jimi	羈縻
Jin (dynasty)	晉
Jin (River)	金
Jin Shan	金山
jing	獍
Jingdu	景度
jing-lu	徑路
Jinglue	經略
Jingzhou	荊州
Jingzong	敬宗
Jinshi	金石
jiu xing	九姓
Jiu-zheng	九政
juan (chapter)	卷
juan (silk)	絹
Jue-luo-wu	掘羅勿
Jue-luo-wu-jian-gong	掘羅勿薦公
Ju-lu Mo-he	句祿莫賀
Ju-luo-bo	俱羅勃
Ju-wu	居勿
Juzhi	駒支
Kaicheng	開成
Kaiyuan	開元
Kang	康
Kang Chixin	康赤心
Kang Zhiliang	康志亮
Kang-ju	康居
Kangxi	康熙
Kegong	克恭
Kuai Tong	蒯通
lang gu	狼顧
Lantian	藍田
Lanzhou	嵐州
li	里
Li Chan	李潺

Li Deyu	李德裕
Li Guang	李廣
Li Guochang	李國昌
Li Hong	李紘
Li Hongshun	李弘順
Li Hui	李回
Li Jie	李杰
Li Jifu	李吉甫
Li Jimei	李繼美
Li Jing	李靖
Li Jingfang	李敬方
Li Keju	李可舉
Li Keyong	李克用
Li Ling	李陵
Li Maoxun	李茂勳
Li Pi	李丕
Li Pin	李頻
Li Qi	李磎, 李谿
Li Quanzhong	李全忠
Li Rong/Yong	李溶, 李容
Li Shi (military governor)	李石
Li Shi (border official, etc.)	李拭, 李栻
Li Shidao	李師道
Li Shimin	李世民
Li Shiyan	李師偃
Li Sili	李思禮
Li Simo	李思摩
Li Siyi	李思義
Li Sizhong	李思忠
Li Xiyu	李栖筠, 李棲筠
Li Yan	李炎
Li Yansheng	李彥昇
Li Yantu	李彥圖
Li Ye (envoy)	李業
Li Ye (son of Li Deyu)	李燁
Li Yuan	李淵
Li Zhongshun	李忠順
lian	聯
Liangzhou	涼州

Liao	遼
Ling	靈
Lingnan	嶺南
Lingwu	靈武
Lingzhou	靈州
Linzhen	臨真
Linzhou	麟州
Liu Congjian	劉從諫
liu luo	六贏
Liu Meng	劉濛
Liu Mian	劉沔
Liu Wu	劉悟
Liu Zhen	劉稹
Longxi	隴西
Longyou	隴右
Loufan	樓煩
lu (savages)	虜
Lu (state)	魯
Lü Jia	呂嘉
Lü Shu	呂述
Lü Wei	呂衛
Lü Yizhong	呂義忠
Lüchiu Hong	閭邱宏, 閭丘宏
Lu-ji	盧級
Lulong	盧龍
Lümen	閭門
Lun Boyan	論博言
Luo Suitai	駱遂泰
Luoyang	洛陽
man	蠻
Mang/Pang	厖
Mang/Pang-ju-zhe	龐俱遮
Mao	昴
Mayi	馬邑
Meijiancheng	眉間城
Meng Huo	孟獲
Mengming	孟明
Meng-mo-si	盟沒斯

mi zhao	密詔
Miao Wan	苗綰
Miao Zhen	苗縝, 苗鎮
Mi-jie Ke-dun	密羯可敦
Ming (dynasty)	明
ming (name)	名
ming huang	明皇
ming wang	名王
Mo-chuo	默啜
Mo-duo Jiang-jun Di-lue	摩咄將軍諦略
Mou-yu	牟羽
Mo-yan	磨延
Mozi	墨子
Muzong	穆宗
nanmian zhaohong Hui-hu shi	南面招控迴鶻使
Nanshan	南山
Nanzhao	南詔
Na-xie	那頡
Ningguo	寧國
Ningshuo	寧朔
Ningwu	寧武
Ningzhou	寧州
Niu Sengru	牛僧孺
Pang Xun	龐勛
Pinglu	平盧
Piti	鵬鵜
Pu	蒲
Pu-gu	僕固, 僕骨
Pu-gu Jun	僕固俊
Pu-gu Yi	僕固繹
pu-sa	菩薩
Qi	齊
Qianfu	乾符
Qiang	羌
Qianyuan	乾元
Qi-bi He-li	契苾何力

Qi-bi Tong	契苾通
Qi-bi-yu	契苾羽
Qi-dan	契丹
Qin	秦
Qing	清
Qingzhou	青週
Qinzhou	沁州
qunian	去年
Quyue	屈越
Ranming	然明
ren hua	仁化
rong	戎
Rong Yu	戎昱
rou	柔
Rou-ran	柔然
Ruan-ruan	蠕蠕
Ru-ru	茹茹
Ruzhou	洳州
Sa	薩
San	散
san gong	三公
san shi	三室
Sanggan	桑乾
Sanhekoudao	三河口道
Shahu	殺胡
Shandong	山東
Shang	商
Shangdang	上黨
Shangjing	上京
Shangxuan	上玄
Shan-yu (region)	單于
shan-yu (title)	單于
Sha-tuo	沙陀
Shengzhou	勝州
shi (measure)	碩, 石
shi (poetry)	詩
Shi Foqing	石佛慶

Shi Jiezhi	石誡直, 石戒直
Shi jing	詩經
Shi Xiong	石雄
Shiji zhengyi	史記正義
Shijiabo	釋迦泊
Shi-she-lang	石舍郎, 碩舍郎
Shi-wei	室韋
Shizhou	石州
Shou-ye-wu	受耶勿
Shouzhi	守志
shu	書
Shu jing	書經
Shunzong	順宗
Shuochuan	朔川
Shuofang	朔方
Shuozhou	朔州
Shu-sa	署颯
Sichuan	四川
si-li-fa	俟利發
Sima Guang	司馬光
Sima Qian	司馬遷
Song	宋
Song Bai	宋白
Sui (dynasty)	隋
sui (years of age)	歲
Sun Chou	孫儔
Sun Fang	孫方
Sun Liao	孫寮
Sun Shuxiang	孫叔向
Sunzi	孫子
Suzong	肅宗
Ta-bo	佗鉢, 他鉢
Ta-bu-he-zu	踏布合祖
Tai	太
Taihe (princess)	太和
Taihe (reign era)	太和
taiwei	太尉
Taiwei Weigong *Huichang yipin ji* xu	太尉衛公會昌一品集序

Taiyuan	太原
Taizong	太宗
Taizong Wenwu Dasheng Daguang Xiao Huangdi	太宗文武大聖大廣孝皇帝
Tang (dynasty)	唐
Tang (emperor)	湯
tao	討
Te-le	特勒
Tian Ke-han	天可汗
Tian Mou	田牟
Tianbao	天寶
Tiande	天德
Tianjie	天街
Tie-le	鐵勒
ti-po	提婆
Tong	潼
Tongguang	同光
Tonghua	通化
Tu-hun	吐渾
Tui-hun	退渾
Tu-jue	突厥
Tu-mi-du	吐迷度
Tuo-ba	拓跋
Tu-yu-hun	吐谷渾
wang	王
Wang Chengzong	王承宗
Wang Feng	王峰
Wang Hui	王會
Wang Kedu	王可度
Wang Mang	王莽
wang shi	王室
Wang Yande	王延德
Wang Yihong	王義弘
Wang Yuankui	王元逵
Wang Zai	王宰
wang zi	王子
Wang Zongbu	王縱部
Wei (dynasty)	魏

Wei (empress of Han Wudi)	衛
Wei (empress of Tang Muzong)	韋
Wei Chu	魏楚
wei Jian-kun zhi shu si	慰堅昆之書四
Wei Jingxiu	魏敬休
Wei Mo	魏謨
Wei Zhongping	韋仲平
Wei-Bo	魏博
Weiguo Gong	衛國公
Wei-wu-er	畏吾爾
Weizhou[a]	蔚州
Weizhou[b]	魏州
Wen Deyi	溫德彝
Wenrao	文饒
Wen-wu He	溫仵合
Wenzong	文宗
Wo-a-ni Yi-nan-zhu He	我阿尼伊難朱合
Wo-mo-si	嗢沒斯
Wu	吳
wu xing	五行
wuchen	戊辰
Wudi	武帝
Wu-du-gong	勿篤公
Wufeng	五鳳
Wu-huan	烏桓
Wu-jian-gong	勿薦公
Wu-jie	烏介
Wu-li-qu	烏厲屈
Wu-li-si	烏離思
Wu-li-wen-dun	烏厲溫敦
Wu-luo-si	烏羅思
Wu-sun	烏孫
Wu-wan	烏丸
Wu-xi	烏希
Wuyuan	五原
Wuzong	武宗
Wuzong shilu	武宗實錄
Xi (= Tatabï)	奚

Xi Shouxiangcheng	西受降城
Xi Xia	西夏
Xia	夏
Xia-jia-si	黠戛斯
Xia-jia-si *guo wang*	黠戛斯王國
xian	縣
Xian'an	咸安
Xian-bei	鮮卑
Xian'e	仙娥
Xiang (duke)	襄
xiang (minister)	相
xiang (wing)	廂, 相
Xiangyang	襄陽
Xianzong	憲宗
Xiao	蕭
Xiao Wangzhi	蕭望之
xiao yin	梟音
Xiazhou	夏州
Xichuan	西川
Xie-die	跕跌
xie-gan-jia-si	頡干伽思
Xie-li	頡利
xie-li-fa	頡利發
xie-yu-jia-si	頡于伽思
Xijun	細君
Xi-luo-shi-zhu-di	醯落尸逐鞮
xin	信
Xincheng	新城
Xingtang	興唐
xingwei	辛未
Xiong-nu	匈奴
Xiongwu	雄武
xiu	宿
Xi-wen	習聞
Xi-wu	悉勿
Xi-ye-wu	奚邪勿
Xizhou	西州
Xuancheng	宣城
Xuandi	宣帝

Xuanye	玄曄
Xuanyuan	軒轅
Xuanzheng	宣政
Xuanzhou	宣州
Xuanzong (r. 712-756)	玄宗
Xuanzong (r. 846-859)	宣宗
Xue-yan-tuo	薛延陀
Xun-rong	獯戎
Xun-yu	獯鬻
Xun-zhou	獯粥
Xu-Ru	徐洳
Xuzhou	許州
Yaizhou	崖州
Yan Liben	閻立本
Yan tie lun	鹽鐵論
Yan Yu	閻顗
Yang Bian	楊弁
Yang Guan	楊觀
Yang Weiqing	楊惟清
Yang'an	陽安
Yangzhou	楊州
Yangzi	揚子
Yan-tuo	延陀
Yanying	延英
Yanzhou	鹽州
Yao	崤
Yao-luo-ge	藥羅葛
Yao-luo-ge Yuan-zheng	藥羅葛元政
Ye-hu	葉護
Ye-lü	耶律
yi (draft)	意
yi (foreigner, "barbarian")	夷
yi (righteousness)	義
Yi jing	易經
yi xing bai pi	儀刑百辟
yi xing Wen Wang	儀刑文王
Yichang	義昌
Yicheng	義成

Yi-Di	夷狄
Yi-mi-ni-shu-si-li-bi	乙彌泥孰俟利苾
Yin (dynasty)	殷
Yin (mountains)	陰
Yi-nan-zhu Mi-jia Di-luc	伊難朱密伽諦略
Ying	潁
Yingwu Chengming	英武誠明
Yingwu Weiyuan	英武威遠
Yingyi Jiangong	英義建功
Yining	義寧
Yinshan dao	陰山道
Yinzhou	銀州
Yiwu	義武
Yiyang	義陽
Yi-yin	逸隱
yi-zhi-zi	伊秩訾
Yizhou[a]	儀州
Yizhou[b]	易州
Yizhou (Hami)	伊州
Yizong	懿宗
Yongle	永樂
Yongxi	雍熙
Youbeiping	右北平
Youzhou	幽州
Yuanhe	元和
Yuan-yin-suo-yi-han-a-yi-shi	元因娑拽汗阿已時
Yuezhou	越州
Yu-jian ri-zhu-wang	蒽鞬日逐王
Yu-jie Yi A-dan Gan-si Mo-he Da-gan	於解亦阿毓干思莫賀達干
Yunjiaguan	雲迦關
Yunzhong	雲中
Yunzhou	雲州
Yuyang	漁陽
Ze-Lu	澤潞
Zhang Jia	張賈
Zhang Renyuan	張仁愿
Zhang Shoujie	張守節

Zhang Weiqing	張惟清
Zhang Xianjie	張獻節
Zhang Zhongwu	張仲武
Zhang Zhongzhi	張仲至
Zhangjing	章敬
Zhangxin	章信
Zhao (duke)	昭
zhao (edict)	詔
Zhao (state)	趙
Zhao Fan	趙蕃
Zhao Jinyong	趙進用
zhao shu	詔書
zhaofu Hui-hu shi	招撫回鶻使
Zhaoli	昭禮
Zhaowu	昭武
Zhaoyi	昭義
Zheng	鄭
Zheng Kang	正鋼
Zheng Su	鄭肅
Zheng Ya	鄭亞
Zhenguan	貞觀
Zheng-Xu	鄭許
Zhengzhou	鄭州
Zhenning	真寧
Zhenwu	振武
Zhenyuan	真源
Zhenzhou	鎮州
Zhexi	浙西
zhi	制
Zhijing	志淨
Zhi-zhi Gu-du-hou	郅支骨都侯
zhong	忠
Zhong Shanfu	仲山甫
Zhongguo zhi qin	中國至親
Zhongyi	忠義
Zhongyi Bi-jia	忠義毗伽
Zhou Bao	周寶
Zhou Huaiyi	周懷義，周懷乂，周懷乂
Zhou yi	周易

Zhou Yu	周瑜
zhuan	傳
Zhuang (duke)	莊
zhuang (memorial)	狀
Zhuangzong	莊宗
Zhu-luo-gu A-die	諸洛固阿跌
Zhu-wu He Su/Suo	注吾合素/索
Zhu-ye Chi-xin	朱邪赤心
Zhu-ye Chi-zhong	朱邪赤衷
Zhu-ye Zhi-yi	朱邪執宜
zi (courtesy name)	字
zi (viscount)	子
Ziyu	子玉
Zizhou	淄州
zong	宗
Zong Mie	鬉篾
Zongying Xiongwu Chengming	宗英雄武誠明
zu	族
Zu-bu	阻卜
zuo	昨
Zuo Chiuming	左丘明
zuo yi-zhi-zi wang	左伊秩訾王
Zuo zhuan	左傳

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